



THE FINAL REPORT

OF THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION

(pursuant to R.A. No. 6832)

OCTOBER 1990

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PREFACE

In the wake of the failed coup of December 1989, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No 146 creating a Presidential Commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 rebellion and the involvement of military and civilian officials and private persons in it. Its members were Hilario G. Davide, Jr, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and incumbent Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as Chairman; Carolina G. Hernandez, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Integrative and Development Studies of the University of the Philippines (UP-CIDS); Ricardo J. Romulo, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, a practicing lawyer, and a business executive; Delfin L. Lazaro, a member of the UP Board of Regents, President of Benguet Corporation (Benguet Corp), and a 1985 TOYM awardee; and Msgr Leonardo Legaspi, Archbishop of the Diocese of Nueva Caceres and President of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, as members. The first four took their oath of office on 7 December 1989. Msgr Legaspi declined the designation. In his place, President Aquino appointed Christian S. Monsod, also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, National Co-Chairman of the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, a 1975 TOYM awardee, and a business executive, who took his oath of office on 28 December 1989.

In its Special Session of 3 January 1990, Congress approved Republic Act No 6832 (RA No 6832) entitled An Act Creating a Commission To Conduct A Thorough Fact-finding Investigation Of The Failed Coup D'Etat Of December 1989, Recommend Measures To Prevent The Occurrence Of Similar Attempts At A Violent Seizure Of Power, And For Other Purposes. It was approved and signed by the President on 5 January 1990, and it took effect on 12 January 1990. The new Commission, with much expanded powers, has since been known as the Fact-Finding Commission. President Aquino appointed to the new Commission the Chairman and the members of the Presidential Commission who then took their oath of office on 12 January 1990. A history of both Commissions is found in Appendix A.

Three Interim Reports had previously been submitted to the President and the Congress, namely

1. Interim Report No 1 - Observation and Recommendations on Military Justice as Related to Coups, 16 July 1990,
2. Interim Report No 2 - The Role of the Philippine Air Force in the Destruction of the Rebel Air Assets in Sangley Point, 16 July 1990, and
3. Interim Report No 3 - The Urgency of Legislation Implementing Military-Related Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, 28 August 1990.

The Report that follows is the Fact-Finding Commission's Final Report. It has seven chapters and 19 appendices. In order to provide a better understanding of the phenomenon of the coup d'etat, Chapter I describes it, analyzes its various elements, and discusses various hypotheses explaining why a coup d'etat occurs on the basis of other countries' experiences. Because a coup d'etat pertains primarily to the relationship between the government and the military organization, Chapter II describes political changes and military transformation in the Philippines prior to the failed coup of December 1989. Because a coup d'etat is primarily the handiwork of military officers and does not take place in a vacuum, Chapter III describes and analyzes the socialization process which the Filipino military officer undergoes to understand the possible reasons for his politicization, the domestic socio-economic-political environment in the country at the time of the failed coup, and the external linkages of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) which might have influenced its officers' orientations. It also provides some insights on the political orientations of purposively selected military units to determine their predisposition towards a coup d'etat.

In Chapter IV, the Report discusses the various coup plots in which factions of the AFP had involved themselves from the failed coup of February 1986 against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos which was overtaken by the EDSA Revolt up to that of 28 August 1987 to show that there is a continuity of the main plots and the main coup plotters. Chapters V to VII contain the core of the Commission's findings as to the coup attempt itself; the main plotters; the causes, both alleged and real; the Commission's analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. The

latter is not addressed solely to government because in the view of the Commission, events and developments in the country are a collective responsibility of all Filipinos.

The Commission prays that its work will be responded to with the same commitment and sincerity in which it undertook this challenging task. We wish to thank President Aquino and Congress for having honored us with their trust and support, the various government agencies and instrumentalities which extended their unqualified assistance and cooperation, particularly the Development Bank of the Philippines which opened its Directors' wing to us undoubtedly bringing considerable inconvenience to itself, and private organizations, particularly Benguet Corporation which responded to our urgent needs especially during the Commission's initial months in office. We also wish to thank each and every employee of the Commission without whose dedication our task would have been more difficult.

This Final Report represents the labor of many hands; the insights, introspection, and experiences of hundreds of Filipinos; and the Commission wants to believe, the patriotism and commitment to democracy by those who have worked and cooperated with it in the discharge of its task. Even as we have profited immensely from their participation, in the end the responsibility for the Report's errors and shortcomings rest solely and squarely on the Commission, particularly its Chairman and four members.

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I

COUP D'ETAT : AN OVERVIEW

The coup d'etat, or more appropriately, the coup attempt, as a politico-military event is a recent phenomenon in the Philippine political scene. The country experienced its first coup attempt only in February 1986, when members of the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) tried to stage one against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. That attempt failed when security forces loyal to President Marcos uncovered the plot. Subsequent events overtook that coup when the people staged the popular People Power Revolt at EDSA and successfully ended Marcos's rule. That popular revolt confirmed the election victory of and installed Corazon C. Aquino as the duly elected seventh President of the Republic of the Philippines. Barely into its fifth month of governance, the Aquino administration faced the first of seven coup attempts.¹ The most recent was the failed coup attempt of December 1989 which the Fact-Finding Commission was tasked to investigate. Even as this Final Report was being written, wild rumors of a possible eighth coup attempt circulated as a spate of bombings upset the peace of metropolitan Manila and sowed fear among its people.

In any event, the coup d'etat has become a hard fact of political life in the Philippines. Gone are the days of a military totally restricted to the barracks or guarding the borders of the State or building roads, bridges and rendering free basic medical and dental services. As will be shown in the succeeding chapters of this Report, notably Chapter II, the Philippine military over the years and particularly under the tutelage of Marcos, developed far beyond those traditional roles.

Local scholarly studies on the subject of military intervention, specifically on coups d'etat, from which the Commission had hoped to draw some ideas for a framework of study, are still relatively few and inadequate. As a phenomenon, however, the coup d'etat has been a

recurring experience that has haunted the majority of the states in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa since the 1900s. In these countries, the rise of the military to prominence in the political arena became the obvious outcome of a successful coup. Figures with respect to the number of coup attempts, successful or otherwise, vary from one author to the other. One author counted a total of 311 attempted coups d'etat in some 79 different countries during the period 1945 to 1985, 170 of which were successful,² at least initially. Put another way, these figures illustrate that "half of the sovereign states represented at the United Nations have experienced an illegal or unconstitutional overthrow of their existing governments (democratically elected or not) at some point in their recent history."³

Clearly, in global terms, "independent political activity by the armed forces is . . . frequent, widespread and of long standing."⁴ One author has noted that of the 51 states existing in or before 1917, all but 19 experienced coups since 1917; of the 28 created between 1917 and 1955, all but 15 had a coup.⁵ In subsequent years until 1980, 70 states⁶ faced a total of 179 coups.⁷ Thus, a total of 115 states all over the world experienced coups from early 1900 up to the end of the last decade.

By the end of 1980, the total number of states governed by men installed into power by some form of military action numbered 37,⁸ "representing 25 percent of the world's 150 independent states and comprising some 55 percent of the population of Latin America, nearly two-thirds of the population of the Arab states of North Africa and the Middle East and a like proportion of the population of sub-Saharan Africa."⁹ Notable in these so-called military regimes is the fact that two had chief executives who were civilians, namely: Uruguay, where the military chose to install a certain Dr Apriano Mendez in lieu of President Bordiguerry in 1976, and Iraq, where Saddam Hussein took over from Field Marshall Bakr.¹⁰

In 24 of the 37 aforementioned military regimes, executive power is vested in the military as an institution by way of a supreme military council.¹¹ There are neither parties nor legislatures in 15 of these regimes, while single official parties exist in the nine others. These 24 states are said to be stratocracies or "closed bureaucratic regimes with the military in supreme control."¹² As for the other 13 military regimes, they are said to be either mixed civilian-military or wholly civilian, where there is military presence in the Cabinet or an all-civilian Cabinet, respectively, under the leadership of a civilian president installed through a coup.

A. The Phenomenon of the Coup d'Etat

A.1. Coup d'Etat Defined

A coup d'etat is a French word which is more or less synonymous to *putsch* in German and *golpe de estado* in Spanish. It is a general term which describes a method of displacing a government or supplanting a regime through the use of military violence.¹³ A coup d'etat is "a direct seizure of political control by members of the armed forces, who may be acting in concert with civilian allies."¹⁴

A coup d'etat is both a political act and a military action.¹⁵ It is the product of a coalition of cliques and groups, usually including both military and civilian elements, who have been preparing for it for a considerable length of time.¹⁶ In this period of preparation, various groups of political actors will have been sounded out and their support assured or their opposition neutralized.

As a political act, it is an unlawful means of seizing power from the duly constituted government,¹⁷ and employed by the military to replace the political incumbents with themselves or their nominees.

As a military operation, the strategy is naturally of utmost importance.¹⁸ Coup plotters need to consider the elements of secrecy, surprise, and the effective tactical neutralization of the possible military and civilian opposition.

Generally, a coup is staged either by the entire armed forces or by a politicized group of military officers who ride on popular grievances among the officer corps against the civilian leadership.¹⁹ Politicization is the process by which military personnel acquire and develop political awareness and inclination to assume functions beyond the sphere of activities normally pertaining to the military role of national defense. Its extreme form is when they use the arms and resources entrusted to them against the very people and the state they solemnly swore to defend and protect. Politicization can occur at the institutional, sectional, or individual level.²⁰ In the case of the Philippines, it never had the experience of a coup staged by the entire armed forces. Chapter IV will show that the series of coup attempts against the administration of President Aquino were staged by a highly politicized segment in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

A coup has six distinguishing features. One, it is the effort by a political coalition to illegally replace the existing governmental leaders through violence or the threat of it.²¹ Two, the violence employed is

usually small.²² Three, the participants already possess an institutional base of power within the political system.²³ Four, a coup does not necessarily need the participation of the masses, or, to a significant degree, the participation of the bulk of the armed forces.²⁴ Five, it does not openly profess any political line or ideology.²⁵ The purpose of this, presumably, is to avoid any form of opposition from any political forces. Six, it does not happen spontaneously.²⁶

A.2. Elements of a Coup

There appears to be five essential elements of a coup, the most important of which are opportunity and motive. As a leading scholar on the military has pointed out, "to intervene the military must have both the occasion and the disposition."²⁷ The other elements are the military's capability to intervene, the strategy of the coup plot, and the leaders of the coup.

A.2.a. Coup Motives

No military is likely to intervene in the political affairs of its country if in the first place it has no disposition to intervene. Disposition here refers to a combination of conscious motives and of a will or desire to act.²⁸ Motive is a driving force behind men and women who are prepared to risk imprisonment and whatever consequences there may be, as a result of an unlawful pursuit of political power.²⁹

Motives for military intervention are varied and complicated. No single factor can be easily pointed out as the sole cause for intervention. It is oftentimes a conjunction of motives which cause the military to intervene in domestic politics. Chapter VII deals with coup factors as they relate to the December 1989 failed coup attempt.

The usual motives of the military for intervention are the "national interests" as perceived and defined by the officer corps, middle-class interests with which the military generally identifies, institutional or corporate interests of the armed forces, regionalistic, ethnic or particularistic interests, and personal interests of some military coup plotters.³⁰ These motives are discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter under factors affecting military intervention.

A.2.b. Coup Opportunity

Opportunity refers to the precise occasion of launching a coup. It is the product of some kind of rational calculation before the coup is

staged.³¹ It includes the presence of necessary conditions for a successful coup. These conditions can either be created or, if they exist naturally, exploited to the advantage of the coup.³²

The conditions which engender opportunities for mutinous military to intervene³³ are war time, when there is civilian dependence on the military, an overt domestic crisis like a civil war, a latent or chronic crisis like a continuing insurgency or prolonged economic distress, and a vacuum in national leadership. Under these conditions, the military is more likely to play a major and highly visible role. Discussion of these conditions in general, is done in the latter part of this chapter, and with respect to the December 1989 coup attempt in particular, in Chapter III.

A.2.c. Capability for Military Intervention

The armed forces have three decidedly overwhelming political advantages over civilian organizations: a marked superiority in organization, highly emotionalized symbols, and a monopoly of the instruments for legal violence.³⁴ These three elements constitute the political strengths of the military, and underscore its capability for intervention in politics. In addition, the military has certain distinct organizational characteristics which make it behave like a machine. These characteristics are discussed in Section B.1.a.

The highly emotionalized symbols generate political strength. The military exacts observance in its rituals and traditions. The newcomers or recruits are indoctrinated to respect the insignia, merit medals, banners, colors, and other physical manifestations of military traditions and rituals. As these traditions are indoctrinated to inculcate a sense of "service to the nation" among soldiers, they become the symbols of their patriotic deeds and ideals. These symbols oftentimes give the military an idea that everything it does is for the interest of the nation. These also tend to enhance military cohesiveness and camaraderie. Thus, in instances where soldiers are caught in conflict with other soldiers, they invoke camaraderie in settling the conflict.

But the most formidable strength of the military which underscores its capability for intervention is its monopoly of the instruments for legal violence. In instances of conflicts and disagreements, the threat or the use of force may determine the outcome.

A.2.d. Coup Strategy

The degree of success of a coup is sometimes measured on the basis of the extent of bloodshed. One author claims that "the more bloodless a coup, the more successful it is."³⁵ Other scholars measure its degree of success by the number of hours or days that lapsed before the coup leaders took full control of the government. In effect, the least time spent in seizing government control, the more successful a coup. The real barometer of success ultimately lies in the effective capture of political power by the coup plotters.

Basically, the three prerequisites for success of a coup are secrecy, surprise, and the neutralization in various ways of the bulk of the armed forces.³⁶

To preserve secrecy, the coup conspirators do not seek the complicity of the entire armed forces.³⁷ The ideal size of the coup conspirators is just large enough to be able to undertake the simultaneous seizure of all crucial targets which include infantry and armored assets, military aircraft, power centers, and all types of communication installations.

The element of surprise is observed by the execution of the coup with optimum speed and coordination. Any error in terms of coordination and miscalculation in speed may allow the government to consolidate its forces and mount resistance to the coup forces.

The element of neutralization includes not only neutralizing the police and the military who are not part of the coup plot, but also the various political forces. These political forces such as political parties, non-government organizations, sectional interests, regional, ethnic and religious groupings, may also protect the government against the coup.

In the context of a coup, neutralization does not necessarily mean the annihilation of its opponents but the imposition of a condition of temporary impotence.³⁸ Hence, to effectively neutralize the political forces, two rules are usually observed by the coup plotters. First, the coup propagandists generally exploit issues that do not antagonize or at least minimize opposition from political forces. Second, maximum speed is observed to temporarily force these political forces who will be caught by surprise into passivity. A delay in the carrying out of the coup plot may allow these political forces to consolidate and organize collective opposition to it.

On the other hand, the neutralization of the bulk of the armed forces may well depend on the crucial targets seized. Communication channels are considered of critical importance for the propaganda and psychological warfare of the coup leaders. Air force assets and armored tanks, if effectively seized, can neutralize the movements of other military forces who are not part of the coup plot. Influential military officers are considered crucial targets for their potential in resisting a coup. To neutralize these officers, they should be seized either in order of importance or simultaneously.³⁹

The nature and quality of recruitment of the military coup supporters and the timing of the day the coup is to be carried out are also crucial factors which may determine the outcome of the coup.

The nature of recruitment may pose a risk to the coup in terms of secrecy and security. Any individual targeted to be recruited may either be a supporter of the coup or an informer of the enemies of the coup. To avert any possibility of recruiting an informer, the three considerations which are usually observed by coup recruiters are links of friendship or camaraderie with the planners of the coup, shared political beliefs and convictions, and family, ethnic and clan links with those planning the coup.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the nature of the recruitment may take the form of any of the following: senior military coup plotters will deceive their men as to what exactly they are going to do; appeal their causes to them by citing anomalies and misconduct of some government officials; or, they would simply threaten them.

The quality of recruits has also often been underscored. The plotters usually recruit the active participation of strategically situated middle-level troop commanders — officers who command infantry or armor battalions stationed in or near the capital city. They also recruit pilots of helicopter gunships or other air assets. The credibility of recruited officers is an important factor in convincing others to support or counter the coup.

The timing of the coup is critical to its success. For instance, at a time when the military security measures against coup plots have become lax, coup leaders have the strategic advantage. The coup also has the advantage when it is launched at a time when there is a serious political issue that ignites widespread criticism of the government.⁴¹

A.2.e. Coup Leaders

A coup is staged by a group of politicized military officers who ride

on popular grievances against the civilian government. But because they are able to exploit certain military and national issues, the coup plotters secure sympathy and support from some idealist military officers. These politicized military officers, who usually are not at the helm of military authority and command, are, as in most cases, driven by personal reasons. The idealist officers, on the other hand, believe that whatever they do are in the best interest of the nation.

Aside from politicized military officers, coup conspirators would also often include civilian individuals. The coup-related experiences of many Latin American countries reveal that some civilian politicians, mostly belonging to the opposition parties, also lent "support" to military coup plotters, or had directly participated in the coup. Military coup leaders listen to the advice of these politicians, count on them for assistance in justifying the coup before public opinion, and solicit their support in running the country if the coup succeeds.⁴²

Politicalized military officers are usually composed of middle-ranking officers from the level of captain to lieutenant colonels who do not yet participate extensively in the usual channels of decision-making, and others who hold grievances against top military officers and/or political leaders.⁴³ These officers are noted to be more effective in seeking the obedience of their subordinates because of the fact that they exercise the most direct authority over the latter.

It has been noted that the advantage of middle-ranking officers over their senior commanders in seeking the obedience of their soldiers is more pronounced once the military is highly politicalized.⁴⁴ In such conditions, these officers attain considerable independence such that their senior commanders usually cannot force them to counter or support a coup.

B. Theoretical Explanations for the Occurrence of Coup d'Etat

The frequency of military seizures of power through coup d'etat all over the world has spawned many divergent interpretations concerning their causes. From among these views, there appear two general perspectives which seem to encapsulize factors affecting the occurrence of a coup. The first comes from those social scientists who theorize that factors attributable to the military organization are the significant causes of a coup. The second perspective comes from those who believe that societal factors which are external to the military more directly

affect the likelihood of a coup d'etat than do the organizational attributes of the military.

Some scholars have warned, however, that internal or societal factors should not be emphasized to the exclusion of the other. This warning seems to have enough merit, as the experiences of many Third World countries consistently show an interplay of these factors. Conversely, no single factor, whether societal or attributable to the military organization, can be claimed as the sole cause for the occurrence of a coup.

In view of this, we have here divided the theories explaining the coup into (1) those attributable to the military organization, and (2) those external to the military. A third, the "contagion" theory⁴⁵ is discussed separately.

B.1. Theories Attributing Coup Causes to Factors Internal to the Military Organization

The military has basic attributes which can be transformed into formidable political strengths against any civilian political force, including the civilian leadership. These military attributes include certain characteristics inherent in the military organization, the mission and role perception of the members of the armed forces, and certain military variables affecting the integrity and self-image of the soldiers.

B.1.a. Organizational Characteristics

The armed forces has certain inherent organizational features which are believed to be essential in the pursuit of the accomplishment of the military's traditional mission of protecting the country from any form of foreign aggression. These organizational features are centralized command, military discipline, hierarchy, formalized internal communication, esprit de corps, and the possession of the means for the legitimate use of violence.⁴⁶

The centralization of command in the entire armed forces is a purposive creation because only through it can the military act as a single unit and hence, achieve its mission with a high degree of efficiency. This centralized command is evident in the observance of the military chain of command where the lowest or most junior officer is linked to the highest commanding officer in the military.

The hierarchical order of the military organization is also observed as enabling the entire armed forces to act as a single fighting unit. An officer of certain military rank is obliged to render explicit obedience to any officer who has a higher rank.

All members of the armed forces, from the highest to the lowest ranking official, are subject to military discipline. Any violation of, or deviation from, military standard functions has its corresponding punishment in the military. Since the military chain of command is considered as sacrosanct in the organization, and the entire military is oriented to act as a single body, military discipline is oftentimes meant as absolute obedience to the orders of superior officers. This particular trait among many military men prompted numerous scholars to liken the military to a machine which normally behaves in a fairly predictable manner.⁴⁷

Internal communication in the military, such as signal systems and military codes, is also an essential factor in effectively carrying out its functions. Coordination and precision in military operations are greatly enhanced by this internal communication system which is independent of civil authorities.

A distinct characteristic that the military possesses as formidable is its monopoly of the instruments for legal violence. By virtue of its mission, the military alone is given the legal authority to carry, maintain, and use arms and weapons.

However, these characteristics of the military organization can effectively work against the very government which maintains it. This is particularly true in Third World countries, where the military has been assigned another role, that of maintaining internal peace and order. In these countries, the distinctive organizational features of the military can strongly affect its propensity to intervene in the political affairs of the nation.⁴⁸ The machine-like nature of the military, for instance, has often been exploited during coups d'etat.

B.1.b. Mission and Role Perception of the Military

In many developed states in the West, the traditional mission of the military has been the protection of the state against foreign military aggression. The external security of the nation has been its sole responsibility. In Third World states, however, the mission of the military has been expanded to include internal security, that is, the maintenance of peace and order threatened by internal insurgencies. In

these countries, the involvement of the military in internal pacification inherently and inevitably brings it into political disputes.⁴⁹ In fact, it has often been hypothesized that the likelihood of military intervention in the political affairs of the nation rises should the armed forces become heavily involved in domestic, police-type, or counter-insurgency activities.⁵⁰ Furthermore, military interference is likely to occur when the armed forces are ordered, contrary to the advice of the officer corps, to use coercion against domestic opponents of the government, or to enforce unpopular governmental decisions.⁵¹ The military's neutrality and subordination to the civilian government are strained because the military becomes not the defender of the state but an instrument of its political leadership.

Also, in Third World nations, the military has often been used by its government as an arm in national development efforts. Governments of these countries believe that in the absence of actual external threat, the military organization, its efficiency, and manpower can become a formidable support in nation-building. Social scientists have theorized that as civic action projects absorb the attention and expertise of the military, these programs lessen the likelihood of military intervention.⁵² The military becomes too preoccupied with these programs that it does not have the time to plot against the government. On the other hand, there are officers who feel it is not their duty to get involved in some types of development programs.

The possibility of military intervention may also arise when military officers alter their mission — when they think of the military as the ultimate custodian of national interests. They then consider it their duty to arbitrate the political disputes or veto decisions of civilian authorities.⁵³ This was the experience of Thailand, Nigeria, Peru, Egypt, and many Latin American countries, where coups were mounted by officers who viewed their responsibility as guardians of the state.⁵⁴

In essence, it is not the mission that pushes the military to intervene. Rather, it is how the officer corps defines and interprets the mission of the armed forces which may give rise to the phenomenon of military interference in the political arena.

B.1.c. Military Variables

Military variables are certain characteristics which vary from one soldier to another, from one service command to another, or such characteristics which may differentiate the entire armed forces of a

country from the military of another country. The variability of these characteristics, that is, whether they are high or low in degree in a particular military, may directly or indirectly affect the propensity of the military to intervene in or abstain from the political affairs of the nation. Military variables include military cohesion or the unity of military personnel, professionalism, autonomy on certain military policy matters, corporate interests, the level of political awareness of the officer corps and the extent of foreign military assistance.

B.1.c.i. Cohesion

The degree of cohesion or unity among military personnel, whether it is high or low, may pose a threat to the civilian government. A military with a high degree of cohesion has a greater capacity to intervene in domestic politics.⁵⁵ On the other hand, a successful coup by a military with a low degree of cohesion is likely to experience countercoups from other groups within the military. This is validated by studies of numerous coups in self-divided militaries of Syria, Iraq, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina.⁵⁶

It should be noted, however, that the military, or a faction in it, does not intervene or attempt to seize political leadership by reason of military cohesion alone. Besides, cohesion is not a reason for staging a coup. Rather, it is a factor which helps promote the success or likelihood of a coup, or of a countercoup. At most, it is contributory to such occurrence.

B.1.c.ii. Professionalism

Military professionalism exists when "the conduct of warfare is given over to men who have committed themselves to a career of service, men who are recognized for their expertise in the means of warfare."⁵⁷ Three of its essential ingredients are expertise, social responsibility, and corporateness.⁵⁸ Military men are technicians in the management of legal violence. They feel a deep sense of responsibility to their client, the state, which may be seen in basic military codes like "duty, honor, country."⁵⁹ They have their own powerful corporate tradition and organization.

Many claim that professionalism in the army is the most decisive factor in keeping the military out of politics. However, there were cases where armed forces with high levels of professionalism became involved in the seizure of political power⁶⁰ such as the German and Japanese

cases. Also, the Royal Thai military was relatively high in terms of professionalism but nonetheless, it staged a coup in November 1971.⁶¹

Consequently, some scholars were prompted to include a fourth requisite to military professionalism — adherence to the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military at all times. One author even claims that the willingness of the military to submit to civilian authority is a very crucial element of military professionalism.⁶² Another scholar says that respect for the chain of command is a characteristic of military professionalism.⁶³ By this definition, armed forces with a high degree of professionalism would not intervene in domestic politics.

B.1.c.iii. Autonomy

Military institutions always claim the right to exercise autonomy in their internal organization and operations. The sphere of military autonomy includes strategy, tactics, logistics, assignment, and promotion of its men.⁶⁴ This issue of military autonomy should be dealt with care and understanding by the civilian leadership because the military is very jealous of its corporate status and privileges. In fact, anxiety to preserve its autonomy is one of the most powerful motives for military intervention.⁶⁵

A high degree of autonomy may place the military in an aggressive position. It can lead the military to consider itself as the ultimate judge on all matters affecting the armed forces, in which case, it can place the civilian leadership in constant threat of military intervention.⁶⁶ On the other hand, a low degree of autonomy may put the military in a defensive position where it may consider certain policy decisions of the government affecting it as interference in its internal affairs. Abrupt shifts in policies, particularly alterations perceived to threaten its corporate interests, prerogatives, and values may cause tensions in civil-military relations. Thus, changes or intentions to alter the military areas of decision-making against its advice or desires are likely to encourage military intervention.⁶⁷

B.1.c.iv. Corporate Interest

The military is a corporate body with corporate interests.⁶⁸ As used here, "corporate" does not refer to a juridical personality, but to a distinct collective body with rules, interests, and traditions especially peculiar to the group.

Operationally, this corporate interest reflects itself in demands for bigger budgets, better pay, adequate equipment, and other material resources, in intense opposition to the creation of any rival armed forces like workers' militia or presidential guards, and in a determination to have a say in public policy-making.⁶⁹ The last is particularly marked among militaries which have not fought a war for a long time, and are unlikely to do so in the immediate future. Such militaries actively search for a new role, and find it in a claim to participate in the development of the nation such as in the cases of the Central African Republic in 1966 and Algeria in 1965.⁷⁰

When a government fails to cater to corporate interests of the military, officers will be more inclined to intervene. While it is not always an immediate cause of intervention, government neglect of the military contributes to a general sense of alienation.⁷¹ Military intervention in Indonesia in the mid-1950s and in Thailand in 1976 took place against such a background.

B.1.c.v. Political Awareness

Political awareness is the level of understanding of an individual of the different issues in society, and the self-assessment of this individual's capability to address or contribute to the solution of these issues. The political awareness of the soldier is greatly affected by the socio-economic-political conditions of the area where he is assigned. This is especially true among Third World countries where the role of the military has been expanded to include security from internal subversion. In these countries, the soldier finds himself directly immersed with the civilian populace, and is thus exposed to their daily problems. Political awareness might lead him to question why he fights his fellow citizens.

The content of military education and training may also affect the political awareness of the soldiers, especially the officer corps. A military education that includes political issues traditionally resolved by politicians would tend to increase the likelihood of military intervention.⁷² Education and training patterned after or influenced by Western models give military personnel a developmental perspective where they see themselves as agents of modernization.⁷³ They begin to believe that modernization is part of their mission.

One author has provided two reasons for this modern outlook among soldiers.⁷⁴ First, officers, especially in the militaries of Third World states, look outside for their models, and are therefore extremely sensitive to the needs of modernization and technical advancement.

Second, militaries are rival institutions. The primary task of the military is to fight wars, and therefore it always wants to be better equipped than the armies of other countries, particularly neighboring ones.

The perception of the military as a modernization catalyst has political consequences for the nation. In fact, in Third World countries, a military with a high level of political awareness that sees itself as an agent of modernization, is more likely to interfere in political affairs. Military domination of the government may, it is argued, have beneficial effects on the economy and improve the prospects of social reform. This appears to have been the experience in Turkey with a military that was modernized by a colonial administration ahead of other sectors. However, this may not be the rule. The extent to which the military becomes an agent of modernization depends on the level of its modernization relative to the other sectors of society. Officers who hold a modern outlook are usually a minority in the armed forces.⁷⁵

A noted scholar on the military has claimed that in terms of modernization, the role of the military changes as society changes.⁷⁶ In an oligarchical society, the soldier is a radical; in a middle-class dominated society, he is a participant and arbiter; and in a mass society, he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order.⁷⁷ Understandably, the more backward a society, the more progressive its military; the more advanced a society, the more conservative and reactionary its military.

In the Middle East after World War II, the soldiers played a modernizing role after seizing power in Syria in 1949, in Egypt in 1952, and in Iraq in 1958.⁷⁸ In Brazil and Argentina in the 1950s, however, and then in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras in the 1960s, the military played a more conservative role.

A high level of political awareness among soldiers has often been pointed out as a cause for military intervention in politics. On the surface, it would seem that a high degree of political awareness works against the government and in favor of coup plotters. On closer look, however, a distinction should be made. High ranking officers with a high degree of political awareness may work within the system because they have enough influence to achieve their goals.⁷⁹ Junior and middle-ranking officers with limited access to and influence on the policy-making process are the ones very much vulnerable to the idea of military intervention. In fact, coup plots have more often been initiated by middle-ranking officers.⁸⁰

B.1.c.vi. Foreign Military Assistance

Foreign military assistance, in the form of military training, scholarships abroad, and transfer of military technology, affects the self-image of the military. This may lead the military to view itself as the most modern sector in society and may tempt it to aspire for a broader political role.⁸¹ On the other hand, it can be a source of frustration, given the government's inability to provide them with resources comparable to their foreign peers. It is also a source of demoralization when the benefits of foreign assistance, particularly training abroad, are perceived to be unfairly distributed.

B.2. Theories Attributing Coup Causes to Factors External to the Military Organization

As noted above, certain societal factors tend to encourage a coup d'état. Some scholars contend that external factors particularly those attributable to the government, affect the occurrence of a coup more directly than factors internal to the military. One author, stressing the greater significance of societal factors, even claims that "there are no bad soldiers, only bad governments."⁸² This view of singularly attributing all causes to the government overlooked relevant lessons from other countries. As discussed in this chapter, no single factor may be claimed as the sole cause of a coup, rather, it is an interplay of organizational and societal factors.

B.2.a. Political Factors

A noted scholar on the military has pointed out that "the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military, but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society."⁸³ When political institutions are weak and fragmented that no group or political faction exercises clear control and leadership, the military usually intervenes. The military mind abhors a vacuum of leadership and feels impelled to fill it. Where such a vacuum exists and there are no "legitimate and authoritative methods for reconciling conflicts,"⁸⁴ a praetorian society emerges. In such a polity, the coercive power of the military enables it to come out on top. Quoting Thomas Hobbes, one author points out that "when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps."⁸⁵

Indeed, the military had often argued that they only intervene when civilian governments are unable to govern effectively. A failure of

governance and consequent political instability may lead to a perceived loss of legitimacy providing coup plotters with both the opportunity and motive for intervention. The coups in South Vietnam in 1963, in Laos in 1959 and 1960, in Burma in 1958, and in Thailand in 1976, all occurred after the civilian governments were perceived to have failed.⁸⁶

The perceived failure of a government to govern effectively is, however, not the only political factor which may affect the military's attitude to intervene. Other political factors are the historical origins of the military, its level of politicization, government policies affecting the military, influence of the political Left, the popularity of the armed forces, and superpower interest as an international factor.

B.2.b. Economic Factors

In most Third World countries, a coup has been consistently preceded by a deep crisis or deterioration in the economic conditions of the people in general. It is not established, however, that a deep economic crisis would always trigger a coup. What is apparent is that the likelihood of military intervention rises when there is a perceived deterioration of economic conditions, especially if accompanied by a belief that the government cannot resolve, or is responsible for, such deterioration.⁸⁷ The experiences of Latin American countries and many African states tend to validate this claim.

When the economic crisis becomes acute, the country usually experiences high inflation, increasing unemployment and poverty, among others. These conditions create a restive atmosphere among labor unions, farmers, public utility drivers, students, and other political forces. These usually constitute the preconditions of a coup. In Indonesia, the failure of the "guided democracy" under President Sukarno to ensure a stable government and economic growth became one of the factors which caused the 1965 coup. In the abortive coup in Thailand in September 1985, economic issues were advanced as the main justification.⁸⁸ Such was the case also of Argentina, where economic growth and stability was cited as the military's justification for the coups in 1966 and 1976.⁸⁹ The military is also provided powerful motives by the business community to intervene in domestic politics. When political tensions rise because of unfavorable economic developments, the business community often looks to the military as the only dependable domestic ally capable of protecting their investments and preserving an environment favorable to economic progress. Thus, private investors curry favor with military leaders while foreign capitalist governments provide not only economic aid but also military assistance.⁹⁰

B.2.c. Socio-Cultural Factors

Military officers tend to share the broader interests of the middle class as a whole and to reflect the grievances of that class.⁹¹ Although military officers do not always have middle-class origins, their status as officers puts them into that class. They also usually marry into middle-class families. A government which fails to satisfy middle-class interests can thus often expect to face opposition not only from the middle class in general but from the officer corps of the military in particular. In fact, coups have often taken place after civilian governments have failed to meet the expectations of the educated urban middle class, especially its demand for economic progress.⁹² Some examples of military intervention initially welcomed by the middle class were those in Indonesia in 1965-66, in Kampuchea in 1970, and in Thailand in 1976-77.

Since soldiers are members of society, they have their own social and cultural characteristics which may be different and distinct from other social or cultural aggrupations. In times where social conflicts become intense and numerous, the soldiers can in no way be spared. Sometimes, individual elements in the military even become vocal partisans in such issues as ethnic tensions, class divisions, regional differences, and cleavages based on education, language, or religion.⁹³ When a point is reached where violence is resorted to by any of the contending civilian groups, military intervention is very likely to take place.⁹⁴

B.2.d. Psychological and Personal Factors

In general, there are four psychological factors which tend to encourage military intervention in domestic politics. These are the military's self-awareness of its overwhelming power or capacity to intervene, heroic complex which may take concealment in some messianic idealistic mission, morbid obsession with power, and a sense of frustration among soldiers on certain matters affecting the military.

The military's self-awareness of its overwhelming capacity to intervene⁹⁵ can be attributed to the characteristics which the military organization has. This factor alone does not lead to military intervention in politics.

The mission and training of the soldiers usually promote an intense kind of nationalism which turns into a display of military heroism. Military medals are not merely decorative. They carry a message of heroism — the more bemedalled an officer, the more heroic he appears among his peers. This tendency towards a heroic complex becomes more

pronounced when they are politicized because they picture themselves as puritanically clean, honest, and sincere in their service to the nation, while perceiving the civilian political leaders as the opposite. Such officers assume a messianic mission to save the nation from the machinations of certain political leaders.

A sense of frustration among soldiers, on the other hand, may arise when the self-esteem of the military has been gravely affected, or when it suffers humiliation on certain issues. Such was the case of Egypt when the pride of the army was gravely wounded and which led to military action in 1948.⁹⁶ In an extreme case, any kind of imagined affront to its pride may spark military intervention.⁹⁷ An illustrative case is the 1943 coup in Argentina where the military displayed contempt for civilian authority. The Argentine military felt "vicarious shame" over the corruption in government, the country's dependence on the United States and the ill-equipped status of the army. The rebel officers felt that because of all these, the army lost face.⁹⁸

Frustration among soldiers can also be attributed to the idealism among officers, especially among the junior level, and a defective promotion system. One author has claimed that some military men who intervened were motivated by high ideals of public service.⁹⁹ During the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, Latin American officers were not only more ambitious for themselves and their nation, but were also more frustrated by repeated economic deterioration and instability.¹⁰⁰ The promotion system is particularly sensitive to the military because of its hierarchical structure and the extreme difficulty of recovering lost seniority. Military officers who find peers whom they believe are inferior being promoted ahead of them are vulnerable to recruitment. They may look to military adventurism as a form of protest or restitution.

There are also personal factors which may prompt soldiers to rebel against the government. Among them is their desire to improve their military career, benefits, and privileges, believing that when the coup succeeds they would receive these improvements. Another is personal grievances against certain leaders in the military or in the government. In Argentina, Bolivia, and a number of African countries, some officers participated in coups due to personal factors.

B.3. The "Contagion" Theory

The "contagion" theory states that a successful coup breeds other coups, either in the same government or in neighboring states. From the

definition, it is obvious that the coup may occur either at the inter-governmental or the intra-military levels.

The "contagion" theory claims that a successful seizure of political control in a country may cause a chain reaction in other nations with a similarly dissatisfied military.¹⁰¹ The occurrence of a coup at the inter-governmental level is influenced by at least two factors:¹⁰² the personal links among military officers in different countries that have coup experiences, and the extent of interstate ties. This was the experience of many African states.

The "contagion" theory also claims that the military is not a monolithic unit, but is divided by political allegiance, sectional interest, generational gap, ethnic composition, inter-service rivalry, religion, and recruitment source. In a coup at the intra-military level, the success of one faction in staging a coup may prompt other factions in the military to counter or emulate those who have succeeded in seizing power. The numerous coups in self-divided armies of Iraq, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina clearly demonstrate this.

In succeeding chapters, we will discuss how the virus of military interventionism infected the AFP.

ENDNOTES

- (1) The first coup attempt against the Aquino administration was staged by civilians and military elements loyal to the deposed President Marcos by taking over the Manila Hotel in July 1986. Subsequent attempts were the November 1986 "God Save The Queen" plot, the January 1987 GMA-7 attempt, the April 1987 Black Saturday incident, the July 1987 takeover plot at the Manila International Airport, the August 1987 and the December 1989 attempts.
- (2) Gregor Ferguson, Coup d'Etat: A Practical Manual (Dorset: Arms and Armor Press, 1987), p. 11.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 4.
- (5) Ibid., p. 2.
- (6) The number includes 22 states that witnessed 27 military interventions in various forms during the period 1958-1962, as discussed by ibid., pp. 1-2.
- (7) Ibid., p. 223.
- (8) As cited by ibid., the 37 states are Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Burma, Chile, Congo Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq, Korea, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Madagascar, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Rwandi, El Salvador, Somalia, Sudan, Surinam, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen Arab Republic and Zaire, p. 257.
- (9) Ibid., p. 223.
- (10) Ibid., p. 257.
- (11) Ibid., p. 263.
- (12) Ibid.

- (13) Ibid., p. 139.
- (14) Claude E. Welch, Jr and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1974), pp. 8-32.
- (15) Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 218.
- (16) Ibid.
- (17) Ferguson, op. cit., p. 13.
- (18) Huntington, op. cit., p. 219.
- (19) National ROTC Alumni Association, Inc. (NARAA), "The Philippine Coup d'Etat and NARAA Resolution No. 7." (Metro Manila: NARAA, 21 February 1989), p. 3.
- (20) Viberto Selochan, "Professionalization and Politicization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines," (Doctoral Diss., Australian National University, March 1990), pp. 21-25.
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- (22) Ibid.
- (23) Ibid.
- (24) Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 27.
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- (27) Finer, op. cit., p. 20.
- (28) Ibid.
- (29) Ferguson, op. cit., p. 12.
- (30) Finer, op. cit., pp. 28-53.

- (31) Ibid.
- (32) Ferguson, op. cit., p. 12.
- (33) Finer, op. cit., pp. 64-76.
- (34) Ibid., p. 5.
- (35) Ibid., p. 226.
- (36) Ibid.
- (37) Ibid.
- (38) Ferguson, op. cit., p. 77.
- (39) Ibid., p. 43.
- (40) Luttwak, op. cit., p. 75.
- (41) Ferguson, op. cit., p. 42.
- (42) Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1966), p. 621.
- (43) NARAA, op. cit., p. 6.
- (44) Ibid., p. 3.
- (45) Claude E. Welch, Jr, Soldier and State in Africa (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 32.
- (46) Finer, op. cit., pp. 5-11.
- (47) Luttwak, op. cit., p. 21.
- (48) Finer, op. cit., p. 5.
- (49) Welch, Jr and Smith, op. cit., p. 10.
- (50) Ibid., p. 11.
- (51) Ibid., p. 10.

- (52) Ibid.
- (53) Finer, op. cit., p. 31.
- (54) Welch, Jr and Smith, op. cit., p. 236.
- (55) Ibid., p. 11.
- (56) Finer, op. cit., pp. 226-229.
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- (60) Finer, op. cit., pp. 20-22.
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- (77) Ibid.
- (78) Ibid., p. 203.
- (79) Welch, Jr and Smith, op. cit., p. 21.
- (80) NARAA, op. cit., p. 7.
- (81) Welch, Jr and Smith, op. cit., p. 18.
- (82) Ferguson, op. cit., p. 195.
- (83) Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p. 194.
- (84) Ibid., p. 196.
- (85) Ibid.
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- (87) Welch, Jr and Smith, op. cit., p. 26.
- (88) Alagappa, op. cit., p. 23.
- (89) Wells, op. cit., p. 219.
- (90) Ibid., p. 299.
- (91) Ibid., p. 292.
- (92) Ibid.
- (93) Welch, Jr and Smith, op. cit., pp. 24-26.
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- (96) Ibid.
- (97) Ibid., pp. 59-60.
- (98) Ibid., p. 60.
- (99) Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p. 193.
- (100) Wells, op. cit., p. 240.
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II

POLITICAL CHANGE AND MILITARY TRANSFORMATION IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1966 - 1989: FROM THE BARRACKS TO THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

This chapter examines the factors, both external and internal, which influenced the politicization of the Philippine military and predisposed it to the launching of coups.

Traditionally, the military establishment is an organization whose sole function is to provide external defense. An extension of that function is internal security, or defense against aggression from within (internal subversion). In many Third World countries, however, the military has had to assume another role — that of maintaining peace and order. The Philippines is no exception to this phenomenon.

A. Historical Development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

When the American Military Commander of the Philippines — upon instructions from the President of the United States of America on 4 July 1901 — turned over the government to civilian authorities, the Philippine-American War (1898 - 1902) had not yet ended. To meet this situation, the Governor General ordered the formation of an Insular Police Force on 8 August 1901 under Capt Henry Allen. Initially, 74 American officers were appointed to man it. By 31 December 1901, the number grew to 180. To reinforce the American officers, Filipinos, deliberately selected from various ethnic groups, were organized as scouts. In 1905, a three-month course was offered at the Sta Lucia barracks in Intramuros for Filipino recruits to be trained as officers in the Insular Police Force. In 1917, the Revised Administrative Code changed the name of the Insular Police Force to the Philippine Constabulary, tasked mainly to provide internal security.¹ External security was provided by the US.

On 15 November 1935, the Philippine Commonwealth was formally inaugurated. It was a creation of the American government which

retained control over Philippine affairs while granting a certain measure of autonomy to Filipinos.

A.1. The National Defense Act

In his inaugural address, President Manuel Quezon stressed the urgent need to formulate an adequate defense program for the Philippines. Since the Commonwealth period would last for 10 years, a military institution would be needed to protect the state. Besides, Japan's aggressive policies indicated its intention to establish a sphere of influence in the area which in all certainty would include the Philippines.² Quezon requested the services of Gen Douglas MacArthur as Military Adviser to assist in the development of the Philippine military.

MacArthur formulated the National Defense Plan. As he envisioned it, the Philippine military establishment would primarily be a "citizen army" with two main components: the Regular and Reserve Forces. The Regular Force would be "made up of individuals who follow the profession of arms as a career, and who were constantly in the service of the government. The Reserve Force would consist of those able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 21 and 50 who have been duly trained for the military."³ For MacArthur, the development of a reasonably adequate defense was important for the Filipinos and the Americans. American pride and prestige would suffer a severe blow should the Philippines ever fall under the control of another foreign power.⁴

Commonwealth Act No. 1, otherwise known as the National Defense Act, approved on 21 December 1935, authorized the organization of the Philippine Army. It was tasked to protect the state against external attack, to promote internal security, and to maintain peace and order.⁵

On 11 January 1936, to implement the National Defense Act, Quezon issued Executive Order No. 11 formally establishing the Philippine Army. The Philippine Constabulary, which arose out of the Insular Police Force, became the nucleus of the regular force of the Philippine Army.

The Philippine Constabulary Air Group which was activated on 2 January 1935, was redesignated as the Philippine Air Force on 3 July 1947. In 1939, an Off-Shore Patrol (OSP) was organized as a unit of the Philippine Army. It was often referred to as the "mosquito fleet." In October 1947, the OSP was renamed Philippine Naval Patrol and on 5 January 1951, it became the Philippine Navy. On 23 December 1950, President Elpidio Quirino issued Executive Order No. 389 designating

the four major services to compose the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Philippine Army (PA) became responsible for land defense, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for air, the Philippine Navy (PN) for sea, and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) which, as the national police, was responsible for the security of rear areas in case of emergency.⁶ Providing the command over the major services was General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines (GHQ, AFP). The Commander of the AFP was known as the Chief of Staff, AFP (CSAFP), who reported to the President as Commander-in-Chief.

A.2. US Role in the Formation of the AFP

American participation in the formation of the AFP was clear from the start, with MacArthur as Military Adviser to Quezon formulating and implementing the first National Defense Plan. The US defined and shaped the functions of the AFP. By assuming external defense, the US caused the AFP to concentrate on internal defense and peace and order. By financing the cost of organizing the military, the US necessarily determined its size, training, equipment, and supplies.

As the Pacific War drew to a close and the promised restoration of independence approached, the US began to plan for the transfer of sovereignty to the Philippines. It prepared to provide military assistance to rebuild the army which it limited to 37,000 troops, to train and equip them, and to establish a group of American army, navy, and air force officers to provide military advice.⁷ A program of military assistance was formulated through the 1946 Military Assistance Act authorizing \$19.75 million to be administered in the Philippines by the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). This relationship was sealed by the Military Assistance Agreement between the two countries on 21 March 1947, an agreement which remains in effect until the present.⁸

The US turned over 33,000 army, 2,000 air force, and 1,800 naval forces to the Philippines on 30 June 1946 with second-hand US army equipment and supplies already located in the Philippines. Under the Agreement, the US had sent a select group of Filipino officers to American military academies and service schools since independence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff articulated on 22 May 1950 the assumption behind US military assistance to the Philippines thus

A sound military policy for the Philippines at the present time justifies maximum emphasis and expenditures upon forces required for the maintenance of internal security and a minimum expenditure upon forces contributing

largely to national military prestige or to forces and resources largely designed for defense against external invaders.⁹

Thus, the AFP was not able to develop external defense capability. This was exacerbated by the fact that the Military Bases Agreement between the two countries signed on 14 March 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty of March 1951 reinforced external defense dependence on the US. US military presence in the bases, their largest overseas, and reliance on US assistance during peace and in case of external attack left the AFP developing largely an internal security function.

A.3. The AFP and the Huk Insurgency

From its establishment until the early 1940s, the AFP was confined to its original functions of defending the state. But the absence of a viable and immediate external threat to the Philippines, the emergence of the Huk (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon or Hukbalahap, more commonly known as Huks) insurgency, and US defense umbrella in the Philippines and the larger Asian region led the AFP to assume a leading role in the peace and order drive in the country.

During this time, the AFP was completely subordinated to the civilian political authority. The President, being the Commander-in-Chief, enjoyed considerable control powers over the military. Congress fully used its authority to allocate funds and confirm senior military promotions.

In the late 1940s, the rise of the Hukbalahap insurgency necessitated the expansion of the role of the AFP beyond its original functions. The Huks originated as a peasant-based movement pressing for agrarian reform. Having fought against the Japanese during the latter's occupation of the Philippines, the end of the war found them heavily-armed and well-organized. Contrary to their expectations, they were excluded from receiving pensions and other benefits because the government did not recognize them as guerrillas. The Huks criticized the government's failure to initiate an agrarian reform program that would correct the inequitable land distribution in Philippine society, particularly in Central Luzon. In the 1946 elections, several congressmen-elect sympathetic to the Huks, including Luis Taruc, better known as the Huk Supremo, were prevented from assuming their seats. Losing faith in the electoral process and the government, the Huks then escalated their armed struggle under the slogan "bullets, not ballots."¹⁰

The AFP embarked on an extensive campaign to defeat the Huks. However, the strategy was not confined to armed combat. Under the direction of Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, the strategy became a fusion of political, socio-economic, and military activities, thus signaling the start of the expansion of the military's protection, security, and peace-keeping functions. In addressing the Huk problem, Magsaysay used two different approaches: a mailed-fist policy and a policy of attraction. He said that "With my left hand I am offering to all dissidents the road to peace, happy homes and economic security, but with my right, I shall crush all those who resist and seek to destroy our democratic government."¹¹ He countered the Huk slogan with one of his own, "ballots, not bullets."

Magsaysay was assisted by the JUSMAG. When Lt Col Edward Lansdale arrived in the Philippines in September 1950, the Huk insurgency was already escalating. Lansdale was not just a military adviser attached to JUSMAG. He was also the head of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) clandestine and paramilitary operations in the country. With him was Capt Charles Bohannon from the US army intelligence unit. Together, they embarked on psychological warfare based on the premise that a popular guerrilla army cannot be defeated by force alone.

Lansdale's team conducted a careful study of the superstitions of the Filipino peasants. In one operation, Lansdale's men flew over Huk areas in a small plane hidden by clouds and broadcast in Tagalog mysterious curses on any villager who would dare to give food or shelter to the Huks.¹² Another "psywar" operation played on the superstitious belief in the *aswang*, a mythical vampire. A psywar squad entered a town and planted rumors that an *aswang* lived in the neighboring hill where the Huks were based. After giving the rumor time to circulate, the squad laid an ambush for the Huk rebels along a trail used by them. The ambushers snatched the last man in the Huk patrol, punctured his neck with two holes, vampire fashion, held his body by the heels to drain the blood, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks discovered their bloodless comrade, they fled from the region.¹³

Lansdale also held regular coffee sessions with Filipino officials and military personnel. Out of this came the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) to lure the Huks with a program of resettlement. EDCOR became the government's response to the "land for the landless" slogan of the Huks. The plan of forming such an entity actually started even before World War II when ex-Senator Camilo Osias suggested it for the public schools. After liberation, the idea of an economic development

corps was espoused by the Army for the purpose of integrating 20-year-old recruits who were to be trained on mechanized farms into the pattern of national defense. But it was not until Magsaysay became the Secretary of National Defense that the plan turned into a reality. EDCOR was placed under military control. This was his "left hand" approach in attracting the dissidents to surrender. Six months after he took office, on 22 February 1951, the first EDCOR farm project was established at Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur. The project consisted of 1,600 hectares of farm land for distribution to ex-Huks at the rate of about six to eight hectares per family. The Army would furnish each family with farm implements, a carabao, a house, seeds and other paraphernalia. In May 1947, the first batch of 56 ex-Huk families was taken at the Army's expense to Lanao. Six years later, a total of 978 families or nearly 5,000 persons had been settled in the four EDCOR farms in Mindanao and Isabela in Luzon.¹⁴ However, only 246, or 25 percent of these families were ex-Huks. Most were members of Magsaysay's armed forces.¹⁵

The AFP also embarked on a host of socio-economic activities such as the building of roads, bridges, irrigation systems, ditches, and school buildings, in line with their counter-insurgency (COIN) program. They also provided free dental, medical, and legal services to residents in the rural areas.

After assuming office on 30 December 1953 as the third President of the Republic, Magsaysay continued the use of the military in his socio-economic programs. He retained the defense portfolio until 14 May 1954.

But despite the fact that the military performed duties beyond their traditional roles, the civilian political authority still remained supreme. Congress continued to exercise effective control over the military through its constitutional powers over the defense budget and the promotion of senior officers.

However, discontent within the military establishment could not be dismissed as non-existent. As an aftermath of the 1949 presidential elections where there were charges of massive electoral fraud committed by Quirino, a guerrilla leader, one Col Medrano of Batangas, led a local rebellion and was reported to have solicited the support of the military. Similarly, in 1958, after Carlos P. Garcia became president following the death of Magsaysay, rumors of a coup were in the air. Although these rumors were never substantiated, Garcia took decisive action by dismissing Gen Jesus N. Vargas as Secretary of National Defense.¹⁶

But these were just plans which were never implemented, for it can be said that during that time, the demarcation lines between civilian and military authority were clearly defined. Civilian political institutions were relatively strong, regular elections provided the mechanism for changing leaders, and the military establishment faithfully adhered to the dictum that civilian authority is supreme over the military establishment.

A.4. The AFP from 1957 to 1965

At the time of Magsaysay's death in 1957, the AFP had become involved in civic action and counter-insurgency functions, and in such various socio-economic projects as the building of schoolhouses, roads and bridges, digging of artesian wells, and the provision of medical and legal assistance to rural residents.

During the incumbency of Garcia, the Socio-Economic Military Program (SEMP) was adopted as a military responsibility. It aimed to use the resources of the military in the socio-economic development of the country. It authorized the Chief of Staff to utilize military personnel for land resettlement, rural development, food production, and public works construction. A number of SEMP settlements were established in Mindanao, Luzon, and Panay islands. However, this endeavor was not then undertaken on a full-scale and permanent basis.

President Diosdado Macapagal, who won the 1961 elections, did not believe that the military's role should be extended to involvement in civic action, unlike Magsaysay and Garcia. He terminated the AFP civic action programs arguing that civic action only encouraged the military to engage in politics. He strongly believed that civic action was not a function of the military. By 1965, there had been a substantial reduction in the AFP's presence in national life. They returned to their barracks and the regularity of military life.

But it can be said that the military's involvement in counter-insurgency, in keeping with its function of providing internal security and maintaining peace and order, led it to participate in socio-economic activities, a task beyond its traditional role.

B. The Involvement of the AFP as a Partner in National Development: 1966 - 1971

After President Ferdinand E. Marcos assumed office on 30 December 1965, he made the AFP an integral component of his economic development

program. In his State of the Nation address, he emphasized that

... the primary threat to our national security within the immediate future lies in internal subversion rather than from any external aggression. The military establishment will be developed along this basic premise in the years to come. However, since the development of our economy provides the permanent solution to this threat, I intend to harness to a greater extent the resources of our defense establishment in our task of nation building. It would be culpable negligence on our part if the peaceful uses of military forces were not availed of to the fullest extent possible in our continuing program of economic development.¹⁷

The Four-Year Economic Program formulated in September 1966 and approved by the National Economic Council noted that

... the Armed Forces of the Philippines with its manpower, material and equipment resources plus its organizational cohesiveness and discipline possesses a tremendous potential to participate in economic development which should be exploited to the maximum. Such participation becomes imperative considering that the problem besetting the country is socio-economic rather than military and that the resources available to solve this problem are scarce and limited.¹⁸

The foregoing policy pronouncements provided the rationale for the AFP's massive participation in socio-economic development.

B.1. Career Development Programs to Suit Their New Role

The AFP's new function required skills and expertise that would be necessary to make the military better qualified for Marcos's plans. In his 1966 State of the Nation address, Marcos called for "increased training, new equipment and heightened morale . . ."¹⁹ Imbuing the AFP with civilian management skills became one of the goals of his defense program. Service schools were re-equipped and re-staffed with career soldiers. At the first year of his presidency, it was reported that

... 2,781 officers and enlisted men completed courses in local and foreign service schools. And 50,000 ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Course] cadets completed the required instructions in colleges and universities in the Philippines. Of all the major services the army was the most actively involved in professionalizing its forces. Special training was conducted during the year for 167 officers. Several combat exercises were also undertaken. Refresher courses were completed by 1,360 officers and men in the Constabulary, and 92 officers from the Air Force. In the Navy, 68 officers participated in training courses. Under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), 145 officers were trained in the U.S. . . .²⁰

The National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), activated on 9 September 1963, became the apex of the officer's military education.

It is the only institution in the country with the mission of educating senior military leaders, as well as civilian executives from the government, for top positions in the national government and in national and international security structures.

The NDCP's first regular course started on 6 February 1966. By June 1972, a total of 93 students in six classes had been graduated. In the next six years (July 1972 to June 1978), it graduated another 251 students in six classes or 151 percent over the first six classes.

Majority of its graduates were holding key and sensitive positions in their respective offices by 1977. Most of these graduates were responsible for the formulation of national or agency policies regarding national security. Among its graduates from the military, 37 had been promoted to the grade of general as of 1977.²¹

Occupying the next rung below NDCP in the officer's military education is the AFP Command and General Staff College (CGSC) which was activated in 1969, with its first class held in July of that year. Previously, each major service command, except the PC, had its own command and staff school, the Army being the first to establish one. All of these command and staff schools were integrated into the CGSC.

Just like its previous counterparts in the different military services, the CGSC aims to prepare officers for senior level positions. However, in its briefing paper, the CGSC explains that training of top military men should not be limited to military matters. Although it is not explicitly stated, the institution appears to be concerned with training military men for civilian leadership roles. It envisioned the ideal of a military professional with a broad perspective of a committed leader and the incisive and analytical mind of a statesman. When the CGSC started, most of the subjects were military courses. Through the years, changes in the curriculum were mostly in terms of management courses.

The CGSC had conducted the following courses: Command and General Staff Regular Course (CGSRC), Command and General Staff Associate Course (CGSAC), Command and General Staff Special Course (CGSSC), Technical Service Command and Staff Course (TSCSC), Non-Residence Correspondence Course (NRCC), and Battalion Commanders' Course (BCC). The CGSC also conducted important seminars as Crisis Management on Hostage Negotiations, Curriculum Development Course, and briefings on human rights. To date, the CGSC has graduated 2,322 AFP officers as shown in Table II-1.

The Philippine Military Academy (PMA) is the country's only military academy for professional career officers. The Academy traces its beginnings to the officers' school of the Philippine Constabulary in Manila which opened on 17 February 1905. With the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 1, the Constabulary Academy rose to full college status. It offers an academic curriculum of four years leading to a degree of bachelor of science. Graduates are commissioned as second lieutenants in the regular force.

**Table II-1 — Number of Graduates
From CGSC By Service Command**

Course	PA	PC	PAF	PN	TechServ	Allied	Total
CGSRC	559	452	296	256	125	129	1,817
CGSAC	75	102	24	24	37	—	262
CGSSC	13	8	4	9	6	—	40
TSCSC	—	—	—	—	86	—	86
NRCC	54	12	8	2	5	—	81
BCC	18	10	2	6	—	—	36
Total	719	584	334	297	259	129	2,322

Source: AFP Command and General Staff College, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila.

Other military schools include the following: the Metropolitan Citizen Military Training Command (MCMTC), Armed Forces of the Philippines Training Command (AFPTC), Philippine Air Force Flying School (PAFFS), PA Training Command (PA TRACOM), Naval Training Command (NTC), and the Philippine Constabulary Training Command (PC TRACOM). A discussion of the kind of training that candidate-officers undergo at the PMA and at the aforementioned military schools is made in the next chapter.

The AFP also sent their men to take advance degrees at various civilian schools and universities, including the College of Public

Administration at the University of the Philippines, the Asian Institute of Management, and at the graduate schools of business of Ateneo de Manila University and De La Salle University.

Other training programs undertaken by the military establishment to make its men better prepared for their newly-assigned roles included the training and equipping of the AFP engineering battalions from 1967 to 1968 in exchange for the Philippine government's commitment to send a civic action team to Vietnam. This was undertaken with a \$7 million grant from the US.²²

The AFP also relied on the training programs provided by the US as a form of military aid under the Mutual Assistance Program. By 1971, Philippine military personnel, numbering 13,588, had received training from the US. Specifically, some 8,729 were trained within the continental US. One hundred and fifty-three senior officers had attended US command and general staff schools. During 1969 and 1970, five US military teams were detailed to assist the AFP in training, supply, maintenance, and equipment operations at an estimated cost of \$300,000.²³

The AFP also participated in training programs provided by other countries. Under the Defense Cooperation Program (DCP), AFP personnel have undertaken training courses and study visits in Australia since 1960. A total of 1,021 military personnel have participated in DCP training programs from the time it was initiated until the present year as shown in Table II-2.

The AFP also participated in study visits under the DCP to familiarize senior AFP officers with Australian Defence Force activities and procedures. Study visits included the following:

- a. Dockyard Management
- b. Personnel Management
- c. Australian Army Organization,
- d. Logistics
- e. Logistics Studies
- f. Survey Training
- g. Formulation of Training Doctrines
- h. Senior Executive Management
- i. Technical Conferences
- j. Explosive Safety Seminar
- k. Army Health

Table II-2 — Number of AFP Personnel Who Participated in DCP Training Programs: 1960 - 1990

Year	No. of AFP Personnel	Year	No. of AFP Personnel
1960	3	1975	16
1961	2	1976	22
1962	2	1977	12
1963	6	1978	25
1964	4	1979	39
1965	3	1980	64
1966	2	1981	66
1967	2	1982/83	101
1968	2	1983/84	66
1969	3	1984/85	63
1970	4	1985/86	77
1971	0	1986/87	103
1972	7	1987/88	79
1973	10	1988/89	64
1974	13	1989/90	171

Source: Office of Education and Training (OJ-8), Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

Other Allied countries also offered training programs through diplomatic invitation to the AFP for command and general staff courses as shown in Table II-3. Data for the years 1966 to 1973 were not available as the records perished in the fire which destroyed the GHQ building in Camp Aguinaldo in 1987. Similarly, annual accomplishment reports of the AFP from 1970 to 1986 relating not only to the education and training but to other changes in the military, were all burned during the fifth coup attempt on August 1987.²⁴

Table II-3 — Number of AFP Personnel Who Participated in Training Programs of Allied Countries

Country	Year Started	Total No. of Graduates To Date
France	1989	1
Germany	1975	17
India	1974	3
Indonesia	1973	53
Korea	1982	12
Malaysia	1975	14
Singapore	1985	3
Spain	1975	15
Thailand	1987	2

Source: Office of Education and Training (OJ-8), Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

B.2. National Development Programs Undertaken by the AFP

With the decision in 1966 to tap military resources for economic development, the AFP embarked on a socio-economic program of unprecedented scale under the banner of "civic action." Projects under civic action fell into two general groupings: those in support of national development program, and those in support of regional or community development programs. Under the former were the construction of highways, feeder roads, and pre-fabricated schoolhouse buildings, irrigation development, flood control, dredging and reclamation, manpower development, land resettlement, and industrial site planning. Under the latter were the civic action centers (Home Defense Centers or HDCs), servicing of regional development programs, and assisting the Department of Health in the provision of medical and dental services to the rural population.²⁵

The most significant achievements of the civic action program were in the field of public works. In the first Four-Year Economic Program, Marcos stressed the need for a public works program amounting to P3

billion, with ₱960.4 million or 31.06 percent for the construction of new roads and the improvement of existing ones. Considering the magnitude of the construction program and the relatively short period within which it was expected to be accomplished, Marcos mobilized the manpower, material, and equipment resources of the AFP. Three major engineering units were directly involved in the infrastructural development program — the 51st Engineer Brigade which was composed of one Special Support Company and 10 Engineer Construction Battalions, the 515th Engineer Forestry Company and the Waterfront and Dredge Company of the Philippine Navy. The 10 Engineer Construction Battalions of the 51st Engineer Brigade were increased to 15 by 1967.

For a period of one year (1966), the 51st Engineer Brigade alone completed 13 major construction projects with a total cost of ₱3.16 million which was more than 50 percent of what was undertaken by the Corps of Engineers in twelve and one half years under previous administrations.

From 1966 to 1973, an approximate comparison can be made of the total national accomplishment with that of the AFP's on a number of infrastructure activities as shown in Table II-4.²⁶

Table II-4 — Percentage of AFP Infrastructure Projects, 1966 - 1973

Project	AFP (in kms.)	National Total (in kms.)	Percent Contribution
Highways	113.645	6,431	1.767
Secondary Roads	72.736	11,748	0.619
Feeder	2,172.724	7,196	30.193
Bridges	1,468.560	37,677	3.898

Source: Col Florencio Magsino, "An Assessment of the Employment of the AFP for National Development" (Masteral Thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, 1974), p. 54.

Although the AFP's contribution in the construction of highways, secondary roads, and bridges was very minimal in terms of the national total, its contribution to the construction of feeder roads was very substantial, amounting to 30 percent of the total. Feeder roads are those made of dirt or gravel to connect rural and far-flung areas to towns and cities.

In meeting the acute shortage of schoolhouses, the AFP constructed 4,185 units of Army-type pre-fabricated schoolhouses and fabricated 6,500 units of the Marcos-type from 1966 to June 1969. This constituted 46 percent of the administration's pre-fabricated school building output from 1966 to 1969.²⁷

The Navy, for its part, implemented dredging programs. The Air Force, by 1969, covered more than 3.2 million hectares with photogrammetry for mapping purposes.²⁸ In 28 provinces, 37 HDCs were established in the same year. These HDCs served as the focal point for coordinating inter-agency support for community self-help projects. The activities undertaken by the HDCs were many and varied, from community irrigation in Luzon to seminars in deep sea fishing in Sulu.

The AFP also provided free medical and dental services, especially in rural areas. By 1969, there were 25 military rural health teams operating in 17 provinces, attending to the public health in medically-distressed areas. In fiscal year 1968 - 1969, 89,613 medical and 43,403 dental patients were treated.²⁹

B.3. Internal Security and Peace and Order

Despite the preoccupation with civic action, the AFP continued to undertake its role of maintaining peace and order in the country. Law enforcement was continually carried out by the PC. They were quite successful in their drive against smuggling during the first year and a half of Marcos's incumbency.³⁰ The PC, with assistance from the Philippine Navy, arrested at least 100 of the most important smugglers.

In the Greater Manila Area (GMA), crime figures were on the rise when Marcos became president. GMA was composed of 4 cities and 13 municipalities, each having its own police force. In 1968, Marcos established the Metropolitan Area Command (METROCOM) of the PC. It assisted local police forces in GMA in dealing with urban unrest among workers and students. Other units of the AFP were transferred to the METROCOM, beefing it up to a force of 1,700 officers and enlisted men, from a meager 300-man team. From 1 August 1968 to 1 July 1970, the

METROCOM was under the administrative and operational control of GHQ, but after this period, the PC took over, making the METROCOM one of the major subordinate commands of the PC with a status equal to that of a PC Zone Command in the provinces.³¹ Aside from assisting the local police forces in general crime fighting, the METROCOM also assisted local police agencies in the arrest, detention, search and seizure of suspects in criminal investigation and prosecution, especially in cases involving illegal possession of firearms, carnapping, and other serious offenses. Trained by the US in crowd control techniques, METROCOM obtained the opportunity to apply what it learned in dispersing demonstrations held at the US Embassy, Malacañang and in other places in 1970 and 1971.

The AFP was also deputized during elections. In 1969, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) mobilized the military in manning the polls. In 1971, military personnel were asked to keep the polls orderly and to guard the ballot boxes from the electoral precincts to the tabulating center in Manila.³²

B.4. Structural Changes in the Military

When Marcos assumed the presidency, he retained the defense portfolio for the first 13 months of his term, following the precedent set by Magsaysay. Marcos immediately undertook the largest reshuffle in the history of the Philippine military.³³ Of the 25 flag officers, 14 were forced to retire, including the AFP Chief and Vice Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Army, the Chief of PC, all four Constabulary zone commanders, and approximately one-third of the provincial commanders.³⁴ A number of key appointments were given to officers from Marcos's home province of Ilocos Norte. Retired BGen Ernesto Mata was recalled to active duty and was appointed Chief of Staff. BGen Segundo Velasco became Chief of PC and Col Fabian C. Ver was appointed commander of the Presidential Security Command (PSC). All three were from Ilocos Norte. These moves can be seen as an early attempt on the part of Marcos to place men loyal to him in key positions in the AFP.

In the South, increasing criminal activities such as smuggling, cattle-rustling, and the conflict between the Christians and the Muslims led to the establishment of the Southwest Command (SOWESCOM) in Zamboanga City on 21 September 1968. It became the first unified command in the AFP. It was composed of elements of the Army, Constabulary, Air Force, and the Navy. It guarded the southern backdoor. Its operations included the maintenance of peace and order,

anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, anti-subversion, and campaign against other acts inimical to national security. On 1 May 1976, SOWESCOM became the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), with jurisdiction over the whole of Southern Philippines and the responsibility of maintaining peace and order, assisting in the socio-economic development of the area, and guarding it from external and internal threats.³⁵

B.5. Participation in a Foreign War

The Philippines also sent a unit to Vietnam. The Philippine Civic Action Group Vietnam (PHILCAG V) was the country's contribution to the Allied efforts in that country. PHILCAG V was involved in the construction and repair of roads, bridges, buildings, in the resettlement of the refugees, and in attending to the sick and wounded from both sides of the battlefield in Vietnam.

From all of the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that the role of the AFP increased under Marcos. But the utilization of the armed forces in socio-economic development programs is not a novel idea. It has been done in other countries. Marcos was not a pioneer in the field. The AFP also undertook socio-economic programs during the Magsaysay era. However, it was only during Marcos's term when the non-military role of the AFP became institutionalized. Before Marcos, military role expansion took place within a political environment where the political institutions were relatively strong, the rules of the political game were observed, and the supremacy of civilian authority over the military was intact.

C. Martial Law 1972 - 1986: Political Consequences and Impact on the AFP

With Proclamation 1081, Marcos placed the Philippines under martial law. He claimed that it was warranted by threats to public safety and the security of the nation arising from increased terroristic activities of insurgent groups, specifically, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Muslim rebel groups in Southern Philippines. Proclamation 1081, signed on 21 September 1972, stated that

... on the basis of carefully evaluated and verified information, it is definitely established that lawless elements who are moved by a common or similar ideological conviction, design, strategy and goal, and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by intensely devoted, well-trained, determined and ruthless groups of men and seeking refuge under the protection of our constitutional liberties to promote

and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their resources and forces together for the prime purpose of, and in fact they have been, and are actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in order to forcibly seize political and state power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted Government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one. . . .³⁶

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Marcos ordered the military to "maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all laws and decrees, orders and regulations. . . ."³⁷ Marcos clarified that the proclamation of martial law was not a military takeover.³⁸ The military authorities would only be implementing martial law to protect the country. He cited the 1935 Constitution and assured that the AFP would continue to uphold the supremacy of civilian authority.³⁹

Contrary to these pronouncements, however, the military was actually involved in the decision to put the country under martial law. In a speech before the AFP in celebration of Loyalty Day, Marcos revealed that 12 high defense officials formed the key group, who were in constant consultation with each other regarding the decision to place the country under martial law. The 12 men had been variously called the "Twelve Disciples,"⁴⁰ the "Twelve Apostles,"⁴¹ and the "Rolex 12".⁴² They were Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, AFP Chief of Staff Gen Romeo Espino, PA Commanding Officer MGen Rafael Zagala, PC Chief MGen Fidel V. Ramos, PAF Chief MGen Jose Rancudo, PN Commander RAdm Hilario Ruiz, PSC Chief MGen Fabian C. Ver, AFP Chief of Intelligence MGen Ignacio Paz, 1st PC Zone Commander BGen Tomas Diaz, PC METROCOM Commander BGen Alfredo Montoya, Rizal PC Commander Col Romeo Gatan, and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. The latter was recalled to active duty with the rank of colonel.⁴³ Vice Chief of Staff Gen Rafael Iletto was against the plan because he thought the declaration of martial law would not be proper at that time. He was subsequently named Philippine Ambassador to Iran, becoming the first active duty officer to hold an ambassadorial post in the country's history.⁴⁴

Soon after the declaration of martial law, Congress was abolished, mass activities were prohibited, political parties were outlawed, and civil and political rights were suspended. Newspaper publications were ordered closed and curfew was strictly implemented.

General Order (GO) No. 1 gave the President the power to "govern the nation and direct the operation of the entire government including

all its agencies and instrumentalities."⁴⁵ GO No. 2 ordered the arrest of individuals who were perceived to be participants in a conspiracy to seize political and state power.⁴⁶ This was later amended by GO No. 19 which authorized the arrest and detention of any person who shall utter, publish, distribute, circulate, and spread false news and information.⁴⁷ GO No. 4 ordered the observance of curfew hours from 12:00 midnight to 4:00 in the morning.⁴⁸ Rallies, demonstrations, and other forms of group actions were prohibited,⁴⁹ as well as the possession of firearms unless duly authorized.⁵⁰

The abolition of civilian institutions like Congress, the weakening of the judiciary, and the outlawing of political parties, left the military as the only other instrumentality of the national government outside of the Presidency. The military had been called to save the Republic and restore confidence in the "democratic traditions" cherished by the Filipinos. In a country with no militaristic tradition — and where the military was traditionally low key — the AFP became very visible, performing a more expanded mission, such as security, law and order, administration of justice, greater management and administrative functions, and developmental, political and miscellaneous roles.⁵¹

C.1. Military Participation in Politics

C.1.a. Martial Law Implementor

The military became one of the vital supports of the regime. Apart from external defense, the AFP was also charged with the suppression of rebellion and the enforcement of all laws, decrees, orders, and regulations issued by Marcos. They enforced nationwide curfew, collection of unlicensed firearms, and the suppression of rallies, strikes, and demonstrations. Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 98 vested in the PC the task of maintaining peace and order in corn procurement areas and the enforcement of pertinent rules of the National Grains Authority (NGA) in line with the government's massive corn procurement program.⁵² The military was also ordered to assist other government offices in the implementation of price control imposed on commodities such as corn and milled rice.⁵³ The Secretary of National Defense was directed to provide assistance in the collection of loans incurred from rural banks, the Philippine National Bank, and the Agricultural Credit Administration.⁵⁴ The agrarian reform law, by virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, was also implemented by the military. LOI No. 45

authorized the PC Provincial Commanders to receive sworn statements of landowners to be submitted to the Secretary of National Defense.⁵⁵

C.1.b. Centralization of Police Forces

Peace and order problems continued to be the responsibility of the PC. In 1975, police forces were incorporated into the Integrated National Police (INP) and placed under the command of the PC chief. These efforts may be viewed as an attempt to centralize political control by taking away a very important power from local governments.⁵⁶ The PC also supervised other law enforcement agencies technically outside the jurisdiction of the military. The PC/INP absorbed as special agencies the law enforcement units of the Land Transportation Commission (LTC), the Central Bank (CB), Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Bureau of Fisheries, and the Bureau of Forest Development.⁵⁷

C.1.c. The Presidential Security Command

The security role of the PSC was also expanded. Initially, the security of the President and Malacanang was the responsibility of the Presidential Security Unit (PSU). Under Ver, the PSU was expanded to battalion strength and became the Presidential Security Battalion (PSB). Much later, the PSB became an independent command, with more men than a battalion, and was renamed Presidential Security Command (PSC). It became one of the stepping stones of Ver in his rise to power. When he became the AFP Chief of Staff in August 1981, Ver relinquished formal command of the PSC to BGen Santiago Barangan. In reality, however, Ver and his sons exercised *de facto* control over PSC. Col Irwin Ver was the PSC's Chief of Staff and Lt Col Rexor Ver was Commander of the PSU.⁵⁸

The PSC was also involved in intelligence work, since its commander was also the head of the National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA).⁵⁹

Originally, the intelligence structure of the AFP was drawn up from the individual service commands. Joint intelligence became the function of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP). The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) was responsible for supervision and coordination of all intelligence services. NISA took over the functions of NICA. It became the dominant intelligence force and the "eyes and ears" of the regime.⁶⁰

AFP units in a region were also unified in a composite force under a commander and his staff. This gave birth to the Regional Unified

Command (RUC). RUCs were composite divisions where PC, PAF, PA, and PN, as well as Marine units were integrated under one command to facilitate better coordination of combat and support operations. Aside from artillery support, the RUCs were also provided with armored fighting vehicles and air support. It was contended that such centralization would result in efficient disaster control and relief operations, and greater responsiveness in civic action programs.⁶¹ However, centralization also helped prop up the dictatorship of Marcos and the control of the AFP by Ver.

C.1.d. Participation in Judicial Functions

The military was also vested with judicial functions. GO No. 8 empowered the Chief of Staff to create military tribunals to try and decide cases of military personnel and other such cases as may be referred to them.⁶² These other cases were spelled out in GO No. 12⁶³ which included crimes against national security, violations of the Anti-Subversion Law and the Laws on Espionage, crimes against public order, and crimes committed by public officials, among others. By 1974, 20 military tribunals had been set up. In December, LOI No. 237 was issued. It ordered the return of many cases from the military tribunals to civilian courts. Despite this directive, some cases still remained with Military Commissions such as those against Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr (Ninoy), Jose Ma Sison (Joma) and Lt Victor Corpuz.

C.1.e. Management Functions

The military was also tasked with the control and management of all media communication and public utilities such as the Manila Electric Co, the Philippine National Railways, Philippine Airlines Inc, and the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority. The military was empowered to take over and control the assets of corporations as the Jacinto Steel, Inc, Jacinto Iron and Steel Sheets Corp, J and P Shipping Corp, Perro Products, the Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, the Elizalde Steel Co, and the Elizalde Rolling Mills, Inc. The then AFP Chief of Staff Espino became the board chairman of the Jacinto companies.

Many military personnel were detailed to civilian offices and individuals. Military personnel were designated as representatives of Marcos to and military supervisors of certain civilian offices, such as the Board of Transportation, Land Transportation Commission, the offices of the city and district engineers, the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the Philippine Sugar Commission.

GHQ issued a circular dated 18 June 1974 which laid out the policies, procedures and guidelines regarding the detail of military personnel to civilian offices. Detailed military personnel were classified into categories:⁶⁴

- Category I – Those detailed with utility firms, public utilities, civilian government agencies, and important persons
- Category II – Those detailed with government corporations and private agencies
- Category III – Those detailed with the Ministry of National Defense
- Category IV – Those detailed with the Office of the President and the National Intelligence and Security Agency.

Since the declaration of martial law until 1980, there were 349 officers and 830 enlisted personnel, or a total of 1,179 detailed outside the AFP.⁶⁵ In April 1980, GHQ ordered the return of military men to the AFP as a response to the personnel shortage of the combat and combat support units in the field, especially in Southern Philippines. After the recall, 115 officers and 298 enlisted men continued to be detailed outside the AFP. As shown in Table II-5, of the 115 officers, 20 were from the PAF, 34 from PN, 26 from PC and 28 from PA. Seven came from the Technical Services.

Table II-5 — Officers and Men Detailed Outside the AFP As of April 1980

Grade	Branch of Service					
	PAF	PN	PC	PA	Techserv	Total
OFFICERS	20	34	26	28	7	115
ENLISTED PERSONNEL	35	48	107	108	0	298

Source: AFP Inventory of Military Personnel Detailed Outside the AFP (Office of the Adjutant General, AFP, April 1980), as cited in Rodolfo D. Dimaano, "The Detail of Military Personnel to Individuals, Offices and Establishments Outside the AFP: An Appraisal" (Masteral Thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, 1981), p. 22.

Most of these officers and men were detailed with the Ministry of National Defense (MND) in various capacities. Others were assigned in civilian offices like the PCA, the Jacinto Corporation, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), BIR, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Philippine National Oil Co.⁶⁶

C.1.f. Investment Activities

Marcos also rewarded the military with investment corporations. PD No. 257 created the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea Investment and Development Corporation (PEFTOK-IDC).⁶⁷ PEFTOK-IDC was granted ₱4 million in capital stock. The decree granted the corporation the power to engage in various commercial enterprises as the creation of all kinds of investment opportunities, development of agriculture, acquisition of lands for agricultural, pastoral and related purposes, and engagement in the business of general and wholesale merchants and exporters, among others.

Another investment corporation that was created for the military was the Philippine Veterans Investment Development Co (PHIVIDEC), established in 1973.⁶⁸ The initial capitalization was valued at \$500,000 which was expanded to ₱10 million by the end of 1973. It was exempted from tax and was opened to military personnel on active duty.

C.1.g. Developmental Roles

The military institution also embarked on developmental roles, in keeping with the tradition started by Magsaysay and was utilized to the fullest in the first years of the incumbency of Marcos.

From 1972 to 1977, the AFP participated in the construction of 2,866 school buildings with an aggregate cost of ₱97.7 million. They also participated in the construction and repair of irrigation systems, rural electrification systems, and resettlement homes worth ₱244 million. The military helped the government in its anti-pollution campaign through the inspection of factories and industrial sites, as well as the clearing of 23,168 square meters of waterways and 269,155 square meters of esteros in the GMA. For the same period, 1.3 million medical and dental patients were treated.

The AFP had also conducted 1,301 air evacuation missions, 506 airlift and 88 search and rescue missions. All over the country, 2,237 hectares of agricultural land within military camps had been cultivated

and 11,567 heads of cattle and hogs were raised. The AFP also planted more than 100,000 trees in support of the national reforestation program, and 683 rain-making sorties were undertaken by the Air Force to preserve the viability of watersheds and agricultural lands.⁶⁹

In the field of construction, AFP engineer battalions completed a total of ₱1.33 billion worth of infrastructure projects from 1973 to 31 July 1982 as shown in Table II-6.⁷⁰

**Table II-6 — Total Value of AFP
Infrastructure Projects: 1973 - 1981**

Year	Total (in millions)
1973	₱ 32.30
1974	78.10
1975	105.00
1976	199.20
1977	2.21
1978	240.50
1979	135.10
1980	54.10
1981	69.10

Source: Juan Ponce Enrile, "The Supportive Role of the Defense Ministry in National Development," in *Fookien Times Yearbook*. (Manila: Fookien Times Yearbook Publishing Co, 1982 - 1983), p. 113.

Military officers were also appointed as Presidential Regional Officers for Development (PROD). The PRODs were regional implementing officers for specific programs of reform and other vital projects as agrarian reform, the establishment of farmers' cooperatives, agricultural production, self-employment, and community development. LOI No. 36 granted them the authority to utilize the prerogatives of the Office of the President in their supervision of projects to enable them to harness the manpower and other resources in the area to achieve their

regional objectives. Three out of the original 11 PRODs were military officers: Region II was under the Commanding General of the Northeast Command, Region IX was under the Commander of SOWESCOM, and Region X was under the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division (4 ID). By 1978, six out of the 12 regions had military men as PRODs: Region II was under Col Gil Manuel, Region III was under Col Benjamin Santos, Region VII was under BGen Mario Espina, Region IX was under RAdm Romulo Espaldon, Region X was under BGen Alfonso Alcosaba, and Region XI was under Col Emilio Ahorro.⁷¹ Obviously, military men were assigned as PRODs in areas with insurgency problems, where the military did not only perform its role of protecting the country from internal subversion, but also assumed a developmental role as part of the overall counter-insurgency strategy.

C.1.h. Political Functions

Marcos appointed active duty officers to perform civilian functions in government and state organizations. A number of officers acted as officials of political units. For example, BGen Benjamin Duque was appointed as Governor of Sultan Kudarat in Maguindanao province while RAdm Espaldon became Governor of Tawi-Tawi, on the basis of the rationale that these were areas with serious problems of internal security. With the dismantling of Congress and the ban on political parties and activities, the military was able to replace traditional politicians, and became the dispensers of political patronage.⁷²

Other roles and functions contributed to the visibility of the military. By authority of Paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, COMELEC was granted the power to deputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies of the government including the AFP to ensure free, orderly, and honest elections. From then on, the military was used extensively during elections in the succeeding years. COMELEC Resolution No. 1313, promulgated on 4 April 1978, deputized the AFP during the elections on 7 April 1978. Similarly, COMELEC Resolution No. 1434, promulgated on 14 January 1980, called on the AFP to help in the 30 January 1980 local elections.

C.2. The Growth and Expansion of the AFP

This expansion in role was accompanied by an increase in size and budget. The AFP grew from 57,100 in 1971 to 113,000 in 1976, with a marked increase of 97.89 percent over a five-year period. To complement the regular forces in the battle against the New People's Army, the

Integrated Civilian Home Defense Forces (ICHDF) was formed. By 1985, the defense establishment included about 274,300 regulars and paramilitary personnel, plus another 124,000 men as reserves as shown in Table II-7. For purposes of comparison, the figures for 1990 for the major services are also shown. The military budget also increased by 500 percent in four years, from ₱880 million in 1972 to ₱4 billion in 1976.⁷³

Table II-7 — Strength of the AFP: 1971 - 1990

	1971	1976	1985	1990
Regular Forces				
Army	17,600	45,000	70,000	67,256
Navy	8,000	17,000	28,000	23,801
Air Force	9,000	16,000	16,800	14,818
Constabulary	23,500	35,000	43,500	41,521
TOTAL	57,100	113,000	158,300	147,396
Irregulars and Others				
Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF)	NA	25,000	65,000	NA
Integrated National Police (INP)	NA	NA	51,000	NA
Reserves	NA	45,000	124,000	NA

Legend: NA - Not Available

Sources: Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1971 - 1972* (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 30; Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1976 - 1977* (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 60; *Manila Chronicle*, 23 November 1987, p.7, as cited in Walden Bello, *Creating the Third Force: U.S. Sponsored Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippines* (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1987), p. 32. For 1990, figures are obtained from OJ-1 (Personnel), Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

But while the size of the military increased, the AFP experienced shortage of combat personnel which led to mass enlistment and the transfer of men from desk jobs to the field. Lacking adequate training and discipline, these contributed to deprofessionalization and demoralization, especially among the men in the field.

C.3. The Rise of the Twin Insurgencies: CPP and MNLF

The arrest of the leaders of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) in 1952 led to demoralization among the ranks. By 1954, the Huk rebellion had virtually collapsed. Pursuit of the armed struggle was further discouraged by the enactment of the Anti-Subversion Law in 1957 with severe penalties for membership in the PKP.

In the late 1960s, intellectual and political ferment among young students at the University of the Philippines (UP), much impressed by Marxism and such international events as the Cuban Revolution and China's Cultural Revolution, formed the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) led by Amado Guerrero (reportedly the pen name of Joma Sison). They joined the PKP through the mediation of an Indonesian postgraduate student at UP, but were expelled in 1967 due to ideological, generational, and leadership differences with the old PKP leaders. These young Marxists formed the CPP.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, a Huk faction under Commander Sumulong degenerated into a crime syndicate. Disgusted, one of his lieutenants, Commander Dante (Bernabe Buscayno), seceded with his men and joined the CPP. Thus, the "marriage between Dante's army in search for a party and Guerrero's party in search for an army gave birth to the NPA [New People's Army] on 29 March 1969."⁷⁵ The National Democratic Front (NDF) was established in April 1973 to unite all left-oriented groups fighting the Marcos regime under one umbrella.

The NPA insurgency grew substantially during the Marcos regime. Although the size of the military increased through mass enlistment, the men lacked adequate training, equipment, and support. With the breakdown of discipline, human rights violations increased, and demoralization set in as the military failed to secure mass support or to suppress the insurgency despite its size.

Furthermore, the mismanagement of the economy and rise of "crony" capitalism and graft and corruption exacerbated the poverty problem, especially in the rural areas. The government gradually lost control of the countryside, unable to implement a meaningful socio-economic

approach to the problem of insurgency. Instead, NPA recruitment intensified.

On the other hand, Mindanao has been marked by tension between Muslims and Christian settlers. In 1968, a separatist Muslim (later Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM) led by older-generation Muslim leaders, declared the independence of Mindanao from the Republic. Young Muslim recruits, the Group of 90, were trained by English and Palestinian mercenaries in the forests of Malaysia to organize an army for MIM. However, disillusionment with and lack of trust in traditional Muslim leaders led these young recruits to form the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) in mid-1971, henceforth, to act in behalf of the Bangsa Moro. Nur Misuari, a contemporary of many KM leaders at UP, became the MNLF's leader. However, the 1971 local elections drew its members away from the MNLF. Many of the members of the Group of 90 joined the Barracudas and Blackshirts, armed Muslim groups which fought the anti-Muslim Ilagas.⁷⁶

The declaration of martial law convinced the MNLF leadership that peaceful change for Muslims was no longer possible. The order to surrender all firearms by Marcos, and the program to create a "new society" were interpreted as repression of their aspirations for separate identity.⁷⁷ In October 1972, they launched an armed struggle against the regime which escalated to dangerous proportions with serious implications for the AFP.

The conflict invited the involvement of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), some of whose members supported the MNLF. Negotiations between the MNLF and the Marcos government mediated by the OIC led to the conclusion of the Tripoli Agreement in December 1976. Pursuant to it, two autonomous regional governments were set up in Muslim Mindanao. Development programs were undertaken to improve conditions there and Muslim rebel surrenderees were integrated into the AFP. These reflected the government's recognition that a purely military solution to insurgency, whether communist or Muslim, would not work.

D. The Lifting of Martial Law: More Form Than Substance (1981 - 1986)

Martial law was lifted in January 1981 by virtue of Proclamation 2045, on the basis that "anarchy had been successfully checked, the leftist-rightist rebellion substantially contained and the secessionist

movement effectively overcome."⁷⁸ But it was a cosmetic act. Substantively, nothing much had changed. Civil liberties continued to be constrained and the media remained under control. Although political parties were allowed to exist, electoral laws and regulations favored the ruling party organized by Marcos, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). In 1984, the regular Batasang Pambansa, with only about 50 active opposition members, was convened.

The military's martial law roles and the machinery for their effective pursuit remained intact even after the lifting of Proclamation 1081. It continued to manage the Jacinto group of companies. Military tribunals continued to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving subversion. The military continued to implement presidential orders and decrees and went on with its law and order functions such as the suppression of strikes and other forms of mass actions.

The role expansion of the AFP enhanced its capacity to intervene directly in the political affairs of the country. The abolition of Congress, the muzzling of the press, and the weakening of the judiciary left Marcos as the only civilian authority in control of the military. Marcos used the military to enforce his orders and decrees, and to perpetuate himself in power.

In exchange, Marcos coddled his favorites in the military. Promotions continued to be his sole prerogative and personal loyalty became the primary criterion. Well-connected officers were able to place their people in key and juicy positions. This was noted by then Vice Chief of Staff Lt Gen Ramos in a letter to Marcos dated 19 February 1986. He wrote that the constant jockeying for key positions by some officers to obtain "midnight" appointments would not be good for the AFP, considering the grave and complex problems that the country faced.⁷⁹

The presence of extendeé generals effectively blocked the promotions of middle-grade officers. Besides Ver and the three major service commanders — MGen Josephus Ramas, Commanding General, PA, MGen Vicente Piccio, Commanding General, PAF, and RAdm Brillante Ochoco, Flag Officer in Command (FOIC), PN, the other 18 extendeés were MGen Delfin Castro, BGen Angel Kanapi, BGen Carlos V. Martel, BGen Hamilton Dimaya, BGen Cirilo Oropesa, BGen Angel Mapua, BGen Alejandro Felix, BGen Andres Ramos, BGen Arsenio Silva, BGen Mariano Miranda, BGen Madrino Munoz, BGen Sinfroso Duque, BGen Leo Santos, BGen Santiago Barangan, BGen Narciso Creus, BGen Ramon Cannu, BGen Manuel Mercado, and BGen Telesforo Tayko.⁸⁰

Consequently, some officers became retireable at a fairly young age but at fairly lower ranks. A lot of officers were bypassed. A number of officers were promoted over several other more senior and qualified candidates. A breakdown in the merit system and demoralization became inevitable.

In the field, the men in combat suffered losses not only because of inadequate training and shortage of equipment and supplies but also because of the lack of troops. The need for manpower resulted in mass enlistment and the transfer of men from desk jobs to armed combat. The concomitant result was that such troops fought against insurgents seasoned in guerrilla warfare.

In August 1983, Ver was implicated in the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Marcos was forced to place Ver on a leave of absence while the investigation was going on. After being initially cleared by the Sandiganbayan, Ver immediately resumed his position as Chief of Staff.

The assassination unleashed massive popular opposition to the Marcos regime and the military organization that sustained it. Ninoy's martyrdom united the people and gave them courage to openly oppose the dictatorship. It became clear that the military leadership was a willing tool to perpetuate the regime at all costs.

Within the military, the assassination and the shame that attended it brought to the fore latent disaffection among some officers leading to the eventual movement for reform.

Independently of the assassination, a number of organizations began to sprout as Ver and his men continued their efforts to control the entire establishment. During the height of the Mindanao crisis in the early 1980s, the Diablo Squad was organized for mutual assistance of enlisted personnel. It was ordered disbanded by Ver but reappeared as the Guardians Brotherhood, Inc (GBI).⁸¹ Their purpose of fostering mutual understanding and cooperation among members of the AFP and the INP remained the same as Diablo's original objectives. The GBI is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Ex-Lt Col Gregorio Honasan's role in the GBI is not clear, but he signed the Articles of Incorporation of GBI as a witness.⁸²

But the most prominent group was the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) whose original activities are stated in their Manifesto. According to it, their efforts would be geared towards the attainment of the AFP's new thrust of uplifting the morale and welfare of every man

and woman in uniform, enhancing the operational effectiveness of the military establishment, and restoring the people's faith in the armed forces. With its initial members coming from PMA classes 1971 to 1984, membership expanded to include retired alumni who voiced out publicly their sentiments while many active officers signified their support quietly. A fuller discussion of the RAM is made in Chapter IV.

E. Post-EDSA (1986 - 1989): Return to Barracks?

When the Aquino administration came to power, it sought to redefine the role of the military. The 1987 Constitution, over-whelmingly ratified by the Filipino people, embodied principles which sought to establish the proper spheres of military activity. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the following articles state that

SEC. 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

SEC. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State, and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.

In its General Provisions, it states the following

SEC. 4. The Armed Forces shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.

SEC. 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.

(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and the nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.

(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.

No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.

(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.

(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.

(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.

(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.

SEC. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

SEC. 7. The State shall provide immediate and adequate care, benefits, and other forms of assistance to war veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans. Funds shall be provided therefor and due consideration shall be given them in the disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain and, in appropriate cases, in the utilization of natural resources.

The foregoing provisions emphasize the supremacy of civilian authority over the military by changing the concept and structure of the Armed Forces. As provided in the Constitution, the Armed Forces is to be composed of a citizen armed force, while maintaining a regular force for the security of the State, unlike in the National Defense Act which provided for a Regular and Reserve force. The present Constitution also prohibits military personnel in active service to serve in civilian positions by appointment or designation, confining the military to its function of maintaining national defense.⁸³

It has likewise significantly reduced the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President by limiting the grounds and duration for the suspension of the privilege of writ of *habeas corpus* and the proclamation of martial law. Only invasion and rebellion, when the public safety requires it, can be invoked as a ground for such suspension or proclamation. It shall not exceed 60 days and may be revoked by Congress by a vote of at least a majority of all its members voting jointly in a regular or special session. The revocation cannot be set aside by the President and only Congress, upon initiative of the President, can extend it. Moreover, the Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension or proclamation or its extension.⁸⁴ This will prevent a partnership of the executive and the military leadership similar to what evolved during martial law.

The administration also sought to address the grievances of the military. In terms of legislation, a total of 82 bills and resolutions related

to the military were filed with the House of Representatives as of 30 April 1990. As of 2 May 1990, a total of 141 of such bills and resolutions were filed with the Senate. But as of these dates, only six bills have become laws or parts of laws.⁸⁵

Within the military, the main thrusts of internal reforms were to resurrect the AFP. After the first 100 days of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP), Chief of Staff Lt Gen Ramos identified two objectives to be accomplished

1. The implementation of wide ranging internal reforms aimed at restoring and reinforcing the credibility of a "reconstituted" and "reinvigorated" AFP; improving the discipline, morale and welfare of its personnel; and increasing its operational effectiveness in the continuing battle against insurgency; and
2. The implementation of strategic campaign plan code-named Mamamayan based on the three pillars of national reconciliation, security and development.⁸⁶

Strategic/operational plan (Oplan) Mamamayan was the military's comprehensive approach to the insurgency problem. It was a three-pronged approach which included not only security and development but national reconciliation as well. It sought to involve the whole military in a coordinated effort against the insurgents. The plan also included the regionalization of troops in the sense that soldiers were assigned to their ethno-linguistic regions.

The military also adopted several measures aimed at improving discipline, training, value formation, and morale among the troops. The value formation program included moral and spiritual development, socio-cultural affairs, and troop information and education (TI & E). Many of the soldiers' grievances were also taken into consideration. Overstaying generals were retired. Military pay scales were upgraded and an even policy of investigating human rights violations committed by both the military and the insurgents was developed.

Structurally, internal reforms also aimed to bring the establishment back on track after years of disorientation. Key AFP commands were reorganized to ensure centralized planning and direction at the GHQ and to have decentralized operations and decision-making in the field. In 1987, the RUCs were abolished. In its place, the Area Unified Command (AUC) was established. Along this line, the Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) covering Regions I, II, and III, Southern Luzon Command (SOLCOM) covering Regions IV and V, SOUTHCOM for

Regions IX, X, XI, and XII, and the National Capital Region Defense Command (NCRDC) were activated. The operational control over SOLCOM was transferred from GHQ to Headquarters, Philippine Army (HPA), effective 16 October 1987. However, GHQ retained administrative control over SOLCOM. The naval forces were also reorganized into naval districts to coincide with the AUC set-up.⁸⁷ In 1988, the Visayas Command (VISCOCOM) was activated to cover Regions VI, VII, and VIII.⁸⁸

A number of formations and units were also either deactivated, reorganized or redesignated. The PSC has been downgraded to a NAFP - Wide Support and Separate Unit (NAFPWSSU) and is now called the Presidential Security Group (PSG). The Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) which was responsible for the security of Ninoy Aquino when he arrived at the airport, has been renamed Philippine Air Force Security Command (PAFSECOM). The METROCOM has been renamed Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM).⁸⁹

The NAFP also announced a campaign to purge its ranks of undesirable personnel at the higher levels of command and in the provinces as part of its reform program. However, no formal evaluation of its effectiveness and comprehensiveness was made public. Instead, the NAFP remained faction-ridden. Despite a previous order to disband groups within the military, new ones were organized like the Guardian Centre Foundation, Inc. (GCFI) which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 18 April 1986⁹⁰ and the Young Officers' Union (YOU). Honasan is one of the incorporators of the GCFI. Five of its other incorporators (Nicanor Cagurangan, Leonides Montehermoso, Oscar Arevalo, Rogelio Attunaga, and Agustin Tuncol) were also GBI incorporators.⁹¹ The persistence of factions and other developments within the AFP leading to the staging of six coup attempts against the Aquino government will be discussed in Chapter IV.

The foregoing discussion shows that political change and military transformation from 1966 to 1989 saw the expansion of the role of the military amid the weakening of political institutions brought by martial law and its aftermath. The popular opposition engendered by the assassination of Ninoy Aquino led to political change to rebuild democratic institutions and to redefine the role of the military. The next chapter deals with the multi-dimensional environment of the AFP.

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III

THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY

Coups begin in the minds of men. Soldiers who launch coups have a particular state of mind — values, perceptions, attitudes, and expectations — that define coups as desirable and feasible.

Chapter I notes that a military group must have both the occasion and the disposition to intervene in political affairs. Occasion refers to the opportunity or conditions which are favorable to staging the coup. Disposition refers to a combination of conscious motives and of a will or desire to act. Chapter II analyzes the transformation of the Philippine military in response to political changes in the country.

This chapter takes a closer look at the economic, political, and foreign environment of the Philippine military. Environment refers to the surrounding conditions or forces that influence or modify the behavior of the military and its component units or individual members.

In examining the coup environment, this chapter focuses on the specific environment of the December 1989 coup attempt. However, it is necessary to look into the general environment of the previous seven coup attempts as a series, and of the continuing occasion for military groups to attempt a grab for power.

Two inseparable but distinct concepts of the environment are used — the idea of the "objective milieu," or the environment as it really is, and the idea of the "psychomilieu," or the environment as it is perceived by an individual or group. Thus, this chapter seeks to provide an objective interpretation of the landscape of the coup attempts and to describe the military's perception of that environment. Necessarily, the psychomilieu is an approximation of the objective milieu and is distorted to some extent.

Some psychomilieus are more accurate than others. Regardless of their accuracy, however, men act on the basis of their psychomilieus. Whether they are in fact right or wrong, military groups who believe coups are right and have a high chance of success will continue launching them, until the consequences of their actions tell them otherwise.

The presentation of the milieus, objective and psycho, of the Philippine military begins with an overview of the socialization process through which the specific psychomilieu of Filipino military officers are formed. This is in Section A. The objective economic, political, and foreign environments of the military identifying the specific factors that may have induced a predisposition among military men to launch coups are discussed in Sections B, C, and D. Finally, Section E provides a description of the actual political predisposition of selected military officers, men, and their units. These predispositions are the closest this Report could get in conjecturing how strategic military units might act in the event of another coup attempt. These political orientations are telling indicators of how these units appreciate and interpret the environment as being conducive or not conducive to military intervention in government and politics.

A. The Socialization of Military Officers

This section describes and analyzes the socialization process that shapes the contemporary Filipino soldier, identifying the factors that may influence his political orientation and predisposition towards coups. The data and analysis were generated by a study on military socialization engaged by the Fact-Finding Commission.¹ The study conducted in-depth interviews of 64 officers purposively, rather than randomly selected from different service units.

The study also conducted in-depth interviews of key personnel from eight military schools — the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), the Metropolitan Citizen Military Training Command (MCMTC), the AFP Training Command (AFP TRACOM), the Philippine Air Force Flying School (PAFFS), the Philippine Army Training Command (PATRACOM), the Naval Training Command (NTC), the Philippine Constabulary Training Command (PC TRACOM), and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

Other sources of information were training materials and school records, personnel files of 72 officers, 47 of whom are suspected coup plotters, case studies of three individuals, and secondary research materials. Newspapers were also content-analyzed.

A.1. Socialization Factors

Socialization is the process by which the behavior of members of a given society is shaped by other members of the society. More specifically, it is the way in which a member acquires a knowledge of the standards and rules that are required to function in a particular society. It involves behavioral conformity, the internalization of norms and values, and the development of more autonomous internal principles.

A.1.a. Personal Background and Cultural Influences

Officers come from middle-class families. Many have relatives in the military. Their families tend to view the military positively. A military career is viewed by many families as a source of a free education and a secure lifetime job.

As gathered from the interviews, stressed in the families of the officer-respondents are respect for authority, the value of education, discipline and loyalty, hardwork, cooperation, thrift, and Christian values — values that reflect those prevailing in Philippine culture as a whole.

Additionally, Philippine society at large teaches the future soldier more authoritarianism, strengthening the predisposition learned at home. The future soldier growing up in Philippine society learns to view his world in terms of personal relationships. This is carried over to his view of leadership. Personality traits as well as personal relationships with the leader are emphasized.

The recruit into the military begins formal military training with certain predispositions from his home background and from the culture at large. He views the military and a military career favorably and expects positive outcomes from his joining the military. The cultural traits just discussed interact with the norms of the military establishment.

A.1.b. Philippine Military Academy and Other Military Schools

There are selected subjects in all regular courses that are politically relevant. Specifically, these are Civil Military Operations, Military Justice (which includes Human Rights), Insurgency, History and Constitution, Socio-Humanistic subjects at the PMA, and the Management-Leadership subjects at the CGSC.

More than half of the subjects in all regular courses are combat-oriented and teach the soldier how to win in battle. The teachers are Tactical Officers. Ideally, the best faculty members for these subjects would be those who are in the field and who excel because of their military skills, moral integrity, and constitutional orientation. This is because personal values are unconsciously but effectively passed on to the student during the highly-charged war game experiences in training camps.

But such "good" military leaders seldom teach in training schools because their commands need them in the field and refuse to let them go. Moreover, military culture tends to look down on teaching duties as assignments for weaklings, old officers or ineffective ones, and the career advancement incentives are lower for training assignments and higher for field assignments ("Invisible" income from other assignments may also not be available in a school setting).

Almost all military training experiences are physically and intellectually isolated from civilian life. This results in a psychological gap between military men and civilians. Intense bonding takes place among cadets, a function presumably of hazing and a very tough plebe year. But this bonding combined with military-civilian separation merely serves to build discomfort, suspicion, and, ultimately, group conflict between these sectors.

The training centers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) teach students that the primary task of the military is to fight the enemy — the communists. Anti-communist sentiment (oddly, not pro-democracy sentiment) becomes inculcated in the minds of the student. Such strong anti-communist feelings may actually lead to the appeal of rightist authoritarian rule which coups represent.

Although PMA barracks are immaculately neat and the honor code is drummed into their minds for four years, there are few opportunities for the cadet to freely and spontaneously express what he is thinking or feeling. The most rewarded phrase in camp is "Sir, yes Sir!" Thus, the formation of consciousness and conscience is highly external with little attempt at interiority. And this is done during the highly impressionistic age between 17 and 22 years.

Such an arrangement produces its desired results when the environment is highly structured. But placed in situations where no clear-cut behavior is defined by an authority, the external-based conscience may not function adequately. In the field, circumstances are

unpredictable and are not clearly right or wrong. More so in coups d'etat, when multiple authorities demand obedience.

A.1.c. The Military Career

The main reasons for joining the military are glamor and prestige of the military, influence of relatives, desire to become pilots and ship navigators, economic need, and patriotism. The typical career path follows a cycle —

TRAINING → FIELD ASSIGNMENT → STAFF ASSIGNMENT → TRAINING

although this is not always implemented properly as some stay too long or too short in an assignment. Field assignments are consistently viewed as more desirable than staff assignments.

The rewards and punishments system within the military as an organization is a function of the rewards and punishments system applied to the military by its governmental, political, and economic environment. For instance, room for promotions depends on the military's share of the national budget. The internal system of rewards and punishment in the military is governed by the Articles of War, the hiring policy and guidelines, the traditions of the unit, and the policy of the Commanding Officer.

According to the respondents, officers are rewarded for gallantry, bravery, honesty, dedication to duty, and excellent performance on the job. They are punished for violations of the Articles of War, unnecessary violence, involvement in coup attempts, immorality, and failure to perform one's duty. Their reactions to the system are mixed; half views the system of rewards and punishments as generally effective, while the other half claims that the system is poorly implemented and the system of rewards and punishments is ineffective.

The top characteristics respondents admire in military leaders are: being principled (fair, straight, honest); disciplinarian/"no nonsense man"; decisive but fatherly; very knowledgeable/intellectual/analytical; and "action man".

The most mentioned shortcomings of military leadership are: involvement in or serving the interests of politicians; absence of coordination among themselves; indecisiveness/inconsistency; improper implementation of the reward and punishment system; abusiveness/

leniency; being out of touch with his men; complacency; being misinformed; and, involvement in graft and corruption/materialism.

Aside from co-workers and their families, the officers are closest to their classmates with whom they train. Because of that special bond, classmates influence their decisions, sympathies, and attitudes.

The respondents were asked to rate the military on prestige, power, competence, honesty, support to civilian government, and morale of soldiers for three different periods upon joining the military, ten years ago, and today. They give most favorable ratings for the period when they joined the military and the least favorable ratings today. PA officers give the lowest ratings. Junior officers give lower ratings than senior officers. The lowest ratings are for morale, prestige, and honesty.

The pre-martial law years are viewed positively as productive years. The first years of martial law are also viewed positively as years of order and discipline. But its later years are seen as the country's and the military's worst. The assassination of Ninoy Aquino is perceived as the greatest blunder of the Marcos government.

The February 1986 events are viewed differently by the respondents. One group views them positively as the height of people power and the prestige of the AFP. Another group views them negatively as being motivated by vested interests of military leaders and leading to instability because they started the series of coup attempts. The recent coup attempts are viewed as stemming from valid issues but using the wrong means.

The literature on the Philippine military obtained and reviewed by the study suggest a military mind peculiar to the profession. This military mind views conflict as part of human history and only the build up of arms can prevent war. There is emphasis on the threats to security particularly from the communists.

A.2. The Military Socialization Process

The young recruit brings into military school the authoritarian and personalistic values of Philippine culture. Military school has a strong and lasting impact on the young recruit. Through the formal program of instruction in school, he acquires knowledge and skills needed by an educated man and a competent professional soldier. He learns the military code which emphasizes discipline, honor, and courage. He is taught to be a good leader by first being a good follower.

Through the increased number of social science courses, he broadens his socio-political awareness. This is enhanced by the political atmosphere in the rest of society as well as by key historical events. At the PMA, the young cadet experiences violence and aggression through the practice of hazing. He also learns to use arms, fulfilling what is probably part of most Filipino males' fantasies. The authoritarian values he brought with him into the military school are further strengthened by the authoritarian culture in the military. In school, he becomes very close to his classmates and the rest of the young men with whom he goes through the rigors of training. Intense loyalties are formed. Through special rituals and ceremonies, a strong identification with the military establishment is developed and the young recruit is proud to be a soldier.

A.3. Seasons in a Military Career

After training, the graduate is commissioned and begins his military career. Life in the military has its high points and low points, but whether up or down, the socialization process continues and the young officer faces a lifetime of exposure to such socializing agents as the military culture, role models, peer influence, reward and punishment, organizational climate, and historical events in the country.

The military code continues to be held up as an ideal. Authoritarian values continue to be reinforced and personalistic values are introduced as it becomes apparent that personal loyalties operate beneath the objective system. Out in the real world, the young officer comes face to face with the imperfections of the institutions he has committed himself to protect with his life. He discovers that some of the leaders he is bound by duty to obey have feet of clay. Soon enough he finds out that the career he had selected partly because of its status and economic perks had in fact promised more than it could deliver. There is demoralization and disillusionment.

But through his disappointment and in some cases even through his own betrayal of these ideals, the officer seems to retain clear expectations of what a professional officer should be, as well as the responsibilities of military leadership. In a sense, he retains a certain degree of idealism.

His military career continues the socialization process began in school as the officer reacts to events in the country, particularly those involving the military. The martial law years, the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, the EDSA People Power Revolt (EDSA Revolt), and the recent coup attempts all contributed to this process. The problems in the

country and the government's continued difficulty in solving them induce a belief that military intervention might be necessary.

Throughout his career, the officer retains close ties with his classmates through regular reunions and get-togethers. Classmates are a sounding board for ideas and a source of support. Given the risk of being killed in action, class unity becomes even more important as survivors usually adopt the family of their slain classmates.

A.4. Military Socialization as a Factor in Coup Participation

Having described the military socialization process and the impact of military schooling and career on the young recruit, one asks: What factors in the military socialization process may contribute to an officer's politicization, i.e., his predisposition to participate in a coup d'etat?

The socialization process broadens the cadets' perspectives about society and politics making him politicalized. Politicalization is the process whereby one's socio-political awareness is developed. There are several hypotheses on the factors that heighten both politicization, one form of which is the predisposition to launch coups, and politicalization. These hypotheses are synthesized from the interviews and analysis of data obtained in the study.

A.4.a. The Politicalized Cadet Hypothesis

Some believe that the curriculum at the PMA contributes to the politicalization of the cadet and this politicalization leads to participation in coup attempts. While an analysis of the program of instruction does reveal a number of courses where political discussions may take place, it is also suggested that faculty influence is a contributing factor to political orientation. The most important factor is the general environment in the country itself, i.e., the growing politicalization and activism of students and citizens which make politicization in the PMA not inconceivable. No matter how much the PMA connection appears as a contributory factor, PMA experience is still not a sufficient condition for participation in attempted coups.

A.4.b. The Disgruntled Officer Hypothesis

The poor organizational climate in which officers operate and the demoralization of the military are often blamed for the coup attempts.

A.4.c. The Power-Hungry Officer Hypothesis

According to this explanation, the career paths of coup plotters which led them to the corridors of power during the Marcos years as well as the role they played in the EDSA Revolt are factors that lead to coup participation. These officers believe that they succeeded in grabbing power in 1986 and therefore, should be able to do it again.

A.4.d. The Idealistic Young Officer Hypothesis

This explanation recognizes that many officers still value the ideals they learned early in their military careers and thus, the disillusionment with corruption and incompetence both in the military as well as civilian leadership leads them to launch coups in order to save the country. These officers and a number of their peers believe that coups are justified under extreme conditions.

A.4.e. Problem Personality Hypothesis

Some of the known coup plotters manifest definite personality disturbances that may partly explain their participation in the attempted coups. Persons with high power needs, who are narcissistic and have sociopathic tendencies (psychological patterns that have been established for some plotters) are prime candidates for coups. While a systematic psychological study of all the coup plotters has not been done, it is reasonable to conclude that personality problems contribute to the explanation.

A.5. Military Socialization and the Coup Environment

While these factors all contribute to a predisposition towards coups d'etat, none of these factors working alone or even all of these factors working in combination can explain coup participation. The study suggests that military socialization factors by themselves cannot explain coup-related behavior. A politicalized military will not necessarily attempt to overthrow the government. Military socialization produces a politicalized officer who then interacts with the "coup environment" existing in Philippine society as described in Chapter II and subsequent sections of this chapter. Coups d'etat are a product of that interaction.

Using force field terminology, the coup environment consists of driving forces or those factors which push the politicized soldier towards coups d'etat and restraining forces or factors that keep him from participating in coups. Some of the main driving forces in the environment

are (a) the criticism hurled against the Aquino government and the present military leadership, (b) pressure from leaders and peers to join them in support of coups, (c) the fact that past coup plotters have not been seriously punished for their crimes, and (d) the poor quality of military life.

The main restraining forces in the environment are (a) the strong public opinion against coups, (b) the strength of the constitutionalist armed forces who will defend the government against attempts to overthrow it, (c) the popularity of the present government, and (d) the job security and other benefits of a military job that will be lost to the officer and his family should the coup fail.

B. The Economic Environment²

The previous section suggests that personal background and cultural influences, military training, and career patterns, are factors that may help predispose military officers to intervene in government and politics. However, it emphasizes that military socialization factors by themselves cannot explain coup-related behavior. At best, the military socialization process produces a politicalized officer who then interacts with the "coup environment". When a critical mass is politicized by the interaction, a coup happens.

Violent political events have often been predicated on adverse economic conditions. One popular hypothesis is Davies's "J" Curve — rising expectations and gratifications, if followed by a period of a short, sharp reversal in gratifications, create a wide gap between what people want and what they get, then the probability of revolution (or other violent event) increases greatly. Conflict develops in a society when major segments acutely suffer this sudden "subjective" deprivation, which usually occurs during an economic downturn. "Violence becomes increasingly likely when any kind of basic need which has come to be routinely gratified suddenly becomes deprived."³ The conjoining factor is the common state of mind: the profound frustration that develops when the environment in the form of culture, society, and government denies the opportunity for basic needs to get fulfilled.⁴

In applying these insights to the Philippine coup environment, we may hypothesize that

1. The probability of the occurrence of an intervention (military or otherwise) in government rises with a decline in human welfare.
2. The probability of success of such an intervention approaches certainty as the indicators of welfare sink to a critical level.

People may differ in their opinion of what constitutes a critical level. "Critical" can be defined in two ways — an inability to meet the most basic needs, as posited above, or popular dissatisfaction even when there is an improvement in the objective economic situation. The latter would not necessarily be inconsistent with the relative deprivation hypothesis since actual conditions in reference to expectations, and not to previous conditions, can also result in dissatisfaction. Certainly, the EDSA Revolt created extremely high expectations among the people, especially in Metro Manila, which is the immediate environment of the coups.

Usually, however, a serious economic recession hastens the formation of a consensus that a critical level has been reached.

By way of a test of the above proposition, the behavior of some macroeconomic variables that correlate well with "human comfort" are examined. Welfare is essentially multi-dimensional, and may include items like per capita income, energy consumption, nutritional status, and political freedom. The discussion in this section abstracts from many of these dimensions of welfare.

B.1. Some Macroeconomic Indicators of Welfare

Macroeconomic variables are analyzed for the two years preceding the EDSA Revolt in 1986 and the three years preceding the December 1989 coup. The EDSA Revolt and the December 1989 coup are of interest because one attained its goal of changing the government and the other did not. Were there significant differences in the behavior of these macroeconomic variables that would help explain the differences in political outcomes?

Table III-1 shows the behavior of real gross national product (GNP), growth rate of real GNP, and the inflation rate for the period 1984 to 1989.⁵

Table III-1 — The Real GNP and Inflation Rates: 1984 - 1989

Year	Real GNP (million pesos)	Growth rate (percent)	Inflation rate (percent)
1984	91,644	-5.50	50.30
1985	87,867	-4.12	23.10
1986	89,504	1.86	0.80
1987	94,705	5.81	3.80
1988	101,093	6.75	8.80
1989	106,830	5.67	10.60

In 1983, the balance of payments difficulties of the country came to a head and the government was forced to negotiate a standby credit arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the exchange rate collapsed. The conditionalities agreed upon with the IMF called for austerity measures that led to a contraction of real output in 1984 - 1985, the first in the postwar history of the Philippines.

The negative to poor aggregate performance of the economy in 1984 and 1985 can readily be seen in terms of the level and growth rate of real GNP, and of the inflation rate. In 1984, the economy receded with a negative growth rate in real GNP of 5.5 percent. The recession persisted in 1985, as real GNP further declined by 4.12 percent. With respect to the general price level, the inflation rate in 1984 rose to 50.3 percent, surpassing even the average rate of the inflation-ridden 1970s. In 1985, the inflation rate moderated somewhat to 23.1 percent.

The above trends can be contrasted with the behavior of the same macroeconomic variables in 1987, 1988, and 1989. The year 1989 is included because the attempted coup d'etat took place in December 1989 when it was too late in the year for the overall performance of the economy to be adversely affected.

In 1986, the economy experienced a turnaround with a modest 1.86 percent growth rate in real GNP. In 1987 and 1988, however, the economy grew by 5.8 percent and 6.7 percent respectively. While the economy's momentum slowed down somewhat in 1989, it still registered a respectable growth rate of 5.7 percent. Concerning the behavior of the

price level, one notes that the inflation rate was rising from 1987 to 1989 — from 3.8 percent in 1987, to 8.8 percent in 1988, and 10.6 percent in 1989. Although the inflation rate hit the double-digit mark in 1989, it was still low compared to the 23 percent inflation rate in 1985.

Looking at the behavior of output and the general price level two years before the 1986 EDSA Revolt and three years before the 1989 attempted coup d'etat, the contrast is quite marked. In line with the proposition of the political economy model presented above, the chance of success of the 1989 attempt was relatively slim. The segment of the military that staged the 1989 attempt failed to build a critical mass of civilian support. In 1986, a massive coalition supportive of the objective to overthrow the Marcos government responded to the call for a popular uprising.

Additional indicators of economic welfare are shown in Table III-2.⁶ The figures shed further light on the difference in political results between the 1986 EDSA Revolt and 1989 coup attempt. The figures show personal consumption expenditures of households and compensation of employees, entrepreneurial and property income of persons, both adjusted for the inflation rates. Personal consumption expenditures, a component of aggregate demand, is close to 75 percent of GNP. Taking it from the income side, compensation of employees and other income of persons is slightly above 75 percent of national income. These two measures correlate highly and positively with human comfort. Again, the trends that emerge from these figures are a decline from 1984 to 1985, as against a steady rise from 1987 to 1988, followed by a mild slowdown in 1989.

Table III-2 — Real Consumption and Compensation/Income: 1984 - 1989

Year	Real Personal Consumption (million pesos)	Compensation of Employees Entrepreneurial and Property Income of Persons (million pesos)
1984	66,032	72,322
1985	65,977	64,474
1986	66,597	66,909
1987	70,409	68,435
1988	74,646	76,640
1989	78,929	81,869

In terms of job creation, 1.2 million new jobs were generated in 1987 and 1.1 million jobs in 1988. The trend dipped to 700,000 new jobs in 1989 but continued to be significantly positive. Poverty incidence also dropped from 59 percent in 1985 to 49.5 percent in 1988 with the National Capital Region, where the coup attempts were concentrated, experiencing one of the highest improvements.

Based on the objective statistics, it seems curious why a segment of the military thought that their coup attempt in 1989 would receive popular support. Going by the behavior of the macroeconomic variables described above, the coup plotters might have thought that the slowdown in the growth rates of these macroeconomic measures was misery-inducing enough to push civilian groups to support their cause. Obviously, it was an erroneous assumption, evident from the fact that civilian groups did not rally to their call.

Their miscalculation may have been influenced by several events in late 1989. As also mentioned in the discussion of the political environment, there was in fact some restiveness among the people. A legislated minimum wage increase in June 1989 was widely criticized by industry, particularly small and medium-scale Filipino enterprises, at the same time that labor was protesting the inability of government to enforce compliance with minimum wage laws by a large number of enterprises. Petroleum prices increased in August and November 1989, along with transport fares, resulting in inflationary pressures on prices of basic commodities. Students protested tuition fee hikes, government workers were aggrieved by the Salary Standardization Law, farmers clamored for an increase in the palay subsidy, thousands of commuters could not get a ride to and from work. There were threats of *Welgang Bayan* (general strike) and jeepney drivers and teachers engaged in selective labor demonstrations. There were also frequent power outages in the third quarter of 1989.

These were on top of unrest in the streets by a broad cross-section of Philippine society not due to economic but to political reasons: Marcos loyalists wanting to bring back the body of Marcos, and military elements complaining of bad treatment by the civilian leadership. The proposed PC-INP bill also agitated the military top brass of the PC because it created uncertainty and morale problems in the ranks.

The resulting price increases and sectoral agitation did not, however, result in serious enough economic slowdown in the aggregate, which could have meant a drastic fall in human comfort, at least by the time of

the coup attempt in December 1989. In other words, the critical level was not reached.

This section shows that while economic misery marked the period before February 1986, the same could not be said for the period before December 1989, when the economy was experiencing output growth and relatively mild inflation. While some groups may have been bypassed by the growth in the economy, their economic difficulties were not sufficient to induce a critical mass of civilians to support the forces aimed at overthrowing the government headed by President Aquino.

B.2. The Present Economic Situation as a Coup Environment

However, given disquieting current trends in the economy (i.e., growth rate, inflation rate, interest rate, trade balance, budget deficit), and the domestic economic reverses resulting from the drought and recent massive earthquake, appropriate government policies to address critical areas of economic performance assume added importance.

The government has to institute measures at a time when sectors which have been very supportive of it have become openly critical of two key economic policies, namely, influential members of the church hierarchy with respect to the management of the external debt, and the business community with respect to the restructuring of tariffs. The government has had to backtrack on the implementation of tariff reform in the face of the criticism and of a probable rebuff from Congress.

That task is made more difficult by unfavorable international developments — external resources are less easily obtainable as the industrial countries pay greater attention to the needs of Eastern Europe at a time when the total available foreign aid is declining, and trade protectionism continues to rise. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait will also have tremendous adverse repercussions for the Philippine economy. It has disrupted overseas contract workers' output and earnings, reduced further deployment opportunities of contract workers, and raised the cost of oil. The expected increase in domestic oil prices will trigger other price increases and labor demands for wage increases, unless the government can mitigate the impact with a comprehensive fiscal reform program.

Some experts hazard a guess that a recession as severe as the one in 1984 - 1985 may give rise to a predisposition by a significant portion of the civilian population to support, or at least not actively resist, another

attempt at military intervention. While the deterioration in economic indicators has become more pronounced than at the time of the December 1989 coup attempt, with real per capita income declining in the second quarter of 1990 for the first time since 1987, a balance of payments crisis and a recession of that severity are still avoidable depending on how promptly and effectively the government handles the situation.

C. The Political Environment⁷

The previous section compared the economic environment preceding the February 1986 events with that of the December 1989 coup attempt. It showed that in terms of "relative deprivation" there was no basis to warrant an expectation on the part of the coup plotters that their attempt would receive massive popular support. Contrary to their perception, the objective economic situation, despite some deterioration by the end of 1989, could not have been a real cause for launching the coup. The restiveness of various sectors was misread by the coup plotters and served to influence their timing.

Independent of the economic environment, there were other variables that may have influenced the behavior of the coup plotters for the December 1989 attempt as well as the six others launched against the Aquino administration. These were the state and dynamics of national leadership, government, politics, and political performance. They constituted the political environment of the coup, which is discussed next.

C.1. An Auspicious Start

The period between February 1986 when Corazon C. Aquino was ushered into power and December 1989 when the latest and most serious coup attempt was mounted, is vital in getting a sense of the political climate surrounding the repeated attempts to destabilize the Aquino government. In spite of the failure of her major initiatives in the first year of her administration to forge peace pacts with the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), two developments in 1987 augured well for her fledgling government. The first was the overwhelming ratification of the new Constitution in February, which strengthened the legitimacy of her government. The second was the May national elections, the first credible elections since Marcos placed the country under martial law rule in 1972. The May elections resulted in overwhelming majorities for the candidates for the Senate and the House of Representatives who were personally endorsed by President

Aquino and the coalition she headed. She had a convincing mandate to govern.

C.2. A Beleaguered Government

Despite that mandate, the most important feature of the political environment of the Aquino administration has been what Ninoy Aquino predicted — whoever became president would face a most unenviable task. Philippine history has been a parade of no less than ten crises administrations from Emilio Aguinaldo to Ferdinand E. Marcos that have failed to satisfactorily contain or resolve the outstanding social, economic, political, and foreign policy crises of their time. The accumulated crises of the past have conjoined to constitute the most severe test of any Filipino political leadership. On top of age-old problems of poverty, gross inequities of income, wealth, and political power, and graft and corruption exacerbated by the excesses of the Marcos administration, the country has to contend with a foreign debt burden of staggering proportions and the problem of governance inherent in a newly-restored democracy.

The gravest threat to the survival of the Aquino government has been the coup attempts. Almost from the start, the repeated attempts by military groups to wrest power from the Aquino government have diverted its attention, time, energy, and resources and sidelined efforts at a systematic resolution of the myriad problems of the nation.

All the coups failed because, among other reasons, they were lacking in political strategy and support. The plotters apparently expected a spontaneous display of "People Power" against the Aquino government which never materialized. The August 1987 coup attempt was deliberately timed to ride on Left-oriented protest demonstrations and strikes against the Aquino government's inaction on agrarian reform and its decision to increase petroleum prices. The December 1989 coup followed a strike of jeepney drivers demanding a fuel price rollback, a teachers' strike for higher pay, and a mass walk-out of hospital workers. Such restiveness turned out to be insufficient to ignite popular support for a coup d'etat. The plotters miscalculated the sentiments of the people against military interventionism.

What could have emboldened this miscalculated adventurism are two beliefs shared by some segments in the Armed Forces, namely: that the Aquino administration is too soft on the communist insurgency, and that the military handed power to the Aquino administration in February 1986.

To counter this perception, President Aquino visibly hardened her approach to the insurgency problem, in her words, "unsheathing the sword of war" and giving more prominence to the military aspect of her total war strategy. The coups helped pull the Aquino government incrementally to the right, through successive cabinet reorganizations and policy adjustments. It endorsed the organization of armed civilian anti-communist vigilantes in both rural and urban areas. In February 1988, the Secretary of National Defense, Rafael Ileto, was removed over a disagreement within the military regarding the counter-insurgency approach.

The people did not lend support to the second belief, as they applauded the dismissal of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile in the wake of the "God Save The Queen" coup attempt, who had been demanding a power-sharing arrangement on the basis of that belief. Despite his initial popularity after the EDSA Revolt, Enrile barely made it as a senator in the May 1987 congressional elections.

The people supported the government throughout the various coups that have been mounted against it. However, it seems the government has mismanaged each post-coup situation and failed to capitalize on its reservoir of mass support.

For example, after renegade Lt Col Gregorio Honasan was caught in November 1987, he was put on a Navy ship in Manila Bay with guards who eventually helped him escape in April 1988. On hindsight, President Aquino's handling of Honasan now appears to be a case of reluctance to confront a problem squarely. As Commander-in-Chief, she could have ordered a court-martial for Honasan. However, Malacañang chose to deal cautiously with Honasan, saying the government did not want to make a martyr of him and other rebels, nor did it want to antagonize a segment of the military. The December 1989 coup attempt is partly the result of the indecision of government to deal firmly with the participants of earlier coup attempts, despite massive popular support for such an approach.

The coup attempts periodically reinvigorated the Aquino presidency. The cause-oriented and centrist groups, despite their increasing disappointment with President Aquino's temporizing over socio-economic reforms, came out strongly after each coup attempt in defense of the Aquino government and the democratic institutions and space it restored.

However, the Aquino government has not effectively consolidated and mobilized its popular support on a systematic and long-term basis.

Hence, her presidency has been "invisible" to supporters who needed a focus for political participation and wanted to see decisive action on major governmental efforts. She would time and again encourage the formation of grassroots organizations, but would not follow through with a major governmental effort, until June 1990 when she finally launched Kabisig.

President Aquino also sought to draw from foreign governments' support that the EDSA Revolt generated. She immediately set out to visit ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, the UN Headquarters, the United States, and Japan within her first year in office. She later visited China and Europe. The US government and the American people were clearly the biggest potential source of assistance.

There is a growing perception that the Aquino government has become less of a rallying point for post-Marcos reforms in the areas of human rights, participatory democracy, agrarian reform, urban land reform, and the establishment of a new moral order. It is claimed that her last two years would just be a matter of survival, with her accomplishments in re-establishing democratic institutions, constitutional government, and the restoration of democratic space serving as the staging point for more comprehensive reforms by the next administration. This seems consistent with her own concept of a transitional leadership from a dictatorship to a full-fledged democracy.

C.3. De-Marcosification

One of the tasks of the Aquino administration was to remove the pernicious practices of the Marcos years in society, the economy, and in government. The effort included recovering the hidden wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies, prosecuting them, neutralizing Marcos politicians and civilian forces, and dismantling the authoritarian machinery and institutions built by Marcos for more than a decade. There have been significant accomplishments in such areas as the abolition of monopolies in certain major commodities, re-direction of government financial institutions, and privatization of some government assets.

On the other hand, the President has not been very successful in consolidating her political base through a political party or movement. This may be due to her desire to avoid criticism that she was copying Marcos's tactics. She understood that she had to get her people into key national and local governmental positions, ousting Marcos loyalists, but

she has not ensured, either by selection or indoctrination, that they share her vision for the government and the nation.

C.4. Democratization

Domestic politics in the last several years have also been characterized by a continuing process of democratization. The President commissioned the drafting of a new Constitution and called for a plebiscite to ratify it. Upon its overwhelming approval by the people, the first free, honest, and credible congressional, local, and barangay elections in a decade were conducted separately.

The new Constitution captures the idealism of the EDSA Revolt in both domestic and foreign policy. It establishes an agenda that is more far-reaching than what a conservative Congress is prepared to legislate. The Constitution also circumscribes the Executive within stringent safeguards against a return to authoritarianism. The resulting structure is a delicate system of checks and balances that requires a high degree of statesmanship in the country's political leadership.

After EDSA, the mass media quickly blossomed under the restored democratic atmosphere, with national daily newspapers alone increasing to more than 25. While a number of newspapers clearly maintain a high level of social responsibility, there is a debate about some of the others as to whether they have deteriorated into the sensationalist, licentious pre-martial law genre. The same can be said about radio. While many practice responsible journalism, there are commentators who concentrate on dramatic political tidbits and still others who deliberately undermine the government.

In the free market of information where government has often been ineffective if not reluctant in speaking for and explaining itself, it has become the victim of propaganda offensives by its enemies — coup plotters, insurgents, foreign interventionists, secessionists, and the political opposition.

However, on balance, the Constitution has been strengthened by the coups and the continuing insurgencies that have challenged it. Democratization has brought democratic space to Filipinos, even though the elite, both old and new, have been quick to corner its benefits in and out of government, possibly preempting wider socio-economic reform.

C.5. Return of Traditional Politics

The first two elections under the Aquino government were a testimony to the durability, if not of the traditional elites, then certainly of traditional styles of political support and mobilization.

Traditional politicians have been cited by coup plotters and by communist insurgents alike as a major reason for their actions. Even the administration itself, in launching Kabisig, hit a raw nerve among the politicians in Congress when the movement was depicted as a movement to bypass the "trapos" (meaning traditional politicians, but the contraction literally means "dirty rags").

It must be recalled, however, that alliances with some traditional politicians [even those who belonged to the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and were loyal to Marcos] were resorted to by the allies of the Aquino administration in a bid to win congressional and local posts and build a nationwide political machinery in 1987 and 1988.

In the final analysis, the return of traditional politics may be traced to the lack of opportunities for various elites to surface during the Marcos regime. The recruitment process for the "best and the brightest" in various fields was disrupted and corrupted. It is only under the democratic space created under the new administration that the normal process of renewal of societal elites, in government and politics, business and industry, the military, and perhaps also in the arts and culture, has resumed. The results of this renewal process are not yet apparent, because of the early lead and positioning the traditional elites have taken.

C.6. Break-up of the Ruling Coalition

The EDSA revolt brought together a broad spectrum of interests, including segments of the military, united by their outrage of Marcos. From this diverse array of forces was drawn the political leadership for the post-Marcos government, led by President Aquino. This incoming ruling coalition in the Aquino government was studded with prominent erstwhile Marcos cabinet members and politicians, side by side with veteran political leaders who fought Marcos and the "best and the brightest" non-political types. Their main challenge was to revive democracy and restore basic freedoms to Filipinos. They assumed that the factors that bound them together in the so-called "rainbow coalition" were sufficiently strong to overcome deep-seated disagreements on

social reform and economic policy. Unfortunately, much more is required of political leaders.

Ruling elites usually possess a coherent structure, infused by a particular ideology. In Singapore, the ruling class is almost a homogenous grouping of economic-minded followers of Lee Kuan Yew, who set the tone and direction for national development. In Thailand, one can predict that the ruling clique will come from the ranks of the military and bureaucracy, bound together by their elite status in society. In Malaysia, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) elite will certainly dominate national political leadership. In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and in Taiwan the Kuomintang are the predictable sources of the ruling elite.

Elites in these countries think as one in moving their countries ahead. The ruling elite has a clear consensus indicative of a disciplined process of decision-making.

This has not been the case with President Aquino's ruling coalition. Only after a few months, the deadly virus of Philippine politics — fractiousness — reemerged. The May 1987 elections further depleted the Aquino circle of advisers. In time, some of these former cabinet advisers would chart their own agenda, and while still loosely considered part of the coalition, they would have very little in common with the President.

In fact, the appointing power of the President became a focus of politics between the executive and the legislative branches of government which included legislators who were clearly elected on the basis of the President's endorsement. President Aquino refused to subject some of her appointments and promotions to the review of the Congressional Commission on Appointments. She vetoed a bill delineating the powers of the Commission, and Congress threatened to override her veto. The controversy may be viewed as part of a larger effort to determine the appropriate sharing of policy-making powers by the legislative and executive branches of government. As played by some legislators, the game deteriorated into pure political grandstanding.

The constant changes in the national leadership contributed to the political insecurity of the country in the two years separating the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts. In some areas, such as land reform, there were changes just about every year. In terms of the economic agenda, the Central Bank would have one idea and NEDA, another. A third dimension would be contributed by the Department of Finance. This

fragmentation was an indication that institutional coordination was lacking and no one was in firm control.

But the fractiousness in government and politics is a price for democracy which often leads to a dilemma. Its essence is openness and accommodation. But without firm institutional moorings and a unifying political vision, this becomes sterile and even destructive, often leading to chaos. The ensuing turmoil in civilian politics is an invitation to military intervention. As Fr Joaquin Bernas sees it, "Once politics get into the military, the danger is that the military will get into politics."⁸ The ultimate result is a political polarization in society at the expense of national consensus and unity, and the danger of military adventurism.

C.7. The Legislature

The government under the 1987 Constitution places greater initiative for policy on the legislature compared to the previous dispensation. The powers of the Executive are significantly reduced. The adoption of the presidential form of government with broad constitutionally guaranteed civil, political, economic, and social rights of the people shifts the center of political gravity from the Executive to the Legislative.

The people, however, continue to look to the President for major decisions affecting national life. Their expectations of the Presidency are too high, especially for an admittedly inexperienced even if charismatic leader such as President Aquino. For example, on agrarian reform, it did not sit well with the people that the President chose to shift the resolution of major issues to the incoming Congress.

The state of confusion and lack of direction that has characterized the political situation is therefore attributable not only to the President's action or inaction, but also to the legislature's. The problems besetting the nation and specific sectors, such as the military, teachers, students, workers, farmers, and urban poor, are problems not only of implementation, but of policy formulation and coordination between the Executive and the Legislative. Thus, the restiveness of the military might have slackened if numerous bills relating to the military had been passed promptly.

Congress had never been rated highly by citizens in pre-martial law years. The new Congress in the Aquino Government was welcomed in July 1987 mainly because it completed, along with an independent judiciary and the restored civil liberties of the people, the return of the democratic system. It also looked promising because of the election of

a significant number of so-called "non-traditional politicians" which indicated a growing maturity of the electorate. But the new Congress is still predominantly conservative.

It did not take long before the body's popularity began to decline precipitously. In September 1988, the House margin of satisfaction (percentage of very satisfied/satisfied minus percentage of dissatisfied/very dissatisfied), according to a Social Weather Station (SWS) survey was +22 percent, which was healthy. That dipped to +8 percent in February 1989, decreasing by 14 percentage points. The Senate declined even more in satisfaction ratings. From +26 percent in September 1988, it fell by 21 percentage points to only +5 percent in February 1989.⁹

What accounts for the sudden drop for both chambers? The survey mentioned "sexcapades, imported Uzis, imported luxury cars, self-granted bonuses, new Congress building, and many more" as the reasons. These were no doubt reinforced by media reports which are easy to come by in exaggerated form. Because members of Congress are very visible, they are vulnerable to media exposure. It takes only one legislator to misbehave for the whole institution to be tainted.

With barely two years left of the term of its present members, Congress may not be able to enact vital legislation to implement several provisions of the 1987 Constitution which require immediate action, such as its provisions on human rights and social justice, i.e., diffusion of wealth and political power.

C.8. The National Leadership

Upon assuming power in February 1986, President Aquino and her Cabinet, mostly newcomers to government service, had to formulate and oftentimes agonize over piecemeal policies, even as an expectant nation and an international audience demanded a comprehensive political and socio-economic blueprint.

Not wanting to be dictatorial, President Aquino was reluctant to decree under the Freedom Constitution not only such a blueprint, but also key policies despite the vast legislative power she held until the convening of Congress on the fourth Monday of July 1987. Instead, she concentrated on restoring the democratic process, so she could immediately pass on to the new Congress the task of substantive policy-making. This departed from past practice, considering that the President, even under the previous liberal democratic regime (1946 - 1972) prior to

Marcos's authoritarian rule, usually set the tone of domestic and foreign policy.

Her main decisions in her first two years in office were institution-oriented. Amidst threats to the survival of her government, she sought to restore democratic institutions and practices to the country. The democratic space she created, however, has encouraged the reemergence of the traditional elite and caused hopes for a new politics to recede. Without resolute government leadership in pursuing needed socio-economic reforms, the forces for the status quo have prevailed.

The people's expectations for meaningful reforms remain high, despite the disappointments of the past four years. Innovative paths continue to be proposed by non-government organizations such as the peace process.

On the other hand, while agreeing that the post-Marcos environment would not be easy, institutions, groups, and concerned individuals have not adequately responded to the challenge of strengthening participatory democracy at the grassroots. This is particularly true at the barangay level where presumably the ordinary citizens feel competent and willing to participate and express themselves as citizens. However, no frenzy of grassroots, community, village, or barangay organizing, discussing, and meeting has ensued since the EDSA Revolt.¹⁰

The centerpiece of the Aquino administration is purportedly the agrarian reform program. This program was projected to cost about \$2.5 billion over a five-year period. Doubts were widely expressed that the government would have the support of the landlords who demand the most in terms of cash settlement. The big question was whether they were willing to subordinate their short-term interest in favor of the nation's industrial future by accepting, say, bonds instead of cash. Given the reactionary nature of this elite, as validated by the nation's history, the answer would be negative. It was demonstrated by the House of Representatives' emasculation of the agrarian reform legislation. Yet there was insufficient public pressure for the legislature to act otherwise. The emasculated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is as much the failure or default of grassroots organizations to mobilize for social reforms as it is a victory of traditional power groups.

This state of affairs in the circles of power prompted Jaime Zobel de Ayala, a prominent industrialist and well-known Aquino supporter, to comment that "there must be anarchy in our blood." In essence, President Aquino was being left to govern alone. "Politicians, save a few,

seem to have forgotten that they are there to serve the people. They waste their time playing to the grandstands of their own creation. And often, we let ourselves be used as their cheering squad."¹¹

In his analysis of the disarray in Aquino's administration, Zobel de Ayala castigated his fellow businessmen as well. "We have forgotten that our companies are more profitable than ever, principally because she has made it possible. . . In the meantime, the President stands by herself, dissected, criticized and crucified daily for all kinds of failings. And not enough are willing to come to her defense."¹²

C.9. The Bureaucracy

Except for the top layer, the one-million-strong bureaucracy has essentially remained the same, despite the efforts of the Aquino Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization and the one-year purge of misfits from the bureaucracy authorized by the Freedom Constitution. The elimination of progressives from the top echelons of the bureaucracy, victims of compromise and horse trading, helped derail bureaucratic reforms. Bureaucratic corruption continued as existing networks of grafters and misfits were left untouched by the reorganization.

C.10. Graft and Corruption

President Aquino's image and character are one of integrity and uprightness. Since the time she decided to fight Marcos for the presidency, she has been on moral high ground. Within a year after her accession to power, the government had filed 39 civil cases with the Sandiganbayan involving 314 defendants headed by Marcos and his family. These cases were mostly for graft and corruption, theft, embezzlement, fraud, and other crimes allegedly committed by Marcos and his cronies.

But President Aquino's moral ascendancy has not filtered down to the lower reaches of the bureaucracy and to other branches of the government where corruption remains. Rumors about the questionable activities of certain presidential relatives began to circulate. In her official family, one of the most damaging scandals was the Garchitorena case at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Smuggling of all kinds of commodities, including guns, was unabated during this period. A member of the House of Representatives was caught smuggling in more than 300 pieces of handguns a few months before the December coup attempt. However, it is a credit to a concerned media and public and

the leadership and membership of the House that the convicted member eventually resigned.

C.11. Civil Order

The upshot of a weak power center in a polity is the propensity of the larger civil society to be restive and disaffected. Alienated groups are politicized. This perpetuates a vicious cycle, because central authorities begin to crack down on civil dissent and a hardening of lines becomes more acute.

Public school teachers, the religious sector, and even those in the creative arts, conventionally apolitical, have increasingly taken to the streets. Political awakening is infectious, and it is not surprising that military elements get politicalized as well.

A politically charged atmosphere also invites crime and other types of anti-social behavior. This especially becomes pronounced in times of economic hardship. Manila has one of the highest crime rates internationally. In a report of Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos, 179,661 crime incidents were registered nationwide in 1987, or 26 incidents per 100,000 people.¹³ But what has created the image of civil disorder in the minds of the people, perhaps beyond what is warranted by the objective situation, is a number of sensational cases that have been particularly mishandled by government and which media have seized upon. Among these are hostage crises such as the Rizal Alih drama that led to the deaths of BGen Eduardo Batalla and Col Romeo Abendan and the assassinations of Congressman Moises Espinosa and American Col James Rowe. The President and Department of National Defense strongly condemned the Digos and Asturias massacres, but like other incidents in the past, these two major crimes are likely to remain unsolved.

Contributing to the general state of civil disorder were the strikes, work stoppages, demonstrations, and other forms of protest actions by all kinds of organizations representing teachers, students, workers, farmers, fisherfolk, women, jeepney drivers, and other constituencies. The problems fed into each other; people were confronted not only by transportation, garbage, and traffic problems, but also power outages and water shortages. This confluence of events provided the setting for the launching of the December coup attempt which nearly put the country over the edge. A final straw was the increase in oil prices a few days before the attempted coup. The Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) were poised to go on a *Welgang Bayan*.

C.12. Fragility of Democracy

There is a greater consciousness among Filipinos of the reversibility of political arrangements. Change applies not only to administrations, but to systems as well. The coup attempts, the insurgency, and the secessionist movements are persistent reminders that if real reforms are not obtained under a democratic dispensation, radical alternatives may become acceptable, feasible, and even affordable.

It is far easier to dismantle a dictatorial regime than to make a democracy work. The forces and resources for achieving the former may be the least appropriate in achieving the latter. People power was easier to galvanize against a hated dictator than to build consensus on pressing and crucial issues such as foreign debt, retention of the US military facilities, agrarian and urban land reform, decentralization, and population control.

Democracy requires an atmosphere of experimentation, pluralism, tolerance, empathy. Such an atmosphere is instantaneously denied by the resort to terrorism and violence that accompany coup attempts. The survivalist response of government to the coups detracts from its developmental functions, as well as impairs its ability to guarantee a democratic space under which democratic institutions can take root and gain strength.

The choice of democracy is at once a choice, at least in the short term, of "inefficiency" in discerning and pursuing the collective purpose. Premium is given to the participatory process as an end in itself, detracting resources and attention from the objectives of poverty-alleviation, social equity, delivery of basic services, and sustainable economic growth.

The change of government from Marcos to President Aquino demonstrated the desire of the people to make Philippine democracy more participative. This much is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. However, the government has not been as supportive of grassroots organizations as it promised, and no law has been enacted which would effectively allow people's organizations to participate at "all levels of social, political and economic decision making" as envisioned in Article XIII, Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution. If the government were more responsive and such a law passed, the people's stake in the working

of democracy would increase and grassroots organization would provide an effective force against undemocratic attempts to gain political power.

C.13. Popular Support for Government

A review of the social history of protest movements in this country reveals an increasing emphasis on the notion of "rights" and a corresponding ability to mobilize action in pursuit of those rights. It is no longer just a matter of asking for higher wages or more amenities from the government. People's groups have become more militant in asserting their rights, and in the process, questioning, confronting, or even seeking the overthrow of duly constituted authority.

While there has been an increasing political sophistication among various citizens and groups on the issue of people's rights and entitlements, there has not been a corresponding increase in their ability to assume more responsibilities and obligations. As University of the Philippines (UP) President Jose Abueva puts it, we have a societal imbalance that may be traceable to the "expansive and romantic" rhetoric of the Constitution and the fact that "our constitutional rights are not balanced by a bill of duties and obligations."¹⁴

While the people themselves are not blameless for the general ills of our society, a more transcendent leadership in the various sectors of government, particularly the Executive, is crucial, when the age-old problems of social unrest, political alienation, economic inequities, lack of progress especially in relation to our Asian neighbors, and graft and corruption are complicated by an unusually heavy debt problem and the dynamics of a society in transition from a dictatorship.

The political environment for the December 1989 and earlier coup attempts saw the increased restiveness of various sectors of the population in response to issues and problems. This may have led the coup plotters to believe that the environment was conducive for such an attempt, thinking that the people would rally behind them.

The people did not. No matter how dissatisfied and frustrated the people have become under the current political situation, a military takeover has not been considered a preferred alternative by a significant number of people. In the August 1987 coup, civilians were shot, wounded, or killed by coup participants because they were jeering the soldiers. The people denounced the violence that was perpetuated by the coup forces, especially in August 1987 and in December 1989. Clearly, while many sectors are restive and are demanding governmental action

on political, economic, and social reforms in response to the complex crisis that appears to grip the nation, it was a mistake for the plotters of the December 1989 coup attempt to read this political climate as being conducive to a military takeover of government.

D. Foreign Military Influence¹⁶

This section looks into foreign military organizations particularly in Southeast Asia for plausible influences on the Philippine military and the predisposition of some of its elements to launch coups. These influences will be categorized into (1) shared regional security perspectives, (2) demonstration effects of the neighbors' military establishments on the AFP, (3) relative deprivation of the Philippine military compared to its foreign counterparts, and (4) doctrinal and logistical influence of a patron military organization.

The shift in Philippine foreign policy that occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s brought the Philippines closer to the region where it belongs. Regional cooperation entailed closer interaction among the military establishments of countries in the region. Interaction occurred in joint short-term training programs, familiarization tours, participation in joint sea and air exercises, conferences, and symposia in the ASEAN, as well as in the broader Asia-Pacific region. These regularly and continuously exposed Filipino military officers to the role of the military in other ASEAN countries, and the nature, benefits, and quality of military careers in neighboring countries.

D.1. Shared Southeast Asian Security Perspectives

Internal security problems in Southeast Asia stem primarily from the contested legitimacy of governments, manifested in insurgency, secessionism, cultural strife, and incessant intra-elite struggles. In addition to subversion, the inherent weakness of societies in meeting the domestic security and welfare requirements of their populations has also encouraged continued foreign involvement in internal affairs. To cope with internal and external security requirements, states have increasingly relied on their instruments of legitimate coercion and violence — the military establishment — to help resolve critical issues of state viability and political independence.

Political institutions and military establishments at present have been fashioned in part by the constant and critical interplay between internal and external security requirements in the ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. These

countries in a sense constitute a security community, because none of them considers any other ASEAN member a likely aggressor.¹⁶ Since 1975, they have increased military cooperation among themselves especially in the exchange of intelligence, regularized meetings of military staffs, and combined training exercises. As a result of these interactions, there is an awareness that the military establishments in Southeast Asia share common security problems, and that for a number of them, a more active military role has proved effective in bringing about not only security, but welfare as well.

D.2. Demonstration Effect

The eight coups so far attempted in the Philippines are not uncommon by Third World standards. Of 157 coup attempts and successful *golpes de estado* which occurred during the 1958 - 1977 period, only six took place in Europe, while a vast majority of the coups took place in 55 countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. By 1985, the military controlled governments in 58 of 109 countries in the Third World.¹⁷

The military-dominated governments in Indonesia and Thailand serve as working models of a developmental role for the military. The Philippine military could not be oblivious to the fact that in Indonesia and Thailand (as well as elsewhere in East Asia — Taiwan and South Korea), the military has been active and effective not only in combatting communist aggression, quelling multi-ethnic disturbances, and warding off external threats, but in pursuing national development goals as well. The better benefits and higher level of psychological satisfaction enjoyed by military officers and men in these countries reflect their success in performing a combined defense and welfare role.

D.2.a. Indonesian Model

The armed forces has proven to be an influential instrument in Indonesia's struggle for national independence, political stability, economic development, and legitimization of an authoritarian rule. When civilian supremacy no longer proved to be an effective principle in the conduct of government, Indonesia opted for the political dominance of its military, which has been steeped and disciplined in the traditional values of *Pancha Sila* and the Soldiers' Oath. The Indonesian military has been effective in armed conflict such as the abortive 1965 communist uprising, the East Timor controversy, and external ones such as the 1963 *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia.

The economic development of Indonesia owes a great deal to the active developmental role played by the armed forces under the uninterrupted leadership of President Suharto, the general who brought the military to power in 1965. Working with a team of professional economists, the military gradually re-allocated government resources from defense to socio-economic development, successfully striking a path toward social welfare and national prosperity.

The Indonesian Army has also effectively fashioned itself as an effective arbiter of national issues and problems through the institutionalization of the principles of *Pancha Sila* and *Dua Fungsi*. *Pancha Sila* refers to five principles: belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, consultative democracy, and social justice. By guiding the proper conduct of society, *Pancha Sila* is considered above politics. The *Doktrin Dua Fungsi* is the performance by the armed forces of an active social and political role in addition to the military or defense role. The former entails efforts to develop a prosperous and joint social development.

The most potent doctrine that galvanized the Indonesian military since its postwar independence struggle has been its nationalism and its anti-communism. The Indonesian Army has enjoyed immense prestige because it was successful in the struggle for independence from the Dutch and the Japanese, unlike its immediate neighbors, including the Philippines, whose independence was won by civilian leaders.

Indonesia's anti-communism is evident in President Suharto's warning to President Aquino during her state visit to Indonesia in 1986: "If you give [the CPP/NPA] any opportunity to consolidate, form forces, they will use it."¹⁸ To signal their unflagging anti-communism, the Indonesian Army executed nine members of the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in October 1986, some 19 years after their sentencing.

The model that Indonesia presents to coup plotters is not only the developmental role of the military, but also the radical solution to the communist threat. The so-called "Indonesian solution" to the communist problem refers to the physical elimination by the Indonesian Army of more than half a million suspected communists during the period 1965 - 1969.¹⁹ The Indonesian solution is said to have inspired the anti-communist purge led by the Chilean military in 1973.²⁰ The Indonesian solution appears to appeal to the RAM-Honasan Faction (RAM-HF) and the Young Officers Union (YOU), who consider a "surgical operation" justified to achieve their purpose.

D.2.b. Thai Model

The Thai and the Indonesian military are complementary and mutually reinforcing models for the Philippine military.

A notable feature in the rule of the military in Thailand is reflected in the interlocking relationships between it and the business sector. Through the numerous business and economic connections of the military, much of the economic growth and development of Thailand was spurred. However, this kind of politico-economic relations in at least one instance, disturbed the generally close relationship between the military and the monarchy which is the key factor to Thai stability.²¹

Another feature of the Thai military that may have inspired similar developments in the Philippine military is the formation of the Young Military Officers Group (Young Turks) of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF). The Group questioned the posture and beliefs and distanced themselves from their elder officers and superiors.²² The populist and democratic sentiments of the Young Turks resulted in the successful overthrow of the civilian government in 1977. After losing power, they tried again in 1981 but they were unsuccessful because of the timely intervention of the royal family. Nevertheless, the young military officers have laid claim to being arbiters of conflict and to being an activist force for social change.

The Thai Young Turks may have inspired a group of junior Filipino military officers who participated in the failed December coup to step out of the shadow of RAM-HF to mount their own opposition to the Aquino government. They call themselves the YOU. According to an AFP document, YOU's earliest manifestations were the statements and press releases issued in 1986 by the so-called Young Lieutenants, Captains and Majors (YLCM) which during that time expressed plans of forming a political party within the military as a counter-force to the CPP/NPA. The document identified the YOU's membership as revolving around PMA batches 1978 to 1988 and reservists who are mostly assigned in the National Capital Region.²³

Unlike the RAM-HF, there seems to be no personality cult in YOU and no traditional political sponsors to compromise the group's principles. According to observers, there was considerable unhappiness within the ranks of military rebels over the macho-like image woven around Honasan. This may explain why the YOU chose to release its statements through a collective fictional spokesman — Capt Carlos Magalang.²⁴

The YOU believes that "the military institution is not limited to being a mere security force but is an active partner in nation-building." It contends that instead of depoliticizing the military, it should be ideologized into a pro-people army and a law enforcement institution.²⁵

Just like the Thai Young Turks of the 1980s, the YOU's initial grievances focused on its own military hierarchy. The main issues raised were those of low pay, a distorted promotions system, and graft and corruption in the higher echelons. The YOU sought to differentiate itself from the RAM-HF and the Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP) through their ideology of Filipinism, which it defines as the non-communist Left alternative to imperialism, fascism, and communism. Similar to the Thai Young Turks, the YOU has also employed leftist rhetorics, e.g., mass democracy, anti-capitalism, anti-elitism.

D.2.c. Limited Applicability of the Models

While the Indonesian and Thai models may have persuasive influences on the Filipino military interventionists, various prerequisites for the apparent success of these models are not found in the Philippines.

The degree of socio-economic development in Indonesia at the time of independence was so low that the Indonesian Army was the modern sector in Indonesia. The communist uprising in 1965 which induced the prominence of the military in society has no parallel in the Philippines. The so-called Indonesian solution where more than half a million were executed based on mere suspicion would be unacceptable to Filipinos.

Other conditions in Indonesia do not apply to the Philippines. For one, oil resources have allowed the military to play a developmental role, earmarking resources for national development, despite the inefficiencies of widespread graft and corruption. Indonesia is also one of the world's largest nations, and like China and the Soviet Union, authoritarian rule and an increased political role for the military have found greater legitimacy and justification. Furthermore, the Indonesian military is also inextricably linked to intense Indonesian nationalism that developed out of the struggle for independence.

On the other hand, the Thais have a stable and powerful political institution in the monarchy, which has served as a moderating, checking, and legitimizing influence on military rule. As the ASEAN frontline state, it has been deeply involved and concerned with the conflict in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Actual penetration of the Thai border has led to the military's engagement of external forces. These are conditions

that have necessitated and justified a high-profile political role for the Thai armed forces, conditions which are not present in the Philippine case. The fact that the Thais have no colonial experience may also explain the self-confidence of the Thai military which may not be present in equal measure to the Philippines.

In both the Indonesian and Thai cases, there are also religious and cultural variables that must be considered. The Buddhist religion in Thailand and Islam in Indonesia give these countries a different cultural perspective from the Philippines, which is predominantly Roman Catholic. In fact, studies suggest the Philippines is closer to Latin America in terms of psycho-cultural make-up, rather than to Asia.

On the whole, the military forces of Indonesia and Thailand are able to work within the framework of philosophical ideas, historical factors, and national objectives that had long taken root in their respective indigenous societies.²⁶

D.3. Relative Deprivation

The constant interaction of Filipino military officers with their counterparts from other ASEAN countries conceivably makes the former feel underprivileged, less modern, and less prestigious by comparison, in terms of the overall quality of the armed forces, and the benefits and privileges of individual military officers. For example, the Malaysian government purchased some US\$2 billion worth of new military equipment over the last two years for its army. Indonesia and Singapore have outfitted their air force with F-16 A/B aircrafts.²⁷ By comparison, the AFP suffers as most of its equipment are either surplus or used.

The quality and capability of the AFP can also be gleaned from the levels of military expenditures. The Philippine military spends the least amount, as a percentage of GNP, among the ASEAN countries even though as a percentage of central government appropriations, it ranks third. Within ASEAN, the Philippines receives less US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits than Thailand, which does not host a US base.

The uniformed services in Malaysia are well-paid, well-cared for upon retirement, and enjoy commercial opportunities when no longer in active duty. There are no glaring grievances to justify exceeding their traditional role. Also, the police balance off the army with their paramilitary activities, manpower, equipment, and control of the intelligence apparatus of the country.

In addition to the formal rewards and benefits provided by the military establishment, Thai military officers have also enjoyed for decades lucrative business affiliations and operations.²⁸ Commercial benefits are likewise enjoyed by Malaysian and Indonesian officers upon retirement.

Not even the martial law years provided a comparable situation for the Philippine military, because of the inequity in the distribution of benefits. Though these years gave the military the biggest share in the national budget (about 24 percent of government expenditures in 1974), equity and distribution among the military men were not fulfilled.²⁹

While the average Filipino soldier remained in a dismal economic state, the favored military officers enjoyed relative comfort due to additional income from government-owned and -controlled enterprises. The drastic reduction in such business-related benefits under the present administration may have led to heightened feelings of relative deprivation among many military officers.

D.4. Doctrinal and Logistical Influence

The persistent influence of American security perspectives and military doctrines primarily stems from the inertia of Philippine-American "special relations", which has continued to be manifested in the participation of Filipino officers in American military training programs and the continuing logistical dependence of the Philippines on the United States.

These "special relations" most obvious on the area of military relations have for decades predisposed the Philippine military to adopt or be sympathetic to the "security" and "threat" perceptions of the US. In the Cold War era, the Philippine armed forces supported the military campaign of the US against communism in Korea and Vietnam. Presently, the anti-communist struggle in Philippine territory is said to conform to the "low-intensity conflict" strategy favored by the Pentagon. The defeat or containment of communist insurgencies remains one of the pillars of American security policy in Southeast Asia.

The United States tops the other countries in terms of the extent of the training programs it offers Philippine military personnel. Its security assistance to the Philippines under the International Military Education Training Program (IMETP) started in 1950. By 1985 about \$41.529 million had been expended for training of 18,071 Philippine military officers.³⁰ The influence of the program may perhaps be

discerned in the training policies of the AFP meant to continue and be directed towards developing highly-trained personnel in small unit operations. The rationale and content of the curriculum reveal an unmistakably US pattern and orientation.

AFP defense capabilities are primarily geared for maintaining internal order, rather than meeting external security needs. This development is a function of the security arrangements between the Philippines and the United States (Military Bases Agreement, Military Assistance Pact, and the Mutual Defense Treaty) since 1947. As already noted in Chapter II, the Philippines has been dependent on the US for its external security, and for its internal security weaponry. This twin dependency provides the US continuing leverage to retain its military facilities in the Philippine bases.

Philippine dependence on a single source of arms (i.e., the United States) seems to have increased as evidenced by the fact that it obtained 82 percent of its weapons from the US for the 1981 - 1985 period, compared to 76 percent during the 1961 - 1965 period. Moreover, without prior American consent, the Philippines cannot purchase weapons from third countries. Thus, Philippine-American security arrangements, coupled with low Philippine economic capabilities, have led to the AFP being the least modern armed forces in ASEAN.

E. Political Orientations in the Philippine Military³¹

This section presents the psychomilieu of selected officers, men, and units of the military. Central to the soldier's psychomilieu are his political orientations — values, beliefs, attitudes, expectations about government and politics. These may or may not correspond to the objective milieu.

To examine the present political orientations in the AFP, a number of private research organizations and individual social scientists were invited by the Commission to present proposals. The Commission evaluated several proposed methods for studying the political orientations of officers and men in the military establishment. Basically, two methods were considered: a random survey of the military, and interviews with purposively selected respondents from military units of particular interest to the Commission. The Commission decided to undertake the latter approach instead of a full random sample survey of the entire military establishment. It was neither feasible nor prudent for the Commission to attempt an AFP-wide sample survey because (1) it could be anticipated and manipulated by renegade elements to reflect a biased

political orientation, which could then be used to create a bandwagon effect in swinging military and civilian support for the coup plotters; (2) it would involve obtrusive measures, plausibly politicalizing a significant cross-section of the military by exposing them to novel, politically sensitive questions and possibly inducing an "opinion" where there may have been none; (3) a random sample would require interviews of specific officers and men who may be deployed in combat zones, entailing extremely high costs, or an unacceptably large number of substitutions; and (4) such a study would take too long to conduct, process, and analyze.

In adopting the key respondents approach, the Commission settled for an indicative reading of the state of mind of selected strategic military units — most of which were directly involved as coup forces in the December 1989 coup attempt (with some anti-coup forces included for comparative purposes). The results of the study would be useful in suggesting how far reforms and changes undertaken by the government and the military leadership since the last coup may have rendered participation in another coup less likely for officers and men of the selected strategic units.

Since the units which supported the previous coup were already "neutralized" (i.e., confinement, re-assignment or dismissal) of rebel elements in the aftermath of the failed December 1989 coup, the questions that had to be answered were: As they presently stand, what are the political orientations of the officers and men in these selected military units? How conducive are these orientations to unauthorized military actions? Based on their political orientations, what is the likelihood that the selected units would join yet another coup?

The selected military units consisted of company- or battalion-sized formations identified by the Commission as having played a role in the December 1989 coup attempt. A few of the units studied were not exactly the same units which participated in the said coup attempt because the latter had been disbanded and their leaders and men detained. Hence, a few of the study units consisted of reconstituted military units to which participants in the failed December 1989 coup had been re-assigned.

The study plan called for interviews with key respondents from 12 units pre-identified by the Commission to be conducted in June and July 1990. For each unit, the pre-selected key respondents were the unit's Executive Officer (EX-O), one platoon leader, and the company sergeant. Two "opinion leaders" in the unit identified by these pre-selected key respondents were added to the list. At five respondents for each of the 12 units, a total of 60 interviews were to be conducted.

An interview guide was designed to enable eight field researchers to cover uniformly and comprehensively the aspects of political orientation the study was concerned with. The respondents were asked to describe not their personal attitudes, but the attitudes of the members of the unit with regard to the various political subjects broached in the interview. It was part of the intention of the study, however, that in describing the attitudes of the other members of the unit, the informant would actually be "projecting" faithfully his own attitudes. Such projections, from the study's point of view, were acceptable as representations of the orientation of the whole unit, especially where the information and data from the five respondents in the unit cross-validated one another.

The results of the study using this method were meant to be indicative rather than conclusive. The results are applicable only to the selected units taken as a group and should not be extrapolated to the entire AFP. The key respondents were not randomly selected from the members of the units, so the information is not, strictly speaking, generalizable for the unit. However, validity in this case may not be any less than in a random survey where soldiers are asked about their own opinion, but mask their true predispositions.

The Commission was able to access the tentative results of a survey conducted by the AFP involving 1,519 respondents in November and December 1989 (just before and immediately after the coup attempt). The results of the two surveys seem to validate each other.

The respondents in the June-July 1990 study were asked to describe the political orientations of the officers and men in their respective units towards the following:

1. political issues and problems, personalities and institutions
2. the nature of Philippine government and politics
3. preferred mode of political change in the Philippines (status quo, reform, or radical change)
4. the role of the military in Philippine government and politics, and
5. unauthorized military actions

E.1. Political Orientation

E.1.a. Military Issues and Problems

Within the military, issues relating to their material well-being and that of their families are foremost in the minds of officers and Non-

Commissioned Officers (NCOs). The main concerns of soldiers in the selected units are their low salaries, allowances, and benefits; the inadequate, inferior, and delayed distribution of equipment; and disparities in pay, promotions, and disciplinary actions. Issues of a non-material nature were the ineffective AFP leadership, the public outcry against the politicization of the military, graft and corruption within the military establishment, and unfair treatment of rebel soldiers compared to communist rebels.

E.1.b. National Issues and Problems

From a national perspective, issues relating to the quality of political leadership and the government are the greatest concern of officers and NCOs. The main ones are graft and corruption in government, weak and ineffective national leadership, poor economic conditions of the people, "too much politics" in government, the continuing growth of insurgency, and the slow justice system.

Officers show much more concern about graft and corruption than NCOs, while NCOs show much more concern about the socio-economic conditions of the people. The officers appear to be more politically-oriented than the NCOs.

E.1.c. Preferred Resource Person on the National Situation

Soldiers in the selected military units prefer national leaders and high-ranking military officers to be their resource persons on the national situation. Among the favorites were ex-Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Santiago, President Aquino, Secretary Ramos, Gen Renato de Villa, MGen Rodolfo Biazon, and Senators Jovito Salonga, Ernesto Maceda, Rene Saguisag, and Aquilino Pimentel.

E.1.d. Assessment of Overall Operation of Government

Seven out of ten of all respondents say their units are dissatisfied with the overall operation of government. The main reasons given were (1) government is incompetent and ineffective, (2) government has not been able to provide for the soldiers' basic needs, (3) there are too many politicians and corrupt government personnel, and (4) government is unable to deliver basic services to the people.

Eight out of ten officer respondents are dissatisfied with the overall operation of government compared to six out of ten NCOs.

E.1.e. Perceptions of Threats to Government

The two greatest threats to the stability of government are the communist rebels and politicians and corrupt officials. A majority of officers think the communist rebels are a more serious threat than politicians and corrupt officials; a majority of NCOs believe politicians and corrupt officials are a more serious threat compared to the communist rebels.

E.1.f. Attitude Towards Political Change

Nine out of ten respondents think their units prefer reforms as against radical change or maintenance of the status quo as a solution to the problems of the country. More officers are radical-minded than NCOs; more NCOs are conservative than officers. Interestingly, the respondents almost to a man understood "radical change" to mean a military takeover of government.

E.1.g. Attitude Towards Military Participation in Politics

There is a wide range of opinion among the respondents as to whether the military should have a bigger share in government decision-making or not. These range from (1) the military not sharing in government decision-making, (2) the military participating but only in areas where "it has expertise", to (3) the military participating because "it has a role to play."

More officers believe the military should not participate in government decision-making, while more NCOs think the military should participate as "it has a role to play" in politics.

E.1.h. Issue and Problem Areas Salient to the Military

The respondents think that if the military should participate in decision-making, it should be in the areas of counter-insurgency, the organization of the military, US military bases issue, treatment of coup participants, human rights policy, government's socio-economic program, and morality and ethical concerns in government, in that order.

E.1.i. Qualities Conducive to Military's Political Participation

If the military were to help solve the problems of the nation, the respondents believe that the military's discipline is its most important

contribution. They also mentioned sense of service, duty, and self-sacrifice; the military's first-hand experience with the insurgency problem; and field experiences that render the military better informed of people's problems than local civilian officials.

E.1.j. Foremost Concerns in Unauthorized Military Action

The respondents agreed that soldiers have no way of knowing in advance whether their unit is about to undertake an unauthorized military action. Family is the foremost concern of a soldier involved in an unauthorized military action. Unit "esprit de corps" is a bigger concern for officers compared to NCOs, while "career" is a bigger concern for NCOs compared to officers.

E.2. Classification of Coup Participants

Based on the description of the respondents, the participants in coups and similar unauthorized military actions may be classified into six categories of awareness and involvement — the deceived, the conformist, the gambler, the agnostic, the believer, and the plotter.

E.2.a. The Deceived

He joins because he thinks he is on some secret mission, or is told it is for some exercise. When fighting starts and he realizes what is happening, he becomes a conformist, as esprit de corps gets the better of him.

E.2.b. The Conformist

He joins the coup because everybody else in his unit does. He figures if he would not be a target of the constitutionalist forces, he would be the target of the rebel forces. As one informant says, "*Magsisisi na langkung tapos na. Nandiyang yan. Napasubo na.*" (The time to regret is when it's all over. It's already there. We're already in it.)

E.2.c. The Gambler

In the event of a coup, he would initially be on the government side, but ultimately, for whichever is the winning side, because he has to think of his career and his family. He regards brigade- or division-level "unauthorized moves" as acceptable as their probability of success is higher compared to company or battalion moves.

E.2.d. The Agnostic

He is generally against a coup d'etat or any illegitimate measure to subvert the government. But, in extreme cases, when the government persists to be unresponsive, he will find a coup justifiable.

E.2.e. The Believer

He joins a coup because he believes absolutely in his superior officer. He does not mind risking his personal safety; he does this everyday. He is more likely to be a younger than an older officer.

E.2.f. The Plotter

He is convinced that the military holds the solution to the ills of the nation and military intervention is the avenue to personal political power. He justifies his actions through some ingenious interpretation of his "constitutional duty", e.g., to save the President from the politicians who surround and control her or to save the country.

E.3. Predisposition of Selected Units for Political Action

On the whole, seven out of the 12 selected units appear predisposed to participate in future unauthorized military actions against the government (Interventionists), while five units appear predisposed to defend the government and uphold the Constitution (Constitutionalists). A brief political orientation profile of each unit is presented below to provide a sense of this rather serious conclusion. For the moment, the real identity of the units are not disclosed.

E.3.a. Results By Units

Commands. Based on interviews with selected respondents from the unit, Command A shows constitutionalist inclinations. The present Commanding Officer (CO) happens to be the single officer who resisted the orders of the previous CO to join the December 1989 coup attempt. A firm believer in the Constitution, he is widely respected. The respondents are one in saying that the appointment of the CO and the reforms he has instituted are the best and most memorable events in the Command.

Similarly, Command B displays constitutionalist inclinations. Although, the respondents are politicalized and dissatisfied with government, most expressed an aversion to coups as these foster

factionalism in the military, apart from their having proved futile in previous attempts.

On balance, Command C shows constitutionalist inclinations. The respondents from the Command are not politicized and their concern is largely the economic welfare of soldiers and their families. They believe the military should be consulted in government decision-making, but that decisions must all be left to officials in government.

Air Force Attack Squadron. There is reason to believe that elements of Attack Squadron D of Strike Wing E of the PAF have interventionist inclinations. The enmity between the Flying School and PMA graduates may again prompt them to take opposite sides in the event of another coup. Both officer and NCO respondents in the unit are also politicalized; they consider graft and corruption the root cause of government problems and the major threat to its stability.

Philippine Marines. The members of Company E of Marine Battalion Landing Team (MBLT) F indicate constitutionalist inclinations. This company was only provisionally organized as a counter-coup force and cannot have any participation in a coup unless reconstituted. Nonetheless, its former members are generally committed to democracy, are believers in civilian supremacy over the military, and are strongly anti-coup.

Likewise, Marine Company G shows constitutionalist inclinations. The CO and other officers of the unit hold constitutionalist views and are well-liked by their men. These officers express strong disdain for rebel soldiers. They are most concerned and emotional about the damage the December 1989 coup attempt has wrought on the image of the Marines.

Infantry Units in Luzon. Company H of the Infantry Battalion I operating in Central Luzon would likely be interventionist in the event of another coup. The CO of the unit, who allegedly joined the December 1989 coup attempt, is unrepentant about his involvement in that coup. He remains dissatisfied with government and believes in radical change if no reforms are forthcoming from government.

The same interventionist predisposition is true of Company J of Infantry Battalion K operating in Cagayan Valley. The CO of the unit exhibits sympathies for the RAM-HF/SFP. He has little confidence in government, and feels a visit by President Aquino to their unit would be useless.

Another likely interventionist is Company L of Infantry Battalion M, also operating in Central Luzon. Prior to its reorganization as Infantry Battalion M, the company's mother unit was Infantry Battalion N which sided with the RAM-HF during the August 1987 coup attempt. As Infantry Battalion M, they participated in the December 1989 coup attempt on the orders of a well-known renegade lieutenant colonel, their battalion commander at the time.

Infantry Units in Mindanao. Company P of Infantry Battalion Q, operating in Mindanao would be predisposed to join another coup. In fact, the CO of the unit said he would follow an order to join a coup if this were to come from higher levels such as the brigade or division.

Similarly, Company R of Infantry Battalion S, also operating in Mindanao is inclined to be interventionist. The CO and EX-O are disgruntled with the present government because of its weak and inefficient leadership. This unit is additionally susceptible because its battalion commander is a brother of a renegade officer and the current CO was reportedly a participant in the failed December 1989 coup.

The third Mindanao study unit, Company T belonging to Light Armor Battalion U operating in Mindanao, is also inclined to intervene. The unit's CO complains about the "politicking" in government, and graft and corruption both in the military and in the civilian government. The CO is well-liked by his men and could sway them to his side.

E.3.b. Other Findings

In many ways, the distinction between the Interventionists and the Constitutionalists does not lie in whether units are or are not politicalized. With the exception of Command C, all of the study units are rather politicalized in that they (1) view politicians with disdain; (2) complain about graft and corruption in government; (3) perceive President Aquino as a weak President; (4) are dissatisfied with the present government because it is unable to deliver basic services to the people; and (5) favor a bigger decision-making role for the military in areas pertinent to it such as counter-insurgency, US bases, human rights, military organization, and trial of rebel soldiers.

What distinguishes the two is the nature and extent of the units' participation in previous coups, particularly the December 1989 attempt. A unit's participation in earlier coups has tended to heighten its anti-government sentiments along the areas mentioned above, leading the unit to be more convinced of the righteousness of

coups. If the Interventionist units were to find themselves in another coup, they may move with more determination.

E.4. Leadership, Socialization, and Milieu Factors

Apart from the levels of politicalization and dissatisfaction within the military, the data in the study indicate the following factors help to motivate soldiers to join a coup. However, it should be noted that the very same factors can motivate a soldier to resist a coup. These factors are:

E.4.a. Fraternal Ties and Family Relationships

Family ties appear to be extensive, given the tendency of military men to encourage their sons and other relations to pursue a career in soldiering. Similarly, fraternal "batchmate" and "schoolmate" ties endure and have been mobilized to subvert the chain of command through a coup attempt.

E.4.b. In-groups and Out-groups in Military Training

The "in-group, out-group" distinction that is fostered to mold military units into effective combat units also creates the inter-service rivalries (e.g., Army vs PC) and intra-unit factionalization (Marines vs other Navy units, Flying School vs PMA graduates in the same Air Force squadron), that render military units susceptible to manipulation and often places them on opposite sides in a coup attempt.

E.4.c. The Role of COs and Other Ranking Officers

In addition to the hierarchical and authoritarian structure of the military, soldiers tend to idolize their commanding officers, which enable disgruntled officers to persuade entire units to side with anti-government forces. In a case where the commanding officer is disliked by his men, soldiers are prone to take the opposite of whatever stand the CO takes.

E.4.d. Other Personal Factors

The participation of soldiers in unauthorized military actions may also be influenced by other factors, such as religious affiliation. According to one Iglesia ni Kristo soldier, it was the strength of their religious convictions that prevailed on them not to join the coup, even as their fellow soldiers ostracized them for not doing so.

E.5. Summary of the Study

The study shows that two units shifted from their previous predisposition to join a coup to its present anti-coup attitude. This indicates some success in the government's corrective measures. The shifts are attributable to the assignment of respected commanding officers with a constitutionalist orientation. However, other units, in spite of having been neutralized of rebel elements but with the same commander, appear to retain a predisposition towards coups.

As suggested above, participation in previous coup attempts is crucial in explaining the predisposition of military men to participate in succeeding attempts.

The next chapter discusses how the previous coup attempts were preludes to and preparations for the December 1989 attempt, tracing the continuity of the effort to grab power, the involvement of key personalities and military units, and the interaction of military principals with civilian co-conspirators and supporters.

ENDNOTES

- (1) This section is based on the background paper prepared for the Fact-Finding Commission by Patricia Licuanan, Cristina Montiel, and Natividad Dayan, "The Socialization of Military Officers," marked as Exh. "HHHHHH-3"-Commission.
- (2) This section is based on a paper prepared for the Fact-Finding Commission by Dante B. Canlas, "On Military Interventions: Some Considerations from a Political Economy Model," marked as Exh. "IIIII-2"-Commission, as well as the paper of Maria Socorro H. Gochoco, "The Overall Macroeconomic Situation," marked as Exh. "IIIII-1"-Commission.
- (3) James Chowning Davies, "Aggression, Violence, Revolution, and War" in Jeanne M. Knutson, general ed., Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 247. Ted Robert Gurr in Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) advances a similar theory of relative deprivation which posits that people feel deprived when there is a gap between what they want and what they can get. Comparison is not just over time, but also as between the differing rewards of various social groups.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Philippine Statistical Yearbook (Manila: NEDA, 1989); National Statistics Office, National Income Accounts, various issues.
- (6) Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Ibid.
- (7) This section is based on the background paper prepared for the Fact-Finding Commission by Belinda A. Aquino, "The Political Environment of the 1989 Coup Attempt" and the paper of Segundo E. Romero Jr., "Philippine Domestic Politics and the Foreign Policy Debate," in Robert A. Scalapino, et al, eds., Asia and the Major Powers: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), pp. 200-229.
- (8) Joaquin Bernas, S.J. in Pansol Reflections. The Role of the Military in a Third World Democracy: The Philippine Experience

- (Manila: Senate Publication and Editorial Division, 20 January 1990), p. 4.
- (9) Tony Guidote, "Performance Rating of the Senate, House of Representatives, the Military and the Police," Senate Weather Bulletin, 89-14 (July 1989), p. 2.
 - (10) Segundo E. Romero, Jr, "Opinion of Selected Filipino Publics Since the Aquino Assassination: Implications for Participatory Democracy in the Philippines" (Doctoral diss., College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, 1990).
 - (11) Jaime Zobel de Ayala, "Social Justice in Sound Business Practice," Philippines Free Press, 2 December 1989, p. 45.
 - (12) Ibid. Underscoring in the original.
 - (13) Fidel V. Ramos, "The DND-AFP Leading the People for Democracy," Fookien Times Philippine Yearbook (Manila: Fookien Times Yearbook Publishing Co., 1987 - 1988).
 - (14) Jose V. Abueva, "The December Coup Attempt and the State of the Nation: Some Lessons and Implications," in Belinda A. Aquino, ed., The Failed December Coup Attempt — View from the UP Community (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Office of Public Affairs and Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1990), p. 15.
 - (15) This section is based on the background paper prepared for the Fact-Finding Commission by Natalia M. Morales, Aileen Baviera, Cecilia Hidalgo, Francisco Magno, Eliseo Cubol, and Jorge Tigno, "External Factors and their Possible Influence on the Perceptions, Attitudes, and Behavior of the Philippine Military," marked as Exh. "JJJJJJ"-Commission.
 - (16) Sheldon Simon, "ASEAN's Strategic Situation in the 1980s," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring 1987).
 - (17) Edmundo Garcia, "Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict in the Philippines: The Quest for a Just and Lasting Peace," in Edmundo Garcia and Carolina G. Hernandez, eds., Waging Peace in the Philippines (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy

and Public Affairs and the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1989), pp. 25-42.

- (18) Asia Yearbook 1987, pp. 24-25.
- (19) This estimate, considered conservative by others, is by Admiral Sudomo, then head of the Indonesian state security agency given in a Dutch television interview in 1976.
- (20) Edmundo Garcia, The Filipino Quest: A Just and Lasting Peace (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1988), pp. 121-151.
- (21) This happened in the 1970s, when Praphat Charusathien, the deputy of Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, owed his power to his allegedly corrupt business connections.
- (22) See Chai-anan Sumudavanija, The Thai Young Turks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).
- (23) Fe Zamora, "YOU: How the Reb Group was Formed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 June 1990.
- (24) John Mcbeth, "Who are YOU?," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 June 1990, pp. 24-26.
- (25) Capt Carlos Maglalang, Interview by Center for Investigative Journalism and Asahi Shimbun, 8 and 17 February 1990, Metro Manila, Exh. "ZZZ"- Commission.
- (26) "Not Quite a Coup in Thailand," The Economist, 16 June 1990, p. 27.
- (27) Appendix E, ASEAN States: Major Items of Military Equipment on Order or Recently Delivered, Mid-1987, in Chin Kin Wah, ed., Defense Spending in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 315-321.
- (28) David Morell, "The Political Dynamics of Military Power in Thailand" in Edward Olsen and Stephen Jurika, Jr, eds., The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p. 139. See also Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979).

- (29) Philippine Daily Inquirer, Series on RAM Boys, 1-12 January 1990.
- (30) Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, "The Philippines: Defense Expenditures, Threat Perceptions, and the Role of the United States," in Chin Kin Wah, op. cit., p. 155.
- (31) This section is based on a background paper prepared for the Fact-Finding Commission by Virginia A. Miralao and Segundo E. Romero, Jr, "Political Orientations in Selected Units of the Philippine Military," marked as Exh. "HHHHHH-1"-Commission.

IV

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1986 - 1987

The most significant development arising from the series of military interventions from 1986 to the present is the emergence of the AFP as a potentially decisive political force in our society. There had been seven attempts at military intervention from the period of 1986 until just before the latest one in December 1989. These are (1) the February 1986 coup attempt, (2) the July 1986 Manila Hotel incident, (3) the November 1986 "God Save The Queen" plot, (4) the January 1987 GMA-7 incident, (5) the April 1987 "Black Saturday" incident, (6) the July 1987 takeover plot of the Manila International Airport (MIA), and (7) the August 1987 coup attempt.

All the coup attempts are irretrievably linked and cannot be analyzed in isolation of each other. Thus, the December 1989 attempt can only be fully understood if viewed in the light of the previous ones. This chapter will analyze the 1986 - 1987 attempts, while the succeeding chapter will deal with the December 1989 incident. On the basis of the testimonies and separate accounts of events, the "God Save The Queen" plot was the most dangerous threat to the Aquino government, if it had been executed as planned — a chain-of-command takeover. Fortunately, top military officers led by then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (CSAFP) Gen Fidel V. Ramos refused to go along with it and effectively contained it. That very little is publicly known about it, since there was no actual fighting, does not detract from this conclusion.

A. February 1986 Coup Attempt

Much has already been written about the bloodless EDSA People Power Revolt (EDSA Revolt) that occurred from 22-25 February 1986, when Filipinos massed in the streets of Metro Manila, mostly around Camps Crame and Aguinaldo, to openly defy the authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos and to show support for a group led by then Defense

Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff Lt Gen Ramos, who had declared their withdrawal of support for the Marcos government. However, not enough has been written about the original plan to stage a coup d'etat by a group of middle-ranking officers referred to as the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), but which was eventually overtaken by the now historic People Power Revolt. A review of the event from different perspectives raises questions on the motives of the principal actors and the historical accuracy of their version of the event. The narration of events in this chapter is largely drawn from published materials, unless stated otherwise.

There is no exact date when RAM was founded, but those close to the officers identified with it place the year as 1982.¹ It is clear, however, that the RAM was controlled by military officers closely linked with then Defense Minister, and now Senator Enrile. The emergence of RAM was principally a reaction of young officers against such issues as the widespread corruption in the military, the lack of professionalism, promotions based on favoritism, and "overstaying" generals who blocked the younger generation's career advancement. What is less evident is that RAM also served Enrile's political agenda and provided him personal security, as he perceived increasing threats from Mrs Imelda R. Marcos, and Gen Fabian Ver, who was appointed Chief of Staff by President Marcos in 1981. Enrile himself revealed at the 1986 press conference that announced his break with Marcos that, "As far back as 1982, we have been getting persistent reports that there were efforts to eliminate us . . . and it was [at] that point that we decided to organize a group to protect ourselves . . . now known as the AFP Reform Movement."²

According to Cecilio Arillo, a journalist closely identified with Enrile and the RAM, matters became untenable for Enrile when defense intelligence reports disclosed that barely a few weeks after Ver's appointment to General Headquarters (GHQ), a "hit" team was allegedly formed in Mindanao to liquidate the defense minister.³ To counter this, Enrile's security group at the Ministry of National Defense (MND), mostly PMA graduates led by Lt Col Gregorio Honasan (PMA '71), underwent rigid training in counter-terrorism in Quezon province. Some 300 men were trained by two retired British instructors of the elite Special Air Service Regiment. Moreover, they were armed with specialized weapons, mainly Uzis and Galils, imported from Israel and allegedly brought in through connections in the Bureau of Customs, where Enrile was once commissioner.⁴

In 1982, to avoid detection, the training of these men was moved from Quezon to the Sierra Madre mountains in northern Luzon. However,

this did not escape Ver's attention and it was reported to Marcos, who became furious about it, fanning his suspicions about the defense minister's political ambitions. When the President confronted him with the report, Enrile completely denied it and blamed it on political or personal intrigues.⁵ By July 1983, Enrile's men had resumed their training in Quezon province.

At this time, while the hostility between Enrile and Ver intensified, a parallel conflict on the personal level seemed to have been developing between Honasan and Col Irwin Ver, Gen Ver's son who was a year ahead of Honasan at the PMA.⁶ As a sign of further consolidation of his power, Gen Ver acquired operational control of the Integrated National Police (INP), a responsibility that normally should have been vested on Ramos as then Chief of Philippine Constabulary (PC), but was transferred by Marcos to his Chief of Staff on 1 August 1983. By then, too, rumors were rife about Marcos's illness and the problem of his successor. As the names of Mrs Marcos and Gen Ver circulated as leading contenders, Enrile's own chances seemed to diminish.

By 21 August 1983, RAM had formed an 11-man Ad Hoc Steering Committee to give direction to the organization and analyze current events, including the implications of the Aquino assassination.⁷ According to a member of this Committee, the 11 members are (ranks shown as of 1985-1986): the late Col Eugene Ocampo PC (PMA '58), Capt Rex Robles PN (PMA '65), Lt Col Hector Tarrazona PAF (PMA '68), Lt Col Gregorio Honasan PA (PMA '71), Lt Col Victor Batac PC (PMA '71), Maj Alejandro Flores PC (PMA '72), Maj Napoleon de los Santos PC (PMA '75), Capt Charlemagne Alejandrino PC (PMA '75), Lt Jose Renato Abella PA (PMA '79), Lt Gregorio Catapang, Jr PA (PMA '81), and Lt Rafael Tadeo, Jr PC (PMA '81).⁸ Except for this Committee, RAM does not appear to have a roster of members. It was an unstructured organization whose meetings were said to be open to any officer or soldier interested in reforming the AFP. The objectives articulated by the members were (1) to fight graft and corruption in the AFP; (2) to ask for promotions based on performance, merit, seniority, and fairness; (3) to work for better medical attention and services; (4) to eliminate the *bata-bata* system; and (5) to improve logistical support for the officers and men fighting insurgency in the field.⁹ However, it appears that while the RAM leadership was publicly known through the Steering Committee, there was a hidden "inner circle" composed of Honasan, Lt Col Eduardo Kapunan (PMA '71), Col Tirso Gador (PMA '66), possibly Navy Capt Felix Turingan ("Baron" of PMA '65), and one other officer, who plotted the February 1986 coup.¹⁰

The RAM steadily grew as Honasan contacted former PMA classmates and alumni, as well as comrades from his Mindanao days (he had been posted there, but was transferred to the MND in 1975 when he was wounded in the leg). Subsequently, even senior officers who were retired from active service, but were supportive of reforms in the AFP, were organized into Senior Cavaliers of RAM (SCRAM) led by, among others, Gen Jesus Vargas (PMA '29), former CSAFP, and Navy Capt Antonio Tansingco (PMA '55). Retired BGen Jose Almonte (PMA '56), then still a colonel, revealed in his testimony before the Fact-Finding Commission on 4 January 1990 that discussions among the RAM in 1986 considered having a political arm which would be the RAM; and an armed group, the Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP).

Among Constabulary men, Batac, a classmate close to Honasan, became the main RAM organizer in the PC.¹¹ On 6 February 1985, six officers met, mostly from the intelligence think tank of the PC Headquarters. Three days later, another meeting of four officers followed. On 15 February, 23 PC officers met. The next day, they drafted RAM's Declaration of Principles, which was distributed to officers as the "Preliminary Statements of Aspirations" during the PMA Alumni Association convention on 17 February.

The RAM appears to have escalated its organizing activities in 1985, which could account for the general impression that it was founded in that year. On 15 March, the RAM formulated its nine-point "Statement of Common Aspirations," and on 21 March, it came out with a position paper entitled "We Belong . . .," short for "We Belong to the Reform the Armed Forces Movement." All three statements were printed in a pamphlet called "Crossroads to Reform." During the traditional PMA Alumni Parade at graduation time on 21 March, some 300 young officers, mostly from Classes 1971 to 1984, broke away from the long line at the parade ground to display a banner marked "Unity Through Reforms." They wore T-shirts that said "We Belong." It was the day before the customary Commander-in-Chief's address to the graduating class, thus marking the first public protest of the military during the Marcos regime.¹²

On 2 April 1985, the official name of RAM was coined from another acronym, "R.E.F.O.R.M. the AFP Movement" during a meeting at the MND Social Hall. "R.E.F.O.R.M." cryptically stood for Restore Ethics, Fair-Mindedness, Order, Righteousness and Morale. Two weeks later, presumably under orders from Malacañang, Ramos, who was then acting Chief of Staff while Ver was on leave to face trial in the Aquino-Galman case, met with RAM officers for seven hours to find out more

about the organization. The proceedings of the meeting were taped and must have been relayed to Marcos. At the end of May, the President called RAM officers to Malacañang for another meeting, which mostly consisted of Marcos's monologue for 40 minutes, berating them. Later, Honasan obtained a copy of a supposedly Malacañang-prepared order of battle with the names of Honasan, Batac, Tarrazona,¹³ Kapunan, and some ten other RAM officers on it.¹⁴ The "war" was on.

Meanwhile, the Enrile forces in Cagayan and at the MND had mapped out contingency plans which went beyond securing Enrile's personal safety, to preventing Mrs Marcos and Gen Ver from taking over in case Marcos died, to directly maneuvering against Marcos. The RAM was a perfect political vehicle. Even as it publicly advocated reforms in the AFP, its inner circle continued to plan for a coup d'etat. By September 1985, the plans for a coup were well advanced.¹⁵

To the RAM, the situation after the 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino provided the necessary political and economic preconditions that could ensure a successful move to oust Marcos from power. Furthermore, Tarrazona, a member of the 11-man Ad Hoc Steering Committee of RAM, wrote in 1989 that

the signal and encouragement from the different sectors of society to unite and move against the dictatorship of Mr. Marcos were too loud and strong to be ignored. Eventually, we were subtly encouraged, if not practically pushed, by the Opposition groups . . . to either stage a coup or start a revolution.¹⁶

On 10 July 1985, RAM officers met with concerned businessmen at the AFP Commissioned Officers Club in Camp Aguinaldo. On 1 August, another group of businessmen and media people met with the RAM at the Association of General and Flag Officers Building in Camp Aguinaldo. Later, a bigger meeting was held between RAM and Manindigan at the Center for Research and Communication in Pasig. Other meetings followed with the group of Corazon C. Aquino (Cory), widow of Ninoy Aquino, Jaime Cardinal Sin, the Manila Public School Teachers Association, Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, the National Council of Churches in the Philippines, the American Study Mission, members of the press, and many more.¹⁷

The expose by the San Jose Mercury News on Marcos's ill-gotten wealth became the basis for an impeachment move by opposition members of parliament, although it was dismissed in less than 24 hours. US President Ronald Reagan had sent Senator Paul Laxalt to Manila for secret dialogues with Marcos, and shortly after that, on 3 November 1985, Marcos announced in a satellite interview on American TV that he

had decided to call for a new presidential election, subsequently set for 7 February 1986. Robles revealed three years after the EDSA Revolt that the RAM had planned to launch the coup against Marcos in December 1985, but deferred it after a "snap election" was called. Robles acknowledged, "So we decided to postpone [it] until sometime after elections around April or May in the summer."¹⁸ However, the coup plotters again changed their plans, prompted by the public outrage against the massive election fraud.

The RAM's own direct participation in the electoral process through its *Kamalayan 1986* project must have given its members a clear idea of the strong anti-dictator public sentiment. Tarrazona relates that for the first time in the history of the Philippine military, a group of officers openly got involved in an election.¹⁹ The project headed by Turingan promoted free, fair, and clean elections by holding rallies in military camps to urge AFP officers and enlisted men to remain "neutral" and to protect the sanctity of the ballot. This was intended to remove the public perception that the AFP was solidly behind Marcos. The *Kamalayan* project was secretly funded by a group of businessmen opposed to Marcos. The transfer of funds was arranged through Tansingco who collected the contributions from supporters, consigned them to SCRAM members in the name of retired BGen Manuel Flores (PMA '34), before finally handing them over to Lt Col Victor Erfe (PMA '69), designated custodian of RAM funds.²⁰

Other *Kamalayan 1986* activities included radio and personal campaigns, as well as requests to PMA alumni and ordinary citizens to write as many letters as they could to the seven top ranking AFP generals and their wives, asking for honest polls, and for peace and order. On 12 January 1986, Tarrazona and Catapang convinced some 800 PMA cadets to sign about 8,000 pre-printed letters appealing for fair and clean elections. Since the PMA Superintendent, BGen Jose Ma Zumel (PMA '59), and the Commandant of Cadets, Col Nicasio Rodriguez (PMA '61), both happened to be absent that day, by coincidence or by design, Tarrazona and Catapang easily obtained permission to engage in this activity from the Assistant Commandant, Lt Col Nelson Eslao (PMA '71).²¹

The "snap election" provided an opportunity for various opposition groups to unite behind the candidacies of Cory Aquino for President and Salvador H. Laurel for Vice President. A citizen's watchdog organization called National Citizens' Movement For Free Elections (NAMFREL) drew thousands of volunteers in a desire to have clean and honest polls. Election violence directed at Cory supporters as well as

NAMFREL volunteers intensified the anger against Marcos. A popular young ex-Governor, Evelio Javier, was brutally murdered in Antique while he was working for the Aquino-Laurel campaign.

Initial results from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) showed Marcos leading, but the quick count of NAMFREL favored Aquino. The public suspected that Marcos was going to try to cheat Aquino. A dramatic walkout of a group of COMELEC computer programmers led by Linda Kapunan, wife of Lt Col Kapunan, Enrile's intelligence chief and RAM inner circle member, reinforced this perception. Their action emphasized in the public mind the rampant cheating that was being done by Marcos's side. The fugitive computer workers were protected by RAM officers led by Kapunan, with the aid of ₱20,000 from Enrile.²² On 14 February, the influential Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) issued a strong statement condemning the election fraud as being unparalleled in Philippine electoral history. Two days later, Mrs Aquino called for a nationwide boycott of "crony establishments" in a rally at Rizal Park which was attended by a huge crowd. Thus was launched the civil disobedience campaign that would take her to Cebu on 22 February.

The "snap election" and its widely perceived fraudulent results gave the RAM the signal to mobilize for action all the elements they had painstakingly put together for many months. The arrangements were so clandestine that for a long time no definite date was set for its launching. The cue to start depended on the favorable political and internal military conditions that would enhance the coup's success.

President Aquino herself revealed in a retrospective interview last February 1990 that her brother, Peping, had been approached by representatives of the RAM in "either December [1985] or early January [1986]" with the message that, "Your sister will never win. She may be popular but the votes will be manipulated and she will not win. There is an alternative. We are planning something and if she will join us or be with us. . . ." They were offering her a seat in a seven-person civilian-military junta to be called Council for National Reconciliation. President Aquino said that her immediate reaction then was to reject the offer because, as she recounted, "I'm not interested in being president for the sake of being president. I want to find out first of all if I do have the support of the people, so I want to go through with the election because they were telling me that since I would have no chance anyway, I might as well bow out of the race and join them in whatever they were planning to do."²³ President Aquino also recalled that she first met RAM officers Robles, Honasan, Kapunan, and Batac at an hour-long meeting on 12

December 1985 at the house of Mila Albert, her late husband's half-sister. She had just come back from her first day of campaigning and they offered her security for the duration of the campaign.

American author Raymond Bonner relates in his book, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, that the Aquino camp had been sought out by the RAM on 20 February with a proposal for a coup and subsequent junta, which Mrs Aquino flatly turned down.²⁴ It was apparently the same message as the one previously received by President Aquino. In any case, the junta would have been composed of Enrile, Ramos, Cardinal Sin, Mrs Aquino, businessman Jaime Ongpin, Alejandro Melchor (a former Executive Secretary under Marcos), and Laurel. The Council was supposed to be transitional and tasked to convene a Constitutional Convention within six months, which would then decide on the form of government. There was also supposed to be a committee to coordinate military operations in what was foreseen as a post-Marcos scenario. This committee was to be chaired by Ramos.²⁵ However, as contended by other people who closely followed what was going on, the Council would have only served as a facade for a military junta consisting of Enrile and his colonels. According to Professor Alfred McCoy, this was the real game plan designed by the coup's political committee composed of Enrile, his civilian aide Silvestre Afable, Robles, and Turingan.²⁶

According to Arillo, the RAM's military operations plan, on the other hand, consisted of several scenarios, each designed to adapt to particular conditions. One scenario was for Enrile to make a stand in Cagayan, his home province, where he knew the terrain as a young guerrilla during the Japanese occupation, while guerrilla fighting is waged simultaneously in Manila and other places in Bicol, Visayas, and Mindanao. Another scenario was for a commando squad led by Honasan to cross the Pasig river and land on Malacañang grounds just after midnight. Guided by PSC men recruited for the purpose, Honasan's team would enter Malacañang and capture President and Mrs Marcos as hostages to prevent an all-out attack on the rebels by troops loyal to Marcos.²⁷

In his testimony before the Commission, retired MGen Rodolfo Canieso (PMA '56), former Commanding General of the Philippine Army (CGPA) and Director of the NICA, said that the strike force that was supposed to attack Malacañang in February 1986 was to have been led by Kapunan, Lt Col Marcelino Malajacan (PMA '71), Maj Ricardo Brillantes (PMA '72), and Maj Saulito Aromin (PMA '74). Arillo, however, denied that there was such a plan for a commando raid. He asserted that such a plan was only contingent on the possible arrest of Enrile and Ramos.²⁸ In an interview with McCoy on 25 July 1986,

Honasan claimed that they had "planned for every possible eventuality." By 7 February 1986, the RAM coup plotters had reportedly recruited 2,500 soldiers, and organized numerous cells in many vital military units around Metro Manila, although lower numbers have been mentioned by other sources.²⁹

A variation of their plan, as later revealed by Almonte, was to ambush and kill BGen Rolando Pattugalan (PMA '57), former AFP intelligence chief then commander of the 2nd Infantry Division (2 ID) in Tanay, Rizal, and a known Marcos man.³⁰ Pattugalan was generally considered as the candidate to replace MGen Josephus Ramas as Army Chief; thus an attempt on the former would, by logic, be blamed on Ramas, thereby sowing dissension within the Army.

It is generally believed that the coup was scheduled to be launched on 22 February 1986. However, according to Robles, reputedly RAM's chief political strategist, they had leaked a series of possible dates to create confusion in the Marcos camp and to compel them to maintain a series of taxing security-alert situations. Furthermore, on 16 February, RAM leaked details of the supposed plot to kidnap the President and Mrs Marcos just to test the reaction of their bodyguards.³¹ The mounting pressure of outright civil disobedience was added to the national outrage at the rampant electoral cheating. Rumors were everywhere that Marcos was on the brink of declaring martial law again and that massive arrests of opposition leaders and their followers would be carried out.

At Enrile's camp, it was estimated that Marcos would probably reimpose martial law two or three days before he took his oath of office scheduled for 25 February. If he did that, Enrile would most likely be one of the first persons arrested because of the enormous political threat he represented to Marcos. It was, thus, concluded by Enrile's side that a preemptive move had to be carried out. Gador, then Cagayan's Constabulary provincial commander and an Enrile loyalist, calculated that the 72 hours before the Marcos inauguration fell exactly on Saturday, 22 February.³²

In the evening of 19 February, forces under Gador, known as the "Cagayan 100", began to deploy in Manila in three waves via a complicated route to avoid detection. Their deployment was completed by the afternoon of 22 February. Their mission was to neutralize the Military Police Brigade in Camp Aguinaldo and to secure the perimeter of the MND building. Other preparations were made by RAM officers to carry out their plan of a Malacañang assault on the early morning of 23 February. A few days before, RAM officers were said to have withdrawn

all their money from the bank and left them to their families. Maj Noe Wong (PMA '75), RAM member and Enrile's senior aide, left his three children in the care of an aunt before going to his staging point. Tarrazona sent his wife and three children to Cavite City to stay with relatives there, although he had made arrangements with two friends as early as December 1985 to take care of them in case anything happened to him. Almonte's quarters in Fort Bonifacio were supposed to be the main staging point from where the coup participants would move on to Villamor Air Base (VAB). Some RAM officers were also scheduled to meet at Tarrazona's house in the air base where they would constitute the advance force. Other officers and enlisted men were supposed to reinforce them later to consolidate their forces at VAB, which had been chosen as Command Post or main operations center due to its sophisticated communication equipment.³³ They were later contacted to join the group at Camp Aguinaldo because of a change in plans.

It appears that the only time the coup plotters realized something had gone wrong with their plans was on Saturday morning, 22 February. Enrile had gone to have breakfast at the Atrium in Makati with a group of politicians, businessmen, and journalists, when he was called to the phone by then Trade and Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin. Ongpin told him that 19 of his security men had been arrested by Marines at Fort Bonifacio while on "night training exercises". This allegedly worried Enrile as three of those men were military personnel from the Defense Ministry "on loan" to Ongpin to train his security unit, and unusual movements like those could call attention to his whole force and their plan for a coup.

At about the same time (10:00 a.m.), Honasan was at his office behind the MND building in Camp Aguinaldo, checking reports of troop and armor movements in Malacañang and other parts of Metro Manila, when he noticed two brief but vital reports. One was the move of the 5th Marine Battalion Landing Team (MBLT) from Fort Bonifacio to Pandacan, just off the Otis entrance of Malacañang Park at 4:00 a.m., and another was the deployment of the 14th Infantry Battalion (14 IB) from Nueva Ecija to North Harbor at 3:00 a.m. that same day. This meant an unusually high concentration of troops in Manila, in addition to those that they had previously monitored. Honasan called Kapunan to his office at once, where they tried but failed to reach Enrile by phone, so they hurriedly drove to his house instead.

After a discussion among Enrile, Honasan, Kapunan, and Wong, Honasan supposedly signalled all the MND security force, RAM, and 300 civilians to be on combat readiness. Enrile then made that famous

telephone call to Ramos. At 6:30 p.m., Enrile and Ramos declared their withdrawal of support for Marcos at a hastily called press conference in Camp Aguinaldo, which angered Marcos all the more.

At 10:30 p.m., Marcos announced at his own press conference that a plot to assassinate him and Mrs Marcos had allegedly been discovered by his son, Bongbong, and the Presidential Security Command (PSC) Chief of Staff, Col Irwin Ver. He said that it was aborted with the arrest of some officers. He accused Enrile and Ramos with having taken part in the plot, thus, their preemptive stand at Camp Aguinaldo to cover their participation.

Marcos then presented Capt Ricardo Morales (PMA '77), chief security escort officer of Mrs Marcos, as the one who allegedly squealed to Col Ver on the rebels' plan. Morales read a prepared statement. He said that the plan was to enter Malacañang and capture President and Mrs Marcos at 12:30 a.m. on 23 February. The attack would be staged from four points. Five commando teams would break through the Palace perimeter from the Pasig river. Malajacan, Commanding Officer of the 16th Infantry Battalion (CO 16 IB), would lead two of his companies and an armor company to create a diversionary action at Malacañang Park. A Ranger Force from the 49 IB would then enter Malacañang's gate on J P Laurel Street in a convoy of 6 x 6 trucks and a platoon of armor under the cover that they were reinforcements from Fort Bonifacio. This would be led by Aromin, CO 49 IB, with his unit from Quezon. The strategy supposedly would be credible since the Rangers were believed to be loyal to Ver. Kapunan would lead another unit that would force its way behind the Palace gym to cover the commandos coming in from the river. Some three battalions were supposed to be involved in the operation, all led by RAM officers.

Of the officers arrested, four were presented at another TV press conference on the morning of 23 February. These were Morales again, Malajacan, Aromin, and Brillantes. Aside from Enrile and Ramos, Morales had also allegedly implicated Gador, Honasan, Kapunan, Wong, and Maj Arsenio Santos, Jr (PMA '72), Enrile's aide. Aromin, on the other hand, was supposed to have confessed that he was part of five combat teams that were to have crossed the Pasig river to attack Malacañang and kill the Marcoses. He allegedly also implicated Honasan, Kapunan, Malajacan, and Santos.³⁴

The battle plan revealed by Morales resembles closely the commando raid earlier mentioned as one of RAM's options. He was obviously in a tight spot of some kind when he wrote a "farewell letter" to his parents

in Davao dated 17 February, Monday.³⁵ Still, the general public reaction at the time was to initially dismiss the coup plot as just one of Marcos's prevaricated justifications to declare martial law, as he did in September 1972.

Notwithstanding the meticulous planning and attention to detail that the conspirators gave their coup plot, there were still apparent breaches in security. According to McCoy, for example, the planning sessions in January 1986 were conducted by Honasan and Kapunan almost like open seminars, with as many as 15 officers in attendance at a time. This seeming lack of concern for secrecy allegedly infuriated senior RAM officers Robles and Turingan that they demanded the compartmentalization of information on a need-to-know basis.³⁶

It also later surfaced that PC Lt Col Rodolfo Aguinaldo (PMA '72), a RAM member, disclosed the names of 14 key RAM officers to his Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contact at the US Embassy in an unauthorized meeting. Thus, those who knew of the coup plans at least a week before it happened included the CIA station chief and, therefore, others in the US Embassy, as well as the Australian Embassy.³⁷ The information might well have reached Marcos and Ver, which could explain the unusually high rate of troop movements in Metro Manila at the time. On the other hand, the increased troop movements could have been the prelude to a declaration of martial law and the repression of the expected mass resistance to it.

Another possible source of the security leak was Maj Edgardo Doromal (PMA '74), Malacañang's perimeter security officer, who was supposedly pressured by Honasan to join the coup plot despite his apparent misgivings and reluctance. Eventually, Doromal allegedly confessed to Irwin Ver. However, the subsequent interview by McCoy on 25 July 1986 revealed that Honasan was convinced the breach in security resulted from Aguinaldo's CIA contact, who in turn passed on the information to Ver.³⁸ As Robles noted of the Americans: "They're shrewd when they play the game. They would bet on both sides, and they would win regardless."³⁹

In his testimony before the Commission on 15 June 1990, BGen Artemio Tadiar, Jr (PMA '59) recalled that on 19 February 1986, Wednesday, he was unexpectedly summoned by Malacañang from Zamboanga where he was inspecting troops as Commandant of the Philippine Marines. The following afternoon, in a meeting at the Naval Intelligence Security Force headquarters in Fort Bonifacio, Ver told Tadiar about the plan of Honasan and his men to grab power by

launching a commando raid on Malacañang, holding Marcos and his family as hostages and putting up their own government. Tadiar said Ver knew the details of the plot at least four days before the planned date of Honasan's initial attack.

Tadiar also said that Ver had received information that the Honasan group was allegedly planning to kill Tadiar on 21 February, Friday. Thus, on Friday night, some military men in full combat gear were arrested by Marines in a restricted area in Fort Bonifacio on suspicion of coming to kill Tadiar. According to Tadiar, the arrested men, 17 enlisted personnel and one officer, turned out to be the security men of Minister Ongpin, led by Navy LtSG Michael Angelo Asperin (PMA '81). Tadiar then reported this to Ver and supposedly urged him to arrest Honasan and company, but Ver refused.

The following morning, 22 February, Enrile's office began calling Tadiar to inquire on the whereabouts of the arrested men. Tadiar told them that he had turned them over to BGen Pedro Balbanero (PMA '57), commander of the Military Police. It appeared that with their coup plot discovered and the prospect of certain arrest by Ver's men, the RAM officers decided to abort the coup and make a stand at Camps Crame and Aguinaldo. Once the decision was made, the coup plotters realized that they had no plan of retreat and most of their orders calling off the action went astray, thus leading to the capture of several RAM members. As Honasan himself admitted after the event, the plotters had violated basic military tactical principles by failing to provide for a retreat contingency.⁴⁰

For the duration of the four-day revolt, the position of the Enrile-Ramos group would gradually be strengthened by the mobilization of the numerous RAM members and contacts in the different units of the four major service commands, as well as the progressively increasing defections of military officers and men to the rebels' side. In the Navy, Cmdr Proceso Maligalig (PMA '69), then Naval Operations Assistant Chief, and Capt Carlito Cunanan, Naval Operating Forces Deputy Chief, who is the elder brother of Col Thelmo Cunanan, (PMA '61), Enrile's intelligence officer, activated upon signal "Operation Twiggy," the contingency plan for the RAM in the Navy. Commo Tagumpay Jardiniano (PMA '57) had defected early to the Enrile-Ramos camp but, like many ranking officers, had asked that the information be kept secret for the time being for security reasons. RAdm Brillante Ochoco (PMA '55), Navy Flag Officer in Command, did not know what was happening at the PN Headquarters (HQ) as he was in Malacañang most of the time. It was

only after midnight of 23 February that he found out 85 percent of his command had shifted to the Enrile-Ramos side.⁴¹

In the Air Force, defections began early. At 7:00 p.m. on 22 February, even while Enrile and Ramos were holding their press conference, Tarrazona, among others, was busy contacting PAF officers to appeal for their support. Priority was given to commanders of flying units. Col Antonio Sotelo, CO of the 15th Strike Wing (15 SW), immediately declared support for Enrile and Ramos. In fact, as early as December 1985, PAF Lt Col Oscar Legaspi (PMA '71) had contacted majority of the Air Force line pilots, including Maj Charles Hotchkiss, then commander of the 20th Air Commando Squadron under Sotelo.⁴² It must be recalled that it was the 15 SW which later sent its helicopters to Camp Crame in a dramatic defection scene, and was responsible for the firing of rockets over Malacañang.

Legaspi had also recruited Maj Francisco Baula, Jr (PMA '73), Squadron Commander of the 5th Fighter Wing (5 FW) based at Basa Air Base. It was he, along with two of his pilots, Lts Noe P. Linsangan (PMA '81) and Nestor A. Genuino, Jr (PMA '81), who flew over Camps Aguinaldo and Crame during the tense days of February, causing much apprehension and fear among the crowd below who did not know whose side they were on. The fighter pilots later flew to Clark Air Base, where their planes were "grounded" on the pretext of lack of fuel so they would not be used by Ver.

Still uncertain of the pilots' loyalty and aware of the crucial importance of control of air power, the contingency plans for the capture of VAB and Basa Air Base were said to have been activated. The plans involved the capture of the two bases by the PC Special Action Force (SAF) under Kapunan and Lt Col Reynaldo Velasco (PMA '71), and the elements from the PC Training Command (PC TRACOM) led by Col Bayani Fabic (PMA '58). Meanwhile, Maj Arsenio Santos, Jr and Lt Andy Gauran (PMA '82) would launch diversionary operations nearby. To prevent the confusion that could arise from not knowing who were "friendly" forces and who were not, Kapunan came up with the idea of a Philippine flag patch as a countersign, changing its position clockwise everyday, starting with the sun on the top and the red portion on the left. It was, of course, assumed that the coup would not last much longer than 72 hours.

News of other defections and support continued to pour in at Camps Crame and Aguinaldo on the second and third days of the revolt. MGen Prospero A. Olivas (PMA '53), head of the Metropolitan Command (METROCOM) and Metropolitan Police Force, was an early convert but

declined to be announced just yet. Retired BGen Francisco Gatmaitan (PMA '52), then Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) Executive Vice President, pledged continuous electric power to the camps despite pressures from Malacañang to cut off electricity. BGen Brigido Paredes (PMA '60), a RAM member, recalled that he had been removed by Tadiar as deputy commander of the Naval Training Command on 13 February 1986 because of his suspected RAM activities. He declared before the Commission that his assignment during the EDSA Revolt was to neutralize the Marines, to prevent them from moving against the RAM. The Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP) was likewise "neutralized" by RAM officers Col Antonio Samonte (PMA '57) and Navy Capt Warlino Sadiarin (PMA '67), both holding key positions in the intelligence service.

Aguinaldo was reported to have led the assault on Broadcast City by Task Force Delta. They also reportedly neutralized the loyalist snipers at Channel 4 and went on to provide security for Channel 7, in case Ver's men decided to forcibly remove the human barricades there. Task Force Delta was a RAM initiative to control the media stations on 22 February, composed of elements of the Constabulary Security Group led by Lt Col Eduardo S. Matillano (PMA '71); a contingent of the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group under Lt Col Francisco Zubia, Jr (PMA '71); and a Narcotics Command contingent under Lt Col Teodorico Viduya (PMA '71).

On hindsight, there are at least two noteworthy non-military-related factors that merit special mention in having shaped the direction of events and paved the way for the successful removal of Marcos in February 1986. First is the massive mobilization of people, now aptly referred to as "people power," and second is the effective media management.

History has shown that the massing of people although unarmed could, by sheer force of numbers, radically influence the outcome of events. There are several historical examples within the Gandhian tradition and the US civil rights movement. But in the Philippines, the February 1986 experience is an unprecedented occurrence of the same phenomenon.

It may be recalled that within four or five hours of Enrile's and Ramos's announced defection from the Marcos camp, there were already some 50,000 people surrounding Camps Crame and Aguinaldo, creating a formidable human barricade against any attack by Marcos troops against the splinter military group. In response to the continuous

appeals aired over Radio Veritas, then later over the clandestine Radyo Bandido, by Cardinal Sin, and other influential civic and political leaders, the crowds continued to increase around the camps' perimeters, converting the streets and sidewalks of the areas they occupied as their "home" for the duration of the uprising. It was estimated that more than two million people gathered together. They could not be dispersed, despite attempts by Marcos and Ver because the military units ordered to disperse them were clearly reluctant to shoot at unarmed civilians.

What many considered incredible is the fact that, despite the extremely tense atmosphere and the presence of armed soldiers from both sides, no provocation or untoward incident happened to trigger a bloody encounter, which would have surely killed thousands of civilians in the crossfire. Tarrazona recalled that a few weeks before the February Revolt, RAM's junior officers, among them Lts Alexander Pama (PMA '79), George Washington Javier (PMA '80), Tadeo, Catapang, Diosdado Valeroso (PMA '82), and others, had coordinated with some civilian groups, giving them advice on how to exercise maximum tolerance and restraint, especially towards soldiers in crowd situations.⁴⁴ More importantly, the experience of NAMFREL, cause-oriented groups, and other volunteers in the non-violent defense of the ballot; the presence of nuns, seminarians and women at the front lines; and the many "conscientization" sessions by anti-Marcos forces over the years after 21 August 1983 turned out to be perfect preparation for the event. Thus, no one taunted the tank operators or battle-tested Marines. Instead, the soldiers sent by Marcos's generals were offered prayers, cigarettes, food, drinks, and even flowers.

Arillo's version is that the RAM had considered using human barricades as part of their numerous contingency plans, and that during the critical periods in the uprising, Enrile, Ramos, and the RAM officers were reluctant to mention the role of the people in the streets as they did not wish to expose to Malacañang any part of the defense plans for the two camps.⁴⁵ At Camp Crame, during the four-day uprising, Ramos's guidelines for then Col Alexander Aguirre (PMA '61), PC Chief of Operations, for the camp's defense plan included (1) to galvanize and make maximum use of people power and (2) to undertake no provocative military action against the opposing side.⁴⁶ Since the Ramos guidelines were issued at the time that people were already massing at EDSA, what is undeniable is that the aborted RAM coup attempt at military intervention had been saved by people power.

In his testimony before the Commission, retired BGen Jose M. Crisol (PMA '42), former Defense Undersecretary under Presidents Magsaysay,

Garcia, and Marcos, opined that the military did not put Mrs Aquino in Malacañang. It was the people. He believed that Marcos's mistake was in attempting to bargain with the mutineers in the early hours of 23 February, giving time for people to organize and flock to EDSA.⁴⁷

The second notable factor that helped bring about the successful February 1986 EDSA Revolt is the effective and exceptional use of the media to mobilize popular support for the Enrile-Ramos group. The direct link of Enrile and Ramos with the masses was Radio Veritas. Then, it became Radyo Bandido when the Veritas radio tower was bombed on Ver's orders. That the public was constantly informed of what was happening in the camps and at EDSA for the duration of the entire event was half the battle won.

From the beginning, the RAM depended heavily on radio, television, and newspapers to articulate their grievances and arouse the people to action, despite the usual constraints of censorship and political intimidation predominant under a dictatorship. Notwithstanding the existence of 26 television stations, 286 radio stations, and 244 newspapers throughout the country, there was no freedom of speech nor of the press. However, this did not stop the anti-Marcos opposition from coming up with an efficient "alternative press" and other forms of expressing discontent and protest, including the ingenious use of humor.

Through the competent management of media (i.e., continuous coverage of events, regular press conferences, interviews, exposes, deliberate information leaks, and other tactical and preemptive uses of media), the RAM had the edge in the propaganda war. But then, winning the hearts and minds of the public in those days was not a very difficult task. More importantly, during those critical four days in February, military units throughout the country were informed of what was happening at EDSA through the media, and RAM members in the regional and provincial commands were provided with up-to-date information needed to perform activities called for by the situation.

The February 1986 attempt may, therefore, be considered as the first attempt at military intervention in the Philippines. It was nevertheless aborted by the security forces of President Marcos and subsequently overtaken by the massive outpouring of people at EDSA. Although it failed, the February 1986 coup attempt opened the possibility of military intervention in our political life.

B. July 1986 Manila Hotel Incident

Barely five months after the assumption into office of President Aquino, a group of armed military men and supporters of former President Marcos occupied the Manila Hotel for 37 hours ostensibly demanding constitutional reform and stronger anti-communist measures, on one hand, while declaring their own government, on the other. There were at least 490 fully-armed soldiers and some 5,000 Marcos loyalists who witnessed former Senator, Foreign Minister, and Marcos's Vice-Presidential running mate Arturo Tolentino take his "oath of office" as "acting President" of the Philippines on behalf of Marcos, who was then exiled in Hawaii. The hotel was declared as the temporary "seat of government".

Tolentino said in his speech that Marcos had written him a letter saying that since he (Marcos) could not immediately return to the country, he was permitting Tolentino to take over temporarily. After taking his oath at the driveway of the hotel, Tolentino appointed the following to his "Cabinet": Rafael Recto as Justice Minister, Manuel Collantes as Foreign Affairs Minister, Manuel Alba as Budget Minister, and Isidro Rodriguez, Jr as Local Government Minister. Tolentino added that he was retaining Enrile as National Defense Minister, as well as assigning him to the position of Prime Minister so that he could "continue the fight against the communists without any interruption."⁴⁸ Tolentino also instructed former Speaker Nicanor Yniguez to convene the abolished Batasang Pambansa so it could immediately call for local elections before the end of the year.

From newspaper accounts, the people who were reportedly present at Manila Hotel for the takeover were a curious mix of military men and civilians, whose outstanding common trait was their loyalty to Marcos. Among the military men who were there were: Ochoco; Olivas; Zumel; Aguinaldo; BGen Antonio Palafox, former Commander, 5 ID based in Tarlac; BGen Jaime Echeverria (PMA '57), former Regional Unified Command (RUC) 12 chief; Col Rolando Abadilla (PMA '65), former METROCOM Intelligence and Security Group head; Maj Reynaldo Cabauatan, former Zambales Provincial Commander; Col Jose Mendoza; Col Rolando de Guzman (PMA '61); Col Dictador Alqueza (not Arquiza as reported in the newspapers), of Jabidah fame and later Samar Commander; BGen Tomas Dumpit (PMA '57), former RUC 1 Commander; Navy Cmdr Bernardo Patino, Jr (PMA '67); Lt Pablo Cardenas; and a certain Capt Cardenas.

Aside from Tolentino and Yniguez, among the other civilian personalities there were: ex-Members of Parliament Gerry Espina, Salvador Britanico, Manuel Collantes, and Manuel Alba; former Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Edmundo Reyes; ex-Gov of Rizal Isidro Rodriguez, Jr, ex-Gov of Zambales Vicente Magsaysay; ex-Mayor of Quezon City Adelina Rodriguez; ex-Mayor of San Juan and now Senator Joseph Estrada; ex-Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros; ex-Manila Vice Mayor Felicisimo Cabigao; former MIA manager Luis Tabuena; ex-Mayor of Kalookan Macario Asistio (subsequently elected Mayor); Batangas Fiscal Felizardo Lota; lawyers Rafael Recto and Oliver Lozano; Gerry Sto Domingo; entertainment personalities Alona Alegre, Elizabeth Oropeza, Annie Ferrer, Amalia Fuentes, Mohamad Faizal, and Weng Weng; Chito Lucero; Sonia Valenzuela; Edilberto del Valle; Carlos Salazar; Rio Diaz; Rick Soriano; Pol Genatin; and many more.

The coup plotters had evidently timed their actions. The Manila Hotel takeover came in the wake of massive student unrest in the colleges and universities of Metro Manila, as the Education Ministry had reportedly failed to respond to the students' call for a moratorium on mass protest actions. The peasants were restive, despite the announcement of the government's proposed agrarian reform package for Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) rebel-returnees the day before the Manila Hotel incident. The AFP was very critical of President Aquino's ceasefire efforts with the CPP/NPA. There were increasingly strong pressures against so-called "leftists" in the Cabinet. The Constitutional Commission was still in the process of formulating the new Constitution, which would replace the Freedom Constitution in effect since March 1986. The President was preparing for her state visit to the US, and the important issues of the day were national recovery and the adoption of a new constitution.

The occupation of the hotel was premeditated and intentional. A day or two before the incident, Tolentino reportedly checked into four adjoining rooms on the 14th floor of the hotel, all registered under a woman's name. Other Marcos supporters also checked into different rooms under assumed names. Codes were used in communicating with each other. They planned to use the MacArthur Suite as their command post.⁴⁹ Plastic bags of rice and even water were later found in the rooms, showing that the rebels were prepared to hold out at the hotel.

It is likewise clear that the takeover plan was known to some high-ranking officers in the military establishment even before it was actually carried out. In his testimony before the Commission on 15 June 1990,

Tadiar revealed that he knew about the plot in advance because Zumel had tried to enlist his and BGen Luther Custodio's participation in it. He said he had refused and had remained in his quarters instead, although his name was later announced on the radio as being at Manila Hotel. Kapunan, Enrile's intelligence chief, also knew about the plan at least several hours before the incident happened. American writer McCoy disclosed that he was waiting in the house of Kapunan for an interview on the morning of 6 July. Kapunan arrived in combat uniform, apologizing for being late "because the Marcos loyalists are going to seize Manila Hotel in a coup. . . ."⁵⁰ Six hours later, the Marcos supporters did in fact take over the hotel, taking the government, at least the civilian branches, by surprise.

In the morning of Sunday, 6 July 1986, Recto, Yniguez, Espina, and other Marcos followers were seen conferring at the 365 Club of Manila Intercontinental Hotel. Their meeting was interrupted by the arrival of Jack Anderson, a visiting Washington journalist. The loyalists invited him to attend their rally that afternoon, where they promised him a "scoop."⁵¹ Just after 4:00 p.m. that day, while the loyalists were holding their rally at the Quirino Grandstand, some 100 fully-armed soldiers in fatigue uniforms accompanied by dozens of civilians suddenly barged through the doors of the Manila Hotel and commandeered the lobby. Zumel approached Mike Wilson, the hotel's Food and Beverage Manager, and told him that they were taking over the hotel. In a short time, the group had swelled to about 300.

By around 5:00 p.m., Tolentino arrived at the lobby (presumably from his room upstairs). After a table and microphone system were set up, Tolentino took his "oath of office". Tolentino later claimed that he had no personal stake in what they had done, and was only after the "unity and progress of the people under constitutionalism, democracy and the rule of law."⁵² The rest of the evening was spent on fiery speeches in the lobby where Marcos-Tolentino banners were hung on the walls. A little after 9:00 p.m., the hotel management began moving out guests gradually on the pretext of transporting them to the airport to catch their flights. At the time, there were about 250 foreign guests billeted at the hotel and around 150 hotel staff members. The evacuation was completed by 8:00 a.m. of 7 July, except for 15 journalists who chose to stay to cover the event and about 20 hotel engineers and security personnel. It was later learned that Marcos had spoken twice with Tolentino at the Manila Hotel via long distance from Hawaii. First, before his oath-taking, and then after it, to congratulate him. A hotel executive was able to intercept and tape the calls. Both tapes were subsequently turned over to the military.⁵³

By late Sunday, 6 July, the loyalists had managed to commandeer several buses and to barricade Roxas Boulevard, P Burgos Street, Bonifacio Drive, and T M Kalaw Street. Inside the hotel, Gerry Sto Domingo, former Assistant Executive Manager of Manila Hotel and nephew of Edmundo Reyes, declared that he was taking over hotel management, while Capt Cardenas, Detachment Commander of Fairways Security Agency which was owned by Ver, announced he was going to handle the hotel's security.

There were vague, conflicting versions about the identity of the rebel troops that occupied Manila Hotel. A number of newspaper accounts mention that there were two companies of soldiers inside the hotel, and some hotel employees said they kept hearing the name of the 225th PC Company. Others said the troops were mostly displaced members of the PSC under Ver, or a motley combination of security guards of Marcos loyalists and ex-cronies. The ones in full battle gear, with insignias of the Special Forces and black headbands, were said to be Guardian members. They had red, white, and blue ribbons tied around the muzzles of their rifles. There were also rebel troops that reportedly took positions behind the grandstand, wearing red and black patches bearing campaign portraits of Marcos and Tolentino. Several reports added that soldiers and policemen from RUC 3 in Camp Olivas, Pampanga trooped to Manila on Sunday evening upon being told that they "were to participate in a revolt against the Aquino government sanctioned by Minister Enrile and Chief of Staff Ramos."⁶⁴ They had evidently been fooled. When they heard over the radio that Enrile and Ramos were on the President's side and organizing the military response to them, they surrendered at once to Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) Commander BGen Ramon Montano. Furthermore, the rebels were also reported to have had different types of firearms, ranging from M16 assault rifles and M79 grenade launchers, to three .30 cal machine guns mounted at the lobby.

It is obvious that Malacañang had no inkling of the coup plot. President Aquino was in Cagayan de Oro with Ramos and PC Chief MGen Renato de Villa (PMA '57) when it happened. When Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo found out about it through his own sources, he immediately tried to contact Enrile who was out. He left an urgent message. Then, he called GHQ and spoke with Vice Chief of Staff Lt Gen Salvador Mison (PMA '55), who said they were aware of the situation and were assessing it. Meanwhile, Enrile got back to Arroyo who apprised him of the situation. Enrile denied knowing anything about it, but said he would attend to it right away. After several more calls to verify information, Arroyo contacted President Aquino in Cagayan de Oro, who said Ramos had told her about it, from Mison's report to him. It was

then decided that Ramos would rush back to Manila, while President Aquino continued with her original schedule of visiting military camps, as well as receiving 20 rebel returnees in Cagayan de Oro, before flying back to Manila on 7 July.

Enrile summoned the General Staff for a Command Conference at GHQ at 7:00 p.m. to map out tactics to deal with the situation. After the conference, he met with the press. Enrile and the military top brass sought to make light of the event, and even presented Tadiar and Pattugalan to dispel rumors that they had joined the rebels. Enrile added that Custodio was at home, and not at Manila Hotel as had been rumored.

In the meantime, government troops (Marines) had set up checkpoints and blocking forces on all the roads leading to Manila Hotel, and had supposedly cordoned off all routes within a one-kilometer radius. However, journalist Belinda Cunanan claimed that the Marine blockades were not really effective in preventing food and human traffic to the hotel. She managed to visit the premises at about noon on 7 July.⁶⁵ By that time, however, water and electrical power had been cut off in the hotel. Employees left inside had earlier refused to connect telephone calls and deliberately dismantled the hotel's public address system.

Elsewhere, Quezon City Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Brigido Simon, Jr reported that loyalists were allegedly recruiting residents in the Commonwealth Avenue, Holy Spirit, and Batasan Hills areas to support those holed up in Manila Hotel.⁶⁶ The National Telecommunications Commission temporarily closed down radio stations DZME, DZEC, DZXL, and DWAD for irresponsible reporting of the incident and for "being conduits of loyalists' messages to their followers". This act received some public and media flak for its perceived encroachment on the freedom of speech. For its part, the Armed Forces leadership relieved Cabauatan as Home Defense Chief of the Central Luzon Regional Command on 7 July, for abandoning his post.

At 2:00 p.m. on 7 July, President Aquino issued a public statement on the Marcos loyalists' failed "propaganda gimmick". She assured the people that the situation was under control. She gave the public a quick update on the incident and an ultimatum to the loyalists, allowing them 24 hours (until 2:00 p.m., 8 July) to give themselves up. President Aquino also issued strong warnings that "the law will not be flouted with impunity," and that "an incident like this will not be allowed to happen again." She further announced that there would be "closer monitoring of loyalists and other similarly subversive activities from here on".⁶⁷

In a closed-door meeting with the joint staff, major service commanders and Metro Manila police superintendents on the afternoon of 7 July at the Navy Headquarters, two strategies were discussed to end the Manila Hotel fiasco. One called for a lightning attack on that day, before the 24-hour grace period to surrender expired. The other, which was already partially in effect, was to completely isolate the loyalists in the hotel from their outside supporters by severing the electricity and communications system and by blocking all the roads leading to the hotel to prevent supplies of food, water, medicine, etc, from getting to the loyalists.

That the whole exercise was a lost cause must have dawned on the loyalist leadership early on. Just a day after he took his "oath" as "acting President", Tolentino shunned responsibility, claiming he "had no role in planning this." He contended he was pressured by supporters of Marcos to take his oath. At a press conference in the hotel, Tolentino seemed to adopt a conciliatory stance when he urged President Aquino to call for early elections, saying many were "restless". He further added, "We do not want the restoration of a constitutional government by violence or by force. That is farthest from our thoughts."⁵⁸

A few hours after the President issued her ultimatum, Tolentino and some others began negotiating with government representatives at the Army and Navy Club. The loyalist leaders among the military, Zumel, Echeverria and Palafox, and among the civilians, Tolentino, Yniguez, Recto, and Britanico, either did not bother to return to Manila Hotel from the talks, or left the hotel shortly after.⁵⁹ Among the leaders who were left behind, Abadilla and Alqueza at first wanted to hold out until the 2:00 p.m. deadline on 8 July, despite the previous consensus among senior loyalist leaders to surrender earlier. The second set of negotiations were held at the police detachment behind the Quirino Grandstand and were attended by President Aquino's son, Noynoy, Honasan, and Montano's deputies, Col Emiliano Templo (PMA '52) and Col Cesar Nazareno (PMA '61), for the government side.

As it turned out, Abadilla, Alqueza, and Cabauatan left Manila Hotel at 4:30 a.m. on 8 July, about an hour ahead of the evacuation schedule, fetched by Enrile's security men, Honasan and Kapunan.⁶⁰ At 5:00 a.m., Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) security personnel and CAPCOM men arrived at the hotel to supervise the evacuation of the loyalists. Ten Metro Manila Transit buses fetched 180 soldiers from the rear entrance, while more or less 300 civilians were quietly advised to disperse. Tolentino himself never came back to

witness the evacuation at 5:45 a.m. on 8 July, some eight hours before the deadline.

From the start, despite the strong presidential statement, the government attitude towards the rebels at Manila Hotel seemed to be of maximum tolerance. They were promised that no criminal or military charges would be filed against them if they surrendered within the 24-hour limit set by the President. Enrile disclosed that he had been contacted at his office on 7 July by some leaders of the troops occupying Manila Hotel, signifying their intention to break from Tolentino's group. He therefore arranged for some sort of processing center to be set up at the grandstand where these men could be received. He assigned Honasan to escort the loyalist officers and men out of the hotel towards the receiving area. Claiming he had clearance from the President, Enrile assured the "returning" soldiers that the government would exercise "maximum leniency without any embarrassment, humiliation against any of them, and they would be taken back into our organization without prejudice to their status as military personnel."⁶¹

At the formal acceptance of surrender of the Marcos loyalist troops at Fort Bonifacio gymnasium on 8 July, Ramos welcomed the surrenderees (including four generals and 69 troopers) back to the fold of the AFP. He declared them free from liability of any crime against the Republic and the Armed Forces. He then ordered them to do 30 push-ups. However, based on testimony received in Executive Session, the push-ups were done to relieve the tension. Enrile, on the other hand, reiterated his promise of virtual exoneration by saying, "No punishment will come your way. I stand on this even to the point of gambling my position to see to it that what we have promised you will be fulfilled." He added further, "There will be no retaliation against you. We shall consider this as past. Let us forget as though nothing had happened."⁶²

On 9 July, upon the Cabinet's recommendation, President Aquino announced her offer of clemency (i.e., non-filing of criminal charges) to the Marcos supporters who took over Manila Hotel, on condition that "they take the oath of loyalty to the Freedom Constitution." There were those who thought the pardon was premature before a full-dress inquiry could be carried out. In other words, it was felt that the loyalists were let off too easily. This was in stark contrast to the treatment given a group of unarmed civilians who demonstrated in front of the US Embassy just a week before, on 4 July. The demonstrators were violently dispersed by truncheons, tear gas, and guns because, as P/BGen Alfredo Lim later reasoned out, they were blocking both lanes of Roxas Boulevard.⁶³

On the other hand, there were people who thought that punishing the loyalists would hamper the government's campaign for national reconciliation and would only give loyalist leaders a chance to be "martyrs". Expressing the prevailing sentiment in the Cabinet, then Political Affairs Minister Antonio Cuenco said that resorting to court trials at that time would have been highly divisive and would only have allowed the loyalists the exposure in court and in the media they wanted.⁶⁴

Two of the arguments used for adopting a policy of maximum leniency towards the loyalists was that no shot was fired and that no casualties resulted from the incident. A damage assessment after the incident, however, showed that the Manila Hotel suffered an estimated loss of ₱10 million, including the physical and material damage to the facilities, the looting of supplies, and loss of revenue from cancelled bookings. There were also losses resulting from the vandalized buses the rebels commandeered to barricade the streets around the hotel on the first night of their coup. Loyalists were, likewise, reported to have attacked a news patrol jeep outside the hotel early on 7 July, resulting in injury to two people. Furthermore, the Ministry of Tourism said at least 670 reservations made by prospective foreign visitors with various big hotels in Metro Manila had been cancelled following the incident.⁶⁵

Although there was no deadline set for the swearing of allegiance to the Freedom Constitution, mass oath-taking ceremonies were held on 27 July. This was attended by many of those in the military who were implicated in the Manila Hotel incident,⁶⁶ and who were eventually retired from the service. On the same day, the police filed formal charges of rebellion against Tolentino, 25 other civilians and 15 soldiers. The charges were based on the recommendations of Western Police District Superintendent Lim, who supposedly conducted an investigation of the incident. Even then, negotiations were going on between the accused and the government. Justice Minister Neptali Gonzales drew up the following conditions for dropping the charges against the loyalists: (1) pledge of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and maintenance of fidelity; (2) recognition of the existence of the present government under the Freedom Constitution; (3) renunciation of the use of force and violence for the overthrow of the government; and (4) not to allow one's name or one's self to be used directly or indirectly for such purposes. The accused must have accepted the terms because eventually all the charges were dropped against them.

On 17 July 1986, President Aquino created an ad hoc Presidential Fact-Finding Committee to investigate the Manila Hotel incident, funded

from the Special Activities Fund. The Committee was composed of Alfredo Bengzon as chairman, with Rafael Iletto, Jesus Ayala, Emanuel Soriano, and Fulgencio Factoran, Jr as members. This group worked for three months, interviewing numerous people and meeting almost daily at the Manila Hotel. The Committee submitted a three-page First Report within a week and a four-page Second Report three weeks later, but instead of a final report, the Committee gave the President an oral report based on a discussion outline.⁶⁷ The major findings in the First Report included the following: (1) even as early as in May or June 1986, some members of the press had already been told or had heard of the plan of the pro-Marcos group to execute the Manila Hotel affair in exactly the manner that it actually happened; (2) the intelligence agencies in the military establishment failed to effectively monitor the movements from San Fernando, Pampanga of the military contingent that participated in the incident; and (3) none of the existing intelligence agencies, either civilian or military, had evaluated the activities previous to the attempt, specifically the Sunday rallies of the pro-Marcos groups and opposition politicians in relation to what could happen. The recommendation in the First Report was, therefore, the immediate establishment of an independent intelligence agency under the President's personal, direct, and exclusive direction and control.

The Second Report had a more extensive assessment of the event. The findings included the following:

1. The Manila Hotel incident was a pre-planned or pre-meditated conspiracy. [For example, at least three days before 6 July 1986, Honasan already knew about the loyalist plan.]⁶⁸
2. The conspirators fell into two groups or categories:
 - a. those who openly identified themselves and admitted participation (open conspirators); and
 - b. those who even after the incident took every measure to conceal their identities and involvement (hidden conspirators).
3. There was a breakdown in the capabilities of the intelligence agencies. They were unable to forecast the event. [Up to the time of the Second Report (14 August 1986), they apparently had not been able to identify the hidden conspirators.]
4. The main objective of the Manila Hotel incident was propaganda-related, specifically intended to embarrass the Aquino administration. However, the event was so planned and structured

that, depending on the response of the military, it could have readily been transposed to an actual takeover or coup d'etat operation.

5. As of the time of the report, the main thrust and principal philosophy of the incident's exercise still existed (i.e., a propaganda event with a built-in mechanism for ready transition to a takeover operation).
6. The military as an institution was not involved in the incident. The military establishment, however, is presently fragmented by four major factional groups which, if not hostile to each other, are in the least seriously undermining the morale of the entire organization. The four groups are the RAM, the Guardians, the BROTHERS (Brotherhood of Officers Towards Harmony, Equality and Reform in the Service), and IROG (Integree and Reserve Officers Group). The existence of factions in the military, in itself, poses serious political and security problems for the government because they operate outside the traditional and formal chain of command.
7. The impending visits then of President Aquino to the ASEAN countries and the US raised high risks of another, if not more serious, Manila-Hotel-incident type of occurrence.
8. The handling of the incident by the government, particularly the seemingly contradictory and independent pronouncements made by civilian and military officials, notably Enrile and Ramos, on one hand, and those from the Justice Ministry, on the other, was perceived by the general public as reflections of the Administration's indecisiveness and weakness. On the whole, such handling of the incident substantially eroded public confidence in the stability of the government. This is especially true with respect to the perceived lax treatment of the high-ranking military officers who openly participated in the attempt.
9. As of the time of the Second Report, the following remained unknown:
 - a. the hidden conspirators
 - b. the extent and sophistication of the command structure of the hidden conspirators' organization
 - c. the nature and system of linkage with Ferdinand Marcos
 - d. funding source, and logistical system and distribution

- e. the manner and nature of the possible future Manila-Hotel-incident type events
- f. the "JPE" [Juan Ponce Enrile] factor

The recommendations of the Committee in the Second Report were the following:

1. As previously recommended, establish an intelligence capability with the President's full confidence, directly taking instructions from and reporting to President Aquino.
2. An in-depth review of all existing intelligence agencies to be conducted immediately with particular emphasis on their personnel.
3. Use the National Security Council (NSC) as was constituted at the time, as the cover for the President's Command Structure in case of emergency during her absence in August and September 1986.
4. Order the immediate dismantlement of the organized factions in the military.
5. Direct the Ministry of Justice to review the present disposition of the known or open participants in the Manila Hotel incident.
6. Direct the immediate and effective actions to be taken against the notorious open participants in a manner that will serve exemplary and deterrent purposes.
7. That the Presidential Fact-Finding Committee, in coordination with the proposed President's intelligence unit, investigate more fully the unknowns mentioned in the findings of the Second Report.

A list of names of civilians and military men was submitted for all intelligence agencies concerned to closely monitor their activities.

According to Soriano in his testimony before the Commission in July 1990, of the seven recommendations mentioned above, only number 2 was substantially implemented, number 3 was partially fulfilled by Cabinet Cluster E, while numbers 5 and 6 became moot when the President granted clemency and all the charges against the accused loyalists were dropped. Despite the order from the AFP leadership

prohibiting unauthorized organizations in the military and disbanding the existing ones, there continue to be clandestine organized groups within the Armed Forces, as evidenced by the appearance of new ones like the Young Officers Union (YOU). Thus, number 4 has not been effectively implemented. As for numbers 1 and 7, there has been no new intelligence unit created under the President. It was decided instead to use the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) for this purpose.

The reactions from different countries within the region, judging from various editorials and articles in foreign newspapers, clearly stressed the need to be benevolent but firm in handling the rebels. The idea that the leaders of the attempt must answer for their deeds "lest they be tempted to try again," was a common opinion in the editorials. The US praised President Aquino's "deft handling" of the aborted coup and reaffirmed their full support for her administration. However, despite its declared policy of non-interference, US embassy spokesman Allan Croghan confirmed that a US vice consul (Ambassador Stephen Bosworth was on leave at the time) had privately conferred with Tolentino during the loyalists' occupation of Manila Hotel. But Croghan reasoned, "We do it every time [something like this develops] to get an appraisal of the situation."⁶⁹

Perhaps, the most significant indication of the public sentiment towards the Manila Hotel incident was the fact that people generally went about their own business, unaffected by the loyalists' call for support. The loyalists were apparently trying to re-enact the February 1986 EDSA Revolt, even claiming that thousands of Marcos followers were on their way to support them, and that units of the AFP would be defecting. But they were utterly disappointed. The majority of Filipinos were still caught up in the optimism of EDSA, and the President's popularity continued to be high. People believed her when, a week after the attempt, she assured them that, "Definitely, no repetition of Sunday (incident) will be allowed to take place. And this is something I am committing myself to in collaboration with the entire government and the support of the Filipino people."⁷⁰ It was the first major test on the stability of the Aquino administration, and although it passed the ordeal, some say it may have revealed a sign of weakness and indecision in the complete exoneration of the rebels.

C. November 1986 "God Save The Queen Plot"

Many of its members believed that the RAM should have disbanded after the EDSA Revolt in February 1986 because its principal goal of

ousting Marcos had already been achieved. However, some of its officers resisted this move and, instead, actively continued to plot a coup d'etat.⁷¹ This splinter group shall be referred to as the RAM-Honasan Faction (RAM-HF).

The Philippine political climate was turbulent in the months prior to the discovery of the coup plot codenamed "God Save The Queen" in November 1986. Just four months earlier, the government had quelled the loyalist attempt at Manila Hotel. The ratification of the Constitution, scheduled for February 1987, continued to be a principal preoccupation of the administration, which was fully aware that a new Charter endorsed by the majority of the voters would enhance the government's legitimacy and, therefore, stability. At this point, too, there appeared to be constant infighting among Cabinet members, a fact which the energetic press constantly highlighted. Defense Minister Enrile, the Administration's most outspoken critic, was also denouncing everything from President Aquino's "soft approach" toward the insurgency problem, to the provisions of the Constitution.

The visit to Manila of US Congressman Stephen Solarz on the first week of November may have exacerbated the growing schism between the President and Enrile. Commenting on the Cabinet imbroglio, the press quoted Solarz as having said that it would be better for the President to sack Enrile as soon as possible. This unsolicited advice drew negative reactions not only from the Enrile camp but also from other sectors, which viewed the congressman's comment as American interference in Philippine internal affairs.

Meanwhile, Marcos loyalists continued their public demonstrations for the return of Marcos and his family. There was a rash of bombings in different parts of Metro Manila, adding to the people's anxiety. Also at this time, peace negotiations between the government and the CPP/NPA were ongoing.

On the economic side, negotiations between the Philippine government and foreign banks for the restructuring of about \$12 billion in loans had bogged down. Reports indicated that foreign bankers were apprehensive over the political situation and bickerings in the Aquino Cabinet and laid down stiff preconditions for postponing payments on maturing loans, prompting then Finance Minister Jaime Ongpin to recess the negotiations. The Philippine panel was asking for a reduction in interests, extension of repayment from ten to 20 years, and a multi-year restructuring for some \$6 billion in debts falling due between 1987 and 1990.⁷²

Foreign businessmen and potential investors expressed their anxieties over the country's political situation. Coup and counter-coup rumors dominated the headlines as well as coffee shop discussions, heightening the general political and economic instability. President Aquino faced a dilemma of postponing or pushing through with her four-day state visit to Japan scheduled for the second week of November.

Because of the continuous flow of intelligence information and disinformation on coup plots, Chief of Staff Ramos called periodic meetings among the major service commanders to assess the situation and receive intelligence service briefings from the different sectors of the military. The same names seemed to be cropping up as coup plotters: Honasan, Kapunan, Turingan, Batac, Robles, et al. Although Enrile's name never appeared in any of the reports, most of the military officers mentioned were closely identified with him.⁷³ It was reported that the plotters made a special effort to recruit officers who directly commanded combat units.

The Commanding General of a major service (CG-witness) testified before the Commission that he first heard about the coup plot from Enrile himself (although he claims it was not yet known as "God Save The Queen"). Around the middle of October 1986, Enrile, who had arrived from Cebu, told CG-witness that he wanted to see him. A week later, Legaspi was sent to fetch CG-witness to bring him to the MND reception hall, where he and Enrile met for around ten minutes. Enrile supposedly told CG-witness that his (Enrile's) position was becoming more untenable in government. Enrile allegedly said that the government was in bad shape and "it's about time that we take back the authority we gave them."⁷⁴ CG-witness claims he informed Gen Ramos about the visit on the following day, although he was sure Ramos had received intelligence reports about the coup by then.

On 4 November, a week before the President was to leave for Japan, Legaspi fetched CG-witness to attend a gathering at Paredes's house in Fort Bonifacio. The gathering has been described as an "invitation to a briefing" as well as a celebration of Paredes's promotion to star rank which had been announced a day or two before, although he had been Marine Commandant since the EDSA Revolt. Among the other people at the party were MGen Canieso, CG PA; MGen Antonio Sotelo, CG PAF; Turingan; Honasan; Robles; and some others. After a while, Enrile arrived to join them. Because of the passage of time the sworn testimonies do not purport to quote *verbatim* the discussions that night, but they establish references to the coup plot now referred to as "God Save The Queen". Enrile was reportedly the one who confirmed the launching

time and date as 12:00 midnight of 11 November, several hours after President Aquino was to have left for her state visit to Japan.⁷⁵ It was said that their individual roles in the coup were not discussed that evening although a tacit message to the key holders of power (i.e., the commanding generals) was that if they were not willing to support the coup, they should remain "neutral" and not prevent their men from joining it. There is testimony alleging that the plotters had previously distributed radios and money (P50,000 each) to four sector commanders who were supposed to impose curfew while conducting "surgical" operations against leftists.⁷⁶

The coup plot appeared to be a rehash of the original plan against Marcos in February 1986, using a commando team to raid Malacañang, capture President Aquino, and pressure her to yield the powers of the presidency while nominally retaining the title and ceremonial role. Two units were supposed to be involved in the operation — the Marines and the Army's 1st Light Armor Brigade (1 LABde). It is not known where the codename "God Save The Queen" came from, but it could be conjectured that it is an updated version of the earlier plan known as "God Save The King" (referring to Marcos).

Through at least two sources other than the military intelligence community (which gave no early-warning report to its Commander-in-Chief), Malacañang found out about the coup plot so the PSG was immediately placed and remained on red alert throughout those critical weeks of November. President Aquino had summoned Marine Commandant Paredes and the commander of the 1 LABde to ask them if she could count on them. Both had allegedly replied in the affirmative. Sotelo, Canieso, and Jardiniano were also called to Malacañang for consultations with the President and Arroyo, presumably to ascertain their loyalties. News of the coup plot broke into the headlines of the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 9 November. It was a deliberate leak to convey a message to the coup plotters that their plan was known.⁷⁷

Ramos called Deputy Chief of Staff MGen Eduardo Ermita (PMA '57), as well as Mison, de Villa, Jardiniano, Sotelo, and Canieso, to a meeting at GHQ, after which they went to see Enrile, with whom they supposedly talked about the perception that some Cabinet members were anti-military. Enrile was said to have shown impatience with the government's handling of national affairs and the insurgency problem. They ended up by signing a resolution urging President Aquino to "consider seriously the replacement of those Cabinet members". One testimony claimed that the top echelon of the military went to see Enrile two or three times, allegedly to dissuade him and his "boys" from

carrying out their plan. Another testimony pointed out that military officers do not engage in direct confrontations, but use subtle and indirect remarks.⁷⁸ In one of these "persuasion visits", they supposedly used the tack "we'll do it together," but that the time was not yet right for it. To buy more time, Ramos was reported to have even suggested doing it after the Christmas season when everyone would be tired of merrymaking.⁷⁹ Enrile was apparently dissuaded.

However, Enrile was reportedly angered by what President Aquino said during a Dental Association conference which she addressed on the morning of her trip to Japan. He was said to have walked out of the conference and ordered the hoisting of flags at the MND, which was presumably a signal to launch the coup that night.⁸⁰

Despite the advice of both Ramos and Canieso not to leave for Japan because "something was going to happen," President Aquino nevertheless left for her state visit as scheduled. Immediately after her departure, Ramos and the four major service commanders met at the VIP Lounge at the airport. They discussed the intelligence (J-2) report about the coup plot and agreed on the preparations for their respective commands.

According to CG-witness, it was only at 12:00 midnight of 11 November that Ramos felt assured that the service commanders were with him. He believed that Ramos was not really certain of how the other generals would act. At the last minute, Enrile was supposed to have called off the coup, since none of the commanding generals were on his side. Thus, there was no overt movement of forces on 11 November, although preparations were allegedly made at Camp Aguinaldo. Honasan was said to have mobilized about ten V-150s and as many as 800 men (security forces of the MND), without counting possible outside support.⁸¹

The day before President Aquino's arrival from Japan, Ramos again called for an emergency command conference at 4:00 a.m. with the four service commanders. They received a briefing from J-2 about reports that the MND Security Group and other units they had recruited were again ready to take action early the next morning. During the meeting, Ramos made several calls to Honasan, Turingan and some others. At 10:00 a.m., Ramos went to see Enrile to prevail upon him to stop his "boys".

During that period, the Command Center (Joint Operations Center or JOC) was receiving reports of troop movements, despite orders to stop. At 1:00 p.m., Ramos and then Deputy Minister Ileto went to see Enrile but apparently to no avail. Ileto had supposedly also tried, but was

unsuccessful, to dissuade Honasan from carrying out their plan, using their personal links (Honasan's father and Ileto were classmates, and their families have always been close).⁸²

As a last resort, Ramos and the four service commanders went to see Enrile at 4:30 p.m. and reviewed the situation with him. Enrile was supposed to have asked what he should do, and as everyone was silent, Ramos allegedly signaled Canieso, being the most senior of the CGs, to give the collective opinion. Canieso supposedly told Enrile that whatever happened, the whole AFP would take measures in favor of the government as this was their duty. After a brief silence, Enrile reportedly excused himself and went into the other room. Shortly after, he returned and allegedly capitulated, saying nothing will happen. The five generals then left and returned to the JOC. They were said to have reviewed their plans and then went back to their respective headquarters.⁸³

Upon the return of President Aquino from Japan, another crisis awaited her. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Chairman Rolando Olalia was abducted by unidentified men and his tortured and bullet-ridden body was found in a vacant lot in Antipolo, while that of his driver, Leonor Alay-ay, was discovered three kilometers away. The brutal killing on the eve of the President's return led to a nationwide protest, where labor and other cause-oriented groups denounced the military as the perpetrators of the crime. Accusations varied from the alleged desire of the military to break up the ongoing negotiations for a ceasefire with the communists, to the military's intention to inflame the people's anger towards the government so that the climate would be favorable for a coup d'etat.

President Aquino formed Task Force Olalia to investigate the case. This was headed by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Antonio Carpio, in the absence of Justice Minister Gonzales. The NBI found proof of military involvement in the stake out and surveillance of Olalia's residence before his disappearance. They allegedly found evidence, to link some RAM-HF officers to the killing.⁸⁴ The argument was made that the timing and brutality of the murders were meant to create an unstable situation favorable for a coup. Perhaps, it was the realization that their actions could be exploited by the ultra-right that radical labor unions and organizations desisted from prolonged massive demonstrations at the time.

Barely a week and a half after the preempted 11 November plan, military intelligence operatives discovered another coup plot, this time set for 23 November and allegedly involving a RAM-Marcos loyalist alliance with the intention of simultaneously massing soldiers in Manila

to coincide with the convening of the old Batasang Pambansa. The plans were supposedly finalized at a meeting in the house of former Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) Assemblyman Antonio Carag, a known Marcos loyalist and Enrile ally, on early Saturday morning, 22 November in Wack-Wack Subdivision, Mandaluyong. The meeting was reportedly attended by Enrile, Honasan, Turingan, as well as Marcos supporters. Turingan was supposed to have called Ramos at his GHQ office to try to convince him to join them but Ramos refused. Turingan allegedly replied, "We will go it alone then."⁸⁵

The plan called for seizing the Batasang Pambansa building in Quezon City, where former KBL assemblymen would convene the parliament that was abolished in March 1986 after the EDSA Revolt. They would then elect former Speaker Yniguez as acting President, nullify the 7 February "snap" presidential election, demand that President Aquino step down from office, and call for a new election, all in one sweep.

In the initial rebel moves, it was said that Lt Col Aguinaldo and Col Hernani Figueroa (PMA '66) moved their forces southward from Cagayan intending to link up with the other rebel troops in Manila. At Camp Aguinaldo, where a Board of Generals meeting was being held at noon on 22 November, CAPCOM Commander Montano reported on some unauthorized troop movements. He said around three trucks of soldiers were reportedly sighted along the North Diversion Road bound for Manila. There was also confirmed movement at the headquarters of Honasan located behind the MND building.

With Honasan's forces at the MND compound were Kapunan, Turingan, Robles, Erfe, and LCdr Jaime Lucas (PMA '73), among others. They had between 100-200 men under them and were backed up by armored vehicles, consisting of about ten Scorpion tanks, advanced infantry vehicles, and V-150s, which were garaged behind the MND building. The RAM-HF officers were aboard three Toyota Land Cruisers in commando team formation. They were all heavily armed and had additional stockpiles of weapons (Ultimax, Galils, Armalites, etc.) inside the vehicles, one of which was owned by Honasan's brother, Don. Most of the group belonged to the MND Security Unit of Enrile, as well as the Special Anti-Terrorist Battalion.

It was subsequently revealed that months before the attempt, these MND Security Forces would often jog at midnight from Enrile's house in Dasmariñas Village to the Defense Ministry in Camp Aguinaldo, after which they would practice shooting. Not long after the EDSA Revolt, they had on several occasions invited the men of the 15 SW, which Sotelo

commanded, to jog with them. Perhaps they saw the potential of air support in their future plans as there were only two combat units in the PAF. Among those in the jogging group of Honasan were Legaspi, Hotchkiss (now Commander of the 16th Tactical Squadron under the 15 SW), Capt Elmer Amon (PMA '81 and also a T-28 pilot), and PAF Lt Gregor Mendel Panelo (PMA '84), all helicopter pilots of Sotelo.

The Special Anti-Terrorist Battalion was the result of Enrile's initiative in May 1986, to form an elite group from the units tasked to deal with hijacking (air, sea or land) and other terrorist activities. The battalion directly reported to Enrile as chairman of the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), and was headed by Honasan. It was composed of specially trained men in the AFP, including the Navy's Special Warfare Operations Group (SWAG), the Army's Special Forces Unit, elements of the Scout Rangers, the PC's Special Action Force (SAF), and others.⁸⁶ In fact, this accumulation of military talent in the MND had earlier alarmed several high-ranking officers, not only because it dissipated the AFP's elite forces, but also because of its suspicious concentration in one place. However, nothing was done about it until after November 1986.

In the afternoon of 22 November, Ramos instructed Mison to monitor the moves of KBL politicians. Mison, therefore, sent surveillance teams to the homes of Yniguez, Jose Rono, and Vicente Magsaysay. Yniguez and Rono both denied any knowledge of the plan when Mison called them. Ramos tried to contact Enrile or Honasan in the late afternoon, but to no avail. Commo Virgilio Marcelo (PMA '61), then a Navy Capt and Commander of GHQ Headquarters Service Command at Camp Aguinaldo, was tasked with preventing the troops of Honasan from leaving the camp at all costs. On the other hand, BGen Javier Carbonell's brigade was given the responsibility of blocking the only road from the MND out of the camp. Carbonell, who rose from the reserve ranks, was reported to have hurled the challenge: "The fight will start and finish there."

By 7:00 p.m., Marcelo had sent a reinforced company to block Gate 1 of the camp (all other gates had been sealed earlier). The composite forces under Mison were monitoring the rebels' armor in coordination with Marcelo's group. Meanwhile, Ramos had conferred with the commanders of the major services, and by 8:00 p.m., all government forces in the three military camps (Camps Crame and Aguinaldo, and Fort Bonifacio) were on full red alert and just waiting for instructions.

At 9:00 p.m., Ramos called PC Maj Efren Arayata, head of the Guardians Brotherhood, Inc (GBI), a military organization which claims membership of about 70 percent of the total AFP strength. It will be recalled that alleged Guardian members also participated in the Manila Hotel Incident of July 1986. Ramos wanted to ascertain the GBI leadership's loyalty, recalling that many of its members had been recruited for the two previous coup attempts. Arayata reassured Ramos of support. That same night, Ramos sent a message to all military field commanders nationwide to inform them of the situation. He also instructed them to "prepare for any eventuality" and to disregard all orders emanating from the MND, particularly Honasan's.⁸⁷ Shortly after midnight, soldiers were sent to guard all vital installations (communications centers, water and electric stations, government buildings). The troops guarding the Batasan complex were beefed up to three battalions.

Also at around midnight on 22 November, Ramos called the RAM-HF officers to a conference, but it was only Turingan and some junior officers who attended. Ramos asked Turingan to locate Honasan but Turingan said he could not do so because Honasan was still "with his troops".⁸⁸ Ramos then sent an unequivocal message to the RAM officers: they could leave the camp but would have to face the consequences. They were also warned not to attempt to use the parade grounds as a landing field because there would be orders to shoot them. Eventually, Honasan's group backed down, probably realizing that they were completely boxed in. At about 3:00 a.m., 23 November, they began going back to barracks.

Canieso, who was then CG PA, revealed to the Commission in June 1990 that the intelligence briefings they had received in November 1986 mentioned several other units as being involved in the destabilization plot now known as "God Save The Queen". These units were the Scout Ranger Companies attached to the MND and to the PSG, the Light Armor Companies attached to the Defense Ministry and to Malacañang, the 16 IB under Malajacan, the 49 IB led by Aromin, and the 42 IB with many junior officers and soldiers formerly with the MND Security Group.

Canieso also disclosed that there were indeed some planned maneuverings by some of these units but they were dealt with effectively. In the case of the 49 IB, Aromin moved three-fourths of his battalion (about 300 men) to Manila from Quezon province. Canieso sent a superior officer to meet the troops along the way and to direct them to Fort Bonifacio to a "reserved quartering area" where they could be controlled. Canieso then sent for Aromin to tell him that he only had two

options. One was to follow Canieso's orders as his CG and the other was to disobey them. Canieso said he was giving Aromin a few minutes to think about it. If Aromin chose the second, Canieso would arrest him immediately for mutiny. But if he opted for the first, then Canieso was going to allow Aromin to report back to his men and they would be authorized to return to the Bondoc Peninsula. Aromin chose to obey Canieso's orders.⁸⁹

In the cases of Malajacan's troops from the 16 IB and some elements of the 42 IB, when reports were received that they were preparing to leave their areas of operation to come to Manila, the Army Chief sent them urgent messages to stay put despite whatever plans they had, and to await orders only from him. The troops were, thus, prevented from moving out. In effect, the coup became a chess game with each side trying to anticipate and block the moves of the other. In the end, the rebels backed down without firing a shot. Thus, the majority of the civilian population was never really aware of all of the activities until the incident, which a retired general termed as a "non-event", was over. President Aquino herself was not provided all the details by Gen Ramos, even as he took all remedial measures to contain it.⁹⁰

On 23 November, Sunday, at 2:00 p.m., President Aquino briefly met with Enrile in her Malacañang office where she asked for his resignation and then immediately appointed Deputy Minister Ileto to replace him. She further asked the rest of her Cabinet ministers to resign in order to "give the government a chance to start all over again." Then, the President went on nationwide radio and television broadcast to announce her decision. She also gave government peace negotiators only until the end of November to produce a ceasefire agreement or terminate all further talks with the National Democratic Front (NDF) [the NDF had called off the negotiations following the Olalia murder]. In her statement, President Aquino firmly added, "My circumspection has been viewed as weakness, and my sincere attempt at reconciliation as indecision. This cannot continue. I hereby give notice to all those who may be inclined to exploit the present situation that sterner measures will be taken against them if they try."

Hours after the President announced her decisions on radio and television, RAM-HF soldiers surrounded the MND building, some even positioned themselves on the roof. The men were in full battle gear. Newly-appointed Defense Minister Ileto hurriedly called for a closed-door conference of the four major service commanders. Later, Ileto issued a statement that the Armed Forces were in full control of the situation. That same Sunday afternoon, the military released to the

media an AFP message sent by Ramos to all major commanders and field commanders, declaring that the plot to convene the defunct Batasang Pambansa, with the support of certain military factions, had been aborted without loss of life. Ramos said that the situation in Metro Manila was calm, with the President in full control of the government. In the same message, Ramos reiterated to the commanders the need for "maintenance of order, sobriety and stability in their respective areas, and to play down any alarm the report might generate." He also called on them to strengthen the chain of command from Commander-in-Chief down to the lowest unit.⁹¹

On Monday, 24 November, Press Secretary Teodoro Benigno confirmed that the newspaper expose on the coup had been true. He said some military forces outside Manila had planned to join former KBL assemblymen in the takeover of the Batasang Pambansa to reconvene a rebel parliament. However, he said, the plot had been uncovered and "checkmated" by government troops. On the other hand, that same day, Minister Ileto appeared vague if not evasive about the details of the attempt. He said: "This plot is still a rumor. We do not have the evidence. We do not have the facts of the case." Asked about the fate of Honasan, Ileto replied, "It's too early for me to tell." However, Ileto mentioned that some of the plotters, most of whom were said to be members of Enrile's staff, had tendered their "courtesy resignations". He named Robles as one of those who resigned. Minister Ileto further stated that a preliminary investigation into the coup attempt was underway and that the results of an "informal investigation at intelligence level" would determine whether a full-dress investigation was warranted.⁹² Ileto had been given a free hand in meting out punishment against the coup plotters by President Aquino.

As testified in Executive Session, no formal investigation was ever made of the incident. On the other hand, Mison told the Commission in June 1990 that an investigation of the incident was ordered by Ramos but he was not aware of any charges filed against the coup plotters. He explained that Ramos's moves had always been conciliatory, not wanting to deepen the cleavages existing within the AFP. He said if the "iron fist" had been used, the military leadership was not sure about the sentiments and reactions of the troops in the field.⁹³ For his part, Ramos maintained that as CSAFP there was not much he could do inasmuch as the plotters were mostly under the jurisdiction of the MND and answerable to someone else.⁹⁴

The group of Honasan remained at the MND for a while even after Enrile's resignation and during Ileto's initial tenure. They were later

redeployed or given different assignments back to their branch of service. One of Ileto's first acts as Defense Minister was to return the armor and heavy weaponry as well as the military personnel accumulated at MND by his predecessor to their respective major service commands. Mison was assigned to formally carry this out. In the process, he discovered that a substantial number of firearms, radios, vehicles, and some P2 million were unaccounted for. After a prolonged official inquiry, the AFP Anti-Graft Board ordered Honasan to account for the money which was supposed to have been spent for the purchase of equipment. His appearance before the Board was scheduled on 30 August 1987, but this was overtaken by other events.

In the aftermath of the announced Cabinet revamp, the various reactions of people and groups were both predictable and generally optimistic. Not much was really known about the details of the coup now referred to as "God Save The Queen" nor about how it was quashed at the time, but the majority of the people appeared relieved it was over. Government officials and even some opposition leaders welcomed the Cabinet revamp which they felt would give the administration a "fresh start". Perhaps as a compromise with rebels' demands of "cleansing" her Cabinet of "left-leaning" members, President Aquino subsequently removed Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez. For its part, the KBL, through its Secretary General Salvador Britanico, vehemently denied any participation in the coup plot. He claimed that the accusations against his party were all part of a disinformation campaign in the struggle between factions of the military.⁹⁵ Vice President Laurel said that the resignation of Enrile should not cause panic and worry as the AFP was in the hands of the "ablest military men" (referring to Ramos and Ileto). Cause-oriented groups and some leftist organizations were more cautious in their reactions. The NDF hailed Enrile's ouster but expressed fears about the government's policy towards the CPP/NPA because they claimed Ramos and Ileto were rabid supporters of the US, which has been behind the implementation of the comprehensive anti-insurgency scheme.⁹⁶ They predicted that the so-called "left-leaning" Cabinet ministers would be removed from the administration.

The foreign reactions were likewise supportive and fairly optimistic. Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden said his government fully backed President Aquino. An Indonesian editorial said that the President's decision to sack Enrile would strengthen her government, while a Thai newspaper commenting on the same said, "It had to happen." The US reaffirmed its now familiar "strong and unequivocal support" for President Aquino. Congressman Stephen Solarz said President Aquino had "won the hearts and minds of the American people

when she came here in September." Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the US Senate Committee on the Armed Forces, commented, "The Philippine military has to be reorganized. The military has to gain the confidence of the people."⁹⁷

A PMA graduate assigned to Central Luzon expressed what could possibly have been a dawning realization for many at that time: "The heroes of February are now the villains of November."

D. January 1987 GMA-7 Incident

On Tuesday, 20 January, there were again reports of a possible coup attempt, this time to be launched over that weekend. The reports to the Army CG pointed to four groups that had an interest in seizing power. These were the Marcos loyalists; military men loyal to Enrile; members of the AFP who were disgusted by the security and counterinsurgency policies of the Aquino administration; and some big businessmen.⁹⁸

One scenario of the plan supposedly involved the abduction or liquidation of the Army Chief, his staff and military commanders. This was meant to paralyze the operations of the Army and prevent its personnel from responding to the normal chain of command. The ultimate objective was to topple the government of President Aquino. However, the plan was disparaged by the Army CG himself, Canieso, saying it had little chance of succeeding.

The political situation took a turn for the worse when, well into the 60-day ceasefire agreement to hold peace negotiations between the government and the CPP/NPA, hundreds of peasants demonstrating for land reform at Mendiola bridge near Malacañang were fired at by elements of the military and the police on 22 January. Many farmers were killed in what is now known as the "Mendiola Massacre", causing the NDF to suspend their participation in the peace talks and government negotiator Maris Diokno to resign from the panel. The ceasefire was scheduled to expire on 7 February, five days after the plebiscite on the Constitution.

On 24 January, an alleged coup plot was uncovered by the military before it was put into operation. The plotters were said to be a disgruntled faction of the Armed Forces, Marcos loyalists, and some right-wing politicians. The attempt was supposedly held off, at least temporarily, when Ramos called for and met behind closed doors the alleged military leaders of the plot led by Honasan and Kapunan.⁹⁹

Three days later, a group of Marcos loyalists, many of whom were members of the GBI, attempted to take over military camps and a TV station with the intention of reinstating Marcos into office before the new Constitution was ratified. There were at least four target areas that the rebels were apparently going to hit, judging from their staging points: VAB, Sangley Point Air Base, Fort Bonifacio, and GMA-7 television station. On their way to reinforce the other rebel troops, a group of soldiers numbering a little over a hundred, coming from the Philippine Army Training Command (PA TRACOM) in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija and Regional Command (RECOM) 3, were intercepted and apprehended by elements of the CAPCOM led by Col Reynaldo Dino at the North Expressway by the Balintawak Toll Gate, as they were entering Metro Manila at 1:30 a.m. on 27 January. The fully-armed military personnel, mostly Guardians, were headed by Capt Nemencio Carvajal, although their orders had come from Cabauatan, as was revealed by later sworn testimonies.¹⁰⁰

As early as December 1986, Maj Romeo Daclan, a GBI member, had been reportedly seen at Fort Magsaysay recruiting other Guardians to join him in a destabilizing action. He was said to have met with Carvajal and Maj Pedrito Magsino at the PA TRACOM. On 26 January, GBI leaders from Fort Magsaysay were met by PC Maj Manuel Divina (PMA '73) and his brother, Lt Edgardo Divina (PMA '77) in San Fernando, Pampanga regarding a planned disruption of the plebiscite on the Constitution scheduled for 2 February.

On the other hand, the movement at VAB appears to have been connected with the meeting of about 20 PAF officers at Kowloon Restaurant in Makati on the evening of 20 January. The meeting was reportedly presided over by Lt Col Rodolfo Calzado, despite the presence of a more senior officer, Col Romeo Javelosa. The same group supposedly met again in a private home in Quezon City on 26 January, this time with the presence of Col Bertuldo de la Cruz, Capt Nonito Calizo, and some enlisted men.

After the meeting, Calizo accompanied by Sgt Samuel Nagac went to the PAF Security Group in Porac and then to Bacolor, Pampanga to allegedly recruit more Air Force men through the GBI network for their planned activity. A group of about ten of them then headed back for Manila but due to mechanical problems, they did not arrive at VAB until 11:30 p.m.

From the meeting in Quezon City, de la Cruz went to another one at the house of Dr Arturo Tolentino, Jr, where he briefed PC Maj

Francisco Ovilla and 21 others, after which he gave them an armalite each and a substantial amount of ammunition. From there, the military men went to VAB on board a Toyota car, a jeep, and a rented coaster. Joined by another group of 41 soldiers along the way, they proceeded to VAB in front of the 205th Helicopter Wing (205 HW) headquarters.

In the meantime, at 9:15 p.m. inside VAB, intelligence reports were received that a group of loyalists were planning to attack the armory and communications facilities of the base that night or the next day. After an emergency meeting of all VAB commanders at the PAF chief's quarters, the interior guard of the 205 HW was doubled, security of the armory was beefed up, and all Wing staff and unit commanders were instructed to take precautionary measures. At 1:45 a.m., 27 January, while Col Loven Abadia (PMA '60), Wing Commander, 205 HW, was briefing his men about the current situation in the aircraft parking area, a convoy of vehicles loaded with armed men arrived. This was presumably the group of de la Cruz. Refusing to identify themselves to Lt Col Dante Bernabe who had been sent to question them, the armed soldiers dispersed and deployed at the far side of the road facing the 205 HW headquarters, while the personnel of the 205 HW took up defensive positions. Loven Abadia then went into the headquarters building where he called up the PAF chief and the Wing Commander of the 520th Air Base Wing (520 ABW) to report the presence of the armed men, who were later identified as the "Blue Thunder Commandos".¹⁰¹

For his part, Calizo and his ten recruits joined another group of about 50 soldiers aboard an M35 cargo truck which dropped them at the Air Material Wing Savings and Loan (AMWSL) area in the early morning of 27 January, while the others got off at different points around VAB. After a short briefing, Calizo's men divided into groups of three and headed towards the 520 ABW.

Meanwhile, an exchange of automatic fire ensued between the commandos led by de la Cruz, and personnel of the 205 HW backed up by other Air Force units at 2:30 a.m. Shortly after, the rebels boarded their vehicles and tried to make their way towards the Baclaran gate (Gate 1) of VAB. However, the road was blocked by government troops positioned in front of the 520 ABW. Another exchange of gunfire followed, during which de la Cruz was wounded.

Calizo was also hit on the leg when firing erupted at 3:30 a.m. from the direction of the PAF Security Command (PAFSECOM) tower towards where he and his men were holed out. He ordered his men not to return fire but to call an ambulance instead. When the ambulance arrived, he

and his men surrendered to the Air Provost Marshal. Calizo later admitted having left Pampanga with his men to meet up with other troops at VAB in order to take over the Wing Operations Center (WOC) of the 520 ABW and to control the aircraft parking area. The men cited varying reasons for having joined the mutiny, ranging from wanting a stronger government policy against communism, having long pent-up grievances against the assignment and promotion policies of the PAF, to feeling discriminated against because they were loyal to former President Marcos.

By 5:30 a.m., the commandos realized they were outnumbered and had no chance with daylight breaking, so they surrendered one by one. Loven Abadia approached de la Cruz, the leader of the commandos, to ask him to surrender and turn in his gun, but the latter arrogantly refused. He only agreed when Abadia fired a warning shot. Altogether, there were 68 members of the commandos who surrendered, 16 of whom were wounded. There was only one killed, rebel soldier Pfc Daniel Hubag.

The Sangley Point takeover attempt began with the raid on the armory of the 240th Composite Wing just after midnight of 27 January. The raid was led by Maj Crispin Galacgac with suspected inside collusion from Capt Alonso Canete and Lt Tomasito Macatangay. Canete was said to have distributed armbands marked with the word "Retwis" in red as a countersign to the rebels.¹⁰² Orders to withdraw firearms from the armory were given simultaneously to their men by rebel officers Lt Col Domingo Bayan, Maj Benjamin Rome, Capt Rodolfo Moral, and Jesus Sam, and TSgt Celestino Fran purportedly because of the "red alert" status at the time. Recruits among enlisted men from the nearby Naval Support Command in Fort San Felipe, Cavite City, were also given firearms by PO3 Vicente Anog, Jr, who had earlier told the men they were going to attend "a happening" at Sangley Air Base.

Thus armed, the officers and soldiers went towards the 15 SW headquarters, joined by two other officers, Capt Rodolfo Jequinto and Lt Villamor Lazo. The guards at the main gate of the headquarters were easily disarmed and their outpost taken over by the rebels. At exactly 1:00 a.m., both BGen Generoso Maligat, 15 SW Commander, and Col Santiago Pitpitan, his deputy, were simultaneously awakened by armed rebel officers in their respective rooms and told to dress up because of some simulated story about an impending communist attack. The two officers were then whisked out of the base in a car owned and driven by Rodolfo Prudente, a civilian rebel sympathizer, who took them to his

house in Cavite City, then later to a less accessible house in a barrio in General Trias, Cavite.

By 2:00 a.m., the rebels had overrun the WOC of the 15 SW, taking Col de Dios, Director of Operations, into custody. Bayan, the acknowledged leader of the group, controlled the communications at the WOC by ordering the removal of the mouthpieces from the telephones, except the one beside him. He also ordered the commercial radio frequency to be changed to 10.8. At one point, he told de Dios, "It is the day of the return of Marcos and we are protecting the government from communism."¹⁰³

Seven hours later, realizing the futility of the siege, Bayan and the rest of the rebels at Sangley Air Base agreed to lay down their firearms. Negotiations were facilitated by PAF officers Col de Dios, Lt Col Baquir, Hotchkiss, and Capt Ortizo. At 10:00 a.m., through negotiations between PAF chief Sotelo and Bayan, Galacgac was sent to fetch Maligat and Pitpitan, earlier held hostage by the rebels in Gen Trias, Cavite. The other rebel officers who surrendered were Capts Manuel Rodis, Jequinto, and Danilo Galvez, and Lt Leodecario Aspan. At 2:30 p.m. on 27 January, the rebel officers from Sangley were airlifted to the VAB for a conference with the PAF commanding general.

At Fort Bonifacio, a group of soldiers and some civilians belonging to the GBI assembled at the quarters of Daclan on 26 January, starting from around 9:00 in the evening. Lt Rogelio Buendia and five Marine enlisted men went there and were told by Daclan that they were going to undertake a purely Guardian action against communism. At 4:00 a.m. of 27 January, on the basis of a report that armed men were grouping there, Daclan's house was raided by combined elements of the Scout Rangers, 202nd Military Police (MP) Company, Light Armor Brigade, and some other units. Daclan, Buendia along with 11 Army soldiers, five marines, one patrolman, and 21 civilians were rounded up and brought to the 202 MP Company headquarters for interrogation.

Most of those apprehended said that they were at Daclan's quarters to attend a prayer meeting led by Buendia. However, they were all heavily armed when arrested. Seized from them were three M14 rifles, 16 armalite rifles, one M60 LMG cal 7.62 with spare barrel, one smoke grenade, a radio set with two handsets, and numerous ammunition. Subsequently, one of the soldiers revealed that Daclan had told him and the others that 28 chapters of the GBI would stage a revolution against the communists.¹⁰⁴

The occupation of GMA-7 appeared to be better planned compared to the other incidents. At 1:30 a.m. on 27 January, PAF Special Reaction Group (SRG) elements from the RPN-9 transmitter and La Mesa Dam areas entered the GMA-7 compound purportedly to augment the security detail there. The group was led by Maj Ruben Sagmit and Lt Zaragoza, assisted from the inside by A1C Romantico. The rebels took the firearms from the SRG arm rack of GMA-7 and distributed them to the members of the group. In the meantime, Sagmit told Maj Pastor Razon, CO SRG unit assigned to the TV station, that a coup d'etat was taking place.

The 43 employees and visitors of GMA-7, who were around at the time, were directed to gather at the Talent Room and were prevented from leaving by rebel soldiers. At 2:20 a.m., three truckloads of heavily armed military personnel led by Maj Divina arrived to reinforce the rebels at the GMA-7. Shortly after, Col Hernando Lopez (PMA '66), SRG chief, who had been contacted by his men, arrived at the GMA-7 compound. He was supposedly told by Sagmit and Divina that they had launched a coup because they did not like the way the government was treating the military. To further convince him of the rebel cause, Abadilla spoke with Lopez by telephone for some 20 minutes. Abadilla allegedly told Lopez that PAF Col Oscar Canlas (PMA '63) would soon arrive at the station and that Lopez should not put up any resistance.¹⁰⁵

At 5:00 a.m., Canlas arrived at GMA-7 with some 100 men to join the rebels there. At about the same time, a group of 100 civilians claiming to be Marcos loyalists also entered GMA-7. Lopez requested Canlas to allow the former to pull out his men, their firearms, and belongings. The petition was granted by the rebel officer and carried out an hour later, after Lopez and his men failed to convince the rebels to give up.

Meanwhile, the government was in a dilemma as to how to resolve the crisis without bloodshed or extensive damage to property. The other four incidents had ended without great losses, except for the death of a rebel soldier and the wounding of some others. The siege at GMA-7, however, was taking longer to end, while in the meantime, it was receiving ample media coverage both here and abroad, a factor damaging to the country's image. There was also a growing number of civilians rallying to the rebels' side, most notable of whom were movie stars Alegre, Oropeza, Ferrer, and "Amay Bisaya". By 12:30 p.m., 27 January, more civilians had managed to enter the GMA-7 compound by passing over the fence, despite the military's having cordoned off the area.

At 4:00 a.m., 28 January, Gen Ramos sternly ordered Canlas and his followers to vacate the premises of the TV station but the rebels refused.

Instead, Canlas wrote a letter addressed to the Filipino people explaining the reasons why they took over GMA-7. Their basic intentions were supposedly to make people aware of the growing menace of communism, to protest against what they perceived was the "communists' access to sensitive government positions", and to decry what they saw as the uneven application of justice among members of the military organization. They called on President Aquino to step down from the presidency and for Marcos to be restored as Chief Executive because for them "only he could solve the country's problems."¹⁰⁶ Marcos and his family allegedly made an attempt to return stealthily into the country from their exile in Hawaii to coincide with the coup attempt, but were prevented from doing so by the US government.

As the second day of the siege ended, the military had begun to examine more drastic options to resolve the problem. Ramos was in a house next door to GMA-7 and they were thinking of digging a tunnel underground so that crack troops could get into the station and launch a surprise attack.¹⁰⁷ It was on the evening of 28 January that a group of PMA officers led by Honasan met with Ramos to present a "plea" to stop the planned assault by CAPCOM troopers on the rebels, arguing that any drastic action would merely divide the AFP.¹⁰⁸

The PMA officers, mostly belonging to Classes 1965 to 1983, made the following petitions:

1. A major reform and overhaul of the AFP and a hard line communist stand;
2. The terms of military officers having reached retirement age should not be extended;
3. All soldiers, including supporters of former President Marcos, should receive equal treatment;
4. Civilian supporters of the rebel troops should be allowed to leave the Channel 7 building; and
5. There must be a guarantee that no force would be used against the rebels.

After a long series of negotiations, the rebels finally agreed to lay down their arms. By 9:00 a.m., 29 January, the civilian rebel supporters left GMA-7 and were brought to Camp Karingal in Quezon City where records-processing was done. Seven hours afterwards, the military

personnel under Canlas were escorted out of the TV station and brought to Fort Bonifacio by BGen Rodolfo Biazon (PMA '61). The siege was over after 64 1/2 hours (almost three days). On 30 January, Ramos ordered the arrest of Zumel, Abadilla, Cabauatan, and Baquiran for their alleged involvement in the rebellion.¹⁰⁹ Charges were filed both in military as well as civilian courts against those who participated in the coup attempt. Some were acquitted, some had their cases dismissed, some still have their cases pending, while others are already serving sentences.

In subsequent inquiries and assessments after the coup attempt, it was found that rebel soldiers had sabotaged the transmitter facility of the government television station (PTV-4) before taking control of GMA-7. They had also destroyed some transmission lines of RPN-9, preventing it from broadcasting for a time. The lines were restored by about noontime of 27 January, and the station was able to go back on the air. GMA-7 was estimated to have lost about P3 million in the three days that it was not able to broadcast. Electronic equipment from the studios, personal valuables, and cash from the offices were found missing after the rebels had left. The GMA-7 canteen lost P45,000 when it was ransacked. Thirty-five people, mostly civilians, were reported to have been wounded during the GMA-7 incident.¹¹⁰

It was said that the rebels, at some point, also tried to take Camp Aguinaldo, the MND building, and Fort Bonifacio, but were repulsed by government troops. This could be connected with the report that the Special Anti-Terrorist Battalion, the same one attached to the MND during the November 1986 coup attempt, had been observed making some movements. There reportedly had been military men in formation in front of the MND building, although not the size of a battalion. In his testimony before the Commission in June 1990, Mison admitted that the unit had remained surprisingly intact by 27 January 1987, despite previous attempts to dismantle it and the fact that Honasan was no longer at MND.

On 21 January 1987, perhaps in anticipation of future coup attempts, Defense Minister Iletto created an AFP Board of Officers headed by the Inspector General, BGen Hermogenes Peralta, Jr (PMA '59), tasked to investigate destabilizing activities against the government. Just six days after its establishment, the Board had its first coup to investigate. Among some of its findings in relation to the 27 January 1987 coup attempt were the following:

1. Most of the Guardians and prominent personalities (military and civilian) who had participated in the 6 July 1986-Manila

Hotel incident were also involved in the 27 January 1987 coup attempt.¹¹¹

2. There definitely had been support given to the military coup plotters from the civilian sector, mostly in the form of food, refreshments, use of homes and vehicles, and other resources. In at least one residential compound in Little Baguio, San Juan, for example, food and refreshments had been prepared for those who participated in the GMA-7 incident.
3. The leaders of the GMA-7 incident were identified to have been Col Rolando Abadilla PC (he was subsequently acquitted), Col Oscar Canlas PAF, Maj Ruben Sagmit PA, and Maj Manuel Divina PC.

As a direct response by the executive branch of government to the coup, and to prevent its being caught by surprise again in the future, President Aquino created a Cabinet Crisis Committee on 28 January 1987. Its task was "to attend to the matter of preventing a recurrence of the 27 January 1987 attempted coup and how to meet a similar situation, should it occur."¹¹² The Committee was composed of Dr Soriano as chairman, in his capacity as National Security Director; Ministers Jose Concepcion, Jr, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr, Alfredo Bengzon, and Vicente Paterno as members. The composition of the Committee altered when Pimentel and Paterno subsequently resigned to run for the Senate. Later, other government officials were also included.

Still another response to the coup was the official designation of the National Capital Region Defense Command (NCRDC) about a week after the 27 January attempt. It was specifically assigned as the unit responsible for the security of Metro Manila amidst the destabilizing activities launched against the government. The NCRDC was not really a new unit. The counter-coup composite forces that make it up were organized right after the EDSA Revolt by then Vice Chief of Staff Lt Gen Mison, on orders of CSAFP Gen Ramos because "the situation was so unstable." The January 1987 coup simply formalized its existence, an act that perhaps could be interpreted as immense foresight, given the important role the NCRDC played in the defense of the government in succeeding coup attempts.

The clearest response to the attempt of 27 January was the people's overwhelming ratification of the 1987 Constitution on 2 February. The new Charter confirmed the legitimacy of the government and emphasized the primacy of civilian authority over the military, a provision found in

several of its sections. This should have sent an unmistakable message to the coup plotters that the people preferred to settle political questions through electoral processes, rather than through violence or civil disruption. However, the message seemed to have been lost on the coup plotters because within two months thereafter, they launched another coup attempt.

E. April 1987 "Black Saturday" Incident

Prior to the "Black Saturday Mutiny", as the 18 April coup attempt has been called, the political situation was again volatile. The campaigns for congressional seats were just winding up in preparation for the first legislative polls since the fall of the dictator, scheduled for 11 May. Opposition candidates had been lambasting the Aquino administration for its alleged corruption and insincerity, for the breakdown in peace and order conditions, for the alarming power outage that hit all of Luzon, for the worsening water shortage problem due to the nationwide drought, for pegging the price of cement which had led to hoarding, and for just about every other problem that plagued the country at the time.¹¹³

However, some of the complaints did have their bases. Insurgency, for example, had escalated within Metro Manila and in the countryside. Some three weeks before the coup attempt in April, 200 communist guerrillas had brazenly raided two police stations and a PC detachment in Polillo Island in Quezon province. Heavy military reinforcements were supposed to have been sent to the area but had been stalled because of reported ambush plans for the military teams.

On the same day that the coup attempt was launched, two bombs had exploded, one after the other, at the Colgate-Palmolive complex in Makati at 4:25 a.m., then at the Philippine Refining Company compound at 4:45 a.m. Nobody was injured in either blast although glass windows and lighting fixtures were destroyed in the first explosion. The police could not be sure if the bombs were related to the coup attempt at Fort Bonifacio, but it had been speculated that they could have been meant as some form of diversionary tactic. Just a month before, three bombs had exploded at the PMA grandstand four days before President Aquino was scheduled to address the graduating cadets at that very stage. Four people were killed, while 43 were wounded by the explosion. All these terroristic activities added to the people's feelings of political insecurity and confusion.

The coup plot had been hatched in a series of meetings, mostly among enlisted personnel and Guardian members. Later investi-

gations revealed Cabauatan as the mastermind of the attempt. Early intelligence reports mentioned a meeting of Cabauatan's group on 4 February 1987 at East Rembo, Fort Bonifacio (a subdivision where many enlisted men and their families live). The coup, which entailed a takeover of the Army headquarters, was to have been launched on 13 March but did not push through due to lack of support. On 15 March, another meeting was reportedly held, this time at the residence of a former assemblyman at Greenhills, with Zumel, Mrs Romeo Daclan, Abadilla, Cabauatan, TSgt William Quitulvo, and ex-Cpl Nestor Bete in attendance, among others. Zumel and Abadilla had allegedly promised the plotters financial support.¹¹⁴

The coup plotters met again on 3 April at a house in Philamlife Homes, Quezon City, where Cabauatan allegedly gave out eleven M16 rifles, three radio sets, countersign patches, ₱10,000 to Quitulvo, and ₱500 each to former enlisted men, Bete and TSgt Ernesto Librado. A similar meeting was held at a coffee shop on Ortigas Avenue and EDSA where Cabauatan gave Librado seven M16 rifles and more money. Still at another meeting in Philamlife Homes on 14 April, the same people met with the addition of Nilo Tayag, Alona Alegre, and Cesar Zagala, all known Marcos supporters.¹¹⁵

Intelligence reports show that at a meeting in Quezon City on 16 April, Cabauatan directed Librado and Bete to go to Quezon province and give ₱20,000 to Majs Aromin and Jamera. By then, the plotters had been discussing more drastic actions (e.g., bomb Malacañang) to pressure President Aquino to step down from office, restore Marcos to the presidency and create a military junta.¹¹⁶

The attempt was launched on 18 April, Easter weekend. At around 4:00 p.m., Librado led a group of 13 enlisted personnel aboard a jeep owned by Daclan and a yellow six-wheeler truck to ram through Gate 1 of Fort Bonifacio. Shooting wildly, they drove straight to the 202 MP Coy stockade where, assisted by eight MP soldiers from inside, they released the 108 military men detained there, most of whom participated in the 27 January coup attempt. However, only 42 of the 108 men joined them. In the meantime, the gate guards had alerted the Army Operations Center (AOC), which then ordered the closing of all entries to Fort Bonifacio and the augmentation of guards at all gates.

At about 5:00 p.m., the rebels proceeded to the Provost Marshal's headquarters where they raided the armory, then went on to the Headquarters Philippine Army (HPA) building where they converted the office of the army chief of staff to their command post. Meanwhile,

Bete and his group, who had previously been given other instructions, decided to join the rest of the mutineers at the HPA, bringing with them civilian and military passengers of the 12 cars they had intercepted along the way, as their hostages.

At 7:00 a.m., there was an exchange of gunfire between the rebels and the government security forces deployed around the HPA. Camp authorities had arranged to selectively deactivate telephone lines to prevent the rebels from calling for reinforcements. In other parts of the city, security had been beefed up at Malacañang and the other military camps, while the roads to Manila were supposedly secured to stop any possible reinforcements of rebel troops coming from the provinces. Ramos later said that the mutineers apparently had not intended to hold out in the camp and were forced to do so only upon realizing that all exits had been closed and were heavily guarded.¹¹⁷

At 7:30 a.m., a telephone negotiation with the acknowledged leader of the group, Librado, was conducted while government forces tightened the security ring around the HPA building. An eyewitness photographer recalled that at least four Scorpion light tanks, several armored cars, and jeeps mounted with machine guns surrounded the building.¹¹⁸

At 10:00 a.m., the mutineers fired at the government forces from the second floor where they had by then retreated to. Half an hour later, the government troops had entered the HPA building and secured the first floor. At 11:00 a.m., another telephone negotiation went on for the rebels to surrender, which they did half an hour later. The rebels admitted that they gave up after they realized they were "outnumbered and outgunned". One said they surrendered after a light tank fired a shell at the building as a prelude to an attack.¹¹⁹ By 12:15, the HPA building had been completely cleared of the rebels, following President Aquino's earlier directive to Ramos and Canieso "to resolve the problem before noon".

Of the 56 mutineers estimated to have participated in the "Black Saturday Incident" (also known as the "Enlisted Men's Revolt"), there were 45 who surrendered, 10 escaped, and one died. Some of the mutineers had white armbands with the initials "NAP" printed on them, presumably signifying "Nationalist Armed Forces of the Philippines," an organization allegedly created by Cabauatan with anti-communist aims. Others, like Librado, had black triangular tattoos on their upper arms with the words "Guardians Revolt". Librado was a "dishonorably discharged" member of the Marcos security forces who allegedly had been missing since February 1986. He was said to be a member of the

Guardians Centre Foundation, Inc (GCFI), a splinter group of the GBI, founded by Honasan.

Military interrogators had quoted some of the rebel surrenderees as admitting that the assault at Fort Bonifacio had been "part of a bigger plot to topple the Aquino government. This included the attempt to take over the International School in Makati and hold children of foreign diplomats enrolled at the school as hostages and the takeover of media establishments and vital public utilities."¹²⁰ It was also discovered that most of the mutineers were former members of the military and came from Nueva Ecija. From among those detained at the MP Stockade who had joined the mutineers, it was found out that they were former men of Cabauatan, who had been part of that rebel force intercepted at the Balintawak Toll Gate during the 27 January 1987 coup attempt.

The rebels allegedly had similar grievances and demands as those articulated in the past coup attempts: that President Aquino's approach towards insurgency was too "soft"; that she should sack the alleged "leftists" in her Cabinet; that the communists were winning because the President was weak; and that the present Cabinet set-up was corrupt and inefficient.¹²¹ In a telephone interview with DZRH at the time of the siege, a leader of the mutineers who had identified himself only as "Col Avila" asserted: "Our demand is to let the people from Malacañang turn over the country to the military for the time being." He had also said, "We are going to fight to the last drop of our blood. We hope this is going to be the last revolt."¹²²

In the after-coup assessment, it was found that there was only one casualty, a mutineer, ex-Sgt Toto de Guzman, while seven had been wounded (three rebels and four civilians). Not much had been materially damaged except for the gate that the rebels had destroyed to enter Fort Bonifacio, and the HPA building that had been left pockmarked with bullets. The damage was more perhaps on the image of the country faced with these obviously recurring coup threats. Although the attempt to destabilize the government on 18 April, a few weeks before the elections, had failed miserably, questions were raised about the administration's ability to survive more attempts in the future. Consequently, however, the government appeared to have been strengthened somehow by the attempt as was evidenced by the electoral exercise. Not even the claims of "mass fraud" by the opposition party, Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD), after the polls could throw doubt on the legitimacy of the elections and of President Aquino's administration. Two cornerstones of democracy had been laid — the Constitution and Congress.

After undergoing court-martial, the 41 non-commissioned officers who participated in the "Black Saturday" incident were acquitted. For his part, Cabauatan was sentenced to 12 years and one day imprisonment at hard labor, similar to the sentence given some of those in the GMA-7 coup attempt.

On 15 June 1987, after five months of investigations, the AFP Board of Officers headed by the Inspector General came up with its conclusions regarding the January as well as the April 1987 coup attempts.¹²³ Some of the findings on the Black Saturday incident include the following:

1. The participation of the Guardians surfaced in both coup attempts (i.e., many of those investigated, detained or facing charges were identified with or admitted Guardian membership).
2. Failure of the intelligence community to follow up leads (e.g., previous meetings held, etc.) which could have nipped in the bud such activities.
3. The groups identified as being involved in coup attempts, particularly the Guardians, have become so pervasive and influential that some officers have joined these groups in order to have some leverage over their own subordinates, thereby obviously relegating their positions as military commanders behind those of their positions as members of the fraternity.
4. Interviews with those implicated in the coups reveal that their sentiments favored Marcos, Ver or Enrile. Also, many viewed the proliferation of fraternal associations within the AFP as military men taking it upon themselves to bring about better treatment for themselves, since they felt that not enough attention is being given them. Others felt that they are neglected, treated badly or ostracized for being Marcos loyalists.
5. In the 18 April 1987 attempt, although the plotters conducted their various meetings at the residences of civilians, the Board supposedly could find no other evidence to warrant the civilians' prosecution before the appropriate court.
6. Substantial funds had been provided to the participants of the 27 January as well as the 18 April 1987 attempts.

The Board's recommendations included the following:

1. Dismantling of all fraternal organizations within the AFP, except those authorized by law;
2. Assignment of "stigmatized" officers and enlisted personnel to positions commensurate to their skills, training, experience, and overall potential;
3. Vigorous and sustained indoctrination and reorientation; and
4. The intelligence community should closely follow up leads related to destabilizing efforts.

F. July 1987 MIA Takeover Plot

The most obscure of the attempts at military intervention is the one that was exposed in the press in July 1987 probably because, like the "God Save The Queen" plot in November 1986, it was a "non-event" — meaning, it had been discovered before it could be launched.

As far as the limited information available reveals, there seemed to have been two separate plots to overthrow President Aquino's government in July. One was publicly exposed by then Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Chairman Ramon Diaz at a press conference on 9 July. He used as evidence the taped conversation of former President Marcos with Robert Chastain, a French businessman, and American attorney Richard Hirschfeld, a former Marcos lawyer. The two were supposedly acting as middle-men in the sale of arms to Marcos. The three-hour conversation took place at Marcos's beachside residence-in-exile in Hawaii on 27 May and was secretly recorded by Hirschfeld. Diaz, however, claimed that three tapes of the conversation were furnished to him only in June during his trip to the US. He, in turn, gave copies of the tapes to President Aquino on 12 June during the Independence Day reception at Malacañang.

The taped conversation revealed that Marcos wanted to buy "from a European country" some 1,000 Armalite rifles, ammunition good for three months, 90 mm recoilless rifles, 100 .50 cal machine guns, 100 grenade launchers, armored personnel carriers, Stinger air-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles, laser-sighting tanks, Blowpipe anti-tank equipment, helicopter gunships, and other weapons. He was planning to launch an invasion on the Philippines to be staged from Tonga, where the King was his personal friend and had offered him his island in the

South Pacific. However, he would be using Hongkong as the trans-shipment point for the arms to be used in the operations, originally scheduled for end of June, but was supposedly changed to mid-July, for some reason.¹²⁴

The purchase of weapons worth some \$25 million was supposed to be financed by a loan from Saudi Arabian Prince Al-Fassi and repaid with gold Marcos claimed to have hidden in the Philippines. The plan was to land in northern Luzon, presumably in his home province, "and if they oppose the landing, . . . that's when we start the battles," declared Marcos in the tapes. Regarding what will happen to President Aquino, Marcos said they would "hold her hostage or, if necessary. . . ." Although left unsaid, assassination seemed to have been implied.

What was interesting in this belatedly exposed invasion plot, besides its fanciful scenario, was its simultaneous revelation in Washington, DC before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. On 9 July, the subcommittee heard the Marcos tapes along with the testimonies of Chastain and Hirschfeld, who disclosed that they had posed as middlemen in the deal to get Marcos the weaponry, and had taped the conversation allegedly on their own initiative after they had failed to get US Justice Department backing for the activity.¹²⁵ The evidence from the hearings and pressure from the US Congress had supposedly prompted the State Department to place Marcos under severe travel restrictions (i.e., barring him from leaving Oahu island where his beachhouse is located).

In a written statement released to the press from Hawaii on 12 July, Marcos claimed that "The discussion in the tapes concerning arms and military action was premised on the prediction of the loss of the Philippines to a communist takeover or to a communist coalition with Mrs Aquino, and that the only hope of restoring freedom and democracy there would be a US-approved invasion which I would lead."¹²⁶ He did not, however, deny at any point the tape's contents.

The highly incredible invasion plot and the rather bizarre circumstances surrounding its revelation had induced most people to laugh it off or dismiss it as being just one more of those coup rumors. The military leadership downplayed the story. AFP spokesman then Col Honesto Isleta (PMA '58) said that they doubted the veracity of the story. Although they did not question the tapes' authenticity, they think Marcos knew he was being taped so "he was giving this message to boost the sagging morale" of his supporters.¹²⁷ On the other hand, President

Aquino was "pleased" about the US warning to the ousted dictator against moves to topple her government.

Barely a week after the Marcos tapes had been made public in Manila and in Washington, DC, news of another coup had leaked to the press on 13 July. This had followed the order to arrest at least 20 more military officers implicated in the new plot by an Army major, who had been nabbed on 10 July and had supposedly confessed. The new coup plot was said to have been codenamed "Oplan Inang Bayan" and had consisted of two substage operations: Luisita I and Luisita II. The first allegedly involved an assault by helicopter gunships at the MIA and the holding of foreign hostages who would be used as shields against government troops. The second phase called for an attack on VAB also by helicopter gunships, aimed at disabling all military aircraft there. Then CAPCOM Chief BGen Alexander Aguirre said that the coup had the financial backing of a right-wing group of civilians and politicians who were said to be Marcos supporters. He added that the series of bombings in the last weeks prior to the discovery of the plot appeared to have been related to the coup bid.

Newspaper accounts mentioned that the coup plotters supposedly consisted of two colonels, one on absent-without-official-leave (AWOL) status and the other still in active service; two majors in active service and holding sensitive posts at the time; two captains; six PAF officers; four Army officers; and a Marine officer. It was said that a former military officer who ran in the 11 May polls under the opposition party was also allegedly involved. Some of the officers were said to have been identified with Enrile, while the others, with Ramos.¹²⁸

Reports revealed that the coup had been planned during several meetings in Makati. On 24 June, at 10:00 p.m., a meeting was said to have been held lasting until midnight, with the attendance of Abadilla; a Col Espejo; Majs Divina, Almario Hilario (PMA '73), Brillo, and Ribaya. The agenda reportedly included the plan to occupy the MIA and VAB, and to establish a Council of State.¹²⁹ Another meeting was supposedly held on 2 July.

Other bits of information included the plotters' having sought the assistance of the Guardians, who had reportedly promised to provide 3,000 fully armed members, while a Marine officer pledged 400 of his men. A big food conglomerate was supposed to have promised to help the rebels by providing them with food during the execution of the coup.¹³⁰

On 15 July, news reports came out regarding six unnamed military officers being questioned about the most recent coup plot. Defense Secretary Ileto, while confirming the interrogation, had said the officers under question "will not be arrested. Nor can they be liable to charges for their alleged participation in the plot." He added that while the supposed plotters might have considered staging a coup, nothing was actually done. "Anybody can sit down and drink beer and say a lot of things. But to actually accuse you is a different question." It would have been different if the plotters tried something like the attempt to capture Fort Bonifacio and their short-lived occupation of GMA-7, he further qualified.¹³¹

Although the coup plot had been admittedly "neutralized", the attitude of the military regarding additional information about it seemed confusing, if not contradictory. While acknowledging that there indeed had been another coup plot, it tried to downplay its importance. And yet, speculations increased when the military leadership suddenly declared a news blackout by ordering all officers to withhold further information on the plot other than what had already been published in the press. Col Isleta said that this was because the military did not want to "jeopardize ongoing investigations on the plot."¹³² However, no other information has ever been released on "Oplan Inang Bayan" since then. There is a case pending in the military court (*People of the Philippines vs. Maj Manuel Divina, et al*) regarding the MIA takeover attempt on 2 July 1987, with four officers named as the principal coup participants.¹³³ These four are Maj Manuel Divina, Maj Romeo Elefante, Capt Reynaldo Regacho, and Capt Christopher Mesias. Elefante was acquitted, while Divina, and Regacho have not been arraigned because they are still at-large. Mesias was recently arrested. The July 1987 plot remains a perplexing incident in the line of past attempts at military intervention in the Philippines.

G. August 1987 Coup Attempt

Weeks before the 28 August coup attempt, the political atmosphere was again particularly tense and extremely uncertain. Labor unrest in the cities and the dim prospects for land reform in the countryside dominated many political debates, even as Congress formally opened on 27 July. There were talks of postponing the local elections originally scheduled for November to sometime in January or February, upon recommendation of the COMELEC (they were eventually held on 18 January 1988).

Earlier, a spate of bombings had rocked Manila, making the populace unusually jumpy. Tensions peaked on 14 August when the government announced an 80-centavo increase in oil prices. The widespread public outcry against the hike extended among the different sectors and social classes in society. Strikes and demonstrations were held all over the country, followed by the intermittent violent dispersals of protestors, which elicited even more public protests. Transportation and work stoppages were resorted to, leaving hundreds of passengers stranded in the streets, or work places abandoned. The militant labor unions and student organizations, who were at the forefront of the protests, had declared a nationwide *Welgang Bayan* starting from 26 August. Despite a price cutback ordered by the President on the eve of the 26th, the national strike successfully pushed through, paralyzing 11 cities.

It is said that the RAM-HF's original launching date for the coup was 29 August, but it was moved a day earlier to coincide with the culmination of the *Welgang Bayan*, when thousands of protestors were expected to be out in the streets. The plan of the rebels appeared to have been identical to the November 1986 "God Save The Queen" coup plot, with minor adjustments. Reportedly codenamed "A Star Will Fall, The Sun Will Rise,"¹³⁴ the plan called for the takeover of Malacañang, key military installations, and radio and television stations in Metro Manila. With the occupations of the Palace and Camp Aguinaldo, which are the symbols of civil government and military authority, respectively, the coup plotters would have used the media stations to broadcast their propaganda in order to generate support from both the civilian and military sectors. The takeover of VAB and other airports, such as the one in Legaspi City, was expected to provide pick-up points for reinforcements from areas under their influence to be airlifted to Manila, the seat of government and therefore the principal battleground. By controlling these key installations for a period of time, the coup plotters expected military units as well as hordes of civilians to defect to their side.

During the coup, there were at least eight areas of major conflict between the rebels and government forces, and numerous other areas of what could be considered as minor confrontation. The eight were Malacañang, Camp Aguinaldo, PTV-4/Camelot Hotel, Broadcast City, VAB, RECOM 3-Camp Olivas, RECOM 7-Cebu, and Legaspi Airport. In the one-and-a-half-day mutiny, the rebels were able to control, at least for a time, seven of the areas mentioned above, with the exception of Malacañang.

A review of intelligence reports prior to the August coup shows that, like in many of the past attempts, there was not really a lack of

information, but perhaps more a deficiency in the follow-up of leads and potential sources of information, as well as the collation and evaluation of all such data. For example, on 10 July 1987, Honasan and a certain CPO Raquion were frequently monitored at Signal Village in Fort Bonifacio, while on 22 July, Nueva Ecija local officials reported that massive recruitment of police and military men by RAM-HF officers was taking place in their area purportedly for anti-insurgency operations. Regular meetings were supposedly being held to discuss perceived threats of a communist takeover, and yet these leads were not followed up. On 3 July, Lt Col Legaspi was said to have solicited Aromin's support "in case the core group that triggered the February '86 revolution would again move to save the country from communists." When Aromin asked what his role would be in the effort, Legaspi allegedly told him he would inform him about it in the near future. Aromin and Legaspi were neighbors then in Fort Bonifacio. It must be remembered that Aromin was the CO of the 49 IB in February 1986 and one of those arrested and publicly presented by Marcos as having been involved in the RAM plot against him. His name surfaced again in November 1986 when he brought most of his men to Manila to participate in the "God Save The Queen" plot.

Other intelligence reports included the supposed plan to liquidate the CSAFP and the PAF Chief by the groups of Hilario and Baula. The plan also included the takeover of VAB and the bombing of Malacañang. On 5 August, a report was received that some 2,000 troops would be led by a provincial commander in RECOM 3 who would take over key government installations and selected media facilities in Metro Manila. The move was to have been followed by similar military actions in other key cities in the country. On 15 August, an open meeting was reported of officers formerly identified with Enrile and the defunct PSC-NISA. The meeting could have been considered a normal one except for the presence of Lt Col Reynaldo Berroya PC (PMA '69) who had been previously reported to be meeting with different AFP units and the Chief of Staff, PSG. On 19 August, another intelligence report stated that key personalities in the AFP were included as targets by disgruntled elements in the military in a coup attempt to be undertaken at a given signal.¹³⁵ It was said that a military junta would be established composed mostly of young officers. More reports of an impending coup kept coming in.

On 22 August, the PC Vice Chief of Staff called for an emergency meeting to verify the persistent reports reaching their headquarters about a plan to overthrow the government by way of assaults on Malacañang, military camps in Metro Manila and other parts of the country, and media stations. Civilian and military personalities were

said to have been earmarked for "neutralization." On the same day, red alert status was declared at VAB. The following day, the situation became even more tense when a telephone call received by some civilian employees of Camp Crame from their relatives who are soldiers warned them "not to stay out late at night", and that the critical period was anytime within the month.¹³⁶ On 27 August, reports were received about two separate meetings of plotters. One said that during a meeting at a restaurant in Timog Avenue, Quezon City, orders were given that the loyalists would move on 28 August at 2:00 a.m. Target areas would be Malacañang, military camps, media stations, and key government officials perceived to be "communists". It was said that simultaneous actions would be initiated in Cebu, Davao, and other provinces. The other meeting was supposedly at the Grand Atrium in Makati and talked about the Guardians launching an attack on all AFP installations. Although it is understandably difficult to verify and process the numerous bits of information received by the different intelligence units of the military, having the capability to do so and sharing this information with the civilian authorities would probably improve the government's security.

As early as 20 August, key officers of the units that would be mobilized by the rebels for the coup appeared to have known their launching date. The 14 IB stationed in Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, under Lt Col Melchor Acosta, Jr (PMA '71) was alerted for action, using the scheduled visit of President Aquino to the RUC 3 as a cover. Company commanders Capt Danilo Baguio and 2Lt Rolando Cailing (PMA '85) were supposed to prepare for the security of the President during the visit, on orders allegedly received from the headquarters (HQ) of the 3 Bde. On 23 August, in Camarines Sur, 16 IB company commander Lt Hernando Caraig, Jr (PMA '84) supposedly received information that something was going to happen in Manila. Thus, he and Maj Eufemio Santos prepared a troop movement plan the next day. On 25 August, Nueva Ecija PC Provincial Commander Eduardo Matillano placed his command on red alert, directed all his officers to prepare their strike forces to be on call within 24 hours for combat operation, and to bring provisions and clothing good for three days.

On the morning of 27 August, 14 IB company commander Cailing called his three platoon leaders, Lt James Joven (PMA '84), 2Lt Alberto Gulmayo, and 2Lt Romulo Evangelista, for a meeting and gave them instructions to restrict their personnel to camp, prepare one week's provisions, and check firearms and ammunition for possible deployment anytime. Baguio did the same for his company. By 5:00 p.m., seven

officers and 117 enlisted men of the 14 IB were ready to move out. Acosta conducted a briefing of the troops. He told them their mission would no longer be to provide security for the President's visit, but instead would be to go to Manila to act as a "blocking force" at Ayala Bridge against a supposed impending attack on Malacañang, after which they would converge at Camp Aguinaldo. Their rendezvous point would be the Sta Rita toll gate on the North Expressway.

Meanwhile, the Special Operations School (SOS) of the PA TRACOM in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, was on "red alert" because of a scheduled visit of the CSAFP. The SOS then was under the command of Honasan, assisted by Maj Rodolfo Lazaro. It had a Scout Ranger (SR) department under it, headed by Capt Ernesto Lasco, with Capt Faustino Dantes as his assistant and Capt Roque Calagui, Jr as the administrative officer. At that time, the SOS was conducting SR training for three classes: SR Class #87-87 under Capt Dominador Lina, SR Class #88-87 under Lt Edmundo Malabanjot, and SR Class #89-87 under Capt Fidel Legiralde, as course directors. On 27 August, at around 10:00 p.m., the whole group of SR trainees with their officers left Nueva Ecija to link up with the other groups at the Sta Rita toll gate. Some of them were told they would be on a graded practical exercise and test mission, while others were simply ordered to board the trucks waiting for them. Lina pulled out 105 of his students on combat maneuver exercise in Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija to bring them directly to Camp Aguinaldo on the morning of 28 August.

At the Regimental Training School (RTS) of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) in San Miguel, Bulacan, the 94 new recruits attending an SR Orientation Course were ordered to board an M35 truck and were brought to the Sta Rita toll gate, passing by the junction of Tartaro and Maharlika Highway where some of the men transferred to a waiting Baliwag Transit bus. Lt Mario Antonio, OIC, 6th Company, FSRR, also based in San Miguel, mustered 14 of his men armed with three days' provisions, and headed for the rendezvous point. On the other hand, Capt Reynaldo Ordoñez (PMA '78) and his men arrived at the Army detachment in San Miguel, where they teamed up with the armor platoon of the 2 LAC led by SSgt Abraham Valenton, and then went to join the convoy parked at the national highway of Bulacan with one APC and one V-150 combat vehicle. Valenton claimed that the Army detachment had received a radio message earlier from the 3 IB HQ to bring the V-150 to Camp Aquino, Tarlac. It was later discovered that no such message had been sent and that it had been a ruse to get the armor out.

Maj Abraham Purugganan (PMA '78), CO, 7th SR Company and about 18 of his men had left Benito Soliven, Isabela on two Land Cruisers

at 11:00 a.m. on 27 August. They headed for San Miguel, Bulacan where they joined the batch of vehicles loaded with armed soldiers waiting along the highway. Purugganan's group later headed directly for Camp Aguinaldo where they secured the Communications-Electronics Service (COMMEL) area during the rebel's siege.

In the meantime, Lt Col Reynaldo Ochoa (PMA '72), CO 62 IB, met all of his officers on 27 August at 11:00 a.m. and instructed them to get the men ready for an "operation". His officers included Capt Daniel Mamaril, battalion operations officer; Maj Manuel Santos, battalion logistics officer; Lt Alfredo Manabat, CO "A" Coy; platoon leaders 2Lts Villamor-Belmes, and Amando Escoto; Capt Felipe Muralla, CO "B" Coy; platoon leaders 2Lts Julian Mamuri, and Pablo Biglete; Capt Andres Fadrigalan, CO "C" Coy; Lt Francisco Atutubo, EX-O "C" Coy; platoon leaders 2Lt Silver Linsangan and 2Lt Lazaro Alcoba; Capt Evaristo Bilog, CO HQ Svc Coy and his EX-O, Lt Edgardo Chua. Other officers who joined them were Capt Felipe Manlapaz and 2Lt Mario Capaycapay. Earlier, the men had already been alerted for a seven-day operation. Thus, fully armed and led by their officers, some 200 men of the 62 IB boarded 14 vehicles and left their base at Camp Tinio, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija at 10:00 p.m. for a mission known only to a few of them. Upon reaching nearby Sta Rosa, some of the troops transferred to the four Baliwag Transit buses earlier arranged for by the PC provincial headquarters in Cabanatuan City. The convoy arrived at the Sta Rita toll gate at around 11:00 p.m. and waited for the other troops to arrive.

At Camp Aguinaldo, Commo Marcelo called for an informal conference at 4:00 p.m., 27 August, attended by Capt Sonny Sabado and LtSG Alvaran, among others. Marcelo gave instructions on the actions to be taken in the light of a projected rebel attack on the camp. After the conference an hour later, Sabado and Alvaran returned to their unit, the Security and Escort Unit (SEU), to brief their chief, Lt Col Jerry Albano (PMA '71), who at the time was in a meeting at his office with Lt Jesus Quisano of NCRDC. When Quisano left, he ominously told one of the SEU personnel, *"Maghanda kayo at may madugong labanan na mangyayari."*

Still at the camp, Lucas had been gathering a group of people at the lobby of the DND building supposedly to secure the Defense Department against any untoward incident. This began in the early evening of 27 August and went on all night. They were later able to pressure Rolando Cabral, Supply Accountable Officer, to issue them weapons from the DND supply room. At 12:45 a.m., 28 August, CSAFP Ramos and Vice Chief of Staff de Villa decided to set up a GHQ advance command post

at Camp Crame after receiving continuous intelligence reports of unauthorized troop formations in Nueva Ecija and Bulacan. Montano and later on, Ermita were assigned to take charge of GHQ, while the other service commanders were contacted and apprised of the situation. Ramos contacted Col Voltaire Gazmin, PSG commander, and discussed the adequacy of Malacañang's defenses in view of the unusually large force reportedly moving toward Manila.

Soriano, then chairman of the Cabinet Crisis Committee and National Security Adviser, joined Ramos and de Villa at Camp Crame a little after 1:00 a.m. Soriano said he learned about the coup at 1:00 a.m. through one of his contacts in Davao. He contacted Ramos immediately who, in turn, asked him to join the battle staff at Crame. Weeks before the coup, the Crisis Committee had been meeting every other week. They knew something was brewing but did not know when it would be launched.¹³⁷

In the meantime, the rebel troops had all arrived at the Sta Rita toll gate by midnight. All the men were instructed to transfer their flag patches over their breast pocket with the red portion on top. Honasan instructed Acosta and his men from 14 IB to head for the Ayala bridge near Malacañang. Most of the elements from the SOS PATRACOM and the RTS FSRR were to go directly to Camp Aguinaldo. It is not clear which troops Honasan himself led, but it may be surmised that he had under him a composite group made up of men from the units that met at the Sta Rita toll gate.

G.1. Malacañang

At about 1:45 a.m., 28 August, the rebels launched their attack on Malacañang. Some 20 rebels ransacked the armory of the Anti-Terrorist Task Force of the PSG at the foot of Nagtahan bridge. They attacked Malacañang from two directions along Aguila and J P Laurel Streets, but were blocked by PSG and CAPCOM elements deployed at all possible approaches. A firefight ensued, where several men from both sides were killed or wounded. The V-150 under the command of rebel Capt Reynaldo Ordoñez (PMA '78) was confronted by a Scorpion tank coming from the Malacañang area near St Jude Church. After Ordoñez spoke with its driver, the tank withdrew and the V-150 later left for Camp Aguinaldo. The 62 IB led by Ochoa arrived at the Nagtahan bridge area at 2:00 a.m., passing through La Loma. They engaged in a firefight with government troops, where three of their companions were killed while two were wounded. After about 30 minutes, they too headed for Camp Aguinaldo. The men of the 14 IB led by Acosta arrived at the Ayala bridge at around 2:30 a.m. and were deployed on both ends of the bridge.

Later, after hearing shots from the area of Malacañang, they fired three rounds of flares to signal their withdrawal to Camp Aguinaldo.

Unable to get into Malacañang, the rest of the rebel troops under Honasan headed for Camp Aguinaldo through the Sta Mesa route. But in the course of their withdrawal, they shot at civilian onlookers who were jeering at them, killing 11 and wounding 54. Earlier, they had also fired at the convoy of President Aquino's son, Noy, who was then rushing home to Arlegui near Malacañang. Noy was wounded, while his bodyguard was killed. Two other people died, and a third one was seriously wounded in the car behind them.¹³⁸ The Marine reinforcements led by Biazon composed of five companies and four LVTs arrived at the Malacañang area at 4:30 a.m., but the rebels had by then withdrawn to Camp Aguinaldo.

G.2. Camp Aguinaldo

At 1:00 a.m., just before the rebel attack on the Palace, the DBX telephone system at Camp Aguinaldo was evidently subverted, rendering the AFP communication network inoperative. When two technicians tried to fix it, Maj Romeo Ranay (PMA '74) of the AFP Computer System Center told them to keep it shut, allegedly on orders of Erfe. It remained shut for 13 1/2 hours. Ranay would return, several hours later, with orders to call up the Antipolo radio relay station and likewise shut off the repeaters there. The orders were complied with.

Meanwhile, Marcelo was informed at 2:00 a.m. that the 2nd GHQ Battalion, composed of three companies and one APC, led by Col Luisito Sanchez (PMA '67) and five armored vehicles under the PALAB unit of Lt Col Luis Severo Melendez would be arriving to help secure Camp Aguinaldo. When they entered the camp, they were instructed to go to the GHQ grandstand and for Sanchez to report to the camp commander. However, instead of going to Marcelo's office, Sanchez went to the DND building to speak with Erfe. Later, in the crucial confrontation between rebels and government forces, Sanchez and Melendez would again refuse to follow orders to attack the rebel troops, saying "The Cory government is not worth dying for."¹³⁹ In fact, by 4:00 a.m., members of the PALAB unit had removed their flag patches and ammunition from their machine guns.

A similar "neutral" behavior was observed of the SEU under Albano and Sabado. Both officers were later found to have ordered their men to stay in their barracks, instead of reinforcing the GHQ building, as had been their instructions. Albano and Sabado were subsequently found

guilty of failure to do their utmost to suppress a mutiny or sedition in violation of Articles of War 68 (AW 68).

At 3:00 a.m., the rebel forces under Lt Col Acosta, CO 14 IB, arrived outside Camp Aguinaldo's Gate 1 but did not initiate any hostile action, until the long convoy of military vehicles and civilian buses full of heavily-armed mutineers arrived shortly after. Acosta's men again fired three flare shots to signal their arrival to other rebels inside the camp. Honasan then demanded entry through Gate 1 but was refused by Templo, then NCRDC Chief of Staff, together with Marcelo and Col Pedro Juachon (PMA '58), AFP Provost Marshal. Juachon reportedly told Honasan to return to Nueva Ecija with his men, but Honasan replied: "No way, sir. We came here and we've decided to stay." Juachon further told him: "Gringo, it might help to let you know that we already have the order to hit you now, *kawawa naman ang mga mamamatay mong tauhan* because we will hit your tank with our tanks and the armor column is on its way out to Boni Serrano." Honasan supposedly answered, "It's alright, sir, we are prepared to neutralize your tanks."¹⁴⁰

Failing to enter through Gate 1, the rebels went around Camp Aguinaldo through the White Plains Road and looked for a break into the camp. Meanwhile, Lucas, with some 30 heavily armed men, left the DND building and went to Gate 5 where they overpowered the guards and forced them to open the gate, thus allowing Honasan's troops in. By about 5:00 a.m., rebel forces were inside the camp and were taking up their assigned positions. The 14 IB elements were deployed in the premises of Gates 2 and 3. Those from the 62 IB took charge of the area fronting the VV Soliven building on EDSA, while Ochosa established his tactical command post at the Golf Club building. The SOS elements were deployed at Honasan's residence, the KKK, and the golf course. The SR Class #87-87 under Lina guarded the DND and COMMEL buildings, while SR Class #89-87 occupied positions in the area of the Mapping Center and the Civil Relations Service (CRS). The elements of the RTS FSR also occupied the CRS and Mapping Center surroundings, and the front of the GHQ building. The SR Class #88-87 were deployed in the golf course area. The 6 SR Coy under Antonio were initially deployed in the vicinity of the CRS HQ, then transferred to the area of the Officers' (Row) Quarters. The 7 SR Coy under Purugganan, on the other hand, secured the COMMEL area.

After overpowering the guards at Gate 5, the group of Lucas went back to the DND building which served as rebel headquarters for the duration of the siege. Honasan had instructed the group of SOS (organic) personnel to position themselves within the perimeter of his house. He

told them their mission in going to Camp Aguinaldo was "to negotiate for the welfare of the Filipino".¹⁴¹ Ordoñez, for his part, also entered through Gate 5 in the V-150. After refueling at the camp, he went to PTV-4, then later came back to Camp Aguinaldo where he eventually abandoned the tank and its crew at 3:30 p.m. on 28 August.

Earlier, Marcelo had sent Alvaran to Gate 5 to check what was happening there. Alvaran met Honasan along the way. Honasan allegedly told him: "Why did your MP try to stop us from entering our camp. I came here to reinforce you because the Aquino government has already sold us to the communists. Join me because what we are fighting for is for our children."¹⁴² As Honasan answered a call on his handheld radio, Alvaran left and reported to Marcelo.

In the meantime, an SEU reaction force led by Capt Vicente Cervano had been sent from within the camp to augment the guards at Gate 5, not realizing that it had already been completely overrun by rebels. When the SEU force arrived there, a PC SAF team was also there confronting some 300 heavily-armed rebel Scout Rangers with their supporting tank. Honasan then appeared and tried to win over the government troops. He told the SAF team that his men "will not fight them," and that they only went there because they had heard "the camp had been attacked by the NPA." With Honasan's group were Alcoba and Ordoñez, classmate and armor instructor, respectively, of Cervano. Eventually, both the SAF team and the SEU force backed down. However, government forces were deployed at EDSA from Ortigas Avenue to Gate 5 to seal off the rebels inside the camp.

By 8:00 a.m., the rebel forces had control of Gates 2, 3, 4 and 5, as well as the Communications Center (COMCENTER) and the surroundings of GHQ building. Honasan went around talking with the officers and men, trying to convince them to join the rebel cause. He went to the SEU to speak with Albano and Maj Jose Jamora, HSG commander. Later records show that Albano, Jamora, and Quisano had prior knowledge of the coup. By 9:00 a.m., the rebels had hoisted the inverted Philippine flag to show that they allegedly controlled the whole camp.

At 9:30 a.m., the rebels were operating the armed forces radio DZAF and airing a cassette tape which announced that Camp Aguinaldo, VAB, Regions I, II, III, and IV, and Cebu City were under rebel control led by Honasan. They repeatedly played this until 11:00 a.m. when there was a power failure. At 10:00 a.m., Robles and Maj Arsenio Santos, Jr were seen in fatigue uniforms walking towards the grandstand. An eyewitness later narrated that she had seen Robles earlier that morning talking

with Mrs Honasan in the latter's house, and had overheard him saying, "*Atin na ang COMMEL.*"¹⁴³ Robles subsequently denied his participation, and the CSAFP on 19 May 1988 approved the recommendation of the Board of Officers to drop and consider closed the case against Robles.

Meanwhile, successive gunshots were heard all throughout the morning, from around 10:00 until the afternoon. On the government's side, a team had been sent to the rooftop of the VV Soliven building overlooking Camp Aguinaldo, to monitor rebel troop movements. It was reported that boxes of ammunition and recoilless rifles were unloaded by rebels from a combi and Army jeep at the golf course around 10:40 a.m. It had earlier been reported that a helicopter had landed near Honasan's house loaded with food supplies. Meantime, Marine units from Zamboanga had been flown to Manila as reinforcements. Additional CAPCOM troops from Bicutan were sent to augment the PC forces in Camp Crame. Tanks and more troops were at the ready along EDSA, by the Corinthian Garden area.

At around 11:30 a.m., government soldiers exchanged heavy gunfire with the rebels in front of Camp Crame, and Gates 2 and 3. Several civilian bystanders were hit in the crossfire. A counter attack was launched by the CAPCOM combat group under Nazareno (later reinforced by 100 cadets of the National Police Academy) and a PA Counter-Terrorist (PACT) Battalion led by Col Rene Dado (PMA '66). A Marine Task Force under Col Braulio Balbas, Jr (PMA '60), with Maj Emmanuel Teodisio (PMA '72), CO MBLT 2, breached the rebel defenses at Gate 2 shortly afterwards.

Carbonell, CO 703rd Brigade, and his men had been assigned to force their way through Gate 3, then go to the GHQ building to relieve the pressure on MGen Ermita and BGen Montano. However, due to some lack of communication, Dado's PACT team, who by then had gotten control of Gate 3, were not informed of this, thus a misencounter occurred between both units. However, by mid-afternoon, the Marines managed to forcibly open Gate 3 and assault the rebel 62 IB elements, leading to their eventual surrender.

In the meantime, fighting had broken out in front of the GHQ building, still controlled by Ermita and Montano. A firefight had also started at Gate 4, with three V-150s firing at the rebel troops who were forced to withdraw about 150 meters. Fighting intensified as Logistics Command (LOGCOM) forces attacked the rebels from behind at the DND building. Two rebels were killed. By then, the 14 IB rebel group of Acosta had withdrawn towards the golf course area. At about 2:00

p.m., rebel soldiers burned the GHQ building to flush out Ermita and Montano. However, an air strike by two Tora-tora planes coming from Sangley Air Base relieved the rebel pressure on the government troops holed up in the GHQ.

From then on, rebel troops gradually began to surrender. Many had earlier separated from their units, changed into civilian clothes and slipped out of the camp. Others had gone to the St Ignatius Chapel to surrender or to wait it out. Honasan was said to have left the camp in a Huey helicopter piloted by Capt Rogelio Seradoy, not long before the air strike by Tora-tora planes. There are at least two versions of Honasan's escape from Camp Aguinaldo. One states that the helicopter ferried him to VAB, from where he escaped by land and the pilot (Seradoy) later abandoned the Huey at Camp Aquino, Tarlac. The other claims that a pilot, coming from Camp Olivas, flew to Camp Aguinaldo, picked up Honasan and brought him to an undisclosed place in Baguio.¹⁴⁴

The government's air strike and marine attack seemed to have been decisive in the battle at Camp Aguinaldo. By 11:30 p.m., the camp had been cleared of all rebel elements with the capture or surrender of 12 officers, including Lt Cols Acosta and Ochosa, Majs Purugganan and Lazaro, Capts Dantes, Calagui, and Legiralde, among others. With the retaking of Camp Aguinaldo from rebel hands, the other rebel-held areas were easily regained.

G.3. PTV-4/Camelot Hotel and Broadcast City

The troop movements of the rebels who attacked PTV-4 began on 27 August, at 7:00 p.m., when soldiers from the different PC line companies and police stations under the territorial supervision and control of the Nueva Ecija Constabulary Command began arriving at the PC HQ in Cabanatuan City. At 10:30 p.m., all the troops were ordered to board the various vehicles available and proceed to PTV-4, arriving there at around 1:30 a.m. 28 August. Upon arrival at the PTV-4 gate, one of the rebel soldiers shouted, "*Ito na*," signaling the exchange of gunfire between the attacking forces and the station's security force (5 GHQ Bn). The gunbattle ended after an hour, with five of the defending troops wounded.

At 3:00 a.m., Matillano, Nueva Ecija Provincial Commander, and his men, numbering about 120, forcibly entered and occupied the Camelot Hotel, located near the PTV-4 station. One of the hotel executives, who was ordered to cut off the hotel's internal communication system, overheard Matillano speaking over the telephone with

Berroya in Pampanga. Some of the officers with Matillano were Assistant Provincial Commander Maj Eduardo Carino, Capt Jessie Arriola, Capt Cesario Valencia, Capt Antonio de la Cruz, Lt Paterno Orduna, Lt Demetrio Soriano Mamaed, 2Lt Ramon Colet Apolinario (PMA '85), and 2Lt Magno Biag.

PTV-4 and ABS-CBN, both located in the same compound on Bohol Avenue, went off the air when the network employees and other civilians caught inside began withdrawing from the area at about 9:20 a.m. The outnumbered military security of the station eventually abandoned their posts due to exhaustion, hunger, and uncertainty of reinforcements by midmorning. The rebels then occupied PTV-4 and the Camelot Hotel simultaneously.

At noon, on direct orders from President Aquino, combined elements of the police under P/BGen Alfredo Lim and the PC Special Action Force from Camp Crame led by Maj Avelino Razon, Jr (PMA '74) attacked the rebels at PTV-4. They were able to regain control of the station an hour and a half after heavy fighting, which resulted in the capture of 12 rebels.

The rest of the rebels under Matillano then withdrew to the Camelot Hotel nearby where they held out until the late evening. A follow-up assault by government forces using two V-150s and 90 mm recoilless rifles, supported by a helicopter gunship, forced the rebels to negotiate their surrender at around 10:00 p.m. However, from mid-afternoon when guests and hotel employees were being allowed to leave, many of the rebels were able to slip out by changing into civilian clothes or uniforms of hotel employees and leaving with the civilians.

On the same day, at 4:30 a.m., another group of rebels led by Maj Benhur Fernandez, 2Lts Marcelino Mendoza (PMA '81), and Andy Gauran (PMA '82) went to IBC-13 at Broadcast City and took over the television station. The station's chief security officer, Rodolfo Demillo, and some 63 soldiers under him put up little resistance. Some of the government troops from the 6 GHQ Bn under Lt Col Arsenio Esguerra, who had been sent to secure the station, even joined the rebel soldiers. These included Lt George Avila (PMA '84), Capts Jose Cruz, and Wilfredo Milagrosa.

At around 9:00 a.m., RAM-HF officer LtSG Robert Lee (PMA '81) went to Broadcast City from the rebel-held Camp Aguinaldo. He was accompanied by TSgt Carlito Dematera and MSgt Buenaventura Clavecilla, both from the PC. Lee's mission was to broadcast over television the rebel's prepared statement, which he was eventually able

to do at 12:00 noon. With other young officers and soldiers in the background, Lee appeared as the rebel spokesman on IBC-13. He denounced the "overindulgence in politics which now pervades in society," and asserted the rebels' supposed role and responsibility to "initiate the struggle for justice, equality and freedom which our senior officers had failed to do." This seemed to unveil the increasingly popular belief, especially among the young officers, that the military, as an important social institution, had the overwhelming prerogative to determine what was good for the country.

After the rebels read their manifesto on the air, IBC-13 as well as RPN-9 were knocked off the air by a power outage arranged by MERALCO. However, some technicians were able to activate their generators and put IBC-13 on the air again for rebel use at about 3:00 p.m. Among the civilians who were later found to have voluntarily and willingly assisted the rebels broadcast their propaganda were Jose and Manuel Jalandoni, Godofredo Lim, Felino Janairo, Domingo Torres, Enrique Ochangco, and Bert Honasan (brother of Lt Col Honasan).

By the evening of 28 August, while the rebels were negotiating their surrender at PTV-4, the bulk of the combined police forces led by Lim went to retake Broadcast City. After a brief firefight, the government forces were able to regain control of the media stations by 11:00 p.m.

G.4. Villamor Air Base

"Red alert" had been declared at the base since 22 August due to the persistent rumors that another coup was going to be launched soon. Evidently, BGen Federico Pasion, VAB Commander and PAF Vice Commander, had issued an order that when the base siren sounded, all military personnel assigned in the different PAF Headquarters (HPAF) units should withdraw their firearms and ammunition, and secure their respective units as well as all gates to HPAF. This seemed like standard procedure, except that Pasion was later suspected of being a rebel sympathizer.

When the siren sounded at 2:30 a.m., 28 August, Pasion together with rebel officers Lt Cols Dante Bernarte and Legaspi, Maj Baula, Jr, and their men occupied the first and second floors of the HPAF. MGen Sotelo was placed under siege in his office on the third floor. The directive of Pasion was for all the gates to be closed and only military personnel belonging to the HPAF would be allowed entry. Rebel troops controlled the lower floors of the HPAF, the 419th Air Force Motor Transport Squadron (AFMTS), Gates 1 and 2, the transient officer's

quarters, and the ramp area where helicopters were parked. Also directly held hostage by the rebels was Sotelo's son, Nickie, whom the rebels forced to telephone his father several times to try to convince him to join the rebel cause, but MGen Sotelo was adamant. Subsequent reports revealed that Tarrazona had also contacted Sotelo at some time during that morning allegedly saying that the rebel force was "composed of 60,000 troops" and that they had to stage the coup because if they did not, "the communists would take over the next year."¹⁴⁵

The takeover of VAB was said to have been planned in four phases: controlling the main gates, neutralizing aircraft parked in the base, demobilizing the motorpool, and occupying the first two floors of HPAF. The seizure of the HPAF was allegedly dependent on the rebels' holding Sotelo as hostage, guarding critical areas through the supposed assistance of Pasion, using the psychological presence of a V-150 armored vehicle (to be procured later by a rebel officer from Fort Bonifacio), and deploying armed troopers and base air police for the security of strategic places.

At 3:00 a.m., rebel Capt Dionisio Balisacan and some 20 men from the 521st Air Police Squadron, of which he was EX-O, were able to enter the 419 AFMTS on the pretext of gassing up. Once inside, they surrounded and disarmed the soldiers there, saying they had been sent by Pasion. At about the same time, Col Alfredo Reyes, went to Gate 1 of VAB which was already rebel-controlled. He tried to convince the men to obey him, claiming he was the newly designated acting wing commander (WC) of the 520 ABW. Just then, Legaspi and Bernarte arrived and asked Reyes to stay "neutral" because by 12:00 noon, they claimed, everything would be over and there would be a new government. Bernarte further added, "*Sa amin ka na, sir. Ginagamit ka lang nila.*" Failing to convince the rebels, Reyes left.

At the 205 HW Wing Operations Center (WOC), the first indication that things were not normal was when they received a call at 4:10 a.m. from A2 asking for additional troops to secure the CG PAF. Thus, a force led by Capt Lauro Catalino de la Cruz (PMA '80) was sent to HPAF.

At around 5:00 a.m., Sotelo, despite being hostaged in his office, ordered the manning of all helicopters in the line. However, this was not possible because the whole parking area was by then controlled by the rebel 521st Air Police Squadron personnel. They had a jeep mounted with a .50 cal machine gun and a recoilless rifle trained on the choppers. It was later agreed between the rebel officers there (Bernarte, Maj Lorenzo Luistro (PMA '74) and Capt Pablo Honrade) and a pro-government officer sent to negotiate, that the 205 HW pilots would not fly

the helicopters on condition that neither would the rebels. Thus, a temporary stand-off was reached.

At 6:00 a.m., an Air Force Rescue Development Center was hurriedly organized, consisting of one officer and 19 enlisted men. It was composed of three striking forces, one of which was led by Maj Dexter Huerto. Huerto's team was tasked to observe the activities of the rebels at Gate 1, VAB, particularly of Bernarte, and if possible, to isolate him from the group. The team observed about 20 rebels manning Gate 1, among them Bernarte, Capt Roberto de la Peña, and MSgt Elmo Glorioso. They also saw two mini-cruisers, one with a mounted machine gun, a buggy, a passenger jeep, and a maroon car parked near the gate. All of this information was reported back to the PAF leadership.

In the meantime, BGen Loven Abadia, 205 HW WC, was able to make it back to the base at about 8:00 a.m. from Mactan, where he had been on official business when the coup broke out. Abadia immediately called for a conference of his officers. At around 9:30 a.m., a firefight erupted at the HPAF building between the rebels and troops loyal to the government. This went on for about an hour. At 1:00 p.m., rebel Maj Allen Querubin (PMA '74) LABde operations officer, took out without authorization a V-150 combat vehicle from Fort Bonifacio into VAB. He ordered the driver of the tank to go to the Air Police HQ, apparently based on previous agreement with VAB rebels. At that very moment, with their actions covered by government forces on the ground, Abadia led a group of pilots to take off in the helicopters guarded by the rebels. Continuous firing went on until the five helicopters were able to take off. They landed in Fort Bonifacio some 15 minutes later.

The getaway of the helicopters accomplished two purposes: the escape from rebel stranglehold of the helicopters and pilots, and as a ruse to allow Gen Sotelo to make a run for it from the HPAF building controlled by the rebels. Shortly after the helicopters landed at Fort Bonifacio, Col Ruben Ciron (PMA '68) accompanied by another person reportedly approached Capt Jorge de Jesus (PMA '79) to try to convince the latter not to send out helicopters against the rebels, seeming to imply that he was on the rebels' side. When de Jesus suggested that he talk with Abadia, Ciron left without a word.¹⁴⁶

With the AOC serving as the temporary command post of Gen Sotelo, PAF air operations in support of government troops in the coup resumed. For example, a helicopter was able to check the reported advance of a convoy of rebel reinforcement troops at the Calamba entrance to the South Expressway.

Back at VAB, rebel forces began withdrawing from Gates 1, 2, and 3 of the base at 5:00 p.m. By 6:30 p.m., the siege had ended and the rebels had left. Residents of VAB reported that they saw rebels board three 10-wheeler Army trucks and head for the South Expressway at around 7:45 p.m. On 29 August, combined forces of the 205 HW and 420 SW pressured the rest of the PAF rebels, mostly from the 520 ABW, into surrendering.

It was subsequently reported that elements of the 49 IB led by Aromin had left their station in Guinyangan, Quezon on 28 August in answer to the call for rebel reinforcements from Legaspi at VAB, and in clear defiance of an earlier order from their superior officer. However, when the troops arrived at VAB at 7:30 p.m., 28 August, the siege had ended and the rebels had withdrawn. Aromin thus ordered his troops back to their station and then went on AWOL himself the next day.

G.5. RECOM 3 - Camp Olivas, Pampanga

The rebel occupation of Camp Olivas was effected by parallel actions on two fronts: an "internal group" that simply declared they were taking over, and an "external group" that invaded the camp.

From as early as 27 August, in the evening, BGen Eduardo Taduran (PMA '58), RECOM 3 Commander, had been receiving continuous reports of unauthorized troop movements in Nueva Ecija (probably Honasan's group). At 10:00 p.m., he called his battle staff to a conference and ordered the implementation of "Oplan Dimatarusan," which called for the setting up of check points and blocking forces, among other things.

Meanwhile, the "external rebel group" was getting ready and their staging point was at Valle Verde Lodge in San Fernando, Pampanga. The rebel officers who assembled at the lodge on the evening of 27 August reportedly included Berroya; Majs Cabauatan, Divina, Nestor Sanares (PMA '73), and Alejandro Lapanid (PMA '73); Capts Teofilo Melliza (PMA '77), Roque Maranon (PMA '77), Pacifico Avenida, Jr (PMA '78), Loreto de la Cruz, Montano Nazario, and Christopher Mesias; Lt Abner Dimabuyo (PMA '82); 2Lt Agripino Javier (PMA '85); and others. While there, the officers and the soldiers they brought along with them were given or asked to invert their flag patches, red side on top over their left breast pocket, as a countersign. Firearms and ammunition were also distributed. The rebels then left for Camp Olivas in separate convoys and apparently at different times.

The PC checkpoint set up along the Gapan-Olongapo road allegedly tried to hold off the convoy of 2Lt Javier's group heading towards Camp Olivas, but later allowed them to pass through when the rebels pointed their guns at them. The convoy consisted of one PC mini-cruiser, one 10-wheeler, six cars, and one V-150 as back-up. When the convoy arrived at the camp, they passed through the gate without resistance. It was even reported that by that time, many military men within the camp were already sporting inverted flag patches, and the flag in front of the administration building had also been inverted.

Even as the battle staff was meeting at Taduran's office at midnight, elements of the RSAF 3 led by Maj Clifordo Noveras (PMA '73) had began to occupy the administration building, specifically surrounding the Regional Commander's office. At 2:00 a.m., Taduran was informed that Camp Olivas was under the control of the rebels led by Berroya, and that at that very moment the rebels were already occupying the offices below. Taduran sent two of his officers to find out what the rebels' intentions were. Later, RECOM officers locked themselves inside Taduran's office. The rebel RSAF 3 elements then fired flares to signal Berroya's group to enter the camp.

As a matter of fact, Javier's group left the Valle Verde Lodge at 2:00 a.m. and arrived at the camp at 4:30 a.m. Upon arrival, Javier ordered his troops to occupy the second floor and rooftop of the administration building. The rebels then forced the signal officer to shut off the communication lines inside the camp. The principal purpose of the rebel takeover of Camp Olivas was supposedly to prevent reinforcement of government troops in Manila emanating from the camp and to declare the regional command in rebel hands, for propaganda purposes.

By around 9:00 a.m., reports from Camp Olivas to Camp Crame said that Berroya had taken over as RECOM 3 Commander, with Maj Divina as his deputy, and Noveras as the camp commander. It was also reported that a helicopter had taken off for an air reconnaissance flight. When it came back, Sanares, Nazario, and its pilot, Mesias, went to report to Berroya.

At 6:00 p.m., another helicopter arrived at the camp. A meeting among the rebels was reportedly held on the ground floor of the administration building. At 9:00 p.m., Taduran was informed that the rebels were going to change their command post to Basa Air Base and would bring him and his key officers with them. Taduran refused to go with them, instead he and his officers decided they would stay put at all costs.

Perhaps due to the failure of the mutiny in Manila, Berroya went to see Taduran at 11:00 p.m. to inform him that they would be clearing out before midnight. Also, perhaps sensing that government troops were closing in on the camp, Berroya and his men quickly slipped out of Camp Olivas so that when the liberating forces arrived at 11:30 p.m., the mutineers were no longer around. By 6:00 a.m., 29 August, it was reported that the situation in RECOM 3 was back to normal. However, subsequent investigations found Taduran and his staff to have failed "to do their utmost" to defend Camp Olivas because at the time they had given up without resistance to the RSAF forces of Noveras, they still outnumbered the rebels who were only 75 at the time. It was only at 4:30 a.m. that the convoy of rebel troops from Valle Verde Lodge arrived. Moreover, it was felt that if the RECOM officers had thought their forces were not enough to resist the rebels, they could have asked for reinforcements from the Zambales or Bataan Constabulary Commands, whose commander had offered his troops earlier.

G.6. RECOM 7 - Cebu

The rebel actions in Cebu were, unlike in any of the other locations, dictated from the top. The Regional Commander himself had openly and directly supported the rebels, thus the widespread effect of his authority became a boon to the rebel cause, especially in terms of propaganda. However, in order not to pre-empt the events in Manila, RECOM 7 Commander BGen Edgardo Abenina (PMA '58) did not immediately announce his defection.

At 3:00 a.m., 28 August, Abenina called up all the major service unit commanders in his area and informed them of the occurrence of a coup in Manila. At 4:30 a.m., he sent a radiogram to all provincial commanders and the Cebu Metropolitan District Command (Metrodiscom) CO, with this apparently deceiving text: "In view of recent developments in Metro Manila, fortify your stations and strengthen your camp defenses. Do not allow any movement of troops and take slant. Obey orders only coming from me, repeat only orders coming from me."

By 8:40 a.m., there were reports about the stand of the RECOM 7 Commander to support the rebels. An hour later, Abenina called up BGen Dominico Casas (PMA '59), WC, 220th Airlift Wing (220 AW) based in Mactan to ask him to join RECOM 7 in support of the rebels, but was turned down by Casas. The latter also denied requests from Abenina to release a C-130 transport plane to pick up rebel troops from Legaspi City and ferry them to VAB, as well as the appeal to close down Mactan Airport. At about the same time, Abenina and all his officers met

with the RECOM 7 soldiers at the HQ parking lot to explain the rebel movement which was allegedly done in the interest of soldiers and policemen, and to ask for their support.

At 10:00 a.m., Abenina came out publicly in support of the rebels. He went on the air over DYLA radio and announced that the entire PC/INP RECOM 7 was backing the rebels. Abenina said, "We have decided to take this stand because we feel that our rights as citizens and policemen have been abridged and trampled by the policies of the present government." He further added, "We shall be in this status until the cause we have been fighting for shall be properly attended to."¹⁴⁷ He ordered the takeover of three government buildings and two residences, the hoisting of the Philippine flag with its red field on top, and the closure of TV and radio stations, except for DYLA which they used for rebel propaganda. Abenina also asked Col Anselmo Avenido, Jr (PMA '67) CO Cebu Metrodiscom, to secure the city and municipal halls in his area, secure the mayors, and request the media stations to stop broadcasting temporarily until further notice. Moreover, he asked Maj Digman Cenon, Assistant Provincial Commander of Cebu, to secure the provincial capitol.

Later, RECOM 7 officers carried out their commander's orders by taking over the PNB offices in Cebu, the Land Bank and its premises, the Central Bank regional office, and the DBP-Cebu branch. Similar defections and takeovers, but in a minor degree, occurred in Toledo City, Siquijor, Cordova, and Naga on the island of Cebu, as well as in Dumaguete under Col Samuel Tomas (PMA '67), and Tagbilaran under Maj Irving Malunda and P/Capt Benjamin Absalon. Closely assisting Abenina in generating support for the rebel cause were, among others, Lt Col Hiram Benatiro, RECOM 7 operations officer; Lt Col Rodolfo Tor (PMA '72), RECOM 7 intelligence officer; Lt Col Neon Ebuena (PMA '71), Region 7 AFPSLAI Manager; Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero (PMA '71); and Lt Cecil Sandalo (PMA '80), RECOM 7 administrative officer.

Despite the constant requests made by Abenina to Casas to join the rebel cause, close down Mactan Airport, and send a C-130 aircraft to fly rebel reinforcements to Manila, the latter allegedly refused each time, but apparently did not actively attempt to engage Abenina's troops. Records show that on several occasions a week before the coup, Abenina had made similar appeals for planes to ferry him and his men to Manila, but had been refused.¹⁴⁸ BGen Romulo Querubin, then RUC 7 Commander, also apparently did not actively check Abenina's unlawful activities nor arrested him, allegedly because the "flow of information was delayed" and the latter "had not taken any hostile action against the

military."¹⁴⁹ Querubin, along with his officers, Cols Apolinario Castano (PMA '58) and Miguel Abaya (PMA '59), were subsequently found to have been indecisive in their actions towards Abenina and the mutiny, and thus reprimanded under Articles of War 105. On 29 August, Abenina was relieved as RECOM 7 Commander and placed under technical arrest. Col Mariano Baccay, Jr (PMA '59), his deputy, took over as acting Regional Commander. Casas was likewise relieved from his post.

G.7. Legaspi City Airport

On 28 August, at 4:00 a.m., elements of the Albay PC/INP Command consisting of six PC officers, one INP officer and some 135 military personnel took control of the Legaspi City Airport for about 27 hours. The officers involved were Capt Leovic Dioneda (PMA '78) CO 255 PC Coy stationed in Tiwi; Capt Reynaldo Rafal (PMA '79) CO 254 PC Coy based in Ligao; Lt Renato Hernandez, OIC 251 PC Coy based in Camp Bagong Ibalon; Lt Diosdado Valeroso, Intelligence and Operations; 2Lt Eliseo Rasco (PMA '86) Junior Officer Coy RSAF Bn; 2Lt Allan Cuevillas (PMA '87) Squad leader of V-150; and P/Lt Lito Pitallano, Malilipot INP Station Commander. The group, using the rebel countersign of inverted flagpatches, arrived in two 6 x 6 trucks, two mini-cruisers, a Toyota staff car, and a V-150 commando vehicle. They hoisted three Philippine flags, with the red on top, at the airport and posted men at the arrival and departure areas, runway and control tower. They claimed that on orders of Batac, Albay Provincial Commander, they would be picked up by a C-130 aircraft to ferry them to Manila. We now know that the plane never arrived, because it was never released in Cebu.

Before he left for Manila on 26 August, Batac had requested in writing the RECOM 5 Commander for two 6 x 6 trucks and a V-150 commando vehicle to be available at 10:00 p.m., 27 August, supposedly for the use of Albay PC/INP command operations. The request was granted with SSgt Rodelito Katigbak, SSgt Alberto Ribay, and 2Lt Cuevillas as drivers for the two trucks, and squad leader of the V-150, respectively. Cuevillas later voluntarily joined the rebel forces when they took over Legaspi Airport.

At about 6:30 a.m., Lt Col Melecio Asis, Jr and Capt Jose Arne de los Santos (PMA '79) went to the airport to verify the report they had received about armed men roaming around the airport premises. While there, they spoke with Dioneda, Rafal, and Valeroso who claimed their only purpose in positioning themselves there was to "insure airport security" while they waited for the plane to transport them to Manila. They added that they would only take orders from their provincial

commander, Batac, who had left for Manila on 26 August supposedly on orders of the Secretary of National Defense (SND). The rebels were insistent that they would remain there until their aircraft came but that they would not commit any violent acts against other military units of the RECOM or against any civilians.

Earlier, Valeroso, acting as spokesman of the group, contacted local radio stations by phone and announced that they were supporting the so-called "idealist" soldiers who had launched in Metro Manila and other parts of the country what he termed as "the continuation of the EDSA Revolution".

Meanwhile, BGen Luis San Andres (PMA '57) RECOM 5 Commander, assembled his staff to analyze the situation and take appropriate actions. The provincial commanders of Camarines Norte and Sur were contacted to set up checkpoints and roadblocks to prevent any rebel reinforcements passing through their areas. Then several people were called to try and convince the rebel group at the airport to give up their plan, among them, Bishop Concordio Sarte of Legaspi City, Col Diony Ventura (PMA '67), Lt Col Orbase, and P/Lt Fuentes. Relatives and families of the rebel soldiers were also contacted to convince their relatives-soldiers to forego their plans. Philippine Airlines (PAL) in Legaspi was advised to cancel all afternoon flights in order to deny the rebels any access to the planes. Moreover, the Albay Electrical Cooperative was told to cut off power at the airport to prevent any landings at night time.

For their part, the rebels held a press conference at the airport cargo check-in area at 5:30 p.m., presided by Dioneda, Rafal, and Valeroso. They had spent the whole day in giving interviews, and press releases and undertaking other propaganda efforts. The rebel leaders aired their alleged grievances, including their perception of government mishandling of the insurgency problem and the deplorable economic conditions of the rebels. After the press conference, RECOM 5 emissaries relayed to the rebels the assurance of San Andres that no offensive actions would be taken against them during the night. Furthermore, according to de Villa who had called San Andres earlier, the rebels would not be subjected to investigations in connection with the coup, if they returned peacefully to their stations. At 8:00 p.m., Dioneda sent word to San Andres that he and his men would pull out from the airport at 7:00 a.m. the next day.

On 29 August, at 7:00 in the morning, Dioneda and his men cleared out of the Legaspi City airport as promised, with no violent incident happening. Regular flights continued after the rebels vacated the area.

G.8. Minor Incidents

Three minor incidents merit inclusion here as they reveal what could be classified as rebel strongholds in the military: 16 IB, Fort Magsaysay, and PMA in Baguio.

G.8.a. 16th Infantry Battalion

In the early morning of 28 August, even before news of the rebel attack on Malacañang spread, Maj Eufemio Santos and Lt Caraig, Jr instructed their men in the 16 IB based in Tigaon, Camarines Sur to prepare for a military operation. The men were issued firearms and ammunition. At 8:00 a.m., Santos and some 150 battalion soldiers boarded three 6 x 6 trucks, two mini-cruisers and one Philtrancobus, and headed for Manila, escorted by a V-150 armored vehicle and three crewmen of the 4 PALAB. Maj Morris Perez CO 16 IB, who had that morning arrived at Legaspi City from Manila, caught up with the convoy in Labo, Camarines Norte, and from there, took charge of the troops.

Their mission appeared to be to join the rebel forces in Manila. However, when they reached Lopez, Quezon province at noon, they were blocked by Col Conrado Infortuno (PMA '58), a battalion commander from the 202 Bde. They were then instructed by BGen Alejandro Galido (PMA '58), CG 2 ID, via radio to proceed to Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal, in an attempt to neutralize them. When the battalion reached Atimonan, Quezon at 8:00 p.m., Perez decided to bring the men back to their headquarters in order to avoid a possible violent confrontation with SOLCOM elements manning checkpoints along their route. Upon their arrival at Tigaon on 29 August, 7:30 a.m., Perez, Santos, and Caraig proceeded to the 102 Bde HQ in Pili, Camarines Sur and reported to BGen Abraham Manuel (PMA '57), Brigade Commander. The next day, they went to Camp Capinpin and reported to Galido, who placed them under technical arrest. The 16 IB enlisted personnel were later redistributed to different line units by the SOLCOM in its counter-insurgency operations. Only 15 from the battalion were subjected to an investigation in connection with the 28 August 1987 coup attempt. It must be remembered that the 16 IB was also the unit supposedly implicated in the original RAM plot to overthrow Marcos in February 1986. It was then commanded by Malajacan.

G.8.b. Fort Magsaysay

Maj Horacio Lactao (PMA '74), CO 3 LAB, had already been suspected as sympathizing, if not supporting the group of Honasan. On 27 August,

at 10:30 p.m., Army headquarters called Col Antonio Yamzon CO PA TRACOM in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, and told him to keep an eye on Lactao as he was apparently "being pressured" to join the coup plotters.¹⁵⁰ After the call, Yamzon went to Lactao's office and "invited" the latter to stay with him at his (Yamzon's) office, with the intention of preventing him from going to Manila to join the rebels. Lactao went with Yamzon. After breakfast on 28 August, however, Lactao asked permission to return to his HQ and by 5:00 p.m., the troops of Lactao were ready to leave. Consisting of two Scorpion tanks, two armored infantry fighting vehicles, two V-150s, and some APCs, the force of Lactao supposedly overpowered that of the PA TRACOM, thus, Yamzon claimed he had no choice but to let them go. Aside from the combat vehicles, Lactao's men also availed of one 6 x 6 truck, two Pepsi-Cola delivery trucks, and a number of military and civilian vehicles.

On their way to Manila, perhaps discovering that the rebels had already lost in the capital and that there would be no troops to reinforce, the 3 LAB under Lactao decided to return to Fort Magsaysay at 9:00 p.m. They arrived there at 11:30 a.m., 29 August, after which Lactao reported to Yamzon.

G.8.c. PMA - Baguio

The move by PMA cadets to support the coup effort in Manila came too late. However, it would be difficult to deny the propaganda leverage the rebels gained from the public declaration of support by the whole cadet corps. On 28 August, at noon, two broadcasters from Radio Bombo in Baguio attended a gathering of some 30 officers at PMA. They interviewed Lt Fernando Baltazar (PMA '81), who claimed to be the spokesman of the group, and Capt Gregorio Catapang. When asked about the events in Manila, Baltazar replied that speaking for the junior officers at PMA, they were supporting the cause of Honasan's group, and renouncing allegiance to the government of President Aquino. Furthermore, if asked, he added, he would personally go down to Manila to support Honasan. At the mess hall, then Cdt (1C) Allen Paredes (PMA '88) read a prepared statement saying, "In behalf of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines, we hereby affirm our stand by the principle of anti-communism which the forces of Col Honasan are fighting for."¹⁵¹ By 1:00 p.m., the interviews and statements of the cadets had been aired on Radio Bombo of Baguio, creating quite a stir among the public.

At 4:00 p.m., a group of four cadets went to the radio station DZWT of St Louis University in downtown Baguio and submitted a longer

statement supposedly expressing the sentiments of the cadet corps. They said in consideration of the events of the past 24 hours, PMA Classes of 1988 to 1991 were reaffirming their support for the rebel cause. Moreover, they believed that politicians should observe a "hands-off" policy in purely military affairs; that persons in authority must exercise justice and good sense in dealing with the rebel soldiers, avoiding drastic solutions; and that there should be a dialogue between the government and rebel representatives with full media coverage.

An hour later, three other cadets accompanied by Maj Wilhelm Doromal, a PMA tactical officer, went to Radio Bombo in Baguio to submit still another manifesto of support. It said that to protect the inherent right of the people as mandated by the Constitution, they supported the movement seeking the establishment of a better government, and that in order to move the country from imminent collapse, the cadet corps was pledging its support to the reformist cause. The manifesto was taped and aired over the radio.¹⁵²

By midnight, the cadets were getting ready for unauthorized deployment. They received a briefing from Capt Alfredo Bambico, Jr (PMA '78), PMA Tactics Group, on the camp defense plan and the moving out of cadets from Fort del Pilar to the different roads of entry to Baguio City, particularly Kennon Road, Naguillan Road, and Marcos Highway. Evidently, the intention was to serve as blocking forces against "unfriendly" forces that would enter Baguio, although it was not clear why they wanted to isolate Baguio, unless the rebels were thinking of making a last stand there. Among the other officers present at the briefing were Kapunan, then a PMA instructor, and Nelson Eslao, both former PMA classmates of Honasan. It will be recalled that Eslao was the RAM contact for the *Kamalayan* election campaign drive at PMA in February 1986, when he served as Assistant Commandant of Cadets.¹⁵³

On 29 August, at 2:00 a.m., the PMA cadets boarded two 6 x 6 trucks and one bus procured by Kapunan. They began moving out with Catapang in a jeep that was to lead the convoy. However, they were stopped at the PMA checkpoint. Catapang got down to talk to someone at the gate, then came back shortly after to say the whole thing was off. The coup they were supporting in Manila had failed.

The following day, two cadets delivered a copy of their letter of support for the rebels to the Baguio Midland Courier, which published it. Still restive, some cadets were reported to be arming themselves and planning to go around Baguio. This was thwarted when Col Lisandro Abadia (PMA '62) Commandant of Cadets, confronted them in their

barracks. Their planned strike in support of the rebels was aborted when PMA officials initiated a series of dialogues to thresh out the cadets' grievances.

G.9. The Aftermath

The 28 August coup attempt lasted for about a day and a half. In the end, there were some 53 people dead and more than 200 wounded, many of them civilian bystanders who were sprayed with bullets as they chided the rebels and cheered for the government troops in the area of Malacañang.¹⁵⁴ This was the first time coup participants had ever fired directly at unarmed civilians, an act that has done irreparable damage to the rebels' reputation and credibility. The failed coup was participated in by around 2,160 military personnel, with damage to properties surpassing millions of pesos. The Camelot Hotel alone suffered over ₱1 million in property losses, while the burned GHQ building was estimated to be worth over ₱41 million.¹⁵⁵ Then, there were the television stations whose sophisticated equipment, costing millions of pesos, were destroyed in varying degrees.

As an immediate reaction to the coup, the militant Coalition Against Oil Price Increase (COAPI) cancelled their protest against increased gasoline rates and the crack-down on participants of the *Welgang Bayan*. The demonstration had been scheduled for 31 August. Other reactions to the coup included panic-buying and hoarding of food supplies, withdrawals of money from the banks, power outages in some areas near Camp Aguinaldo because MERALCO facilities had been damaged by heavy fighting, people flocking to buy gasoline, among others. In general, it was bad for business because of the uncertainty it created, and also bad for the tourist industry, where again hotels suffered huge losses in cancellations of bookings not only for individuals but for conferences and conventions that were going to be held in the country.

In Congress, bills were rushed to grant pay increases to soldiers. Across-the-board salary increases for the whole AFP were unprecedentedly granted (106 percent for a Master Sergeant, to 36 percent for a General). Furthermore, there was a joint Senate and House investigation on the coup attempt supposedly to determine whether anti-government politicians, including deposed President Marcos and rightist elements in the US government, were behind the mutiny. Opposition Senator Enrile strongly denied any involvement in the coup. He said he deliberately made himself unavailable to the press because he had no knowledge of it and could not answer any questions about it. In an interview over DZRH, Senator Enrile was ambivalent at one point,

refusing to make any statement of "condemnation or absolution". Then, he said he did not make any statements because "he did not want to get involved," and that because those men once served under him (referring to Honasan, et al), the least he could do was to keep quiet. Later in the interview, however, he capitulated by saying the mutineers should "rethink their positions."¹⁵⁶

Many political watchers believe that the 28 August coup attempt pulled the Aquino administration towards the right in the ideological spectrum. They cite, as an example, her having sacked Joker Arroyo as Executive Secretary in reaction to the rebels' demand to rid the Cabinet of supposedly left-leaning members. Another example was President Aquino's tacit approval of armed quasi-military groups by renaming the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) as Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU). Others believe Gen Ramos emerged as the second most powerful person in government as a result of the attempt. There are some, however, who think the coup revealed some discontent within the Armed Forces against the leadership of the Chief of Staff (e.g., one of Honasan's demands was the resignation of Ramos).¹⁵⁷

It was said that the police emerged with a new role after 28 August. They were given the task of retaking the media stations and they succeeded. Some observed that the reason for their effectiveness was that they were not bound by the fraternal ties that allegedly inhibit soldiers from fighting soldiers, and therefore, they had less hesitation to shoot at the rebels.¹⁵⁸

The simultaneous lightning attacks by rebels on key target areas during the 28 August coup constituted a marked improvement in strategy compared to the earlier coup attempts. However, these were not supported by sufficient forces to execute a successful seizure (as what happened in Malacañang), or to sustain control over the occupied area. Time was an important factor for both sides. If the rebels had held on to those installations long enough to produce a stalemate, then it could perhaps have induced the shift of allegiance by some regional and provincial commands who may have been wavering to their side. On the government's side, it had to act quickly and attack early (as it did in Camp Aguinaldo and the television stations), before any of the rebel reinforcements arrived. As in all the past attempts, however, the rebels did not receive any widespread popular backing despite their having chosen the timing of the coup to coincide with massive discontentment against the government. Surely, the best gauge for the success or failure of a coup is whether the people would support the alternative that the coup plotters offer.

H. Concluding Observations on Military Interventions, 1986 - 1987

The political events in the last four years have shown that the Philippines has firmly been introduced to the phenomenon of military intervention in politics. When analyzed collectively, the series of coup attempts, starting from the February 1986 plot to the August 1987 one, present a pattern of interwoven factors that put forward the idea of a continuing effort by a group of determined military officers, backed by their civilian supporters, to overthrow the administration of President Aquino and install a military junta. Although there are some variations to this pattern, the underlying image remains the same, that is, there were two main groups of people behind all the destabilizing activities which culminated in the seven coup attempts discussed in this chapter. The groups are the RAM, or more accurately after February 1986, a faction of the RAM under Honasan, and the so-called Marcos loyalists led by Zumel. Ironically, they were the opposing protagonists in the February 1986 coup attempt who were both left out after EDSA.

Following this line of argument, the coup attempts may thus be classified into those led by the RAM-HF, those by loyalists, and those that reveal a possible connection between the two. This is despite the fact that Honasan had scoffed at the idea of an alliance with the Marcos followers, saying that the younger officers of the RAM who were uncompromising idealists would never tolerate working with soldiers and civilians tainted by association with the dictator's excesses.¹⁶⁰ The February 1986 plot was definitely a brainchild and product of the RAM. The July 1986 Manila Hotel Incident, on the other hand, was a loyalist attempt, but may have been known to some RAM officers. The latter may have bailed out a few of the loyalist plotters, possibly to earn their goodwill for some future collaboration. The November 1986 "God Save The Queen" plan was principally a RAM-HF plot but could have been another attempt at some sort of collaboration between the two groups. But because the coup was never launched, the extent of collusion is not clear. The January 1987 plot reveals another loyalist effort, even if again Honasan seemed to have stepped in to intervene during the negotiations for the surrender of the rebels at GMA-7. The April 1987 destabilizing activity should not really be considered a coup, but rather a loyalist-instigated jailbreak and short-lived blitz possibly intended for propaganda purposes. On the other hand, the July 1987 attempt appears to have consisted of separate plots by the two groups, though due to the lack of official information available on the events, it is difficult to pinpoint responsibility. The July effort may have been the premature version of the August plot, which was principally led and executed by RAM-HF, but

with the apparent support of some loyalists. The Commission has received testimony that in the Manila Hotel and GMA-7 incidents, the RAM-HF planned to step in if the Marcos loyalists were able to produce a critical mass of at least 500,000 people.¹⁶⁰ Whether there was an explicit "understanding" between the two groups is not established. It is clear, however, that the so-called tactical alliance between the Zumel and Honasan groups in December 1989 had its antecedents and should not have been a surprise to anyone who had done an analysis of the linkages between them in previous coups.

Seen as a whole, the seven cases that were discussed here reveal certain common features, as well as some innovations unique to particular attempts at political intervention by a section of the Armed Forces. Among the common characteristics, we find that each attempt was launched during a period of crisis, when the government was perceived to be at its weakest and when people were generally at their most vulnerable. Observing the political and economic conditions during each coup attempt, thus, gives an idea of the different settings that were deemed by the plotters as propitious for military intervention. These triggering events may be classified into two types: (a) genuine events that were brought about by socio-political and historical developments, such as labor and peasant unrest, widespread poverty and economic hardships, massive discontent resulting from years of authoritarian rule; and (b) simulated events that could be created or provoked in order to effect the tense and unstable atmosphere necessary for a coup. A good example of the second type is political assassination, which the brutal killing of Rolando Olalia could have been.

It is possible that if a crisis does not exist, coup plotters could find a way to bring it about. With the effective use of media, they can exploit civilian and military complaints against the government to build a favorable political climate for a coup d'etat. There are always popular issues against the administration that can be cultivated. Moreover, they can and have taken advantage of the President's physical absence from the capital. It is after all in critical periods that the government's ability to respond quickly and decisively is put to the test. On this depends its political survival.

Looking at the pre-coup environments of the seven cases, we find similar circumstances that support the idea of coup attempts being launched under a particular political climate. The triggering events of the past coups have included periods of division among the people, such as during elections and plebiscites; nationwide protests like the *Walong Bayan*; massive student demonstrations; constant labor strikes;

extensive consumer disaffection with rising prices of commodities; strong public reactions against increases in oil prices or transportation fares; regular bombings and other terroristic activities; highly publicized cases of graft and corruption in government; widespread criminal lawlessness; and others. It is under such a climate that the government's attention is necessarily divided, while the public is generally unorganized and confused. There is another reason for creating an environment where the citizens are afraid, insecure or disgusted with the authorities, and that is, people would then tend to be more susceptible to the idea of drastic military action, such as the imposition of martial law or the establishment of a military junta.

Another common denominator among the seven cases was the target areas attacked by the coup plotters. In all the coup attempts, the focus of hostilities and confrontation was Metro Manila because it is the seat of the national government which the rebels are trying to overthrow. The inclusion as targets of the regions around the capital, such as Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, and Bicol, seemed to have the dual purpose of providing easy access for rebel reinforcements to Manila from key units where the RAM-HF had built support, or allowing the rebels to intercept military reinforcements thereby crippling the government's capacity to respond to the emergency in Manila. During the August 1987 attempt, the rebels also attacked and/or occupied civilian and military targets outside of Luzon (i.e., Cebu, and to a lesser extent, Bohol and Negros Oriental). This could be, on one hand, simply because of rebel supporters coming from those areas or, on the other hand, it could be indicative of the coup plotters' endeavor to widen their sphere of influence and give the impression of their movement being national in scope.

The specific target areas within Metro Manila hardly varied with each coup attempt. The rebels invariably attacked or planned to seize Malacañang to capture the President; the military camps, for logistics and communications; the media stations, to gain public support; and Villamor Air Base or the airports, with the intention of controlling air power and facilitating the rapid airlift of rebel reinforcements from the provinces to Manila. The takeover of the Manila Hotel in 1986 and Camelot Hotel in 1987 could be considered as exceptions to the rule.

The grievances and demands expressed by the coup plotters were basically similar in all the attempts. There were complaints internal to the military, such as inadequate pay and benefits; insufficient logistical services and supplies to soldiers in the field; favoritism in promotions and assignments; and discriminatory treatment, in the case of Marcos loyalists. Curiously enough, many of these were the same ones raised by

the RAM against Marcos in 1985. The complaints directed against the government, on the other hand, included the consistent issue of graft and corruption and the perceived "soft-approach" of the President in her counter-insurgency policy, which the rebels implied was connected with the presence of so-called "left-leaning" officials in her Cabinet and their alleged anti-military biases.

While the grievances openly declared by the rebels may be valid, and the idealistic aspirations for good government of some younger rebel officers may be genuine, it is nevertheless important to delve into the possible unstated intentions of the key coup plotters. Most of the leaders of the loyalist attempts were senior military officers who had served under the Marcos regime. In the Manila Hotel incident, they were directly supported by former officials of the past administration. While Marcos was alive, they seemed to have a binding commitment to work for his return. However, with his death, this unifying factor has been removed and the loyalist cause appears to have gradually lost vigor. The identified loyalist leaders who have gone underground have little choice but to give up, or to support other destabilizing activities in the hope of succeeding and regaining power, even if it is shared with the RAM-HF.

On the other hand, a closer look at the principal coup plotters of the other attempts would lead us to the RAM. Although the RAM was originally organized to work for reforms within the military, its existence was related to the political survival and physical safety of then Defense Minister Enrile, by his own account.¹⁶¹ Thus, it becomes unavoidable for his name to be linked with any activities that former RAM officers, led by Honasan, undertake. Though some new personalities have surfaced as coup participants in the investigations of succeeding coups, the same names associated with the February 1986 events keep reappearing. Then, as in the succeeding RAM-HF attempts, their ultimate goal seemed to be the overthrow of the government and the creation of a military junta, presumably composed of people of their choice. This appears evident in the February and November 1986 attempts, as well as in the August 1987 coup plot. In all the seven cases taken up here, no clear post-coup political and economic program has ever been presented to the public; instead, it appears that this would depend on who sat in the junta.

According to Secretary Ramos, the first direct involvement of the troops of the Scout Rangers was during the 28 August 1987 attempt. However, according to retired BGen Almonte, a key RAM officer in the early years of the organization, Honasan had recruited battalion commanders from the FSRR, mostly majors then, for the February 1986

coup plot.¹⁶² This is not surprising as Scout Rangers, like the Marines, are considered among the best trained and disciplined members of the AFP. They are mobile units of the Armed Forces, continuously operating as a team and assigned from one place to another to influence any given military situation. Moreover, and more importantly perhaps, the Scout Rangers are given such rigorous, specialized training that they later develop strong camaraderie and loyalty towards each other — valuable traits in a coup attempt. The FSRR no longer exists today. Its members were absorbed by other units of the AFP after their extensive participation in the December 1989 coup.

Another source of recruitment in the past coup attempts was from the Guardians organization, a military fraternity composed mostly of enlisted personnel said to extend to about 70 percent of the AFP.¹⁶³ There are actually two related groups existing: the Guardians Brotherhood, Inc (GBI), which has its roots in the Diablo Squad, allegedly formed in the early 1980s; and the Guardians Centre Foundation, Inc (GCFI), founded in 1986 with Honasan as the lead signatory in its Articles of Incorporation. There was said to be considerable Guardians participation in all the past coup attempts, particularly in the February and July 1986 coups, as well as in the January and April 1987 ones. It was reported that the GBI officially disowned any connection with Honasan after the August 1987 attempt.¹⁶⁴

The bond that unites the coup participants thus appears to be primarily based on personal loyalties, friendships, and other personal ties, rather than on shared political beliefs, principles, and a vision of the future. It is true that for many coup participants, the rallying call seemed to be anti-communism but the network of RAM-HF recruitment still frequently relied on personal relations.

The general reactions of the government to the past coup attempts have included a revamp of the Cabinet, including the ouster of some of its liberal members due to the rebels' demands; the announcement of reform measures; and the conduct of an investigation on the coup attempt (e.g., Bengzon Committee, Cabinet Crisis Committee, Vice President Laurel's informal survey of military camps). An immediate response has been the increase in budget for the military (e.g., after the 1987 coup attempts, the Senate restored ₱373 million out of the ₱500 million proposed cut in the DND's ₱23 billion budget). There were also measures taken to promote the soldiers' welfare by expediting action aimed at increasing their material benefits.

The military, for its part, has also conducted investigations on the coups but there appears to be uneven inquiry and reporting into the seven cases. Official military reports were only available on the January, April, and August 1987 attempts. The executive department also seemed to have been left out in the military's pre-coup reporting, as evidenced by Malacañang's lack of information and preparation in several of the past attempts. The public, on the other hand, has reacted to the coups by giving unprecedented attention and interest in military affairs. Academic studies and public fora dealing with the topic have also increased. Even religious groups have now focused on the Armed Forces as subject of prayer rallies and pastoral letters. Moreover, there has been heightened media coverage on the military since the advent of the *kudeta*. The importance of mass media, especially radio, in informing people of what was happening during the coups cannot be overemphasized. However, it has also been in this environment that the release of misinformation and disinformation about the coups has occurred. For instance, much speculation and even inaccurate information coming from foreign media were repeated in the Philippines through the wire services during some of the past attempts.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, plotters have admittedly also manipulated the media with half truths and false "leakages" for their own purposes.¹⁶⁶

In retrospect, the coup plotters employed certain strategies that manifest careful planning and perseverance in their implementation. In recruitment, for example, the rebels generally harnessed the active participation of strategically situated, middle-level troop commanders. For the August 1987 coup, it is said that their major effort was directed at field commanders who controlled significant units in the AFP, like battalion commanders of the Army, provincial commanders of the PC, some squadron commanders of the PAF, and maybe some unit commanders of the Navy. The officers who command infantry or tank battalions stationed in or near Manila, as well as those who have control over helicopter gunships and other aircraft within striking distance of the seat of power, are crucial for a coup's success. It was easy for the RAM-HF to recruit because most of the commanders were of their age group and from the PMA, either former classmates or contemporaries at the PMA of the Honasan group. This was in contrast to the February 1986 plot where, outside of the RAM members, recruitment went up vertically to the major unit commanders with the rank of brigadier general. In 1987, the RAM-HF worked on the "horizontal cut" at battalion level and below, as MGen Montano pointed out.¹⁶⁷ The plotters undermined the chain of command by likewise getting the loyalty of company commanders. They talked to captains and lieutenants who actually handle the troops.

Former CSAFP and now DND Secretary Ramos disclosed that rebel recruitment for the August 1987 coup was done among junior officers, sometimes even involving key non-commissioned officers, under the guise of school reunions, training sessions, dialogues, and ordinary get-togethers.¹⁶⁸ For the August attempt, it was observed that Honasan, then head of the Special Operations School (SOS) of the Army's Training Command in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, trained various classes of Scout Rangers but did not graduate them. About five or six classes were accumulated at one period, and instead of being graduated normally one class after the other, they were extended at the school and later mobilized for the coup.¹⁶⁹

To begin with, the reassignments of Honasan at the SOS and Kapunan at the PMA after the November 1986 coup attempt appear to have been used to maximum advantage by the coup plotters. These are precisely the places where they could considerably influence the younger soldiers and recruit them for coup or terrorist activities. Between a group that had a single-minded purpose of taking power, regardless of means, and the Ramos/de Villa group which was sincerely working for genuine reconciliation, the former had a clear edge in planning and conspiring. There are lessons to be learned from these past coups for purposes of handling the aftermath of the December 1989 coup. These will be discussed in Chapter VII.

ENDNOTES

- (1) Retired Col Guillermo G. Cunanan, who was then assigned to the MND, places the date of RAM's founding as 1982, see "Open Letter to Gringo," *Philippine Star*, 7 September 1987, pp. 1 and 10. Journalist and author Cecilio T. Arillo gives a more exact date of 23 July 1982 in Breakaway: The Inside Story of the Four-Day Revolution in the Philippines, February 22-25, 1986 (Manila: CTA and Associates, May 1986), p. 166. On the other hand, retired BGen Jose Almonte, Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and RAM member, says the idea for RAM was crystallized in 1985, although discussions had been going on long before that [from his Sworn Testimony before the Fact-Finding Commission (FFC), 4 January 1990]. American writer and Political Science Professor Alfred W. McCoy mentions two conflicting dates of "late 1984" and "early 1985" as RAM's founding dates in two separate articles in "RAM Boys Series," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, February 1990, p. 3 and p. 4.
- (2) McCoy, *ibid.*, p. 4.
- (3) Arillo, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.
- (4) McCoy, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
- (5) Arillo, *op. cit.*, pp. 138 and 141.
- (6) Cunanan, *op. cit.*, pp. 1 and 10.
- (7) Arillo, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
- (8) Sworn Testimony of Col Hector Tarrazona before the FFC, 21 August 1990.
- (9) Col Hector M. Tarrazona, After EDSA... (Volume I) (Manila: By the Author, February 1989), pp. 25-26.
- (10) Tarrazona Testimony, *op. cit.*
- (11) McCoy, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
- (12) Tarrazona, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-15 and 21.

- (13) Tarrazona was promoted to the rank of colonel by President Aquino. It appears, however, that by virtue of a recommendation of a panel that he be severely punished under Article 105 of the Articles of War for his alleged involvement in the 28 August 1987 coup attempt, for which in time he was reprimanded, the CSAFP recommended to the President that his name be stricken off the list of officers for promotion submitted to Congress for confirmation. This recommendation was favorably acted upon by the President. Tarrazona, nevertheless, continues to wear the insignia of a colonel because he filed a motion for reconsideration which, according to him, is still pending.
- (14) Tarrazona, op. cit., p. 22.
- (15) McCoy, op. cit., p. 10. However, in his book, Raymond Bonner mentioned that by October 1985, coup plans were well advanced. See Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York: Times Books, 1987), p. 434.
- (16) Tarrazona, op. cit., p. 26.
- (17) Ibid., pp. 26-31.
- (18) From an interview of Navy Capt Rex Robles aired over DZRH on the mutiny's third anniversary. See "RAM Officer Talks on February 1986 Mutiny," Daily Globe, 23 February 1989, pp. 1 and 8.
- (19) Tarrazona, op. cit., p. 32.
- (20) Ibid., p. 33.
- (21) Ibid., pp. 37 and 38.
- (22) Sylvia Mayuga in Monina Allarey Mercado, ed., People Power: The Philippine Revolution of 1986. An Eyewitness Story, (Manila: James B. Reuter, S. J., Foundation, 1986), p. 77.
- (23) Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, "There's Still So Much to Know About EDSA," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 February 1990, pp. 1 and 8.
- (24) Bonner, op. cit., p. 434. Bonner cites his interviews with American

- intelligence and diplomatic officers as his source for the information on the proposed junta.
- (25) Sworn Testimony of BGen Jose Almonte (Ret) before the FFC, 4 January 1990.
 - (26) McCoy, op. cit., pp. 10 and 11. Also see Cunanan, op. cit., pp. 1 and 10.
 - (27) Arillo, op. cit., p. 11. See also Ros Manlangit, "RAM Planned to Put Marcos Couple on Public Trial in '86," Daily Globe, 25 February 1989, p. 1, for interview with retired BGen Jose Almonte and other RAM members.
 - (28) Arillo, ibid., p. 37.
 - (29) McCoy, op. cit. However, McCoy claims on p. 11 that the rebels counted on only 300 troops at the start of the revolt. Capt Robles, on the other hand, said the mutineers initially numbered only 185; "RAM Officer Talks on February 1986 Mutiny," op. cit., p. 8.
 - (30) Manlangit, op. cit., pp. 1 and 12.
 - (31) "RAM Officer Talks on February 1986 Mutiny," op. cit., p. 1 and 8. Also see Arillo, op. cit., p. 20.
 - (32) Arillo, ibid., p. 149. After Cory Aquino took over the presidency, Gador briefly took charge of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) upon Enrile's recommendation but was replaced by Col Voltaire Gazmin, a personal choice of Aquino. The PSC changed its name to Presidential Security Group (PSG) on 1 March 1986.
 - (33) Manlangit, op. cit., pp. 1 and 12. See also Tarrazona, op. cit., p. 46.
 - (34) Nick Joaquin [Quijano de Manila], The Quartet of the Tiger Moon: Scenes from the People-Power Apocalypse (Manila: Book Stop, Inc., 1986).
 - (35) Ibid.
 - (36) McCoy, op. cit., p. 11.

- (37) Ibid.
- (38) Ibid.
- (39) "RAM Officer Talks on February 1986 Mutiny," op. cit., pp. 1 and 12.
- (40) McCoy, op. cit., p. 11.
- (41) Arillo, op. cit., pp. 170 and 172.
- (42) Tarrazona, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
- (43) Arillo, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
- (44) Tarrazona, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
- (45) Arillo, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
- (46) Ibid., p. 51.
- (47) Sworn Testimony of BGen Jose M. Crisol (Ret) before the FFC, 24 August 1990.
- (48) "Tolentino Courts Sedition Charges," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7 July 1986, p. 6.
- (49) Luis D. Beltran, "Alcuaz and Loyalist Radio Stations," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, p. 4.
- (50) Paper presented by Professor Alfred W. McCoy before Philippine-American Community in Los Angeles, California in February 1990. Cited in Antonio C. Abaya, "Twixt the RAM and the NDF," Manila Chronicle, 23 May 1990, p. 4.
- (51) Beltran, op. cit., p. 4.
- (52) "The Philippine Experience," Final Report of the Department of National Defense Special Investigating Committee to President Aquino, 22 March 1990, p. 1.
- (53) Rey Arquiza, "Allegiance? No Way—Recto," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 July 1986, p. 6.

- (54) Victor Agustin, "Cabinet to Decide on Loyalist Plot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 July 1986, pp. 1 and 2. See also Belinda Olivares Cunanan, "Questions on the Loyalists' Caper," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 July 1986, p. 5.
- (55) Belinda Olivares Cunanan, "A Quiet Sunday at the Historic Manila Hotel," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, p. 5.
- (56) Victor Agustin, "3 p.m. Today or Else," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, p. 11.
- (57) "The President's Statement," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, p. 1.
- (58) "Tolentino: I Was Pressured," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, p. 2.
- (59) Belinda Olivares Cunanan, "Now That the 'Other Party' Is Over . . .," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 July 1986, p. 5.
- (60) "No Charges, Retaliation — Enrile," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 July 1986, p. 1.
- (61) "Enrile: No Charges, If . . .," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, p. 2. In a separate article, Hilarion Henares makes the connection between Honasan, who was listed as signatory in the Articles of Incorporation of the Guardians Center Foundation, Inc, and some of the troops that occupied Manila Hotel, who were reportedly Guardian members. Henares further notes that the negotiating panel sent by Minister Enrile to deal with the rebels were: Honasan himself, Kapunan, and Boy Vasquez. See Hilarion M. Henares, Jr, "Who Will Guard Us from the Guardians?" Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 July 1986, p. 5.
- (62) "No Charges," op. cit., pp. 1 and 3.
- (63) "Special Treatment for Loyalists," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 July 1986, p. 4.
- (64) Cunanan, "Questions on the Loyalists' Caper," op. cit., p. 5.
- (65) See the following for reports of damages and losses resulting from the Manila Hotel Incident: "The Philippine Experience," op. cit.,

- pp. 1-2; "Tolentino: I Was Pressured," op. cit., p. 2; and various newspaper articles covering the incident.
- (66) It was reported that Gen Prospero Olivas and Col Rolando Abadilla did not attend the oath-taking ceremonies. See "Loyalists Back Down," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 July 1986, p. 2.
 - (67) The findings cited here are from the Presidential Fact-Finding Committee Reports on the Manila Hotel Incident of 6 July 1986 (First Report, 24 July 1986, and Second Report, 14 August 1986).
 - (68) Sworn Testimony of Health Secretary Alfredo Bengzon before the FFC, 11 July 1990.
 - (69) Rey Arquiza, "No Sanctuary for 'Turing' and Henchmen," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, p. 2.
 - (70) Victor Agustin, "Loyalists Go Free," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 July 1986, p. 1.
 - (71) From various testimonies received by the FFC in Executive Sessions.
 - (72) "The Philippine Experience," op. cit., p. 6.
 - (73) Sworn Testimony of Rear Admiral Tagumpay Jardiniano (Ret) before the FFC, 27 June 1990.
 - (74) Testimony given before the FFC in Executive Session.
 - (75) Ibid.
 - (76) Ibid.
 - (77) Ibid.
 - (78) Sworn Testimony of MGen Rodolfo A. Canieso (Ret) before the Fact-Finding Commission, 29 June 1990.
 - (79) Testimony given before the FFC in Executive Session.
 - (80) Ibid.
 - (81) Ibid.

- (82) Sworn Testimony of NSC Director General Rafael Ileto before the FFC, 10 July 1990.
- (83) Canieso Testimony, op. cit.
- (84) Sworn Testimony of Former NBI Director Antonio Carpio before the FFC, 19 July 1990.
- (85) Dave Veridiano, "The Foiled Coup Try: How It Was Planned," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 November 1986, pp. 1 and 9.
- (86) Sworn Testimony of Former CSAFP and now Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos, before the FFC, 16 April 1990.
- (87) Veridiano, op. cit., p. 9.
- (88) Sworn Testimony of Lt Gen Salvador Mison (Ret) before the FFC, 27 June 1990.
- (89) Canieso Testimony, op. cit.
- (90) Testimony given before the FFC in Executive Session.
- (91) Veridiano, op. cit., p. 9.
- (92) "Coups Attempt Probed, Putschists on the Run," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 25 November 1986, pp. 1 and 3.
- (93) Mison Testimony, op. cit.
- (94) Ramos Testimony, op. cit.
- (95) Veridiano, op. cit., p. 9.
- (96) "Aquino Decision Generally Okay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 25 November 1986, p. 8.
- (97) "U. S. Backing for Cory Reaffirmed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 25 November 1986, p. 8.
- (98) "The Philippine Experience," op. cit., p. 7.
- (99) Ibid., p. 8.

- (100) Final Report (MND Order No. A-005) from the Office of the Inspector General (OTIG) Board of Officers to the SND, dated 15 June 1987, Exh. "RRRRR-3"- Commission.
- (101) Chronology of Events of January 1987 Attempted Coup Submitted by BGen Loven C. Abadia, Vice Commander, PAF and Wing Commander, 205 HW, dated 3 August 1990.
- (102) PTI Report on Sangley Point Incident from PTI Panel to CSAFP, dated 7 April 1987, Exh. "OOO-3-C"- Commission.
- (103) Ibid.
- (104) Summary of Events of 27 January 1987 from the SND to President Aquino, dated 28 January 1987, Exh. "RRRRR-3"- Commission.
- (105) Ibid.
- (106) "The Philippine Experience," op. cit.
- (107) Testimony before the FFC in Executive Session.
- (108) Vittorio Vitug and Sonia Dipasupil, "Ramos Orders Gen. Zumel, 2 Colonels, Major Arrested," Malaya, 31 January 1987, p. 6.
- (109) Ibid., p. 1.
- (110) Jose de Vera, "Siege Ends As Troops Pull Out of TV 7," Manila Bulletin, 30 January 1987, pp. 1 and 18.
- (111) Final Report, op. cit.
- (112) Memo on the Creation of a Crisis Committee, 28 January 1987, signed by Executive Secretary Joker P. Arroyo.
- (113) "The Philippine Experience," op. cit., p. 13.
- (114) Final Report, op. cit.
- (115) Ibid.
- (116) Ibid.
- (117) "Mutiny Crushed," Manila Chronicle, 19 April 1987, p. 6.

- (118) "Black Flag Marks Black Saturday Rebellion," Manila Chronicle, 19 April 1987, p. 6.
- (119) "Mutiny Crushed," op. cit., p. 6.
- (120) "Mutiny Part of Bigger Plot," Philippine Star, 20 April 1987, p. 1.
- (121) "The Philippine Experience," op. cit., p. 14.
- (122) "Mutiny Crushed," op. cit., p. 6.
- (123) Final Report, op. cit.
- (124) Jerry Esplanada, "FM's 'Invasion' Plot Thwarted," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 July 1987, p. 8.
- (125) "Reagan Urged: Jail FM," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 July 1987, p. 1.
- (126) "Ex-Ruler Admits Planning Invasion," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 July 1987, pp. 1 and 9.
- (127) Cesar M. Espino, "Cory Pleased; Military Cool," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 July 1987, p. 8.
- (128) Dave Veridiano and Cesar Espino, "AFP Links 20 Officers to FM Plot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1987, p. 9.
- (129) Report Re: 28 August 1987 Coup Attempt from BGen Pedro G. Sistoza, CG CSG, to Chief, PC, dated 1 September 1987, Exh. "RRRRR-2"- Commission.
- (130) Veridiano and Espino, op. cit., p. 9.
- (131) Cesar Espino and Dave Veridiano, "Six Officers Held on Coup Plot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 July 1987, pp. 1 and 9.
- (132) Ibid., p. 9.
- (133) From PTI Report of Lt Col Rodolfo G. Munar JAGS to CSAFP on Maj Manuel Divina PC, Maj Romeo Elefante PN (M), Capt Reynaldo Regacho PN (M), and Capt Chris Mesias PAF, dated 25 August 1987.

- (134) Francisco Nemenzo, "Military Insurgency: Reflection on Gringo's Adventure," Kasarinlan (Philippine Quarterly of UP Third World Studies Center), Vol. 3, No. 2 (4th Quarter 1987), p. 8.
- (135) Report Re: 28 August 1987 Coup Attempt from BGen Pedro G. Sistoza, op. cit.
- (136) Ibid.
- (137) Soriano Testimony, op. cit.
- (138) "Cory Orders Probe of Killing," Philippine Star, 7 November 1987, p. 3.
- (139) Memo Re: Case against Col Antonio Q. Romero PA, et al in connection with the 28 August 1987 Failed Coup from AFP Board of Officers to CSAFP, dated 16 December 1987, Exh. "OOO-5"- Commission.
- (140) Memo Re: Case of Col Gregorio Honasan, et al for Alleged Violations of AW 67 and 96 from AFP Board of Officers to CSAFP, dated 16 October 1987, Exh. "OOO-5"- Commission.
- (141) Ibid.
- (142) Memo Re: Case against Lt Col Jerry Albano, et al (Alleged Involvement in the 28 August 1987 Failed Coup Attempt) from AFP Board of Officers to CSAFP, dated 22 October 1987, Exh. "OOO-5"- Commission.
- (143) Memo Re: Case of Capt Rex C. Robles PN from AFP Board of Officers to CSAFP, dated 25 April 1988, Exh. "OOO-5"- Commission.
- (144) Frankie Tuyay and Alden M. Alag, "Pilot in Gringo Getaway Captured," Philippine Star, 24 November 1987, pp. 1 and 7. See also Lito Mangaser and Maning Silva, "Gringo Flown to Baguio, Hunt On," Manila Chronicle, 30 August 1987, p. 1.
- (145) Memo Re: BGen Federico Pasion, et al for Violation of AW 67, 68, 96 and 97 from AFP Board of Officers to CSAFP, dated 9 October 1987, Exh. "OOO-2-D"- Commission.

- (146) Post Operations Report of August 1987 Attempted Coup submitted by BGen Loven C. Abadia, PAF Vice Commander and WC, 205 HW, dated 3 August 1990.
- (147) "Rebels Control Olivas, Cebu," Manila Chronicle, 29 August 1987, p. 8.
- (148) Memo Re: Case against BGen Edgardo Abenina, et al for Violation of AW 67, 96, and 97 and Article 139, Revised Penal Code, from the AFP Board of Officers to CSAFP, dated 28 November 1987, Exh. "OOO-4"- Commission.
- (149) Ibid.
- (150) Memo Re: Alleged Mutinous Activity of the Elements of the 3 LAB at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City on 28 August 1987, from the AFP Board of Officers to CSAFP, dated 21 December 1987, Exh. "OOO-5-C"- Commission.
- (151) Memo Re: Alleged Illegal and Unauthorized Activities of Officers and Cadets of PMA, dated 8 October 1987.
- (152) Ibid.
- (153) Memo Re: Involvement of Lt Col Eduardo Kapunan PA and Lt Col Eslao in the Unauthorized Operations of PMA Cadets in Connection with the 28 August 1987 Attempt in Metro Manila from AFP Board of Officers to CSAFP, dated 30 October 1987, Exh. "OOO-2-A"- Commission.
- (154) "The Philippine Experience," op. cit., p. 16.
- (155) According to a report of the GHQ Survey Board dated 6 January 1988, the total value lost in the GHQ fire was about P30 to P40 million. However, according to the camp engineer's report on 14 September 1987, the value of the GHQ building alone was over P41 million, plus other property damage of over P200,000.
- (156) Jess Diaz, "Enrile Urges Gringo to Yield," Philippine Star, 31 August 1987, pp. 1 and 8.
- (157) Amando Doronila, "Crisis Makes the Military Stronger," Manila Chronicle, 30 August 1987, p. 5.

- (158) Ding Marcelo, "Crucial Palace Moves Recalled," Manila Bulletin, 31 August 1987, pp. 1 and 4.
- (159) Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, "AFP Disloyalists: 'Guns To Our Heads,'" Philippine Free Press, 20 January 1990, pp. 3 and 47.
- (160) Testimony given before the FFC in Executive Session.
- (161) McCoy, op. cit., p. 4.
- (162) Almonte Testimony, op. cit.
- (163) R. M. DeJoya, Jr, national chairman of the GBI in 1987, claimed that their organization represented about 80 to 85 percent of the total AFP manpower; see "Guardians' Expel, Disown Honasan," Manila Times, 24 September 1987.
- (164) Ibid.
- (165) Ramos Testimony, op. cit.
- (166) "RAM Officer Talks on February 1986 Mutiny," op. cit., pp. 1 and 8. See also Arillo, op. cit., p. 20.
- (167) Sworn Testimony of MGen Ramon Montano before the FFC, 25 January 1990.
- (168) Ramos Testimony, op. cit.
- (169) Montano Testimony, op. cit.

V

THE FAILED DECEMBER 1989 COUP: PRE-COUP EVENTS AND BATTLE ZONE NARRATIVES

A. Overview

This chapter deals with the events associated with the failed December 1989 coup attempt in great detail. This overview gives the reader the broad picture, like a road map in a manner of speaking. The illustrations on page 259 show the battle sites during the December 1989 coup. The Commission hopes this will help him link one event with the others which occurred in different places at the same time.

A.1. Strategy and Planning of the Coup d'Etat

The basic assumption behind the launching of a coup is that a concerted attack conducted with speed, surprise, and surgical precision against key facilities of a government in crisis, actual or perceived, will cause its immediate collapse. Such a strategy, however, calls for the total commitment of all the coup forces at one time.

As pointed out in Chapter I, in a coup there is no opportunity to change strategy and tactics, replace weapons and men, or correct errors and omissions. The planning stage of a coup is thus of crucial importance. The strategy, the propaganda, the recruitment, the logistics, and every move necessary for the success of the coup must be set beforehand.

A.2. Pre-Coup Activities

The Commission has, therefore, included in this chapter a report on pre-coup activities (both the rebels' and the government's) as gathered through direct testimonies, sworn statements, affidavits, exhibits, and intelligence reports. These sources indicate that by at least the first quarter of 1989, an extensive conspiracy amongst the coup plotters was in motion.

The major players, ex-Lt Col Gregorio Honasan, BGen Edgardo Abenina, ex-BGen Jose Ma Zumel,¹ and others, met frequently with BGen Alejandro Galido, who was reportedly then acting as a deep penetration agent for Gen Renato de Villa, Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines (CSAFP). Galido also had meetings during this period with, among others, Cherry Cobarrubias, Enrique Cojuangco, and Luis Tabuena. An alliance between the RAM-HF (Honasan Faction) and the Loyalists (Zumel Group) was forged at this time. Individual efforts at recruitment, such as those conducted by Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero in Cebu and other parts in the south, were taking place in various units of the Armed Forces. The activities of the government, on the other hand, consisted of monitoring the various moves of the conspirators and of taking such preventive action as was possible under the circumstances.

A.3. Execution of the Coup

A.3.a. 29 November - Tagaytay Incident

The failed December 1989 coup began inauspiciously on 29 November 1989, when a Scout Ranger team prematurely destroyed the AFP communications station in Tagaytay. This mission was not supposed to take place until 30 November, since it was meant to signal D-Day for the 1 December coup.

Nonetheless, despite this false start, rebel ground and air forces commenced hostilities against their pre-chosen targets almost simultaneously in the late evening of 30 November and in the very early morning of 1 December. These targets, picked in accordance with the aforementioned strategic principles, were: Fort Bonifacio, Villamor Air Base (VAB) together with the Domestic and International Airports, Camp Aguinaldo, Channels 2 and 4, Sangley Point, Mactan Air Base (MAB), Malacañang, and North and South Harbors. The Makati business district appears to have been outside the initial plan.

A.3.b. 30 November and 1 December - Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base

At about the same time that two rebel Marine companies, supported by three LVTs and two V-150s, launched an attack on VAB, three companies of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) occupied the FSRR Headquarters (HQ), surrounded and secured the Army Operations Center (AOC), almost capturing the Commanding General of the Philippine Army (CG PA) in the process, and thereafter took over the rest of Fort Bonifacio without encountering any significant resistance.

However, the rebels were unable to use the armor of the Light Armor Brigade (LABde), nor the artillery pieces of the Philippine Army Light Armor Regiment (PALAR), whose range is capable of reaching Camp Aguinaldo and Malacañang, because these units remained loyal to the government.

Meanwhile, rebel Marines succeeded in entering VAB, neutralizing the 205th Helicopter Wing (205 HW) and its assets, sealing off the Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force (CG PAF) on the third floor of his HQ, damaging the 205 HW HQ Building, and the Bachelor Officers' Quarters, as well as disabling the helicopters and taking over the entire base.

A.3.c. 1 December

Domestic and International Airports

At the Manila Domestic Airport, gunfire erupted early in the morning as Philippine Air Force Security Command (PAFSECOM) soldiers engaged rebel troops in defending the airport terminal. However, shortly after 5:00 a.m., the PAFSECOM personnel at the Domestic Airport were overpowered. A rebel force of about 100 men took over the Baggage Area near Terminal No. 2. Another group led by ex-Maj Lyle Tugbang and Maj Jose Gamos, composed mainly of civilians and Guardians, occupied the main Terminal Building where defending PAFSECOM personnel were herded into a room inside the Terminal Building.

At the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), a PAFSECOM Battle Staff was established which ordered Runways 06-24 and 13-31 barricaded with firetrucks and baggage containers to prevent their use. However, rebel forces made no attempt to capture it. By 2:30 p.m., rebel forces led by Gamos and Tugbang left the Domestic Airport and moved to the vicinity of Quirino Avenue and Coastal Road.

Coastal Road

The Gamos-Tugbang-led rebel troops were blocked by a unit of the South Sector Capital Command (CAPCOM) who were deployed at the vicinity of Coastal Road corner MIA Road. A firefight ensued when the blocking force refused to join the rebels. At around 5:00 p.m., troops from the Metropolitan Police Field Force (MPFF) arrived to assist the blocking force, causing the group of Gamos-Tugbang to withdraw shortly after.

Camp Aguinaldo

At Camp Aguinaldo, the AFP Logistics Command (LOGCOM) under Commo Domingo Calajate declared their open support for the rebels at about 8:00 a.m., occupying the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Building by force. The LOGCOM rebels backed off, however, and returned to their compound when confronted by BGen Lisandro Abadia, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, who was supported by the 72nd Infantry Battalion (72 IB) under Lt Col Alejandro Lasan. Thereafter, the 2nd Infantry Division (2 ID) under the command of BGen Javier Carbonell, supported by five armor vehicles, launched an attack against LOGCOM. After a firefight, LOGCOM surrendered.

The following reinforcements arrived to defend Camp Aguinaldo:

1. 72 IB at 7:40 a.m.;
2. 701st Infantry Brigade (701 Bde) of 7 ID at 8:10 a.m., along with other elements of the 72 IB, a total of 260 men;
3. 2 ID at 11:30 a.m., a strength of 826 men;
4. AFP Training Command (TRACOM) at 11:46 a.m., a strength of 345 men;
5. RECOM 3 at 5:27 p.m.;
6. 1st Marine Brigade (1 MBde) of NCRDC at 7:05 p.m.; and
7. On the following morning at 3:30 a.m., the 202 Bde and the 203 Bde.

ABS-CBN and PTV-4

Before dawn, some of the rebel Marines, who took over VAB, proceeded to ABS-CBN and PTV-4 compounds in Quezon City and easily occupied the government television station PTV-4, since the security platoon assigned there withdrew in the face of superior forces. At around 2:00 p.m., a group of civilians, led by Rafael Recto, arrived and entered the PTV-4 premises ostensibly to look for his daughter Plinky who works at ABS-CBN. However, Recto was overheard to say that he was there to attend a press conference. Lito Gorospe, who was inside the ABS-CBN area at that time, allegedly intended to air some messages, but since the management of ABS-CBN and PTV-4 had disabled the transmitters, none of these events took place.

Mactan Air Base

BGen Jose Comendador, the Commander of the 2nd Air Division, took parallel action in MAB by assuming control of the base, and while initially not declaring his position, he later took the rebel side. Army troops from Mindanao composed of elements from the 23 IB and 30 IB joined Comendador later that day, and secured MAB for the rebels.

Sangley Point

With the use of minimal force, the rebels took control of Sangley Point. At 12:30 a.m., two 6 x 6 trucks loaded with rebel soldiers in full battle gear disarmed the guards manning the main gate. The rebels then successively took over the flight line and the government air assets, then isolated the Wing Commander of the 15th Strike Wing (15 SW) in his HQ. The same action was taking place on the naval side of the base. The rebels equally restricted the Commander of the Philippine Fleet to his HQ, after failing to convince him to join them, and then proceeded to occupy several units of the Philippine Fleet Headquarters.

However, by around 1:00 p.m., the rebel air assets were destroyed by the government F-5s. By mid-afternoon, combined elements of Cavite, Laguna, and Batangas Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police (PC/INP) Commands launched an attack which eventually resulted in the retaking of Sangley. Also, the two rebel battalions of the 68 IB and 24 IB which had earlier arrived from Bataan aboard a fishing vessel were permitted to return to their home base. Thus, by early evening of 1 December, Sangley Point was back in government hands.

Malacañang and Sta Mesa

At around 6:25 a.m., three T-28s (Tora-Tora), manned by rebel pilots and assisted by a British Norman Islander acting as a forward air controller, took off from Sangley Air Base. They conducted bombing and strafing runs over the Malacañang complex. Although two F-5 fighter jets from Basa Air Base were scrambled to intercept the Tora-Toras, no dogfight occurred.

Meanwhile, rebel soldiers mostly in civilian clothes, blocked certain approaches leading to Malacañang to prevent it from being reinforced. However, a Task Force, composed of the Presidential Security Group (PSG) and Manila police personnel, augmented by seven armor infantry fighting vehicles, assaulted rebel positions in and around the Sta Mesa

district. At about 7:00 p.m., this area was cleared of rebel soldiers by the Task Force.

North and South Harbors

By 3:00 a.m. RAM-HF forces with some Customs personnel, led by ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit, had control of the main entrances and exits of the North and South Harbors, and occupied key buildings in both areas.

The Zaragoza Gate (Gate 1) and Moriones Gate (Gate 2) of North Harbor were barricaded with container vans and cargo trucks by heavily armed rebels. The same thing happened at Gate 3 of the South Harbor. Personnel at the Coast Guard Station located at the North Harbor were disarmed, and the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) office there was made the headquarters of the rebels. At the South Harbor, the rebels occupied the Customs Police Station and raided the Enforcement and Security Services (ESS) HQ, while disarming the personnel on duty, and carting away guns and goods of various sorts.

However, in the late afternoon, RAM-HF soldiers around the PPA Police Station area started dispersing and leaving. By early evening, the Coast Guard had cleared the North Harbor of some more rebel soldiers.

A.3.d. 2 December

North and South Harbors

Early in the morning, rebel troopers abandoned the area around the ESS HQ and regrouped by the building where the Office of the Commissioner of Customs is located. Elements of the CAPCOM and Western Police District (WPD) were poised to attack the rebels, waiting only for reinforcements, when two CAPCOM cars unexpectedly entered Port Area through Gate 1 with full sirens blaring. Alerted, rebel soldiers withdrew through Gate 6. By early afternoon, the North and South Harbors were clear of rebel soldiers.

Fort Bonifacio and Makati

By midmorning, Scout Rangers began abandoning their strong holds in Fort Bonifacio and brought their firearms, mortar tubes, and Howitzer guns to Gates 1 and 2. The Philippine Army Communications Center (PA COMCEN) and AOC were abandoned by rebel troops as they started consolidating near Gate 2 and the Headquarters Philippine Army (HPA) Grandstand. An attempt to negotiate the surrender of the

Scout Rangers occurred at this point but when it failed, most of the rebel forces moved out of Fort Bonifacio for the Makati business district.

Upon reaching Makati, the rebel Scout Rangers occupied some 22 high-rise buildings in the Ayala business area. Snipers were deployed at the rooftops of strategically located buildings, supported by maneuvering forces on the ground. In response, the government organized a Task Force Makati, composed initially of elements from CAPCOM and the PC from Laguna and Batangas, to block off escape routes and eventually to retake Makati.

At this time and for some days thereafter, intermittent encounters took place and sniper shots were exchanged between the rebels and government forces.

ABS-CBN and PTV-4

Government forces attacked in the early morning, and after a two-hour resistance, rebel soldiers withdrew from the PTV-4 station and joined their comrades near Camp Aguinaldo.

Camp Aguinaldo and BGen Blando

The rebel Marine forces, which came from VAB and PTV-4, utilizing LVTs and V-150s, commenced their attack on Camp Aguinaldo, alternating between Gates 1, 2, and 3. However, government troops held on to their defensive positions. Meanwhile, the rebels situated by the Mormon Church at White Plains were being subjected to frequent air strikes. No significant inroads were made by the rebels on this day.

In the morning, BGen Marcelo Blando's forces, composed of two infantry battalions of the 7 ID plus one Scout Ranger company from Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, reached Metro Manila and, instead of proceeding to Camp Aguinaldo, positioned themselves at the Greenhills Commercial Center in front of Unimart. After pretending all the while to be on the government side, Blando finally declared himself for the rebels. Fortunately, his two infantry battalions refused to commit outright and to fight the government forces in Camp Aguinaldo, eventually causing Blando to surrender the following day, 3 December. However, the company of Scout Rangers detached themselves and attacked Camp Aguinaldo through Gate 4.

Mactan Air Base

The pilots in MAB, under the leadership of Lt Col Antonio Anciano, Commander, 208th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, escaped from the base and proceeded to the Visayas Command (VISCOP) HQ in Cebu City. Thus, BGen Comendador was left with airplanes but no pilots to fly them. Both BGen Renato Palma, Commander VISCOP, and BGen Cesar Go contacted Comendador and tried to convince him to give up. The latter refused to surrender, and threatened that should government forces attack Mactan, he would blow up the aircrafts in the base, particularly the two 747s belonging to Philippine Airlines (PAL).

A.3.e. 3 December - Camp Aguinaldo

From 1:30 a.m. to 6:00 a.m., the battle of Camp Aguinaldo raged in earnest.

Rebel forces, coming from the White Plains area, initiated combined artillery and mortar attacks. Backed by Marine LVTs and other armor vehicles, ground assaults were launched in the northern vicinity (Gate 1 of Camp Aguinaldo and Main Gate of LOGCOM), as well as the eastern vicinity (LOGCOM perimeter). But loyal troops repulsed the attacks using artillery, mortar, and recoilless rifles, which disabled the enemy's armor. A rebel V-150 was destroyed, while an LVT was totally burned and partially blocked Gate 1.

Meanwhile, some rebel Marines led by Maj Cesar de la Peña infiltrated Camp Aguinaldo but government defenders were able to isolate them at the General Headquarters (GHQ) Dispensary and St Ignatius Chapel. After a brief firefight, the rebels surrendered.

Later, at about 6:30 a.m., the rest of the attacking rebel forces under Lt Col Romelino Gojo PN, Operations Officer, Philippine Marines, withdrew towards White Plains but were subjected to continuous air strikes by PAF F-5 jets and Sikorsky helicopter gunships. Enemy forces then dispersed and finally withdrew from the camp's vicinity. At 7:00 a.m., rebel remnants and their armor located near the Marmion Church at Katipunan Avenue were bombed by government jets. Elements of the 2 ID then cleared the area of all rebel resistance and secured it against possible counter-attacks.

A.3.f. 4 to 9 December - Makati and Mactan Air Base

In Makati and Mactan, the period between 4 to 9 December was spent with both sides intermittently threatening, posturing, fighting or negotiating. Finally, by 2:30 a.m. of 6 December as a result of the negotiations led by BGen Arturo Enrile, Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), with the rebels, a ceasefire was declared, culminating later in the morning in the departure of foreign tourists and apartment dwellers from the rebel-occupied Makati area. On 7 December, at around 9:00 a.m., the rebels ended their occupation of the commercial district of Makati and marched back to their barracks at Fort Bonifacio. Mactan followed suit on 9 December when the rebels, headed by BGen Comendador, formally surrendered to BGen Palma in the middle of Mandaue Bridge.

A.3.g. 1 to 2 December - Air Strikes

Rebel Air Strikes

In the morning of 1 December, the rebels, using air assets captured at Sangley, conducted the following sorties:

1. 6:25 a.m.: Three Tora-Toras bombed and strafed Malacañang complex;
2. 7:00 a.m.: Two Tora-Toras strafed government troops in the vicinity of PTV-4;
3. 8:00 a.m.: A Sikorsky strafed government forces around PTV-4;
4. 9:00 a.m.: Two Tora-Tora planes augmented a Sikorsky in bombing Camp Crame resulting in the burning of the PC HQ;
5. 9:45 a.m.: Tora-Tora planes dropped four bombs hitting Gen de Villa's quarters; and
6. 10:00 a.m.: A Sikorsky hit Camp Aguinaldo twice.

Government Air Strikes

On the other hand, government aircraft made the following strikes:

1. 7:00 a.m., 1 December: Two F-5s scrambled to intercept three Tora-Toras but no dogfight occurred;
2. 7:30 a.m., 1 December: An F-5 took off to intercept two Tora-Toras;
3. 9:45 a.m., 1 December: A Sikorsky fired at rebel forces at LOGCOM;
4. 10:00 a.m., 1 December: Three F-5s fired rockets at the sea waters adjacent to the runway at Sangley;
5. 11:45 a.m., 1 December: A Sikorsky struck at rebel positions at LOGCOM;
6. 12:45 p.m., 1 December: An F-5 piloted by Maj Danilo Atienza took off to attack Sangley, and destroyed the rebel planes and the fuel dump;
7. 12:49 p.m., 1 December: Two F-5s took off to attack Sangley and fired cannons, strafed the airfield, and bombed the hangar;
8. 1:00 p.m., 1 December: A Sikorsky made three air strikes at rebel positions in White Plains;
9. 3:20 p.m., 1 December: Two Sikorskys struck at White Plains;
10. 6:00 a.m., 2 December: A Sikorsky and an F-5 struck at White Plains;
11. 6:15 a.m., 2 December: A Sikorsky made three air strikes at White Plains;
12. 6:45 a.m., 2 December: Two F-5s made two air strikes at the Katipunan-White Plains area and the 202 Bde was hit by mistake;
13. 7:00 a.m./7:15 a.m., 2 December: Two F-5s dropped bombs over Libis area;

14. 10:00 a.m., 2 December: Two Sikorsky helicopters made two air strikes each over the next seven hours at White Plains; and
15. 3:00 p.m., 2 December: A Sikorsky struck at White Plains. Other air missions after 2 December are no longer listed.

A3.h. 1 to 7 December - Other Hostile Acts In the Provinces

While Metro Manila was under seige by various rebel forces, the following incidents took place in Regions I, II, IV, V, VI, X, and XI.

1 December

1. Twelve soldiers in the Cordillera region entered a local radio station and insisted in broadcasting their support for the rebels.
2. Rebel Scout Rangers took over Legaspi City Domestic Airport. However, after lengthy negotiations, they ended their occupation of the airport and were escorted back to Camp Bagong Ibalon.
3. Elements of 253rd PC Company left Sorsogon in two buses for Manila but were stopped in Camarines Norte where the Provincial Commander convinced them to return to Camp Escudero, Sorsogon.
4. Two hundred men from 339th PC Company gathered at Bacolod Airport waiting for a PAF C-130 to fly them to Manila. When the airplane did not arrive and subsequent efforts to use a shipping vessel at a nearby wharf failed, they were persuaded by the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental to return to their camp.
5. Lt Emil Ong, Team Leader, 7th Riverine Assault Company, wrote BGen Raymundo Jarque, Commander Negros Island Command, offering to resign because he was disappointed with the AFP. Later, Ong with four men from his company attempted to use the Pulupandan Port but was refused entrance by the security guard at the gate.
6. A group of junior pilots at Fernando Air Base wanted to fly an SF-260 aircraft and conduct persuasion flights over Manila in support of the coup. Col Hector Tarrazona, Director for Operations, 100th Training Wing, was instructed by Wing Commander Col Felipe Abando to persuade the pilots not to do so. While the

meeting was going on, Col Abando ordered the maintenance officer of the 443rd Field Depot and Maintenance Squadron to disable the aircrafts.

7. Cagayan Gov Rodolfo Aguinaldo went on the air over DZRH in the morning, declaring support for the coup. Five hundred of his men attempted to reach Manila but were blocked in Nueva Ecija.

2 December

1. An officer of the HQ Service Company, PC TRACOM, at Silang, Cavite displayed a banner expressing support for the RAM-HF.
2. Lt Col Teodorico Viduya, Davao del Norte PC/INP Provincial Commander, with a group of 30 officers sought guidance from BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, RECOM 11 Commander. They wanted to issue a manifesto in favor of the rebels. He dissuaded them from doing so; but an unsigned manifesto was circulated just the same.

3 December

1. Elements of the 56 IB based in Palayan City, Nueva Ecija left for Manila but were stopped in Pampanga.
2. Before an assembly of officers and men of PC TRACOM, Superintendent Col Renato Motus issued a manifesto expressing support for the rebel cause.
3. Capt Gregory Ramos, Commanding Officer (CO), Alpha Coy, 2nd Light Armor Battalion (2 LAB) LABde, with 20 of his men and five armor vehicles left his station at Tuburan, Mawab, Davao del Norte to secure the Davao City Airport in a show of sympathy for the rebel cause. They encountered a roadblock at Barangay Sasa, Davao City. They were eventually brought to BGen Baccay by Col Danilo Olay, and after a lengthy dialogue, Capt Ramos and his men returned to their camp.
4. Six truckloads of rebel soldiers from 30 IB led by Lt Generoso Bolina boarded MV Nasipit Princess in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte bound for Cebu. However, the vessel was unable to depart due to the absence of the ship's captain.

7 December

Forty officers of the 4 ID at Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro, led by Lt Col Reynaldo Rivera, sought a meeting with their Commanding General to air their grievances, among which seems to have been their objection to the participation of the US Phantom jets. However, they were made to resign before their Commanding General would dialogue with them. It appears that their resignations were not accepted.

With the foregoing overview as a background, a detailed narrative of significant pre-coup events and of each battle zone follows.

B. Pre-Coup Events

B.1. Activities of Major Coup Plotters

The conspiracy and planning which took place prior to the coup is best unraveled by recounting the activities, as gathered by the Commission, of some of the major coup plotters and their supporters and sympathizers. Some of their activities were made public for the first time in the now famous "Galido Expose" which disclosed the alliance between the forces of Honasan and Zumel through the efforts of Abenina, as well as the role which the military coup plotters wanted to give some civilian political leaders of the opposition.

B.1.a. Honasan, Abenina, Zumel

Playing his role as a "deep penetration agent" for the CSAFP,² BGen Alejandro Galido,³ CG Southern Luzon Command (SOLCOM), instructed his security officer, Capt Oscarlito Mapalo, to find a way to get in touch with the group of Honasan. Honasan escaped from detention on board BRP Andres Bonifacio while it anchored off Manila Bay on 2 April 1988.⁴

Initially, Mapalo could not establish the desired contact, despite his getting in touch with his former classmates, Capt Ed Oban and LtSG Alex Pama. However, after meeting Lt Col Marcelino Malajacan, Mapalo was able to attend a meeting somewhere in Cavalier's Village, Antipolo, Rizal. This meeting was attended by Col Anselmo Avenido, Lt Col Rodolfo Tor, Lt Col Malajacan, ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit, Cmdr Bernardo Patino, and others who Mapalo could not identify. On this occasion, arrangements were discussed for a future meeting between Galido and Abenina. Also, Mapalo was apprised of the objective of the movement which was purportedly for reform and to establish a civilian-

military junta to consist of Abenina, Zumel, Honasan, and Galido (if he joined the movement), together with some civilians who are non-traditional politicians.⁵

In January 1989, Enrique "Henry" Cojuangco, younger brother of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, Jr, picked up Galido in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and brought the latter to a parking place in the Makati Commercial Center where Galido met Honasan in a van. They (Galido and Honasan) talked while the van cruised along the South Expressway. Honasan asked Galido's support for a planned destabilization to be launched in March 1989.⁶ Later, Galido confided to BGen Raul Aquino, CG 2 ID, the fact of the meeting without disclosing its subject matter. Galido also revealed that during the August 1987 failed coup attempt, he had an overseas phone conversation with ex-President Marcos, and kept the latter informed about the progress of the attempt.⁷

Meanwhile, on 5 June 1989, the office of the AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J2) received information on an alliance forged between the Zumel and Honasan groups for a destabilization attempt to be staged during the first or second week of June 1989.

In July 1989, Galido had a meeting at the Manila Garden Hotel, Makati, Metro Manila — arranged by one Cesar Lopez — with a certain Harold Magleo (or Maglio, as in some news reports), who claimed he was a colonel with the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).⁸ Magleo informed Galido that the DIA favors the overthrow of President Corazon C. Aquino and the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. According to Col Juan Mamorno, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer SOLCOM, Galido commented after the meeting that he doubted that Magleo was a colonel because he did not behave in a military manner.⁹

In a press statement issued on 3 April 1990, the US Embassy in Manila confirmed that Magleo met Galido once, sometime in April 1989 (not July 1989 as Mapalo testified), but denied that Magleo was ever a colonel in the US Air Force or that he was in any way connected with the DIA. The Embassy also said Magleo is employed at the Norton Air Base in California and was vacationing in the Philippines as a private individual.¹⁰

On 2 August 1989, Galido, Abenina, and Malajacan met at a house in Kamuning, Quezon City.¹¹ Abenina tried to convince Galido to join the group planning the coup¹² and suggested that destabilization activities be undertaken, citing Malacañang and VAB as targets, and President

Aquino, Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos, and Gen de Villa as persons to be assassinated.¹³

Abenina also gave Galido a series of documents regarding the creation of a new Government Council to be composed of military officers, namely, BGen Abenina, Artemio Tadiar, and Zumel, as well as Honasan, and three unnamed civilians. Abenina then tried to convince Galido that he should be the seventh man in the Council, in lieu of Honasan who was viewed as "so junior".¹⁴ In his testimony before the Commission, BGen Tadiar, Deputy Commander, Subic Naval Base Command (SUBCOM), denied any knowledge about his proposed membership in the Council.¹⁵

In the same meeting, Abenina briefed Galido on the military officers joining the coup, namely: Col Avenido, Secretary, Head-quarters, Philippine Constabulary Staff; Lt Col Gojo, Cmdr Patino of SUBCOM, reportedly representing BGen Tadiar; Col Mamorno, Maj Artemio Gamayo of 16 IB in Magdalena, Laguna; Lt Col Renato Jamora of 42 IB in Catamayan, Quezon; Lt Col Ramon Garcia in Pamplona, Camarines Sur; Col Victor Mayo of 49 IB; and Col Edgardo Espinosa PN (M). Abenina further claims that BGen Blando, CG 7 ID, and BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, Commandant, Philippine Marines (PMAR), were supporters of the planned coup.¹⁶ It is possible that these officers mentioned were not necessarily supporters of the coup, but dropping names of "credible" officers is a classic strategy in planning for a coup, as mentioned in Chapter I.

Galido asserted that, according to Abenina, the following officers had been assigned to make destabilization tactical plans: Lt. Cols Avenido, Gojo, and Malajacan, Cmdr Patino, and Col. Mamorno.¹⁷

Abenina also informed Galido that, for the planned coup, funds and logistics would be provided by Cesar Lopez and Cherry Cobarrubias. Tadiar testified that Cobarrubias was a close friend of the Marcoses.¹⁸ According to Patino, she regularly dealt with the Navy, selling various supplies.¹⁹ Lopez's role was supposedly to extend support in terms of transportation. Cobarrubias, on the other hand, promised to give between ₱2 million and ₱4 million once the final plan for execution was completed. She is also supposed to have relayed the promise of Imelda Marcos to give Galido "ten million" pesos within 24 hours after the arrival of Mrs Marcos and her family in the Philippines.²⁰

In his testimony before the Commission on 15 June 1990, Luis Tabuena, manager of the Manila International Airport during the

Marcos regime, confirmed that Cobarrubias is close to the Marcoses. She arranged his meeting with Galido at a room at the Mandarin Hotel on 6 September 1989; she likewise arranged for the long distance conversation between Galido and Imelda Marcos the day before.

Tadiar, meanwhile, testified before the Commission that at a meeting with Galido in June or July 1989²¹ or July or August 1989 at a house in Times St, Quezon City, he (Tadiar) was surprised to see Cobarrubias whom he last met in Malacañang in 1986. She was with a man who was introduced to Tadiar as one Mr Lopez. Actually, this Lopez is Cesar Lopez, another close associate of former President Marcos and the "Liaison of Marcos with the loyalist forces."²²

In a letter received by the Commission on 10 August 1990,²³ Cobarrubias is described as a coup operator or coup financier tied to the Zaldivia-Aguas front whose dealings link Mrs Marcos to the coup plotters. Diane Aguas admitted that Cobarrubias is a friend of her former live-in partner, who originally introduced himself to her as Kit Santiago. Santiago later became known as Capt Francisco de la Peña, and later still, when he "died" on 5 August 1989, as Franco Sanchijo.²⁴ Sanchijo's "death" is surrounded by suspicious circumstances.

Evidence obtained by the Commission further discloses that on 29 November 1989, Cherry Cobarrubias (under the name Serafia C. Cobarrubias) checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel.²⁵ She checked out on 2 December 1989.

In his sworn statement dated 19 January 1990,²⁶ Galido stated that Col Avenido, according to Abenina, was a member of the planning group; that Col Espinosa had promised to support the coup with two Marine battalions assigned in Bulacan; and that Lt Col Gojo would take care of getting all the Marines in Fort Bonifacio to join the rebel forces. Galido further said that he ordered Col Mamorno to join the planning group as his (Galido's) means to monitor the group's plans.

On 12 August 1989, Rico Mendoza, representing himself as a close friend of exiled Danding Cojuangco, met Galido in the Quezon City residence of a certain Rafael Ayoste, a businessman from Lucena City. Mendoza purportedly relayed Cojuangco's wish to return to the Philippines and support a takeover of the government.²⁷

From August to October 1989, on Galido's verbal instructions, Mamorno attended four meetings of a certain group. The first two of these meetings were held in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, in the residence

of a certain Medardo Pestano, reportedly an uncommissioned PMA '72 graduate. The latter fetched Mamorno at the parking area of the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati for these meetings. Present in the first meeting were Avenido, Pestano, Tor and a PAF officer whose name Mamorno could not recall.²⁸ In attendance during the second meeting were Avenido, Pestano, Tor and one Col "Joe" Espinosa of the Philippine Marines (Mamorno knows Espinosa by his nickname "Joe" but was uncertain if "Jose" is the former's correct first name. He is sure, however, that Espinosa belongs to the Marines).²⁹

The next two meetings were held in the residence, either in Marikina or Antipolo, of a certain "Tor", introduced to Mamorno as a PC officer. On those meetings, Malajacan, Tor, Avenido and Pestano were present. The group asked Mamorno to commit SOLCOM forces for the coup; however, he consistently replied that he would refer the matter to his commander.³⁰

Galido further said in his affidavit that Luis Tabuena received ₱5 million, evidently from the Marcoses, of which ₱2 million would be for Zumel and ₱3 million for Galido. It was BGen Luther Custodio who informed him (Galido) about the money during a family reunion on 2 September 1989 at the residence of Rico Mendoza in San Fernando, Pampanga. This affair was also attended by Henry Cojuangco and Baby Asistio. Galido then asked Capt Mapalo to contact Cobarrubias to inform Tabuena that he would like to talk to him. His meeting with Tabuena eventually took place in a room at the Mandarin Hotel in Makati on 6 September.³¹

According to Tabuena, he was contacted by Cobarrubias at the 365 Club of Hotel Intercontinental, informing him that Galido would like to see him. It was Cobarrubias who arranged the 6 September meeting at the Mandarin and when he arrived there at 2:00 p.m., Cobarrubias and Galido were already there. In the presence of Cobarrubias, Galido asked Tabuena about the delivery of the money to Zumel. Tabuena denied having known about it, while Cobarrubias did not say anything. According to Tabuena, Zumel was the Military Supervisor of the Manila International Airport for two years when Tabuena was its General Manager.³²

Galido and Cobarrubias had been at the Mandarin Hotel since 5 September. According to Galido, in the evening of said date, Cobarrubias arranged a long distance call for him with Imelda Marcos who asked him (Galido) to hasten the plan to destabilize the government through a coup so that the Marcoses could return to the Philippines and help the new Government. Mrs Marcos further expressed her willingness to support the activity financially, however, at that moment she was hard up. She

promised to provide support within 24 hours following her arrival in the Philippines.³³

Tabuena admitted that he had known Mrs Marcos since college days when he played basketball and she used to watch the NCAA games. A year after the Marcoses left the Philippines, Mrs Marcos used to call him once or twice every two weeks; as a matter of fact, two weeks before he gave his testimony to the Commission, Mrs Marcos had called him. She also called him before the December coup to ask what was going on and also after the coup to inquire how many were killed.

Ten days after that Mandarin Hotel meeting, he met Cobarrubias at the Intercontinental Hotel and confronted her: "*O iyon lang pala ang tatanungin mo sa akin, eh, hindi mopa sinasabi sa akin?*" She answered that she did not know what Galido wanted to take up with him. Tabuena, however, admitted that he was of the impression that what Galido wanted to take up with him was secret, but that Cobarrubias knew what it was about. He did not confront Galido as to why the latter insinuated that he (Tabuena) may have misappropriated the money nor did he inquire as to the source of the money. When he obtained a copy of Galido's affidavit implicating him, it did not occur to him to communicate with Galido or to try to see Cobarrubias.³⁴

Tabuena confirmed that Cobarrubias resides abroad and travels a lot to the Philippines, often passing through Honolulu where she has a travel agency. She told him that she visited the Marcoses in Honolulu. He used to see Cobarrubias at least twice a month; however, since after the December 1989 coup when she was implicated, he has not seen her.

Other Meetings of BGen Galido

On 14 November 1989, Galido, Zumel, Abenina and Honasan met to discuss a coup slated to be staged before Christmas. On the way to the meeting, Galido rode in a car with Abenina and Atty Homobono Adaza.³⁵ Also present at the meeting were Avenido and Tor, both of whom were implicated in the 28 August 1987 failed coup. This meeting was allegedly held either in San Francisco del Monte,³⁶ or Tierra Pura, Tandang Sora³⁷, both in Quezon City.

In Camp Aguinaldo at about 2:00 p.m., 30 November, Galido received a note from Abenina stating that H-Hour for the coup would be at 3:00 a.m. of 1 December, and for Galido to bring all his SOLCOM forces to support the rebel forces in the National Capital Region (NCR). Galido said he was annoyed at this unexpected change of date for launching the

coup, since the original date mentioned by Abenina was 8 December. Upon being contacted by Galido for an explanation, Abenina said that he was just notified of the change by Honasan and that he (Abenina) had no control over the matter, since RAM-HF was calling the shots.³⁸

That evening, during the Command Conference called by Gen de Villa at Camp Aguinaldo, Galido briefed the officers on the different coup countersigns (white-day 1, pink-day 2, red-day 3, and again, white-day 4, pink-day 5, red-day 6, they had plans for six days) as disclosed to him by Abenina.³⁹ After the Command Conference, Galido met Abenina somewhere in the Araneta complex in Cubao during which time Abenina kept urging Galido to support the coup despite the change of date and time, or at least to remain neutral. Galido claimed he turned down both propositions.⁴⁰ On the following day, Abenina telephoned Galido almost every hour trying to convince him to support the coup. As an inducement, he allegedly offered Galido the initial position of Commanding General of the Philippine Army and eventually that of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, if the coup succeeded.⁴¹

Other coup leaders played the following roles during this period: Commo Domingo Calajate at the LOGCOM; Col Alexander Noble in Agusan del Sur and Metro Manila; ex-Lt Col Bibit and Lt Col Victor Batac, in Quezon City and Holiday Inn, Manila; Lt Rasco in Quezon Province, and Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero in Cebu City.

B.1.b. Calajate

On 26 November, after the flag ceremony in Camp Aguinaldo, a conference was held at the AFP LOGCOM at which all officers were informed that there might be a coup sometime during the second week of December. Commo Calajate, Commander LOGCOM, instructed all officers to proceed to camp immediately once they hear about it over the radio. According to him, this information came from a conference at GHQ on 24 November.⁴² Three days later, Calajate sent his family out of their residence at Camp Aguinaldo to some place outside the camp.⁴³

In breach of the code of honor of an officer and a gentleman, all the time aware of his participation and role in the unfolding coup, and knowing the exact hour it would be staged, Calajate had the temerity to attend the Command Conference at 5:30 p.m. of November 30 called by the CSAFP on which occasion government defense plans were discussed.

A few days before the coup, Lt Col Jerry Albano was a frequent visitor

of Cmdr Proceso Maligalig, Deputy Commander AFP LOGCOM. On 1 December, Albano joined Calajate at the LOGCOM, Camp Aguinaldo.⁴⁴

B.1.c. Noble

From October up to the second week of November 1989, at the latest, Col Noble had been going around Mindanao. He sought to establish links with the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) of Reuben Canoy.⁴⁵

He also tried to establish links with landowners who opposed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and who organized themselves into the Mindanao Freedom Movement (MFM).

As testified to by former Bukidnon governor, Carlos Fortich, Noble attended conferences of the Mindanao Freedom Movement. In one of these, which was either held in Cagayan de Oro City or Bukidnon, either early or in the second week of November, both Noble and Canoy attended. This is further evidenced by pictures taken on that occasion.⁴⁶ Others present were Atty Romeo Montalban (brother-in-law of Fortich) and Atty Odilon Mallari of Davao City, an organizer of the MFM.

In said meeting, Noble read a paper in which he mentioned secession. Canoy read the MIM's proclamation of independence. The subject of a coup d'etat was also discussed. The stand of the MFM was that if a coup succeeded, Mindanao should secede. Noble assured the Movement of protection.

On 26 November, while in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, Noble told Sgt Asterio Dejarme of the 401 IBde, 4 ID based in Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, that they would go to Manila to get instructions from the RAM-HF command control, and that they would return to Mindanao to set up the Federal Republic of Mindanao.⁴⁷ That same day, at 6:00 p.m., Noble and Dejarme arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport aboard a PAL flight from Butuan City. They proceeded to Noble's house at 135 MacArthur Avenue, Fort Bonifacio. There, Dejarme was tasked to operate Noble's radio and to handle communication with contacts in Agusan del Sur. Dejarme learned that codes 949 and 375 referred to Noble and Honasan, respectively.⁴⁸

On 27 November, Sgt Romeo Evangelio, Noble's close-in bodyguard, joined Noble and Dejarme in Fort Bonifacio. At 10:00 a.m., Evangelio and Noble left the latter's residence in Fort Bonifacio for an unknown destination, returning at 7:00 p.m.⁴⁹

On 28 November, Evangelio left Noble's house, returning later with one Galil, one machine pistol cal 9 mm, and one Zig assault rifle.⁵⁰

At noon of the same day, on Noble's instructions, Dejarme went to the South Harbor on a red Land Cruiser. At the gate, the driver of the Land Cruiser approached the security guard who directed the former to a van located just outside the gate. Without asking for pertinent papers, the guard unloaded from the van a wooden box which he turned over to the driver and Dejarme. The latter noted that there were four other similar boxes left inside the van. The driver told Dejarme that the items in the box were financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Later, when Noble opened the box at his Fort Bonifacio residence, Dejarme saw that it contained an Armburst anti-tank weapon. Earlier in the morning, Noble revealed to Dejarme that there would be a coup.⁵¹

B.1.d. Noble/Batac

On 29 November, around 9:00 p.m., a driver on board a Pajero came and fetched Noble and Dejarme in Fort Bonifacio.⁵² They were brought to a house in Gen Segundo St, Quezon City where Noble stayed for almost one hour⁵³ while Dejarme stayed in the Pajero.⁵⁴ In Dejarme's supplemental statement of 3 January 1990, Dejarme pointed to this house near Maalikaya. It turned out to be No. 62 Gen Segundo St.⁵⁵

Other evidence obtained by the Commission disclosed that the address of Crismel Verano, who was mentioned in the Galido affidavit, is No. 60 Segundo St, Heroes Hill, Quezon City, just adjacent to No 62.⁵⁶

According to Emmanuel Lao, owner of the lot where House No. 56, Gen Segundo St is located, a certain Verano is the owner of the two lots where houses No. 58 and 60 stand.⁵⁷

Around 10:00 p.m., Noble, with two companions — one of whom was identified by the Pajero's driver as Lt Col Vic Batac and who was observed by Dejarme to be carrying a bulging brown envelope — emerged from the house and boarded the Pajero.⁵⁸

The group proceeded to Holiday Inn Hotel where Noble, Batac and their unidentified companion alighted and went inside, leaving Dejarme and the driver behind. The brown envelope was left in the Pajero; because it was open, Dejarme could see that it contained money which the driver estimated at ₱1 million.⁵⁹ Thirty minutes later, Batac called through the handheld radio and instructed the driver to bring the brown envelope into the hotel. The driver complied. Upon returning to the

Pajero with the envelope ("*parang bawas na iyong laman*" [it seems some of its contents were taken] because it was no longer bulging, according to Dejarne), the driver told Dejarne that there were around 30 persons in the room with Batac and Noble.⁶⁰

Noble and Batac stayed inside the hotel for approximately two hours. Later, Noble and Dejarne were brought back to the former's residence in Fort Bonifacio at around 2:00 a.m., 30 November.⁶¹

As shown in the discussion below, Bibit had already checked in at Room 1701 of Holiday Inn by 29 November.

In his testimony before the Commission, Dejarne confirmed the foregoing.⁶² He declared further that he and driver Alex Callada, on board a Mitsubishi car together with Noble and Evangelio, were intercepted at a checkpoint in Sta Rita, Samar on 5 December 1989. Noble and Evangelio subsequently managed to escape. Found and seized from the car were ₱70,000 in crisp ₱500 bills, sophisticated weapons including one Armburst anti-tank weapon, a rifle with a laser sight, and documents tending to show the tie-up of the RAM-HF and troops which Noble referred to as the "Armed Forces of Mindanao", and which he was to lead in the last coup attempt.

Also found from the car were several documents, among which are:

1. A letter dated 28 November 1989 of one Vic addressed to Sir Alex. The latter was told to contact or see Sonny, Andy Gauran, MJ Mendoza, or to relay his messages through their base (code 581); after making all these contacts, Alex was to meet "TF Diamond" at Room 1701 of the Holiday Inn. Alex was also to call Billy or Jake or Abe. The codes for them were 757 for Billy, 507 for Jake and 711 for Abe.
2. A draft of a press release/public statement addressed to the "Soldiers of Mindanao."
3. Alert codes for broadcast which read "The roses that lately bloom in November will surely warm cool hearts by December" and "Dear Pare, comadre Rose will give birth anytime after 29 November 1989. Please contact other Maninoys for the grand binyag."
4. Instructions on the countersigns to be used and attached to uniforms/clothes and vehicles of coup participants.

5. Codes for pick-up points, like (a) New Library for McDonalds, Quezon Blvd, (b) Library for McDonalds, Paseo de Roxas, (c) Dennis for McDonalds, Greenhills, (d) Adamson for Shakey's along Katipunan Road, (e) Palace for Tropical Hut, corner EDSA and Ortigas Avenue, and (f) HI for Holiday Inn.
6. Papers regarding the establishment of the Armed Forces of Mindanao under the Federal Republic of Mindanao.
7. List of confirmed radio frequencies of various military units, base stations, and group operations centers.
8. Code numbers relating to Malacañang, such as the President's car; cars and drivers of Presidential kin Noynoy, Viel, Eldon, Ballsy, Pinky, Kris and Manolo and their individual code numbers; those of the PSG and its officers; and other operational codes.
9. Handwritten notes containing entries about an apparent bank heist.
10. A handwritten note referring to the radio network of the rebels containing the telephone number 810-1701. The Commission traced this number to someone answering on behalf of Royal Match, Inc, and when asked about his location answered that he was in Ayala Avenue.

MGen Flores believes that Vic referred to Victor Batac, Alex to Alexander Noble, Billy to Billy Bibit, Jake to Marcelino Malajacan, and Abe to Abraham Purugganan.⁶³

B.1.e. Bibit

Bibit had earlier been appointed by Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tañada to serve in the Customs intelligence service. Commissioner Mison subsequently appointed him as Assistant Chief, Operations Division of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS).⁶⁴

In August 1989, Bibit had been seen in Bacolod City with an unidentified companion.

The Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) had earlier warned Mison of the recruitment activities of Bibit in the Visayas in September 1989. Mison assigned Atty Jereos, CIIS

Chief, to watch Bibit. However, Mison later admitted he had not given the matter his personal attention, explaining that his business was to raise revenues for the government.⁶⁵

On 28 November, Bibit checked in at Room 1701, a suite at Holiday Inn, Manila, accompanied by another man. The room reservation was made in his behalf by his sister-in-law, Fe de los Reyes, secretary of the Chief Engineer of the hotel.⁶⁶

During Bibit's stay, de los Reyes went to his room twice for merienda-dinner at his invitation. On the first occasion, de los Reyes overheard Bibit making a telephone call; on the second occasion, the phone rang twice and she heard Bibit talking to the caller(s).⁶⁷

Records of Holiday Inn show that during this period, long-distance telephone calls from Room 1701 were purportedly made by one Boy Fuentes to telephone number 22376 in Bacolod City. This is a private PLDT line subscribed to the residence of one George Yap, a former member of the PC-Regional Security Unit 6 operating in Bacolod City.⁶⁸ Yap went into hiding after the December 1989 failed coup attempt and remains at large.⁶⁹

On 29 November, at 3:11 p.m., four persons, with one transceiver, entered Room 1701.⁷⁰

At about 7:30 a.m., the following day, Bibit telephoned P/Capt Job Gavino, Station Commander, North Harbor Port Police, and told the latter that he (Bibit) would be sending over his representatives for some important business. At 11:00 a.m., 20 men in civilian clothes arrived at the North Harbor Police Station looking for Gavino, supposedly on Bibit's orders. They tried to convince Gavino to join the rebel forces but he allegedly refused.⁷¹

In the early morning of 1 December, Bibit's room was discovered vacant. Because Bibit did not check out properly, de los Reyes had to pay his bill since she was the one who made Bibit's hotel reservation. De los Reyes was later reimbursed by her sister, Mrs Bibit.⁷² Evidence received by the Commission discloses that at 2:00 a.m. of 1 December, rebel soldiers in full battle gear equipped with high-powered weapons arrived and deployed themselves all over the area of Gate 3, South Harbor, Manila. The soldiers numbered approximately 200 and were commanded by Bibit.

B.1.f. Rasco

At 1:00 p.m., 28 November, in Sariaya, Quezon, a Philippine Army officer approached and informed 2Lt Eliseo Rasco PC, CO of the 1st Special Action Company, RSAF Battalion, RECOM 4, of a coup d'etat, and asked him to bring his troops to Sangley Point, Cavite City.⁷³ Two days later, or on the night of 30 November, a BLTB bus was found parked inside Camp Nakar, Lucena City. Subsequent investigation showed that this bus was originally contracted by Rasco to transport soldiers to Sangley but mistakenly, was sent to Camp Nakar instead of to Barangay Sto Cristo, Sariaya, Quezon. Rasco and his group got another bus and eventually reached Sangley.⁷⁴ Rasco used to be under Lt Col Marcelino Malajacan when the latter was Battalion Commander of 16 IB.⁷⁵

B.1.g. Fusilero

LtCol Fusilero played a leading role in Cebu, particularly in Mactan during the December 1989 coup attempt. He was the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Oriental for sometime until his relief for having assaulted a human rights lawyer in Dumaguete City on 4 September 1986.⁷⁶ Recalled to the RECOM 7 Headquarters in Cebu City, he was accused together with Abenina, then RECOM 7 Regional Commander, and PAF ex-Lt Col Neon Ebuena, then manager of the AFPSLAI Office in Cebu City, of joining the 28 August 1987 coup attempt. The three were charged with violation of Articles of War 67, 68, 96, and 97 before General Court Martial (GCM) No 8. Fusilero was placed under house arrest under the custody of the commander who took over from Abenina, BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr. Baccay was later transferred to Davao and replaced by BGen Benjamin Dizon who retired shortly before 30 November 1989. Dizon allowed Fusilero to roam around freely.⁷⁷ BGen Raul Imperial took over RECOM 7 a few days before the coup.

During the months of September and October 1989, Fusilero was sighted in Negros Occidental in the company of Bibit, a former PMA classmate, courting the support of military officers and enlisted men for a coup attempt. Intelligence reports were submitted by NICOM Intelligence Officer, Maj Alphonsus Crucero, on the recruitment activities of Fusilero and Bibit as early as September.⁷⁸ No pre-emptive action was made by higher headquarters and thus recruitment of coup supporters appeared to continue.

Although Fusilero was facing charges before GCM No 8 for his role in the 28 August 1987 coup attempt, he was not prevented from going to Leyte, certain parts of Mindanao, and Luzon. With his motorcycle

buddies called the Cyclones, he went to Agusan del Norte and contacted logging concessionaire Cesar Magsaysay, in whose company a brother of Fusilero has been employed.⁷⁹ A book entitled "A Path of the Masters", bearing Cesar Magsaysay's name, was among the things found in Noble's attache case when the latter's car was intercepted at a checkpoint in Sta Rita, Samar on 5 December 1989.⁸⁰ Apparently, Fusilero made these motorcycle caravan trips with the Cyclones as a good cover to make contacts with his military and civilian friends in various areas, including Bicol and the islands of Leyte and Samar.⁸¹ The Cyclones also visited Aparri, Cagayan, bailiwick of former Governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo, another one of Fusilero's classmates.

Sometime before 1 December, Fusilero was also seen at the Alavar's Seafood Restaurant in Cebu City, dining with Atty Homobono Adaza, an opposition leader from Mindanao, and BGen Comendador.⁸²

In the morning of 29 November, Fusilero instructed Lt Augusto Marquez, Chief, Regional Operations and Plans Branch of the R3 Division, RECOM 7, to contact Maj Anacleto Chagas, CO of the 347th PC Company based in Toledo City, and to tell Chagas to go to Roy Khan Station Restaurant located at Osmeña Boulevard, Cebu City at around 8:00 p.m. that day.⁸³ Chagas went directly to the office of the Operations Officer or R3, RECOM 7, thinking that it was Lt Col Alphonso Uranza, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, RECOM 7, who called for him. Upon reaching the R3 Division office and before he could go into the office of Uranza, Marquez told him that there would be a meeting at Roy Khan Station Restaurant at 7:00 p.m.⁸⁴ While in Cebu City on official business, Capt Cecil Ezra Sandalo, former Aide-de-camp of Abenina and CO of the 342nd PC Company based in Bogo, Cebu, also received a message in his residence from Fusilero for him to proceed to the restaurant.⁸⁵ Marquez, who was at the quarters of Uranza that evening with his future bride and in-laws, also received a call from Fusilero for him to proceed to said restaurant himself.⁸⁶

During this meeting at Roy Khan Station Restaurant, Fusilero informed those in attendance, namely, Chagas, Sandalo, Marquez, Ebuena and others, who were all in civilian clothes, that the coup they have been waiting for, would be staged at 10:00 p.m. of the following day, 30 November.⁸⁷ Fusilero then gave Chagas the amount of ₱10,000 in ₱100 bills in the presence of the conferees, and told Chagas to send troops to Mactan at 2:00 a.m. on 1 December.⁸⁸ Fusilero also requested Sandalo for his support, promising logistics and a handheld radio.⁸⁹ Fusilero told Marquez that the coup would not really affect Cebu as troops nationwide would converge in Manila.⁹⁰

After the meeting, Chagas followed Marquez to the quarters of Uranza where they revealed to him the disclosure made by Fusilero.⁹¹ The three had a drinking session which lasted until 2:30 a.m. of 30 November.⁹² None of them saw it fit at that time to inform either BGen Imperial, the Regional Commander, Col Andres Superable, the Chief of Staff, or Lt Col Enrique Cuadra, the Provincial Commander, of what transpired at the restaurant.⁹³

At around 6:30 a.m. of 30 November, Chagas left Toledo City and went directly to the quarters of his immediate superior, Lt Col Cuadra, informing him about what had taken place at the Roy Khan Station Restaurant the previous night.⁹⁴ Sandalo was also there to report the same matter. Cuadra instructed the two not to allow any troop movement, and to adhere to the chain of command.⁹⁵

At about the same time, Marquez, who barely had four hours of sleep, reported to his office and advised Superable that a coup would be staged in Manila that evening.⁹⁶ Superable then instructed Marquez to gather more information.⁹⁷ It seems that Superable did not elicit anymore information from Marquez, nor did Marquez, who was briefed by Fusilero the previous evening, appear to have volunteered much information.

After advising Lt Col Cuadra, Maj Chagas reported to Col Superable the incident at restaurant. Superable was surprised and got mad upon learning that Fusilero had asked Chagas to send troops to Mactan. Chagas was then instructed not to make any troop movement and to follow the chain of command. Chagas said that he later went to see Marquez and gave back the ₱10,000 to be returned to Fusilero.⁹⁸ Marquez confirmed that he received the amount from Chagas and alleged that he had returned it to Fusilero the same day at the RECOM 7 HQ, right after Chagas told Superable that the coup would be staged at 10:00 p.m. that day.⁹⁹ It was only upon learning about the planned coup from Fusilero that Superable informed BGen Imperial that there were strong indications that a coup would be staged that day, prompting Imperial to call PC Chief MGen Ramon Montano. As Montano was not around at that time, Imperial called up BGen Victor Natividad, then PC/INP Deputy Chief, and inquired about the developments in Manila. Imperial asked Natividad: "*Sir, may mga bali-balita dito na may mangyayari ngayon. Mayroon ba kayong balita ryan?*" (Sir, we have news here that something is going to happen. What's the news on your side?) To which query Natividad retorted: "*Anong ibig mong sabihin na may mangyayari ngayon* (What are you referring to), can you give me more details?" Imperial answered thus: "*Wala nga Sir, kaya nagtatanong ako kung mayroon kayong balita ryan*"¹⁰⁰ (We have none, Sir, that's why

I'm asking if you yourself have news). Imperial said that Superable did not convey to him the information given by Fusilero that the coup would occur at 10 p.m. on 30 November, although, he admitted that Superable mentioned to him of troop movements scheduled for 2:00 a.m. the following day.

B.1.h. Purugganan and Lim

Maj Abraham Purugganan and Capt Danilo Lim held meetings in Fort Bonifacio in October and November respectively. The first meeting was reportedly held at the office of Purugganan. In attendance were Col Luisito Sanchez, Capt Rogelio Bonifacio, Capt Lim, Capt Nestor Flordeliza, Capt Joe Cruz, Lt Stephen Flores, Lt Charles Galvez and enlisted personnel including MSgt Demabildo. It was mentioned that an "activity" may happen sometime.¹⁰¹

The second was held at the FSRR office and was also led by Purugganan and Lim. Other officers who attended were Capt Felix Calimag, Capt Roberto Rusio, Capt Jose Barao, Capt Pablo Casalme, Lt Allen Capuyan, Lt Samuel Bactad, and 2Lt Napoleon Mabalot. Each was asked for his particular field of interest and function in office.¹⁰²

B.2. Related Activities

B.2.a. Davao del Sur

The 19-25 January 1990 issue of the Philippine Muslim Times reported that certain Army authorities based in General Santos City were behind the alleged arrival of Irwin Ver and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr at the latter's farm in Malita, Davao del Sur, on 23 November 1989. An intelligence report of a senior NBI agent in Davao City dated 22 January 1990 further revealed flights of two private aircrafts during the week of 20 November in the vicinity of Malita at a private airstrip owned by a company controlled by the Cojuangcos and at the Davao International Airport.¹⁰³

Taking these news item and report as leads, the Commission was able to obtain information and evidence which may have some connection with the arrival of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr, a personality mentioned in the Galido affidavit who incidentally arrived a few days before the coup attempt.


The Chartered Flight to Kota Kinabalu

On 20 November at 9:15 a.m., a plane registered as RP-C585 left Manila for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia with a lone passenger, Roberto Huang. The plane was piloted by Capt Adriano Morales and Capt Loreto Vergeire.¹⁰⁴

Capt Morales initially told the Commission that the flight was chartered by Jayapuri Brunei Ltd and arranged through the Executive and Tourist Aviation, a company owned by Chemical Industries of the Philippines, Inc and managed by him. Huang, later testified that "about two or three" months before 20 November, a certain Oliver Ker, a Malaysian whom Huang had accidentally met in one of the casinos in Metro Manila, called him by telephone. Ker told Huang that he would arrange for him to visit Kota Kinabalu. Around 20 October, Huang was allegedly called by another man (whose name Huang could not remember), claiming to be the manager of Jayapuri, who told him that "they were contacted by Ker to arrange for a chartered flight for me [Huang]..." In any case, Huang was requested to assist in getting a charter and so he asked Capt Vergeire to arrange it.

The route contracted for, as authorized by Jayapuri, was Manila-Kota Kinabalu-Manila.¹⁰⁵ Without the prior knowledge of either Jayapuri or Ker, Huang added Davao City to the itinerary. According to Huang, a sidetrip to Davao City would not make that much difference in price, and so he and Capt Vergeire decided to do it on their own. However, the price differential and the flying time are not likely to be negligible because Capt Morales, in a sworn statement, said that Manila, Kota Kinabalu, and Davao are like the three points of an equilateral triangle as shown in Figure V-1.

Figure V-1 — Flight Diagram of Manila-Kota Kinabalu-Davao-Manila



At any rate, the total cost of the charter flight was a little over US \$6,000. About two weeks before 20 November, around US \$5,000 was sent to Huang allegedly from Ker through an emissary whose identity Huang could not remember. The foreign exchange was not surrendered to the banking system. Approximately US \$4,000 was given to Vergeire as down payment, while Huang kept the balance. When asked whether Vergeire issued him a receipt, Huang first said "I cannot remember, but I think so . . ." and then corrected himself and said a receipt was issued "because I remember he [Capt Vergeire] wrote 'Jayapuri' on the receipt." But in the end, Huang confessed that he was not really sure a receipt had been issued. Capt Vergeire, he said, was not really authorized to issue a receipt because, "from what I know, the airline is not his own or he does not work for the airline" whose plane they had used.

When asked whether a charter contract was in fact executed to cover the flight, Huang claimed: "I am not familiar with it. I don't know if there was a contract signed by Mr Vergeire with whom, to whoever, I don't know." Ker, for his part, apparently did not object to the informality of the arrangement, even if this was the first and only time Ker had arranged for Huang to charter a flight to Kota Kinabalu.

Huang alleged that the purpose of the trip was to make a deal about an oil mill, belonging to an insolvent company under receivership. It was situated about 200 kilometers from Kota Kinabalu, in a place whose exact name Huang could not remember.

The plane landed in Kota Kinabalu at 11:50 a.m. of 20 November. The pilots and Huang stayed there for three days, billeted in separate rooms at the Hyatt Hotel. Neither Morales nor Vergeire claimed to know what Huang did or whom he met. Capt Morales even disclaimed knowing whether Huang stayed at the Hyatt Hotel in Kota Kinabalu.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, Huang admitted that he told the pilots that he was checking in at the Hyatt Hotel and that on one occasion, the pilots invited him for a drink at the hotel lobby.

Huang did not meet with Ker until "in the afternoon, in the evening". They agreed to see the oil mill the next day, after which Huang would meet its receiver.

On 21 November, Ker and Huang went to the mill site and were there for less than two hours. They were permitted by the guard to look at the machineries and they saw that "there are about 12 units of them . . ." Huang considered the mill as still saleable, but, as a bargaining ploy, he described it to Ker as "in a very bad condition".

The following day, Ker told Huang that the receiver would not be able to meet him. No reason was given. In fact, not even the name of the receiver was revealed by Ker. The wasted time, effort and money did not seem to bother Huang. After all, he claimed to have "earned a few bucks," and said that the money spent was not his.

On 23 November, the plane left Kota Kinabalu at 2:00 p.m. for Davao City, allegedly with only Huang as the passenger.¹⁰⁷ At Davao International Airport, it was met by PAFSECOM, the Bureau of Customs and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation personnel. After refuelling, the plane left for Manila.

There are conflicting testimonies on the number of passengers aboard the flight to Manila, but there was unanimity on the point that Huang was not one of them.¹⁰⁶

The plane arrived in Manila at 7:45 p.m., 23 November.

Huang maintained that although the leg from Davao to Manila was already paid for, he really intended to disembark in Davao all along because it was imperative for him to brief his business associate, a certain Jess Quiogue, on what had transpired in Kota Kinabalu. He admitted, however, that he had made no prior appointment with Quiogue. Yet, instead of calling Quiogue from the Davao airport to find out if they could meet, Huang went to Davao Insular Hotel. He took his time before trying to contact Quiogue, who turned out to be in Manila. So Huang had to take the last PAL flight to Manila.

The Commission also received evidence showing that on 21 November, another aircraft, registered as RP-C410, owned by Agricultural Investors, Inc., an Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr company presently under PCGG sequestration, left Manila at 10:43 a.m. for Bacolod with Enrique Cojuangco, Ramon Ang, and Danilo Gamboa, as passengers.¹⁰⁹ The aircraft arrived in Bacolod at 11:57 a.m. and stayed there until 12:06 noon of 22 November, at which time it flew to Malita, Davao del Sur with Cojuangco and Ang as passengers. Gamboa was left behind in Bacolod. At 4:33 p.m. of 23 November, RP-C410 flew from Malita to Manila allegedly with Enrique Cojuangco and Ang as the only passengers.¹¹⁰

These two flights present a number of coincidences. For instance, all the pilots are somehow connected with Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. The pilot of RP-C410, Capt Jose Castillo, admits to having piloted for Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr several times in the past. He met with him personally at least once, between 23 November 1989 and 30 November 1989 at Cojuangco's residence at Balet Drive, Quezon City. The co-pilot of RP-C585, Capt Vergeire, was a pilot of the Cojuangcos for 14 years. He too admitted that he met with Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr at his residence after he had learned of his return. Morales initially denied knowing Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr personally, but later, in his sworn statement of 7 September 1990, he confirmed what Castillo had stated under oath, namely that "Morales, ... taught them [Eduardo and Enrique Cojuangco] how to fly years ago ..."¹¹¹

In addition, both Vergeire and Castillo were aware of each other's whereabouts on 23 November without having actually talked to each other. When Vergeire left Manila, as pilot of RP-C585 on 20 November,

he did not know that Castillo was going to fly RP-C410 the next day. But Vergeire claimed to have known that Castillo was flying near Davao City on 23 November in the afternoon because he allegedly "heard him through the radio." Castillo also admitted knowing Vergeire's whereabouts at the same time because he "heard his voice over the radio."

It must be noted that by the time Vergeire in RP-C585 flew into the Davao Airport at 4:45 p.m., Castillo had already taken off from Malita about twelve minutes earlier. Morales admitted that he and Vergeire started radio contact with the Davao International Airport tower only when they were over Cotabato. Furthermore, the Aircraft Flight Logbook Report (No 6301) of RP-C410 reports its "microphone weak" and "radio altimeter out". Still, both pilots claimed they knew where the other one was during this time.

What seems significant to the Commission is the admission made by Morales that RP-C585 could have flown from Kota Kinabalu and landed at Malita before proceeding to the Davao International Airport¹¹² without the government authorities finding out. Malita is on the direct line of a flight from Kota Kinabalu to Davao City. Morales insisted that they did not land at Malita. However, it took them two hours and 45 minutes to fly from Kota Kinabalu to Davao City and only two hours and ten minutes to negotiate the nearly equal distance from Davao City to Manila.¹¹³ Varying flight conditions could possibly account for the difference of 35 minutes, although such time could also be used to land and unload a passenger in Malita.

B.3. Government Activities

In the meantime, bits and pieces of information related to a coup attempt were either gathered by or filtered into the various intelligence services of the Armed Forces.

B.3.a. National Capital Region

In Manila, on 3 November, BGen Rodolfo Biazon, CG, National Capital Region Defense Command (NCRDC), detected that a coup attempt was shaping up and that there would be an alliance between the RAM-HF and the Loyalists.¹¹⁴

B.3.b. Camp Aguinaldo

On 21 October, in Camp Aguinaldo, elements of the security force of Vice President Laurel under Maj Gamos and Lt Calimag were reportedly

preparing plans, vehicles, codenames and numbers, and sketches of streets and buildings, all presumably in preparation for the coup.¹¹⁵

At Camp Aguinaldo, on 28 November, an unconfirmed report was received from the Intelligence Office of the Philippine Marines regarding the plan of some officers to launch a coup within the week. FSRR elements were pinpointed as participants. The wife of Lt Rodolfo Cachola was identified as the source of the report. Mrs Cachola revealed that her husband and another officer undergoing Scout Ranger training in San Quintin, Pangasinan were called to FSRR HQ in Fort Bonifacio and were briefed on the forthcoming coup. Lt Cachola relayed this information to his wife with instructions to report it to the Philippine Marines.¹¹⁶

B.3.c. Fort Bonifacio

In Fort Bonifacio, also in October 1989, Col Raul Urgello recommended to MGen Manuel Cacanando, CG PA, the relief of Capt Lim and Lt Julius Flores from their positions as FSRR's Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G3) and Intelligence Officer, respectively, based on Urgello's observation that said officers had united the Scout Rangers against BGen Rene Cardones, CG FSRR.¹¹⁷

On 2 November, on suspicion that the Scout Rangers and the Marines would participate in a coup attempt, an artillery battery consisting of five pieces of 105 mm Howitzers were pulled out of the Rangers leaving the FSRR with three defective ones.¹¹⁸

Before 30 November, BGen Cardones received reports that certain FSRR officers were holding meetings which he believed were for the purpose of motivating people to participate in a coup. Moreover, before 1 December, he received reports of visits made by BGen Blando to FSRR HQ which were not cleared with him, contrary to military protocol. Cardones also observed that Blando continued to have contacts with Purugganan, Lim, Galvez and Sanchez, all FSRR officers.¹¹⁹

B.3.d. Villamor Air Base

In June 1989, Ebuena was reported to be visiting PAF bases recruiting officers and men for the coup.¹²⁰

On 3 October, the PAF Intelligence Office received reports about a RAM-HF plan to undertake a coup attempt during the visit of President Aquino to the United States in November 1989.¹²¹ The following day the

Air Intelligence and Security Group received information on the formation of a group calling itself the Young Officers Union (YOU) reportedly poised to stage a coup if the Aquino government did nothing about the Uzi-Galil-Car-Buko scandals.¹²²

On 27 November, PAF received information about YOU's plan to stage a coup, making their first move in Sangley.¹²³

B.3.e. Cavite

In October 1989, a group of military personnel was reported to be recruiting at Sangley Point for another coup attempt, allegedly offering ₱10,000 to ₱20,000 to each recruit.¹²⁴

B.3.f. Central Luzon

In November, elements of the Angeles Metropolitan District Command (METRODISCOM), Pampanga PC/INP Command, Olongapo METRODISCOM, Zambales PC/INP Command and SUBCOM were purportedly recruited for a coup attempt.¹²⁵

B.3.g. Laguna

In August, Capt Rafael Cardeno, reportedly of the PC Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), visited his PMA classmate, Capt Melito Mabilin, police station commander of San Pedro, Laguna, at the latter's office, and gave Capt Mabilin 10 to 15 photocopies of information sheets on the YOU, which was said to be composed of officers from the ranks of captains to majors only. According to Mabilin, his wife burned the papers.¹²⁶

B.3.h. Pampanga

In Angeles City, before the opening of classes in June 1989, Capt Felizardo Serapio, Jr, CO 174th PC Company, was visited by his compadre and PMA classmate (Class '77), Capt Roque Maranon. At that time, Maranon was under detention for his alleged involvement in the siege of Camp Olivas during the 28 August 1987 failed coup. Maranon was allegedly out on pass from detention to attend a court hearing. Although Serapio disclaimed that Maranon tried to recruit him, he did not discount the possibility that Maranon's mention of his "assets" in Angeles City was the latter's indirect way of recruiting him. Serapio also said that, by that time, he had received information regarding recruitment efforts in his area by rightist elements in the Constabulary.¹²⁷

B.3.i. Cebu

During the PC Day Anniversary celebration in Cebu City in August 1989, Fusilero spread the news that a coup would take place.¹²⁸

At Punta Engano, Lapu-Lapu City, in September, an enlisted man under the Negros Island Command (NICOM) was approached by unidentified persons to join Fusilero in the planned coup. Members of the "Lost Command" of ex-Col Carlos Lademora were reportedly in Cebu meeting with some coup plotters.¹²⁹

Maj Alphonsus Crucero, NICOM Staff Officer for Intelligence, overheard FSRR officers complaining about the military leadership and about reforming the whole system.¹³⁰

In October, BGen Palma held a meeting with major unit commanders in Camp Lapu-Lapu, Cebu City, to discuss rumors of a coup and to emphasize the importance of following the chain of command. A separate meeting was held with BGen Comendador, who, when asked what his stand was, allegedly answered that he would follow the chain of command.¹³¹

B.3.j. Negros Occidental

In the first week of September, Fusilero and other suspected RAM-HF leaders were reportedly in Negros Occidental courting the support of officers and enlisted men.¹³²

At Negros Occidental, in the second week of September, Lt Col Anthony Lim of the 5th Scout Ranger Battalion (5 SRB) and Lt Col Roy Kyamko, CO 7 IB reported to BGen Jarque, CG NICOM, that Bibit was soliciting their support for a coup attempt.¹³³ In Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, in the fourth week of October, ex-Lt Col Bibit arrived with a group at the wake of the late MSgt Tomas Angostura PC. He also inquired from Lopez, CO 332nd PC Company, about the peace and order situation and the morale and welfare of the men. When asked why he was in the area, Bibit said that he just wished to condole with Angostura's family and that he was going around visiting "friends".¹³⁴

At Bacolod City in August, Bibit was seen with an unidentified companion at the Alice Log Cabin; he was also seen by MSgt Zoilo Ramos at the Golden Field Complex.¹³⁵

In September, a conference was reportedly held on the island of Pulupandan near Guimaras attended by some prominent businessmen and military officers. A separate report was received on the frequent meetings between some hacienda owners and disgruntled PC officers concerning a coup attempt.¹³⁶

In Bacolod City, on 4 November, it was learned that a coup had been planned to be carried out during President Aquino's visit to the US. However, it was allegedly aborted because the RAM-HF could not secure full support from its contacts. Continuous rebel recruitment to the level of battalion commanders and officers of NICOM was being monitored.¹³⁷

B.3.k. Dumaguete City

At Dumaguete City in the third week of November, P/Capt Rogelio Bais, INP, Deputy Station Commander for Administration of the Dumaguete City police station, received a call that some armed men were at the South Sea Hotel & Restaurant. A team responded and reported that the armed men were military personnel led by Fusilero. No further action was taken by the police authorities.¹³⁸

B.3.l. Davao City

On 20 November, an alleged study group from the Special Intelligence Training School (SITS), ISAFP, under a certain Capt de Guzman of the PAF, arrived in Camp Catitipan, Davao City, supposedly to conduct a survey among officers and enlisted personnel, directed by the CSAFP. Questions asked related to the probability of a coup d'etat.¹³⁹


On 23 November, Capt Gerry Diamante appeared at the 8 IB HQ, Camp Catitipan, Davao City and talked to the Battalion Executive Officer (EX-O), Maj Roberto Bara, warning the latter of the movement which had started its "countdown" and that it would soon "explode".¹⁴⁰

The local government officials in Davao del Norte were alerted of rumors of coup d'etat which would take place at Davao City and the Central Bank branch therein would be the target of rebel soldiers.¹⁴¹ On 20 November 1989, the study group of SITS, ISAFP was tasked to survey the military camps in view of the information of a pending coup d'etat. Hence, full red alert status was enforced in all units by BGen Baccay, who also called an emergency conference. It was learned that some junior officers had been conducting clandestine meetings in Davao City for the past few days with 2Lt Cesar Mancao as one of the active participants in the meeting.¹⁴²

B.3.m. Agusan del Sur

On 22 November, Capt Diamante appeared at 401 Bde HQ, Agusan del Sur, to inform the Brigade Commander, Col Cristobal Gurra, and staff officers about the "Movement to Free Mindanao," which he said would be launched within the month. Initiated by young military officers, the movement plans to sever Mindanao from Luzon and establish a revolutionary government. Diamante stated that the revolutionary government would be organized in coordination with other secessionist groups.¹⁴³

Other pre-coup activities which form an integral part of certain events are left out of this section and are included instead in the respective battle zone narratives.






Figure V-3

REBEL TROOP MOVEMENTS IN LUZON December 1989 Coup Attempt






Figure V-4

REBEL TROOP MOVEMENTS IN VISAYAS and MINDANAO December 1989 Coup Attempt



NARRATIVES OF BATTLE ZONES

C. Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base

The takeover of Fort Bonifacio was critical because of the tactical importance of the camp. Fort Bonifacio has the biggest ammunition depot in the Philippines where the Light Armor Brigade (LABde) with their armored vehicles, plus armories of high-powered weapons and combat equipment are found. Howitzers based in Fort Bonifacio can lay its deadly ammunition all the way to Malacañang and Camp Aguinaldo. Another reason was that the headquarters of the elite fighting units of the AFP, the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) of the Army and the Philippine Marines (PMAR) of the Navy, are based inside the camp.

Signals of a Coup

After hearing several reports of an impending coup, a group of Philippine Army Intelligence Officers of the 15th Intelligence and Security Unit (ISU) held a meeting in the morning of 29 November at their headquarters.¹⁴⁴ However, the conferees merely confirmed receipt of such information and dismissed the same as rumors.

Unfortunately, the unconfirmed reports proved to be true. On the evening of 29 November, Scout Rangers of the 14 SR Coy, FSRR, under Capt Jaime Junio based in Tagaytay, attacked the PAF Repeater Station in Tagaytay City. This was to signal the start of the attempted coup.¹⁴⁵ By 10:00 p.m. of 29 November, reports were received that elements from this company had destroyed the antennae of the PAF Repeater Station.¹⁴⁶ However, they failed to cut the cable of the communications equipment. This enabled the radio operator in Tagaytay to contact the duty operator at VAB and was able to report the incident to Col Dominador Salac, PAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (A2), at about 10:15 that evening.¹⁴⁷

This message was relayed to Col Rene Dado, PA Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, (G3), who was at the Army Operations Center (AOC). The AOC is near the Communications Center (COMCENTER) which houses the communications facilities of the Army. As Operations Officer of the Philippine Army, Dado issued a directive to the Post Commander of Fort Bonifacio to strengthen the security of all vital installations. He also directed the CO of Task Force Bonifacio to send elements of his unit to beef up security at the AOC.¹⁴⁸

There were indications that the attack in Tagaytay was premature. In subsequent interrogation of the arrested rebels by men under BGen Rene Cardones, (CG FSRR), one of the men arrested remarked to the investigator: "*Napauna lang 'yung tira namin doon kagabi*, [actually] *mamayang gabipayung pukpukan*." (Last night's attack was premature, the action is later tonight).¹⁴⁹ As pointed out by BGen Loven Abadia, Wing Commander 205 HW, Junio "got his signals crossed" as the attack "got everybody curious".¹⁵⁰

C.1. Movement of Scout Rangers in Fort Bonifacio

C.1.a. 30 November

Preparation of Scout Ranger Troops

At 2:00 a.m., Capt Jose Agdeppa, course director of the FSRR on training instructed his trainees to withdraw their rifles and ammunitions. He issued M-16 rifles and 60 rounds of ammos with magazines per soldier. It must be noted that at this time, aside from the FSRR HQ staff and trainees, there were no Ranger units assigned in Fort Bonifacio as all other units were deployed outside the camp. Most of the Rangers inside the camp were trainees at the Retraining Center under Agdeppa. The Rangers were supposed to graduate by 28 November but to allow them to stay longer in Fort Bonifacio, their graduation was deliberately delayed.¹⁵¹ Capt Lim coordinated the other Scout Rangers who belonged to the HQ Company.¹⁵²

It was reported that the sudden increase in the number of Scout Rangers inside the camp was due to the arrival of personnel coming from other SR units, like the 4 SRB under Lt Col Galvez stationed in Isabela, the 9 SR Coy under Capt Albert Yen at Fort Magsaysay, and the 14 SR Coy under Junio in Tagaytay City. These troops moved from their home base to Fort Bonifacio, and "infiltrated" or un-officially joined the other Scout Rangers based inside the camp a few days before 30 November 1989.¹⁵³

By early dawn of 30 November, intelligence officers were receiving mounting information which pointed to an impending coup. There were reports that Honasan and Bibit were present at Ilang-ilang St, North Cembo in Fort Bonifacio. Counter-intelligence operatives conducted surveillance in the area but found no sign of them.¹⁵⁴ Thirteen of the soldiers who raided the AFP communications station in Tagaytay were arrested by CAPCOM troops. The arrested soldiers belonged to the 14 SR Coy.¹⁵⁵ Three of these soldiers, Pfc Joseph Soriano, Sgt Eduardo

Acevedo and Cpl Maguillen were investigated by personnel of BGen Cardones.

Meeting of PA Officers

At 8:00 a.m. of 30 November, seeing that the veracity of the reports about an impending coup was becoming clearer, Capt Jaime Yangzon, Assistant Chief, Operations Branch G3, PA called a conference of all junior battle staff officers to disseminate the information received about the coup. He then ordered the officers to take the necessary security measures in the event that the reported coup materialized.¹⁶⁴

At 10:00 a.m., Col Dado instructed the intelligence officer of the Headquarters and Headquarters Service Group (HHSg) to monitor activities of Scout Rangers within Fort Bonifacio.¹⁶⁷

Also by this time, Col Cesar Ilano, Commander of the PA Security and Intelligence Service Group (SISG), received a report from Capt Ralph Villanueva, Commander 3 ISU, that a coup was to be launched in the evening of the same day or early dawn of 1 December.¹⁶⁸ Ilano called a conference of officers of the SISG. He asked his EX-O, Lt Col Rodolfo Garcia, to preside over the conference, so that the former could call up his chief, Col Raul Urgello, PA Intelligence Officer (G2). Urgello, however, was tired and dizzy from lack of sleep due to the interrogation he conducted on Junio, and so he instructed Ilano to inform MGen Cacanando directly.

At 3:00 p.m., Ilano went to HPA but did not find Cacanando who was then in Baguio attending the launching of the "No Hazing Movement" and the Recognition Day rites at the PMA. Ilano instead met Dado and told the latter of the impending coup. At that time, Dado was preparing to leave for Bataan the following day (1 December) to assume the command of the 702 Bde. He told Ilano that if a coup occurs after his departure, Lt Col Jaime Ligot, the Deputy Operations Officer, can take over. Ilano rejoined the conference of the intelligence officers, who were still waiting for him, at about 5:30 p.m.¹⁶⁹

Cacanando left Baguio at around 3:00 p.m.¹⁶⁰ On his way to Manila, he first heard about the impending coup at 7:00 p.m. when President Aquino called him by phone and asked "What's this startling report, General?", referring to the reported attack by the Scout Rangers on the PAF communications facility in Tagaytay City. She also asked him to cancel his 4 December trip to the US.¹⁶¹

Cacanando immediately called his General Staff by phone and ordered that a conference be held at his quarters later that evening upon his arrival. He also ordered Col Abraham Paray to put all armor assets within Fort Bonifacio on alert status, to which the latter complied.¹⁶² At about 5:00 p.m., the junior battle staff of the AOC was activated to direct, monitor, and prepare contingency forces.¹⁶³

Meanwhile, the number of Scout Rangers in Fort Bonifacio had swelled to include elements of the 4 SRB from Isabela, which arrived in batches at Brgy Militar (Brgy Sto Niño) in Fort Bonifacio. They reputedly were the same elements who were monitored at about 1:15 p.m. by the Nueva Ecija Constabulary Command, passing through the area aboard three 6 x 6 trucks, one jeep and one pick-up.¹⁶⁵

In the early evening of 30 November, Col Ilano went to the G2 (PA) (Col Urgello's) office to wait for MGen Cacanando. There, Maj Rodolfo Espiritu, Intelligence Chief Operations Officer, reported the entry of civilians carrying *bayongs* on board jeepneys and going to the FSRH HQ. This information was submitted to the G2.¹⁶⁶ By 7:00 p.m., ISU Operations Officer Capt Percival Abu had obtained information about a plan to hold Cacanando hostage by the Special Intervention Platoon (SIP) under Lt Vicente Gregorio Tomas, who was reported to have sided with the rebels.¹⁶⁷ Ironically, the SIP was supposed to be the unit assigned to protect the CG PA in case of a coup. Likewise, Tomas was a most unlikely coup participant. He was with Col Dado in Camp Aguinaldo during the August 1987 coup attempt, when they both defended the government against Honasan. During that engagement Tomas was wounded.

At 6:30 p.m. Ilano prepared a written report of the intelligence information he gathered.¹⁶⁸ He sent copies thereof to Cacanando and to the other units. The copy for Cacanando was delivered by Capt Rodrigo Macalang and was received by Maj Yano at the quarters of Cacanando.¹⁶⁹

The Scout Ranger rebel troops were consolidated and made combat ready at about 8:00 p.m. of 30 November. In preparation for the planned attacks, Maj Purugganan and Capt Lim held a third meeting at the office of the G2 FSRH to finalize their plans. It will be recalled that their first two meetings were held in October and early November.

At this third meeting, the group already included Capt Ed Malabanjot and Maj Leovino Valencia. They were informed that the "activity" would take place by 3:00 a.m. of 1 December 1989. Their task included the takeover of HPA, AOC, 808 Custodial Company, INP TRACOM, and

Gates 1 and 2. Capt Jose Cruz, FSRR Logistics Officer, was assigned to provide supplies and equipment.¹⁷⁰

At 9:00 p.m. the rebel Rangers had started to move in different directions. Thirty minutes later, they took control of the Area Research Center. Further information revealed that Marcos Loyalist troops were ready to lend their support.¹⁷¹ Rebel soldiers aboard two 6 x 6 trucks passed through the vicinity of the HPA and moved towards the AOC.¹⁷²

At about 10:00 p.m., MGen Cacanando arrived at his quarters. He convened the Staff Conference which he had called for while en route from Baguio City. This was attended by the General Staff of the PA with selected Post Unit Commanders.¹⁷³ Cacanando and the Staff discussed the reports about the attack on Tagaytay and on the reported coup. The former ordered the security at Gates 1, 2 and 3, including the detention centers, strengthened. He gave further instructions to his officers to meet him in a conference at the AOC with the entire Battle Staff. They then proceeded to the AOC at about 12:00 midnight.¹⁷⁴

The Takeover of the Headquarters Philippine Army

Lt Col Ligot was at his office inside the HPA when rebel soldiers on board the two 6 x 6 trucks passed by the vicinity of the HPA reception area. He called the AOC, to which Dado had proceeded upon Cacanando's instructions, to verify if the troop movement was authorized. He learned from Capt Edgardo Gurrea that the soldiers were not friendly troops. BGen Lisandro Abadia called from Camp Aguinaldo and, upon being briefed about the development instructed Ligot to lock the HPA doors and not to let the troopers enter. Ligot complied.

Lt Col Julius Javier, the PA EX-O, who was at the AOC, tried to call HPA but to no avail as he found the phone lines dead. Ligot then ordered the accounting of personnel who were also told to stay dispersed inside the Army Operations (G3) office. Capt Glorioso Miranda who was among the armed troopers outside, went to the HPA to talk to Ligot, who was the highest ranking officer present at that time. Miranda gave the assurance that there was no intention to harm anyone and requested that the door of the building be opened. Upon hearing this, Ligot acceded but only Miranda was allowed to enter the building. The latter also requested that the offices of MGen Cacanando and BGen Ramberto Saavedra, Chief of Staff PA, be opened.

By 10:00 p.m., the rest of Miranda's troops had assumed control of the HPA.¹⁷⁵ Government personnel did not resist because they were

outnumbered. The rebels pointed their guns and rifles at Government personnel and demanded their surrender. The latter were disarmed and told to follow whatever instructions the captors would give.¹⁷⁶ The raiders were led by Capts Pablo Casalme and Miranda and 2Lt Arnulfo Pajarillo.¹⁷⁷

Then at 10:30 p.m. power lines in Fort Bonifacio were cut, resulting in a total blackout.¹⁷⁸ Rebel troops took over Gate 1 of Fort Bonifacio at Pateros. These troops were students of the Mortar Gunnery Course of the FSRR. They took their firearms, M-60 machine guns with 300 bullets each, from the Regimental Troop School. Supply room personnel did not want to allow the withdrawal of the firearms, but were prevailed upon to do so by Capt Fidel Legiralde, Jr.¹⁷⁹ There were reports that Capts Cruz, Agdeppa, Lim, and Jose Barao and Lt Cesario Almendras supervised and distributed firearms, ammunition, and equipment to rebel Rangers.¹⁸⁰

The intelligence information gathered by Capt Abu about Lt Tomas of the SIP siding with the rebels came as a surprise. Upon learning this from Abu by phone, Lt Danilo Estropia of Cacanando's Security Services team confronted Tomas about the report. Tomas confirmed it saying "*Go na sila* (referring to the SIP)".¹⁸¹

The situation became serious as the very platoon tasked to guard the AOC had joined the rebels. Worse, the AOC was the venue of MGen Cacanando's conference with the PA staff officers scheduled at about midnight of 30 November.¹⁸²

Lt Estropia then went to the ISG Office and broke the news to Col Ilano. At about 11:00 p.m. of 30 November, Estropia and Ilano went to the AOC and tried to warn Cacanando, who was not yet there when the two arrived. Ilano then relayed the information to BGen Saavedra who in turn asked Capt Morales what troops were below the AOC Office. The latter said they were the SIP. Overhearing this, Col Dado interrupted and said "*atin yan*" (They are ours). Ilano warned the personnel at the AOC not to let them come up because they would capture Cacanando. Thereafter, Ilano left the AOC and went back to his office.¹⁸³ It remains unconfirmed, however, whether Saavedra received Ilano's report.

As recounted by Col Paray, Lt Tomas was manning a checkpoint near the Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQ) in Fort Bonifacio at about 11:40 p.m. of 30 November. Paray was allowed to pass through and proceeded to inspect the 4th Light Armor Company Separate (4 LACS) to check on the readiness of armored vehicles and crew in case of any

eventuality.¹⁸⁴ Then, he went on to the AOC for the staff meeting called by Cacanando. Paray reached the AOC at 12:35 a.m. 1 December and saw Cacanando, Saavedra, Col Dionedo Villanueva, PA Personnel Officer (G1), Col Dado, Col Reynaldo Gopilan, PA Logistics Officer (G4), Maj Benjamin Magday and Cesar Javier, Capts Gurrea, Yangzon, Jesus Abante, and some other AOC junior officers.¹⁸⁵

C.1.b. 1 December

Escape of MGen Cacanando from the AOC

Before midnight of 30 November, rebels had already taken over the HPA, located some 100 meters from the AOC. Col Gopilan at the AOC received a report from Capt Carlos Holganza of the PA Plans Office (G5) about the presence of rebel Rangers around the HPA.¹⁸⁶ At this time, Lt Estropia asked MGen Cacanando's Aide-de-camp, Lt Ronaldo Manahan, "*Alam na ba ni CG na si Tomas ang papasok dito?*" (Does the CG know that Tomas will take over here?). Surprised, Lt Manahan relayed this to Maj Carlos Calanog.¹⁸⁷ Immediately, Calanog led Cacanando out of the AOC, boarding a wagon together with two aides, Lts Manahan and Sayson.¹⁸⁸

At the same time, Rangers entering the AOC compound stopped the outgoing wagon at the gate. They pointed their guns towards its occupants and shouted "Halt! Halt!" Pretending to be with the Rangers, Estropia shouted back "*Clear na yan. Si Maj Calanog yan.*" (That vehicle has clearance. Maj Calanog is inside). The wagon was allowed to pass leaving Estropia behind. He later noticed that Lt Yogyog was leading the team of Rangers manning the gate.¹⁸⁹ Cacanando and his group then proceeded to the HHSO about one kilometer to the left of AOC. Phone lines at the AOC were suddenly cut.¹⁹⁰

FSRR elements aboard two trucks arrived at the AOC at about 12:40 a.m. of 1 December. No resistance was put up by the SIP under Tomas. By 1:00 a.m., all SIP elements wore the rebel forces' countersign. The guards previously manning the gates were herded to one side and instructed not to make any false moves.¹⁹¹

Because MGen Cacanando was incommunicado, Gen de Villa appointed BGen Galido as acting CG PA.

The officers at Cacanando's conference were held hostage by rebel Rangers. Among the rebels were Col Sanchez, Lt Col Galvez, Maj Valencia and Purugganan, Capts Yen, Dominador Pagulayan, Fernando

Abuan, Ernesto Cutiyog, and Essel Soriano and Lts Galvez, Tomas, Alvin Tiamwatt and Agane Adriatico.¹⁹² The rebel Rangers also took control of the nearby JUSMAG compound.¹⁹³ Capt Yen, together with some FSRR radio operators, sent out communications in the name of MGen Cacanando.¹⁹⁴

Apparently the transmitted misinformation was used to move troops stationed in the north.¹⁹⁵ One of the messages was addressed to BGen Marcelo Blando, CG 7 ID.¹⁹⁶ The rebel Rangers also broadcasted radio messages in the name of MGen Cacanando, stating that the whole PA was fully supporting the rebel forces in their alleged effort to reform the political structure, and urging all Army units to contribute to the attainment of this objective. BGen Orlando Antonio, CG NOLCOM, received the radio message at about 8:00 a.m. of 1 December while he was aboard a Huey helicopter bound for Tarlac. However, he disregarded this message since no radio telephone contact with the HPA could be established for verification. It was instead referred to BGen Lisandro Abadia.¹⁹⁷

Col Ilano said he sent Capt Abu and Capt Maclang to go around and try to obtain information about the Ranger's activities. Maclang and Abu wore rebel countersigns allegedly to be able to move freely. After the attempted coup, the two were relieved by MGen Cacanando. He also relieved Col Ilano of his command for the failure of his intelligence operations.¹⁹⁸ Ilano denied the imputation, claiming they were in fact able to establish the occurrence of the coup several hours before it began.¹⁹⁹

Takeover of Vital Installations

The Scout Rangers led by Capt Legiralde moved swiftly. Aside from securing the HPA, AOC, the JUSMAG compound, Gates 1 and 2, they also attacked the 808th Custodial Company at the Army Detention Center. A firefight ensued at the area, including the vicinity near Gate 1.²⁰⁰ The Scout Rangers prevailed. They disarmed the personnel at the 808th Custodial Company and released the 1987 coup detainees from the detention center.²⁰¹

The Scout Rangers also rushed to COMCENTER. They disarmed the personnel there, including Capt Feliciano Fernandez, Communications Officer, PA Signal Group, who was in charge of the COMCENTER. An unidentified Ranger announced a coup d'etat, the capture of AOC, G3 HQ, and the PALAR and instructed that communications and power lines be destroyed. However, Capt Fernandez

was able to negotiate and the Rangers agreed not to blow up the communications system; instead, they disconnected the telephone lines at the main distribution frame.²⁰²

By 2:00 a.m., the rebel Rangers had already taken control of HPA, AOC, COMCENTER, JUSMAG compound, the 808th Custodial Company, Gates 1, 2, 3, including the INP/NCRDC Field Force,²⁰³ and the National Mapping and Resource Inventory Authority (NAMRIA) where they took the firearms of the security guards and nine vehicles which they used subsequently in transporting officers and hauling supplies and equipment.²⁰⁴

A group of about 20 Scout Rangers searched the quarters of key military officers including those of MGen Cacanando and BGen Cardones.²⁰⁵ One company of Rangers led by 2Lts Raymundo Acorda and Angel Adrian Sievert arrived at Cacanando's quarters and disarmed the guards assigned at the gate. The Rangers then made the guards drop to prone positions. Lt Estropia, who proceeded to Cacanando's quarters after leaving the AOC, talked to the Ranger officers and noting that Cacanando was not there, ordered them not to search his quarters. The Rangers obeyed and proceeded to man the JUSMAG.²⁰⁶

BGen Cardones was also not in his quarters when the Rangers arrived, since he was attending the Command Conference held by Gen de Villa at Camp Aguinaldo. When he returned to his office at the FSRR HQ in Fort Bonifacio, and upon hearing that Scout Rangers had taken over major points in Fort Bonifacio, he took temporary refuge in the quarters of Lt Col Javier. Cardones hid by the creek, staying there the whole night and then escaped by going over the wall towards Dasmariñas Village.²⁰⁷

Build-up of Rebel Ranger Logistics

After taking control of various vital facilities and locations in Fort Bonifacio, the Scout Rangers sought to acquire additional arms. The troops of both "B" Company and "C" Company, 1 SRB, FSRR were instructed to withdraw their M-16 rifles with magazines and 140 rounds of ammunition.²⁰⁸ The rest of the 14 SR Coy based in Tagaytay City arrived in Fort Bonifacio by 4:30 a.m. of 1 December and stayed in the Liaison Office of the FSRR HQ.²⁰⁹

Later, they were called to formation and boarded a 6 x 6 truck with Lt Galvez and were brought to man Gate 2.²¹⁰ At 6:30 a.m. Lt Col Salvador Limsiaco, Chief of Staff of LABde, Lt Col Paypon of PAFC, Maj

Nescarito Ramos of SSBde and Maj Pablo Bayot of G1, LABde were stopped by FSRR elements at Gate 2 on their way to their offices. They were made to board a white Land Cruiser of NAMRIA and they were brought under escort to the FSRR Officers Lounge where they were detained for 11 hours.

Limsiaco later reported the presence at the lounge of officers who were not organic to the FSRR and were wearing rebel countersign patches, namely, Lt Col Franklin Brawner, Lt Col Ligot, Col Leopoldo Aliac, Capt Soriano and Capt Cutiyog. Ligot, however, said that he had to wear the patch because otherwise he could not have left the AOC.²¹¹ He requested Col Sanchez and Capt Lim to allow him to go to his office, promising to return. He was then allowed to leave.²¹²

Presence of BGen (Ret) Felix Brawner

Limsiaco saw BGen (Ret) Felix Brawner, Jr and MGen (Ret) Jaime Echevarria, both in civilian attire, moving about freely in the area near the Officers Lounge. Limsiaco requested BGen Brawner to contact his (Limsiaco's) wife to assure her of his safety.²¹³

By morning, Capt Lim and other Scout Ranger officers had gone to the AOC.²¹⁴ Col Dado and the rest of MGen Cacanando's staff were still being held there as hostages. Some of the rebels at the AOC, particularly Lt Col Galvez and Lts Adriatico and Tomas, tried to recruit him to join the rebel cause. He refused.²¹⁵ In his testimony, Col Dado confirmed the presence of BGen Brawner in the area. Col Paray, one of the officers hostages at the AOC, stated that at about 10:00 a.m., BGen Brawner visited the AOC and spoke to him about the "importance of the armor" saying "if the rebels had them, this would hasten what they (the rebel Rangers) were doing." When Col Paray did not agree, BGen Brawner left and walked towards the HPA and there conversed with Col Sanchez and Maj Valencia.²¹⁶ By this time, the rebels had intensified their defense position at the AOC by placing a V-150 and establishing lookouts and gun emplacements at every corner of the AOC complex.²¹⁷

Recruiting the Light Armor Brigade Commander

Knowing the importance of the assets under the control of Col Paray, Lt Col Galvez, Valencia, Lim and other FSRR officers exerted efforts to convince him to release the 4 LACS and place it under the FSRR. Paray refused. Lim told him that some of his men had sent feelers wanting to join the rebels. While Paray was confident none of his men would join the rebels, he agreed to go to the 4 LACS area to ask for the stand of his men.

At 3:00 p.m., they proceeded to the 4 LACS compound and the personnel there immediately took defensive positions so that the Rangers could not approach them. Only Paray was allowed to step forward. He spoke to Capt Amado Contreras, Company Commander, who reaffirmed the company's position to follow orders only from Paray. Paray then went back to the Ranger officers and told them his unit would not join.²¹⁸

Before the coup, as a precautionary measure, Paray instructed his men that if a coup occurs, the 4 LACS should obey only orders given by him personally.

Lim persisted in trying to convince Paray, who continued to refuse. In their heated argument, the former dropped the name of BGen Blando who he said was expected to arrive at the AOC by helicopter.²¹⁹ There were also reports that a helicopter was sent in the morning to Fort Magsaysay to fetch Blando. The latter, however, did not arrive at AOC. Maj Purugganan was heard to ask "*Bakit wala pa si Tatang One?*" (Why is Tatang One not yet here). Among the Rangers, "Tatang One" was the code name for Blando.²²⁰

Seeking Artillery Equipment

Aside from the armor, the rebel Rangers also sought artillery equipment. At 9:00 a.m., Capt Constante Pante, Operations Officer of the Honor Guard Battalion (HGB) HHSG, PA, with a RAM-HF countersign placed on his left arm, went to the firebase (the place where the 105 mm Howitzer guns were located), gave Capt Eugenio de los Santos, head of the Battery Command, six pieces of countersigns, and tried to convince the latter and his personnel to wear them. De los Santos refused.

At 3:00 p.m., de los Santos saw Pante, Galvez, Lim, Soriano, Cutiyog and Paray at the 4 LACS area, which is beside the Battery Command. All except Col Paray were wearing countersigns, and Capt Pante said to the others "*atin yan*" referring to Capt de los Santos. At 11:30 p.m., Pante returned to the firebase and approached de los Santos with a map and instructed him to compute the "data" of Camp Aguinaldo and Malacañang. As used in the military, "data" mean the calculations needed to aim the 105 mm Howitzers, which have a firing range of about 11 kilometers. Both Camp Aguinaldo and Malacañang are well within the range. Pante also instructed de los Santos to "lay the guns," but de los Santos stalled, saying it was too late in the night. Pante, who claimed to be the new HGB Commander, allegedly threatened de los Santos that if he would not join the rebels he would be liquidated.²²¹

Regrouping of Rebel Rangers

Failing to persuade the COs of the 4 LACS and the Artillery unit of HGB, the Rangers had to make do with only five armored vehicles which they took from the Maintenance Depot, and two platoons of the HGB.²²² By this time, PAF jets had destroyed the rebel air assets in Sangley Point and BGen Blando had failed to arrive at Fort Bonifacio. The Scout Ranger officers sought to regroup. They left the AOC by early afternoon of 1 December.²²³ Some of the hostaged government officers were released by that time.²²⁴ At about 2:30 p.m., Capt Lim and Lt Col Galvez arrived at the COMCENTER and instructed its personnel to restore one hot line at the AOC to the FSRR headquarters and one local line at the AOC.²²⁵

At the FSRR Officers Lounge, Col Sanchez released Lt Col Limsiaco and Maj Bayot, but instructed for them not to leave the camp compound. The two reported to the LABde.²²⁶

By late afternoon, Sgt Logan of the monitoring team had reported that some Scout Rangers and AWOL soldiers numbering about 300 had been observed changing their white countersigns to red countersigns.²²⁷ The monitoring team under SSgt Oscar Obenia, HQ Intelligence Company, reported to the NCRDC Command Operations Center the sighting of 100 Scout Rangers in full combat gear aboard two V-150s and two 6 x 6 trucks moving from Fort Bonifacio towards Ayala Avenue and EDSA.²²⁸

C.1.c. 2 December

Early in the morning, Lt Tomas and his security, wearing the RAM-HF countersign, arrived at the firebase and asked de los Santos to tow one 105 mm Howitzer to the AOC building. The latter refused and said that unless Col Dado or Maj Magday instructed him to do so, he would not comply.²²⁹

Shortly thereafter, Capt Pante arrived again and asked de los Santos to bring out the 105 mm Howitzers to defend Fort Bonifacio in case of an attack by government troops from SOLCOM.²³⁰ De los Santos again refused.

Government Troop Movements

Between 8:00 to 10:00 a.m., the 4 LACS personnel maneuvered and redeployed all their armor vehicles away from the area near the firebase. They then consolidated at the LABde HQ to rescue the remaining

hostages at the AOC.²³¹ At the same time, the personnel at the HHSG, which is just across the AOC, began to take defensive positions.²³²

FSRR elements, noting the movement of the armor vehicles, alerted Maj Valencia; he then asked Col Paray to explain the 4 LACS movement. The latter took this opportunity to request that he be allowed to leave AOC to meet the men. His request was granted and he went to the Brigade HQ to talk to his officers and men. He reminded them to remain loyal to the duly constituted government. He also wrote a note to BGen Lisandro Abadia regarding the situation which was delivered by courier.²³³

The maneuver of the 4 LACS which resulted in all the armor moving out of the firebase left the Howitzers of de los Santos without protection. To avoid having the artillery fall into rebel hands, de los Santos instructed his men to remove the firing pins of the 105 mm Howitzers, bury them in the nearby field, and to leave their post.²³⁴

Feelers for Negotiation

By 9:00 a.m., the Scout Rangers at the AOC had received reports that General Headquarters was planning to stage an offensive operation against them, employing two brigades under the NCRDC.²³⁵ This news led Capt Agdeppa to instruct his troops of "C" Company, 1 SRB, FSRR, to establish a defensive perimeter against government troopers.²³⁶ By mid-morning, some Scout Rangers started abandoning their positions in Fort Bonifacio. At about 11:00 a.m., feelers for a dialogue were received by Cacanando shortly after Maj Valencia and Capt Lim arrived at the AOC for this purpose. Col Dado held a short dialogue with the two. One of their requests was for the CG PA or G2 to call former CG PA MGen (Ret) Rodolfo Canieso of NICA and discuss some demands of the Rangers.²³⁷

In the meantime, Capts Yangzon and Gurrea slipped out of AOC through the back exit and established contact with the PA Battle Staff at HHSG.²³⁸ They briefed Cacanando on the situation at the AOC.²³⁹ Gurrea and Yangzon returned to the AOC, informed Dado about their contact with Cacanando, and presented their escape plan in case the negotiations failed. Dado then went to see Cacanando.²⁴⁰ The latter sent Col Urgello, who was designated as his official emissary, and Dado to talk with the rebel leaders of the Scout Rangers²⁴¹ to settle the matter peacefully. Col Sanchez, Lt Cols Galvez and Ochosa, Maj Valencia, Capts Lim, Yen, Pagulayan, Abuan, Cutiyog, Soriano and Tiamwatt, and Lts Tomas, Galvez and Adriatico met with Cols Urgello and Dado, Maj Magday, and Capts Gurrea and Yangzon at the G2 section of the

HHSG building.²⁴² Urgello revealed that Tomas was disgusted because he thought they were just being used in a power play.²⁴³

Capt Lim served as spokesman for the rebels. As a result of the negotiations, it was initially agreed that there would be no fighting inside Fort Bonifacio and that the rebels would recognize the authority of MGen Cacanando. They also agreed to assemble at HPA Grandstand for accounting of personnel and inventory of equipment.²⁴⁴ Lim, however, indicated that the matter must be cleared with Maj Purugganan, giving rise to the impression that Purugganan was the leader of the rebel Scout Rangers in Fort Bonifacio.²⁴⁵

At 1:00 p.m., as the rebel Rangers abandoned AOC, government troopers led by the Headquarters Intelligence Security Group (HISG) immediately secured the building.²⁴⁶ The Rangers also left the COMCENTER with instructions not to restore the communications system without their clearance.²⁴⁷ At around 2:00 p.m., they started pulling out from the areas they occupied, as earlier agreed upon. However, instead of assembling at the HPA Grandstand, they consolidated at the Golf Club area near Gate 2 fronting McKinley Road at Forbes Park.²⁴⁸ About 350 rebel Rangers, excluding those who may have left earlier, under Maj Purugganan, Lt Col Galvez, and Capt Lim, instead of returning to barracks went to the Makati Commercial Center. Some 66 Rangers under Col Sanchez, Lt Col Ochosa and Maj Valencia returned to barracks.²⁴⁹

Retaking of Fort Bonifacio by Government Forces

HPA personnel immediately took control of all vital installations in Fort Bonifacio²⁵⁰ as soon as the rebel forces vacated the occupied areas in the camp.

MGen Cacanando then directed the reorganization and consolidation of his forces to man designated areas including vital installations such as the AOC, HPA Building and COMCENTER. He directed HHSG to strengthen the security of Gates 1, 2, 3, the detention center, and the ammo dump. BGen Cabanlig's Marines manned Gate 3. The Command Contingency Task Force was reorganized under Col Paray. Inventory of equipment and physical accounting of personnel were conducted by all post unit commanders.²⁵¹ At the COMCENTER, Capt Fernandez ordered the restoration of normal operations and the inventory of all equipment, firearms and ammunition.

C.2. Movement of the Rangers to Makati

It is not exactly clear why the rebel soldiers, contrary to prior agreement reached with Dado and Urgello, marched from Fort Bonifacio and occupied Makati's commercial district. The government forces did not anticipate the rebel seizure of Makati's tall buildings. When everything was over and done with, they theorized that it was simply a delaying tactic to allow rebel reinforcements to arrive and to prevent additional government forces from assisting the defenders of Camp Aguinaldo.²⁵²

On the other hand, the Mayor of Makati, Jejomar Binay, called it a "last ditch" stand taken by the rebels who had been defeated at Fort Bonifacio.²⁵³

In an interview with rebel-at-large Maj Purugganan conducted by journalist Sheila Coronel of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism on 14 January 1990, Purugganan said that Makati Commercial Center figured in the planning prior to the December 1 activity as a defensive fallback position. Said Maj Purugganan: "Now, if you will take note, 'there are I think more than 40 embassies there and . . . 109 multinational centers in Makati. And that position, if you will be able to occupy that, and looking from other areas adjacent . . . the place is like a fortress. And controlling that area is practically controlling the whole of Makati.'²⁵⁴

The Makati takeover was a very costly incident. Lives were lost; property was destroyed; the tourism industry suffered a very serious blow; and for several days the financial life of Metro Manila, and to a considerable extent of the entire country, was paralyzed.

C.2.a. 1 December

Although various reports indicated rebel presence in the Makati Commercial Center on 1 December, nothing foretold the events that were to occur the following day. At around noon, ex-Lt Col Honasan was sighted at the Coffee Shop of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila (Intercon).²⁵⁵ In the early evening, DZRH reported rebels pulling out of the PLDT Building, in Legazpi Village.

Commo Calajate dropped off Navy Capt Ison from his beige staff car, somewhere along Pasong Tamo Street sometime around 7:30 p.m. From there Ison proceeded to his sister's house in Quezon City where, sometime

later, he was picked up by the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) personnel after surrendering to Commo Pio Garrido, Jr, PCG Commandant.²⁵⁶

C.2.b. 2 December

Things began to stir by midmorning. At about 10:00 a.m., reports were received by Mayor Binay that about 20 rebel soldiers, riding in four private vehicles, were converging at the area around the Intercon²⁵⁷ where a meeting of the Central Committee (CENCOM) of the Nacionalista Party (NP) was scheduled to be held at 1:30 p.m., to be followed by a press conference at about 3:00 p.m.²⁵⁸

Evidence received by the Commission disclosed that sometime between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m., Amy Castillo from the Office of Vice President Laurel called up Emelinda Santos, Banquet Coordinator of the Hotel Intercontinental (Intercon), and reserved the Dasmariñas Room for 30 to 35 persons.²⁵⁹ The charges for the room and the snacks served amounted to ₱3,715.00. It was paid for in cash and covered by an official receipt numbered 399281, dated 2 December 1989, made out to the Nacionalista Party.²⁶⁰

As early as 1:00 p.m. rebel soldiers were seen massing at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA. About 30 Army troopers were scattered on the sidewalk beside the Hotel Intercontinental and in the car park behind. An armored personnel carrier was parked at the sidewalk along Ayala Avenue north of the Intercon.²⁶¹

The NPCENCOM Meeting started as scheduled at 1:30 p.m. Although the press conference was scheduled to follow only later at 3:00 p.m., media people came early so that the meeting of the CENCOM was also covered by the media.²⁶² The press conference ended by 4:00 p.m.

It is not clear at what time the rebels first entered the Intercon; whether it was before or during the Nacionalista Party press conference. Newsman Ramon Isberto declared that he saw no uniformed soldier inside or in front of the Intercon during the press conference; but Mayor Binay testified receiving reports saying that the hotel's elevators were manned by rebel soldiers. Gloria Diaz, who was at the coffee shop of the hotel testified that the rebel soldiers entered the hotel lobby, "after lunch, merienda time."²⁶³

The exact time for the entry of the rebels could have been easily pinpointed had two hotel officials, Chief of Security Pedro G. Rojo,²⁶⁴ and Resident Manager Jean Pierre Etroit,²⁶⁵ who were most of the time in the

lobby of the hotel, during this period, been either more observant, or more cooperative as witnesses.

Etroit, liberally embellished his testimony with "I don't know" or "it is difficult to say" and other vague responses. To the question "can you tell us more or less in the evening what time they [rebel soldiers] went into the hotel?" he simply replied: "It was still light outside, so I believe 5:00, 6:00 or 5:30, something".²⁶⁶

Rojo, whose office was located at the ground floor of the hotel, claimed twice before the Commission (first on 1 March and then on 25 June 1990) that he learned of the Nacionalista Party press conference, which was held on 2 December, only on 6 December 1990 and from a television news report at that. He averred

As far as I can recall on December 2, 1988, regarding the presence of soldiers, all I can say was on or about 6:00 in the evening of December 2 that was the only time that a group of soldiers entered the hotel lobby and asked me where the way to the second floor was. But before that time all I can remember was there were really soldiers but not inside the lobby but outside the hotel.²⁶⁷

The firmness by which he clearly remembered 6:00 p.m., however, is a stark contrast to his recollection of his whereabouts between noontime and 6:00 p.m. He said

I cannot exactly say where I am between that time but I'm sure I'm in the hotel.²⁶⁸

In any case, it was established that at about 2:00 p.m., around 500 Scout Rangers had entered the Makati Commercial Center and began the occupation of the area.²⁶⁹ Part of the group headed by Capt Lim entered the Intercon around 3:00 p.m.²⁷⁰ Another group led by Galvez proceeded to the parking lot behind the hotel and then went to Twin Towers where they stayed most of the time.²⁷¹

In quick succession, and meeting very little resistance, the rebels set up their positions in 22 buildings and establishments in the Makati Commercial Center.²⁷²

By about 3:30 p.m., DZRH reported the presence of snipers in almost all of the tall buildings in the commercial center, notably the Twin Towers, the Hotel Nikko Garden (Nikko), the Intercon Hotel and the PCIB building.²⁷³

GHQ AFP could not immediately send its own reaction forces since Camp Aguinaldo was still under attack from the rebel forces at the White Plains area under Lt Col Gojo.²⁷⁴ Instead, MGen Montano assigned the task of confronting the rebels at Makati principally to the available units of the PC²⁷⁵ under BGen Aguirre, who was at Camp Bagong Diwa waiting for instruction to go to Camp Aguinaldo and assist in its defense.²⁷⁶ The government forces, composed of elements of PC Laguna under Lt Col Edgar Aglipay, PC Batangas under Lt Col Regalado, and the Regional Special Action Force of RECOM 4 (RSAF 4), and an assault force of MPFF under P/Lt Col Romeo Maganto supported by SWAT teams, left Camp Bagong Diwa at about 3:45 p.m. They arrived at Makati at about 4:00 p.m.²⁷⁷

The MPFF, composed of 92 enlisted men, in full battle gear encamped at Ugarte Field, established a blocking force at the intersection of EDSA and Pasay Road, and positioned troops along the left lane of EDSA (going to Quezon City) fronting San Lorenzo Village.²⁷⁸

Upon its arrival, the Laguna PC deployed its units. Elements of the RSAF 4 and the 229 PC Coy under Capt Rodolfo de Garcia established an advance command post near the intersection of Ayala Avenue and Herrera Street. The 223 PC Coy under Maj Ismael Rafanan and PHQ elements under Capt Ricardo Marquez conducted reconnaissance at the vicinity of the Mandarin Hotel and along Makati Avenue. The 224 PC Coy under Capt Felipe Buena occupied various buildings at the intersection of Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas. The 226 PC Coy under Capt Leo Kison augmented the Batangas PC command at the corner of Pasong Tamo and Pasay Road while the 228 PC Coy under Capt Luisito Palmera occupied de la Rosa Street.²⁷⁹

To prevent loss of civilian lives and to minimize possible damage to property, the government forces decided to retake Makati from the rebels "block by block, building by building . . . sniper to sniper."²⁸⁰ The general plan was to slowly constrict the area under rebel control until the rebels realize that, having been surrounded by a superior force, it was time to give up.²⁸¹

Although initially the government forces were not as heavily armed as the rebels, they nevertheless were able to chalk up some immediate successes.

At 5:40 p.m. DZRH reported that the Paseo de Roxas and the Makati Greenbelt areas were clear of rebels but the glass walls and doors of the Interbank Building were shattered.²⁸² At around 7:00 p.m., elements of

the 15 RSAF 4 occupied the Pacific Star Building at the corner of Makati and Sen Gil Puyat Avenues as the rebels retreated towards the Mandarin Oriental Hotel (Mandarin).²⁸³ DZBB reported a stalemate at Ayala Avenue,²⁸⁴ while DZXL reported that there was sporadic firing going on at about 9:40 p.m. at the other end of Paseo de Roxas and at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue.²⁸⁵ At 10:00 p.m. government troops attacked the rebels occupying the PCIB Building.²⁸⁶

The day ended with government forces suffering some casualties. At about 11:30 p.m., while some MPFF elements were with Patrolman Macalino and a certain G. Mojica, a civilian police aide, checking their road block near San Lorenzo Village, rebels riding a dirty-white Hi-Ace van came by and opened fire killing Macalino and Mojica and wounding Maganto. The latter, after instructing P/Capt Renato Valeria to take over the operations, was rushed together with other casualties to the Makati Medical Center. Reinforcements from the RSAF 4 arrived and positioned themselves at the overpass in front of Mantrade.²⁸⁷

C.2.c. 3 December

At 4:00 a.m. on orders of the Commander of the Task Force Makati, the MPFF pulled out of their roadblocks and returned to the Command Post to provide perimeter security. The troops were divided into three teams: one team under Capt Valeria was deployed in the vicinity of the Sean Philip Building; another, under P/Capt Vicente Vargas at the Makati Fire Central Station; and the third, under P/Lt Jose Rayco at the Makati Medical Center.²⁸⁸

At about 8:30 a.m., the elements from the 15 RSAF 4, under Capt Ronald Sabug and Capt Philmore Balmaceda, occupied and secured the DBP Building.

At 9:30 a.m., 15 RSAF, four elements encountered rebels at Ayala Avenue. One V-150 of the government was hit by rebel anti-tank weapons. Two enlisted men were killed and Capt Tagaca and five other members of his assault group were wounded.²⁸⁹ Shortly thereafter, P/Lt Nelson Yabut was also wounded as rebels fired their 90 mm recoilless rifles while he was boarding the V-150. Finally, at 10:45 a.m., a V-150 was neutralized by rebel soldiers while it was on a reconnaissance mission at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue.

BGen Aguirre believed the rebels had "an oversupply of sophisticated communication . . . not [of the kind] from the basic supplies of the military" which were able to jam the radios of the government troops.²⁹⁰

At 2:00 p.m., MGen Montano ordered the Task Force Makati to assault any target where the presence of Honasan is confirmed.²⁹¹

About 3:00 p.m., elements of the Eastern Sector Command under Col Jewel Canson, Rizal PC Commander, arrived at the Makati Advance Command Post to reinforce the government troops at the corner of Paseo de Roxas and Puyat Avenue.²⁹²

At about 4:00 p.m. 3 December, a BO-105 helicopter with tail number RP 183 belonging to the PC Aviation Group, piloted by Lt Col Alfredo Silapan with Capts Tito Ticman and Dante de los Trinos, and under the guidance of Lt Col Meynardo Carpio, CO PC RIU, took off from the CAPCOM helipad and proceeded to the Makati area. The helicopter maneuvered over Fort Bonifacio and delivered several rounds of 50 cal HMG fire at the rebels located at the multi-level parking lot behind the Intercon. On its second and third attempts, the helicopter gun malfunctioned forcing the aircraft to return to CAPCOM headquarters.²⁹³

At about 5:30 p.m., shortly after elements from the Rizal PC arrived at the Task Force Makati Advance Command Post, a convoy of three cars wandered into a no-man's land in the area of Makati Avenue by the DBP Building and was met with heavy rebel fire. One car had to be abandoned; two security personnel and BGen Aguirre were wounded.²⁹⁴

Close to midnight, the 1st Marine Brigade moved its tactical command post from the corner of EDSA and Boni Serrano Avenue to the area between Ayala Avenue and Pasay Road, to act as a blocking force.²⁹⁵

At an undetermined time, Pedro Samatela, a security supervisor of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and Jesus Nava, an assistant, were executed by the rebels who occupied the building. This was recorded in the firm's closed circuit television, unfortunately, the perpetrators could not be identified through the video tapes.²⁹⁶

C.2.d. 4 December

At 8:00 a.m., the government troops from the 15 RSAF 4 occupied the Mandarin.²⁹⁷ At 10:00 a.m., elements from the PC Batangas had an encounter with rebel soldiers at the vicinity of Gibson's at the Landmark Building.²⁹⁸

With the Mandarin in government hands, troopers of the 15 RSAF 4 exchanged fire with the rebels at the Grand Atrium, PCIB and UCPB Buildings.²⁹⁹ Meanwhile, at the Rustan Commercial Corporation's store

at Ayala Avenue, rebels sought permission from Rustan's Security Chief, PC Col (Ret) Virgilio Poblete to plant snipers on top of Rustan's Building. Poblete was able to dissuade them from doing so. Instead, at the request of the rebels, he gave them two cases of sardines and a case of coffee.³⁰⁰

At 3:00 p.m., Gen de Villa, on account of feelers received from the rebels that they wanted to talk to BGen Arturo Enrile, PMA Superintendent, called the latter to Camp Aguinaldo to establish contact with the rebels. From Camp Aguinaldo at 11 p.m., BGen Enrile was able to establish telephone contact with Lt Col Galvez at the Tuscany. The latter informed the former that they, the rebels, intended to hold on until President Aquino resigned or until they died in the process. At 11:45 p.m., contact was also made with a certain Lt Dario at the Twin Towers. BGen Enrile impressed on him the futility of further resistance and asked that he be allowed to talk directly to the rebel group. Lt Dario said he would inform their leader.

During the night, the Mandarin hired a fleet of taxis and safely evacuated its guests.³⁰¹

At about midnight, PMAR troops under BGen Cesar Abella, after conducting patrols at the Forbes Park area, arrived at the Task Force Makati Command Post. They were deployed along Paseo de Roxas, Pasay Road, Ayala Avenue, EDSA vicinity Mantrade, and McKinley Road.³⁰²

C.2.e. 5 December

At 1:00 a.m., the 2nd Marine Battalion Landing Team (MBLT 2) established a blocking position at McKinley Road together with the Command Group, 1st Marine Brigade (1 MBde) which had its tactical command post at the San Antonio Arcade.³⁰³ Heavy fighting occurred very early in the morning. The Marines at McKinley Road, at about 2:00 a.m., were fired upon by the rebels posted at the high-rise buildings in the commercial center. The firefight lasted for two hours.³⁰⁴ At about 4:30 a.m., rebel snipers at Nikko also engaged the MBLT 2 at the corner of Pasay Road and Palm Avenue.³⁰⁵ An encounter occurred at 5:00 a.m. between the rebels and the 2 Marine Coy MBLT 2 at the multi-level car park behind Intercon. Twelve government troopers were wounded.³⁰⁶

At 6 a.m., the 15 RSAF 4 troopers under Lt Leodegario Regis and Lt Rogelio Moral attacked the Grand Atrium under covering fire provided by the team commanded by Capt Romeo Sabug.³⁰⁷

While all this fighting was going on, the Department of Tourism, between 4:00 to 6:00 a.m., established contact with the rebels through feelers from the rebels wanting to find out whether the Department was really acting in good faith in seeking the safe evacuation of tourists trapped in the hotels controlled by the rebels. At around 9:00 a.m., Tourism Undersecretary Rafael Alunan, with an announcer of DZAM acting as intermediary, received a call from Maj Purugganan who wanted to hear directly from Alunan about the government's intentions. After a brief discussion, the evacuation was agreed to in principle, and with the assurance from Maj Purugganan that they were ready to open the gates of Makati at 10:00 a.m., Alunan agreed to meet with the rebels in an hour at the Petron Station outside the Dasmariñas Village gate on Pasay Road. Because it took some time to mobilize buses, Alunan got to the meeting place only at about 11:00 a.m. By then he was told that the evacuation would not push through because the rebels complained of "intermittent firing". Alunan was advised to settle the matter with BGen Aguirre.

The intermittent firing complained about must have been the firefight at the Grand Atrium at about 6:00 a.m., when the 15 RSAF 4 troopers attacked, and at 10:00 a.m. when the rebel snipers fired again at the Marines on Pasay Road.³⁰⁸

At any rate, Undersecretary Alunan with Tourism Secretary Peter Garrucho, personally went to the Headquarters of BGen Aguirre and asked for the troops to cease firing. Aguirre gave them 30 minutes, extendable upon request, to iron out the details with the rebels. Aguirre agreed also to give two hours for the actual evacuation of the tourists.

At about the time that the Tourism officials were negotiating with the rebels, BGen Enrile, together with volunteer-negotiators, Lt Col Edilberto Adan, Capt Ricardo Morales, Lt Jose Manuel Faune, Lt Clemente Enrique and Capt Arturo Ang, all of the Philippine Army, proceeded to the FSRR Headquarters to gather information about the rebels. There they were informed by BGen (Ret) Emilio Luga that he was also able to establish telephone contact with Galvez, Purugganan and Lim at the Intercon. Enrile accordingly invited Luga to join the negotiating team.

Garrucho and Alunan returned to EDSA to meet with Purugganan only to find that they were at the Intercon being interviewed by the media. After thirty minutes of mingling with rebel soldiers at Nikko, Garrucho and Alunan were invited to meet with the rebels at the Intercon. After an hour and a half of discussions, the negotiations

encountered a hitch as the rebels demanded that the government troops should move back one kilometer from all sides. Since that was a military issue, the talks were suspended and both parties agreed to meet again the following morning.

It must be pointed out that even while the negotiations were going on, sniping from both sides continued. Garrucho noted that he was at one point so close to the shooting that he personally saw a guy on a motorbike get hit during one of the exchanges.³⁰⁹

By about 3:30 p.m., a portion of the Insular Life Building caught fire after being hit by rebel mortar. Nevertheless, by this time, about seven buildings had already been retaken from the rebels.³¹⁰ There was one incident of intense firing at about 4:00 p.m., with the government suffering one casualty, Pfc Acosta.³¹¹ Heavy sniper fire harassed the Marines who did not fire back.³¹² At about 5:50 p.m., the combined forces of the government captured the Grand Atrium as the rebels retreated to the Manila Peninsula and the Makati Tuscany.³¹³

Two rebel soldiers, Pvt Clarito Bongo and Pvt Mario Anos, trying to escape in civilian clothes and under cover of darkness, were intercepted at 7:00 p.m. along Ayala Avenue.³¹⁴ An hour later, MPFF elements were dispatched on orders of the Task Force Makati Commander to secure the BPI Building and others along Ayala Avenue. The MPFF troops were divided into three groups: one, under P/Lt Rayco which secured the Philbanking Building; another group under P/Capt Santos took the Banco Filipino Building and the third under P/Capt Vargas took the new Makati multi-level car park.³¹⁵

Ceasefire was announced at 8:00 p.m.

At 9:00 p.m., Lt Col Galvez called to ask for the evacuation of their two wounded soldiers to the Fort Bonifacio General Hospital. To prove the government's sincerity, the request was granted and the two wounded rebels were picked up by a Red Cross Ambulance at about 9:45 p.m. Upon being informed by BGen Enrile, Lt Col Galvez agreed to consider Enrile's proposal for them to return to barracks. He also promised to call back Enrile. At 11:45 p.m., an unidentified caller told Enrile that the rebel officers were ready to receive him at Nikko. In response, Enrile asked the caller to contact the Chief of Staff by phone and thereafter call him.

At 12:00 midnight, the 1st Marine Brigade established a blocking force at vantage points in EDSA at the corners of McKinley and Pasay Road.³¹⁶

C.2.f. 6 December

Fifteen minutes after midnight, BGen Enrile was again contacted by the unidentified caller, who claimed that de Villa had been contacted and that the rebels were waiting for him at Hotel Nikko. With the clearance from de Villa, the government negotiators left Fort Bonifacio at about 1:20 a.m. in two private cars owned by BGen Enrile and a certain Capt Pangilinan. They passed through the Dasmariñas gate and then to Nikko. Galvez, Purugganan, Lim and five other members of the rebel group were waiting for them at the hotel lobby. It was revealed at this time that the contacts made by the unidentified caller were arranged by Galvez.

At 2:15 a.m., BGen Enrile reported to de Villa that he and the negotiating team had established face-to-face contact with the rebels, who agreed to release all the hotel occupants and residents of the rebel-controlled buildings at daylight. De Villa ordered a total ceasefire³¹⁷ and prohibited troop movements.³¹⁸ At about 4:00 a.m., de Villa advised Garrucho to bring the evacuation buses to the Makati Commercial Center at about 6:30 a.m.

Negotiations specifically for the return to barracks started at 2:45 a.m. After two hours, the parties decided to recess and resume negotiations after the evacuation.

The guests in the occupied hotels and the residents of the condominium buildings under rebel control started leaving the area at about 7:00 a.m. Some 20 tourist buses under the supervision of Tourism Secretary Garrucho and Undersecretaries Narzalina Lim and Alunan were made available for evacuation. Alunan, who had the opportunity of meeting with Galvez and Purugganan during the evacuation, observed that Galvez looked demoralized, except when he was talking to media. He described Maj Purugganan as "gung-ho."³¹⁹ He further told the Commission that while the evacuation was going on, he heard from foreign journalists that Alona Alegre, a known Marcos loyalist, was seen at the top of the Intercon wearing a red cross uniform together with some armed persons dressed as civilians.³²⁰

From Nikko, the government tourism officials proceeded to the Intercon, then to the Manila Peninsula Hotel, and the other buildings

thereafter.³²¹ At about 11:00 a.m., the evacuation of about 878 guests and civilians was completed.³²² Most of them were brought to the Fiesta Shopping Center Complex near the NAIA.

Things were not, however, at a standstill on the military side. Garrucho reported that just before he left Makati after the evacuation, he saw a Fiera-type vehicle transporting ammunition to the rebels at the Intercon.³²³

Enrile sought to resume negotiations with the rebels but was unsuccessful on account of continued rebel complaints about government troop movements. Talks were formally resumed at 4:00 p.m., and continued on and off until about 8:00 p.m.

At about the same time the 15 RSAF 4 were occupying the Manila Peninsula Hotel, the rebels were consolidating their forces at the PLDT, Allied Bank, Ritz Tower and Twin Towers.³²⁴

Finally, after the rebels were informed by BGen Enrile that they had only up to midnight to finish their negotiations, an agreement for a return to barracks was reached at about 8:00 p.m. However, it was agreed that no media announcements would be made until the next day. The rebels were to remove the mines they had planted in the area during the night.³²⁵ Purugganan was not present during the last phase of the negotiations. It was learned later that he slipped out just before the final talks.

C.2.g. 7 December

After arrangements were made for the turnover of the buildings to the PA soldiers and the safe passage of the returning rebels to Fort Bonifacio, BGen Enrile ordered their return to barracks at 7:00 a.m.

By 8:30 a.m., the rebels came out of their positions in the still occupied buildings — PLDT, Allied Bank, Ritz Towers and Twin Towers. Shortly thereafter, the government forces at the Pacific Star, the Mandarin, PCIB, UCPB and the Grand Atrium buildings advanced and conducted mopping up operations to make sure that the buildings were free of mines. Afterwards, the buildings were turned over to the civilian security guards to prevent looting and other untoward incidents.³²⁶

On their way back to Fort Bonifacio, the rebels were able to project before the television cameras and the onlookers at the sidewalks a victorious image. At about 3:00 p.m., the government held a Makati

victory parade for the forces that defended the Constitution and the duly constituted authorities.

C.3. Philippine Marines Headquarters, Fort Bonifacio

C.3.a. 30 November

Doubtful Red Alert

At about noon, BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, Commandant PMAR, claimed that he instructed all units, including the Marine Battalion Landing Team 4 (MBLT 4) under Maj Cesar de la Peña, to go on red alert. He said he sensed unusual happenings. He learned on 28 November from the Marines, who were training with the Scout Rangers at Fort Bonifacio, that their graduation was postponed because they were to move to Pangasinan. Then, in the morning of 30 November, YOU posters were noticed along EDSA and in the Makati area. At that time too, he was informed of the Command Conference called by the CSAFP to be held at 5:30 p.m. in Camp Aguinaldo.³²⁷

It appears, however, that the instruction was not implemented. In the list of red alert declarations from 1 September 1987 to 1 December 1989 for the Philippine Marines HQ submitted by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations PMAR, Lt Col Armenio Cristal, Jr.,³²⁸ no red alert was declared on 30 November 1989. The last was on 3 November which was downgraded on 13 November.

BGen Cabanlig attended the Command Conference in Camp Aguinaldo where they were briefed of the impending coup which was to occur at 2:00 a.m. the following day. Thereafter, he returned to his HQ and upon arriving at his HQ at 10:30 p.m., he immediately held a conference among his officers.³²⁹ The conference was attended by Capt Jonathan Martir, Operations Officer of the MBLT 4, and other officers of the battalion namely, Capt Basilio Calimag, EX-O; Capt Romualdo Gualdrapa; Capt Ben Chavez, Logistics Officer; Capt Celestino Ferrera, Intelligence Officer; Capt Santos Petalio, a company commander, and other junior officers. BGen Cabanlig briefed the officers about the impending coup³³⁰ and instructed Capt Calimag to prepare the MBLT 4 to move to Camp Aguinaldo (LOGCOM/NCRDC) HQ because Maj de la Peña had not yet reported having been on "pass" since 25 November.

Interestingly, according to Cabanlig, Lt Col Gojo, a relative of Honasan, was also on leave for 15 days before the coup attempt allegedly because of family problems.

Meeting of Marine Officers

After the meeting, they went back to the Battalion HQ. Capt Martir was surprised to see three officers and 12 enlisted personnel who were not organic to the battalion. These officers were Capt Ariel Querubin of the Western Command (WESCOM), Capt Jaime Napoles of LOGCOM and Capt Juancho Sabban of SUBCOM.³³¹

Querubin and Sabban, who were Martir's classmates at the PMA, were involved in the 28 August 1987 coup attempt. With Kapunan, they attempted to bring down to Manila from Baguio the PMA cadets to support Honasan. These non-organic officers had with them VHF radios which were not a regular issue of the Marines. Querubin tried to convince Calimag not to move yet and just to wait because if he moved to LOGCOM or NCRDC HQ, he would be pulverized by artillery fire as the Army artillery were already pointed towards GHQ (meaning Camp Aguinaldo). Calimag said that his unit would follow the chain of command and would move. Querubin was furious; Calimag turned around and told Martir to find out how many men they have and to start arming some of their personnel within the battalion quarters for there may be a firefight to stop them from moving.³³²

Martir moved to his section (S3) and instructed his operations chief, MSgt Fortes, to direct all personnel to go to the armory and get their issued firearms and prepare for a possible firefight. While he was giving instructions, Martir saw the personnel of the intelligence unit (S2) already wearing white patches on their left shoulders; he already doubted that Capt Querubin had actually controlled some of the MBLT 4 officers. When he was about to confront those wearing patches, Capt Ferrera entered the room with an Ultimex weapon and machinegun, and proceeded directly to the quarters. Martir, who followed him with Calimag, confronted Ferrera and asked why he did not say that he was committed to YOU during the conference with Cabanlig. Ferrera, answered that he is not YOU and "this is another thing and it is the instruction of their Battalion Commander" (referring to de la Peña). Calimag just remained quiet.

When Martir went out, he saw de la Peña who looked haggard and tired. It turned out that he arrived from Iloilo at 7:00 p.m. that day but he proceeded to his Antipolo residence. Martir told him that Querubin and Sabban came to convince Calimag who did not give in. De la Peña instructed Martir to call all officers of the battalion for a conference. De la Peña went to the radio room and directed the radio man to announce

through the public address system for all officers to proceed to his office for a conference.³³³

Martir returned to the office of de la Peña where he saw him and Calimag talking; de la Peña told Martir to lock the doors and to join them. Just as he had seated, there was a loud knock on the door. When he opened it, he saw Lt Col Gojo who pushed the door, proceeded to where Maj de la Peña was, extended to him his right hand and said, "*Cesar, 'yung pinag-usapan natin*" (Cesar, don't forget what we had discussed). De la Peña stared at Gojo who had with him a VHF radio and extended to him his hand. De la Peña walked towards the quarters with Martir and Calimag. When asked by Martir, "*Sir, ano ba ito?*" (Sir, what is this?), de la Peña did not answer but merely reiterated his instructions to call all officers for a conference.³³⁴

While the officers were entering the office of de la Peña for the conference, Capt Petalio was seen holding a bunch of countersigns similar to those of the S2 personnel. Martir also saw Lt Rolando Cal, another company commander who was holding a radio similar to that of Gojo. De la Peña asked the officers to follow the tanks wherever they would go. Martir told de la Peña that his order is in opposition to that of the Commandant; but the latter insisted that they should follow the tanks. He told de la Peña "*hindi ako puede diyan, sir*" (I can't go along with your plan, Sir). He went to his office and got his cal .45 pistol and M-16 rifle. Before he was able to report to Cabanlig what happened, de la Peña approached him and said that they are still friends.³³⁵

At about 11:30 p.m., just before Martir arrived at the office of his Commandant, BGen Biazon called up BGen Cabanlig and requested for PMAR 6 x 6 trucks to ferry the elements of MBLT 4 to Camp Aguinaldo to be escorted by CAPCOM mobile cars. Col Millena, Logistics Officer PMAR, called up the motor pool to prepare all available trucks to ferry the troops and one 60 RR mounted on an M151 truck to be attached to the MBLT 4. However, BGen Biazon called up again to get confirmation if MBLT 4 had joined the coup because when he called up MBLT 4 to direct them to intercept two truckloads of unidentified soldiers at the South Expressway, he was informed that "*Bumaliktad na kami*."³³⁶ (We have joined the rebels).

At about midnight, Cabanlig talked to the Marine trainees; he learned later that when they marched back to their barracks with their officer-in-charge, Capt Castillo, rebel officer Lt Liwag pointed a gun at Castillo and Liwag was able to persuade 71 of the more than 200 trainees to join him.³³⁷

At this point, Martir arrived at Cabanlig's office to inform the latter that the MBLT 4 was committed to YOU and reported on what transpired at the MBLT 4 Headquarters. Cabanlig was surprised; he ordered his Aide-de-camp, Lt Romeo Tanalgo, to call de la Peña by telephone. No contact was made as the lines were busy. Cabanlig ordered his Operations Officer, Col Salazar, to block the gates and not to allow the MBLT 4 to go out. Salazar then directed the placement of barricades and ordered the MP detachment to stop the MBLT 4 from getting out.³³⁸

C.3.b. 1 December

Since his Aide-de-camp failed to contact Maj de la Peña, Cabanlig sent the Intelligence Officer of the PMAR, Col Buenaventura, to try to convince Lt Col Gojo, and for the MBLT 4 to desist from participating in the coup.³³⁹ In his testimony, however, Cabanlig stated that he sent his Intelligence Officer to meet Maj de la Peña. At two minutes past midnight, while his Intelligence Officer was on his way, four LVTs and two V-150s followed by troops numbering about 200 rammed Gate 3 and left for VAB. There were, however, elements of the unit still being formed and so Cabanlig ordered Buenaventura and MSgt Renato Villanueva to talk to them. These elements told them that they have "crossed their bridges" and that they are leaving the camp.³⁴⁰

Mobilization of Marine Units

Evidence further discloses that by late afternoon of 30 November, the Marine officers had already started to mobilize the MBLT 4 based in Fort Bonifacio. Sworn statements by Marine enlisted personnel show that many of them were ordered to mobilize on the evening of 30 November without knowing that the action was intended for a coup. The troops were moved to different locations. One enlisted personnel narrated his experience

An armed man in fatigue uniform bearing no nameplate arrived at the Headquarters of the Philippine Marines (PMAR HQ) and ordered the drill inspector to order the men to withdraw their rifles. Hence, firearms were issued and troop formation was done in front of the station of tanks at the PMAR HQ.³⁴¹

The Marine troopers were informed that they will be participating in the "Balikatan Exercise" at Subic Base.³⁴² There was a consolidation of a large number of Marine troops by early evening of 30 November. Later, the troops of MBLT 4 were ordered to assemble in front of Brown Hall of the Marine HQ.³⁴³ The company commanders were instructed to report to de la Peña and Calimag.³⁴⁴ These were the troops which were

ordered to move out of Fort Bonifacio and to proceed to occupy VAB by late evening.³⁴⁵

The 34 Marine Company (MC) of MBLT 4 was directed by its CO, Lt Cal, to pack-up for the following day's Exercise Balikatan. The troops then fell in with their firearms and proceeded to Gate 3 of Fort Bonifacio. There, Cal and his men boarded a ten-wheeler truck which brought them to PTV-4.³⁴⁶

At about 4:00 a.m. of 1 December, Cabanlig went out of Gate 3 and got in touch with some commercial radio patrol units like DZRH, DZEC and DZMM. He announced to the Marines through the radio that he was for the government. He told them not to be deceived by any of the officers and asked them to march back to camp.³⁴⁷

In the afternoon of 1 December, Cabanlig sent Col Romeo Daranchang, PMAR Chief of Staff, with Lt Col Jose Cordero and Capt Andayan to VAB to convince the Marines to go back. Daranchang was able to talk to Gojo, who appeared to be the one "calling the shots." However, Gojo refused saying "they have burned their bridges."³⁴⁸

Cabanlig devoted the whole day of 1 December to the consolidation of his forces. He was able to gather a force of 700 men.

C.3.c. 2 December

Thinking that Fort Bonifacio was still under rebel Ranger control, Cabanlig said that he decided to launch an attack against the FSRR HQ. As they were ready to move, he received a telephone call from the Army Chief of Staff, BGen Saavedra, advising the former to stop from attacking as Fort Bonifacio had already been cleared. Cabanlig received a call from de Villa who ordered him to prepare the Battalion he had formed to reinforce the troops in Malacañang on de Villa's orders.³⁴⁹

C.3.d. 3 December

On this day, the PMAR continued to consolidate forces; it remained at standby to reinforce Malacañang forces.³⁵⁰

C.3.e. 4 December

At about noon, BGen Aguirre called BGen Cabanlig to request the latter to move his battalion to Paseo de Roxas in Makati. When Cabanlig cleared this with de Villa, the latter granted him authority to move; he

At this point, Martir arrived at Cabanlig's office to inform the latter that the MBLT 4 was committed to YOU and reported on what transpired at the MBLT 4 Headquarters. Cabanlig was surprised; he ordered his Aide-de-camp, Lt Romeo Tanalgo, to call de la Peña by telephone. No contact was made as the lines were busy. Cabanlig ordered his Operations Officer, Col Salazar, to block the gates and not to allow the MBLT 4 to go out. Salazar then directed the placement of barricades and ordered the MP detachment to stop the MBLT 4 from getting out.³³⁸

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Mobilization of Marine Units

Evidence further discloses that by late afternoon of 30 November, the Marine officers had already started to mobilize the MBLT 4 based in Fort Bonifacio. Sworn statements by Marine enlisted personnel show that many of them were ordered to mobilize on the evening of 30 November without knowing that the action was intended for a coup. The troops were moved to different locations. One enlisted personnel narrated his experience

An armed man in fatigue uniform bearing no nameplate arrived at the Headquarters of the Philippine Marines (PMAR HQ) and ordered the drill inspector to order the men to withdraw their rifles. Hence, firearms were issued and troop formation was done in front of the station of tanks at the PMAR HQ.³⁴¹

The Marine troopers were informed that they will be participating in the "Balikatan Exercise" at Subic Base.³⁴² There was a consolidation of a large number of Marine troops by early evening of 30 November. Later, the troops of MBLT 4 were ordered to assemble in front of Brown Hall of the Marine HQ.³⁴³ The company commanders were instructed to report to de la Peña and Calimag.³⁴⁴ These were the troops which were

ordered to move out of Fort Bonifacio and to proceed to occupy VAB by late evening.³⁴⁵

The 34 Marine Company (MC) of MBLT 4 was directed by its CO, Lt Cal, to pack-up for the following day's Exercise Balikatan. The troops then fell in with their firearms and proceeded to Gate 3 of Fort Bonifacio. There, Cal and his men boarded a ten-wheeler truck which brought them to PTV-4.³⁴⁶

At about 4:00 a.m. of 1 December, Cabanlig went out of Gate 3 and got in touch with some commercial radio patrol units like DZRH, DZEC and DZMM. He announced to the Marines through the radio that he was for the government. He told them not to be deceived by any of the officers and asked them to march back to camp.³⁴⁷

In the afternoon of 1 December, Cabanlig sent Col Romeo Daranchang, PMAR Chief of Staff, with Lt Col Jose Cordero and Capt Andayan to VAB to convince the Marines to go back. Daranchang was able to talk to Gojo, who appeared to be the one "calling the shots." However, Gojo refused saying "they have burned their bridges."³⁴⁸

Cabanlig devoted the whole day of 1 December to the consolidation of his forces. He was able to gather a force of 700 men.

C.3.c. 2 December

Thinking that Fort Bonifacio was still under rebel Ranger control, Cabanlig said that he decided to launch an attack against the FSRR HQ. As they were ready to move, he received a telephone call from the Army Chief of Staff, BGen Saavedra, advising the former to stop from attacking as Fort Bonifacio had already been cleared. Cabanlig received a call from de Villa who ordered him to prepare the Battalion he had formed to reinforce the troops in Malacañang on de Villa's orders.³⁴⁹

C.3.d. 3 December

On this day, the PMAR continued to consolidate forces; it remained at standby to reinforce Malacañang forces.³⁵⁰

C.3.e. 4 December

At about noon, BGen Aguirre called BGen Cabanlig to request the latter to move his battalion to Paseo de Roxas in Makati. When Cabanlig cleared this with de Villa, the latter granted him authority to move; he

then coordinated with the Mayor of Makati, but this movement did not materialize.³⁵¹

C.3.f. 5 December

At about 5:00 a.m., the 11th Marine Battalion was deployed with CAPCOM at Makati Commercial Center.

At 12:00 midnight, the 1st Marine Brigade established blocking forces at a vantage point in EDSA, on McKinley and Pasay Roads.³⁵²

C.4. Villamor Air Base

C.4.a. 30 November

Declaration of Red Alert

Because of the intelligence reports on the Tagaytay City relay station attack at 10:30 p.m. the previous day, CG PAF MGen Jose de Leon, declared a red alert in all PAF units.³⁵³ BGen Rogelio Estacio, CG PAFSECOM placed the 805th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) on standby alert by 10:40 a.m. of 30 November.³⁵⁴ At 2:00 p.m., BGen Loven Abadia, the Commander of the 205th Helicopter Wing (205 HW), put his unit on red alert.³⁵⁵ By evening, Estacio received intelligence reports that the coup would be staged at dawn of 1 December. He requested one V-150 from the PAF Operations Officer to help in securing NAIA but this was denied.³⁵⁶ Col Felipe Abando, Jr, Commander of the 100th Training Wing, Fernando Air Base, Lipa City, received similar intelligence information, and ordered that base security be increased.³⁵⁷

Immediately after the adjournment of the Command Conference called by CSAFP in Camp Aguinaldo, MGen de Leon called up his office to inform his officers to be ready for a conference. Upon his arrival, de Leon convened the conference with the various COs of the PAF, the Unit Commanders in VAB, and the HQ staff at the Hall of Flags on the third floor of the PAF headquarters (HPAF).³⁵⁸

C.4.b. 1 December

Marine Troopers Enter Villamor

The conference started by about midnight.³⁵⁹ As de Leon broke the news to his officers, saying: "Gentlemen, there is this fantastic news about . . ." he was cut short by gunfire from the direction of Gate 2 of

VAB.³⁶⁰ Immediately after, two LVTs with two V-150 Commandos, two 6 x 6 trucks and other armored vehicles led the troops of the MBLT 4 under de la Peña, along with the Marines under Gojo towards VAB. The vehicles rammed Gate 3 of Fort Bonifacio and followed by about 200 troops following, crossed the bridge across South Expressway and moved towards Gate 2 of VAB.³⁶¹ An LVT rammed through Gate 2 of VAB.³⁶² They rumbled along Sales Street in VAB. Immediately, the VAB Unit Commanders rushed back to their units while de Leon, Vice Commander BGen Protacio, BGen Leopoldo Acot and the HPAF Staff rushed to the adjacent Command Operations Center (COC) which was also on the third floor. The entries to the third floor were sealed with iron grills and barricaded by office tables.³⁶³ BGen Loven Abadia rushed to the 205 HW HQ.³⁶⁴ BGen Estacio rushed out of the conference rooms, stopped by his quarters for his arms and slipped through the golf course into NAIA.³⁶⁵

The Marines were composed mainly of MBLT 4 from Fort Bonifacio led by Maj de la Peña and Capt Calimag, and other units like the 4th MC under Lt Filomeno Macahilig, 2Lt Jarius Gelverson III and 2Lt Oscar Ramos, the 24th MC under 2Lts Delfin Actas and Memel Roxas; and the 44th MC under Lt Santos Petalio, 2Lt Adonis Fernandez and 2Lt Oscar dela Peña. Elements of the 31st MC, MBLT 1 stationed in Sta. Catalina, Bata, Bulacan and led by 2Lt Francis Carandang and 2Lt Gerry Tagle later joined in attacking VAB.

Within an hour, the Marines gained control of VAB.

Takeover of 520 ABW

The first move of the rebels was to capture the armor assets inside VAB assigned to the 529th Special Operations Squadron (529 SOS) which is under the 520th Air Base Wing (520 ABW). The SOS was organized by then CG PAF MGen Sotelo after the August 1987 coup as an anti-coup force. It was provided with two V-150s, four recoilless rifles, ten machine guns, and other armaments. Yet, when the time came for the squadron to defend VAB, not a shot was fired. In fact, its two V-150s were used by the rebels to attack Camp Aguinaldo on 3 December.³⁶⁶

Capt Robert Yusay, EX-O of the 529 SOS, while proceeding to his HQ, met the Marines following the LVTs.³⁶⁷ Yusay immediately radioed the Wing Commander (WC) of the 520 ABW, who advised him to check out the movement. Yusay then proceeded to the 520 ABW barracks, woke up TSgt Armando Padilla and his men, and ordered them to take out the two V-150s with body number F-301 and F-302.³⁶⁸ The men boarded their tanks. Yusay then radioed the WC to report that his unit,

including the two V-150s, was ready for action upon orders. The advise was to maintain the stronghold.³⁶⁹ Likewise, 2Lt Abner Awang, Light Armor Commander PAF, sought clearance from his superiors to engage the rebels but was told not to confront them.

In the meantime, 70 to 80 armed soldiers led by Lt Hernando "Boy" Caraig of 16 IB, PA, based in Quezon, surrounded the tanks while the personnel of the 529 SOS readied themselves inside the tank. Noting the superior number of Caraig's men, the tank commander, Lt Domingo Balitaan, directed the crew to disembark but to lock the tank's door. TSgt Padilla was brought to Lt Caraig and was asked where the crew were. Padilla refused to answer. This prompted Caraig to threaten Padilla with bodily harm. Later, Caraig's men destroyed the door locks of the tank and Padilla was ordered to drive and tow the van used by the Marines. The van was stuck after overshooting the corners of Zetzer and Andrews Avenues. After doing so, Padilla requested Caraig to allow him to disengage. This time, the latter allegedly threatened Padilla with death if he did.³⁷⁰ The rebels took complete control of the 529 SOS, and later, left at 1:30 a.m. of 1 December, making sure all the communication lines were out.³⁷¹ Meanwhile, they had stored the firearms they gathered from the 529 SOS personnel in the two V-150s they had commandeered.³⁷²

Attack on the 205th Helicopter Wing HQ

Other Marine troopers maneuvered to capture the air assets inside the base. After ramming Gate 2, the Marine LVTs went to the flight line of the 205 HW. Fifty Marines marching at the back of the LVTs disarmed the guards at the 505 Air Reserve (AR) flight line, and took hostage four officers and 26 enlisted personnel (EP). Capt Antonio Bautista, Commander of the 209th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, who was still at the flight line, directed two EPs to arm their helicopters. They immediately returned because rebel Marines had already taken control of the flight line.³⁷³

By early morning, several trucks with an estimated two companies had entered the flight line to reinforce the rebel troops. Two platoons with the LVTs proceeded to Hangars B and C and immobilized the 452nd First Division Marine Squadron (FDMS) and 451st Special Squadron (SS) personnel.³⁷⁴ Then two V-150s followed and stopped at the 205 HW driveway near the Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQ). The Marines in the V-150s shouted at the Wing personnel led by BGen Loven Abadia to surrender but the latter steadfastly held their ground and placed more M-60 machine guns in front of the HQ.³⁷⁵

By dawn, the rebel Marine tanks bombarded the 205 HW HQ area with cannon fire.³⁷⁶ A gunbattle ensued as Loven Abadia and his men gave resistance to the Marines' attack.³⁷⁷ The firefight lasted ten to 15 minutes.³⁷⁸ Loven Abadia and his men laid flat on their stomachs as the tanks kept firing. Rebel Rangers were seen leading the attack. When one of Loven Abadia's men was injured, a PAF colonel on the government side waved his cap at the LVTs so that he could approach the wounded soldier. The colonel was mad and he shouted invectives at the Rangers who also approached the wounded man. The Colonel shouted: "*Bakit ninyo kami binabaril? Hindi ba kami ang sumasagip sa inyo sa bundok?* [Why are you firing at us? Aren't we the ones who save you in the mountains?]"³⁷⁹

The gunbattle left the 205 HW HQ partially burned and the BOQ razed to the ground. The force of the Marines was overwhelming. They later took control of the 205 HW tarmac. They, however, were not able to fly any of the helicopters and other aircraft because none of the pilots of the 205 HW HQ would cooperate with the rebels.³⁸⁰

Rebel Control of the Gates

Other rebel Marines in Villamor supported by armor took control of Gates 1, 2 and 3. Not knowing about the loyalty of the Marines as they passed the 528th Law Enforcement Squadron (LES) HQ, its EX-O, Capt Jose Maceda, led a team to investigate Gate 2 where Marines surrounded them and confiscated their firearms. Maceda identified the rebel officers as Lt Col Gojo, Lt Col Gasmin, Capt Mariano, ex-Lt Col Bernarte, Capt Querubin, Capt Pineda, and another captain with Serial No. 0-7790³⁸¹ who confiscated Capt Maceda's .45 cal pistol.³⁸²

Entry at HPAF

The Headquarters of the Philippine Air Force (HPAF) houses the offices of top PAF officers including the COC which coordinates all movements of the PAF. At 4:00 a.m., rebel Marines surrounded HPAF and broke the glass doors of the first and second floors. They checked out every office including those belonging to Air Personnel, Logistics, Comptroller, Dental Surgeon, Chief of Engineers, and the Chief Chaplain. The personnel in the Dental Surgeon's office were sent to the Dental Dispensary and the Chaplain personnel to the chapel, while the Air Logistics personnel were told to stay in the office but were ordered to keep the doors locked. All telephone lines in the HPAF were cut.³⁸³ The Marines ransacked the HPAF Supply Section as the seven supply personnel were disarmed and confined at the office of the Air Comptroller.

Negotiation at the HPAF

Inside the Air Personnel Office, Col Santiago Madrid, PAF EX-O, met the rebel Marines. He asked that he be brought to Maj De la Peña whom he personally knew. Madrid was led to de la Peña and Lt Col Gojo at the hallway of HPAF. Gojo wanted to assault the third floor of the HPAF and gave an ultimatum. Madrid, in an effort to negotiate with the rebels, called the COC at the third floor and was able to relay the ultimatum. Answering the call, the Air Personnel Officer replied that Gojo must deal first with the Commander of the Air Squadron, BGen Acot, before making any move towards the third floor.

Dialogues followed. Col Roberto Sabularse, Air Comptroller EX-O, and Madrid served as intermediaries who relayed messages between the rebels and the PAF officers at the third floor. They managed to convince the former not to attack the third floor because all the personnel there were already immobilized. Madrid also tried to convince Gojo to stop the attack at the 205 HW.

MGen de Leon, in the meantime, was able to maintain constant communication with other unit commanders and to direct the operation of other PAF bases through the COC. Fortunately, the personnel of the Office of the Director for Communications-Electronics under Col Edgardo Rosal, who were on stand by at the third floor, ensured the continuous operation of the radio and telephone in the COC.³⁸⁴

By 4:00 a.m. some tanks and Marine troops, after immobilizing the 205 HW, the BOQ and Hangars B and C, the 505 ARS, 520 ABW and the 452 FDMS, had regrouped at the flight line. Two more Marine platoons crossed Fort Bonifacio to VAB. Armed with bazookas and machine guns, the rebels occupied the overpass connecting the gates of both camps.³⁸⁵

Meanwhile, Lt Caraig, after immobilizing the 520 ABW, ordered the two V-150s to be brought to the gate of the 420 SW HQ. The armor vehicles, upon orders of Caraig, rammed the gate but were fired upon.³⁸⁶

As of 8:00 a.m. the Marine troops were still in control of VAB. They were then consolidating their forces, with some Marine elements looting the firearms supply and cash storage boxes.³⁸⁷ At 9:00 a.m., some Marines started to move out. Members of the MBLT 4 boarded a 6 x 6 truck which brought them to PTV-4.

Aircraft Activity from Villamor

The NCRDC Command Operations Center received a report that a helicopter left VAB for Camps Aguinaldo and Crame at about 5:15 a.m.³⁸⁸ Upon learning this, personnel at the HPAF contacted BGen Jose Comendador, CG 2 Air Division (2 AD), to request for the dispatch of four F-5s from Mactan Air Base (MAB) in order to intercept the rebel planes at VAB. The planes from MAB never arrived. It was later learned that Comendador prevented the pilots from flying the planes.³⁸⁹

The Marines wanted to take control of the helicopter air assets in VAB. Ex-Lt Cols Ceferino Sarmenta and Dante Bernarte tried to persuade, but without success, the pilots of 505 ARS under Lt Col Rodolfo de Castro, Squadron Commander, to fly the helicopters out of VAB.³⁹⁰ Bernarte was also seen talking to Lt Lopito Gonzales, aide of Col Jaime Ilete, at the back of the VAB theatre. Incidentally, both Bernarte and Gonzales were also implicated in the August 1987 coup.³⁹¹

According to Gonzales, however, he was sent by Ilete from Clark Air Base to return Loven Abadia's gun. He was still in VAB when the attempted coup occurred, and he talked to Bernarte who was his previous CO.³⁹²

Firefight at the 205 HW HQ

The firefight at the 205 HW still raged by early afternoon. The Wing personnel fired at the LVTs and the Marine troops as they approached the HQ area.³⁹³ The Marines retaliated with a Howitzer round aimed at the HQ, which damaged the Wing Adjutant's office, killed TSgt Austria and wounded Sgt Rolando Acevedo, A1C Alex Urnaguino, and Sgt Baccay.³⁹⁴ Personnel of the 529 SOS, 520 ABW with their Squadron Commander, Maj Julius de la Torre, proceeded to the 205 HW HQ after a ten-minute lull in firing. While at the corridor of the building with some personnel of the 205 HW, de la Torre heard two big bursts from an M203 (grenade launcher) fired by the Marines. These hit the 529 SOS building and wounded its seven personnel.

During the lull, women were seen bringing food to the rebels. Loven Abadia tried to contact GHQ AFP to bring reinforcements. However, it was reported that the tank reinforcement sent turned around and joined the rebels.³⁹⁵

Negotiation for a Ceasefire

Col Felix Duenas, Air Plans EX-O, called up Col Paulino Poquez, Duty Officer of the 205 HW, to advise the Wing personnel not to return fire as the former was negotiating a ceasefire with the rebel Marines at HPAF. Col Romeo Daranchang, together with Lt Col Cordero and Capt Andayan, arrived at HPAF to persuade Gojo and de la Peña to return to Fort Bonifacio. Both rebel officers refused.

Duenas and Sabularse spoke to Loven Abadia proposing a ceasefire wherein Abadia was not to take counter-offensive action provided the Marines desist from attacking Abadia and his men. This proposal was similar to an earlier agreement forged with the rebels at HPAF. Loven Abadia refused, insisting that the Marines should leave the 205 HW area first. But as the Marine troopers continued firing, he fought back. Meanwhile, rebel Marines and Rangers surrounded the 205 HW compound and some were able to penetrate the rear, capturing some of Loven Abadia's men. Abadia moved forward and went inside a building near the 205 HW HQ.

Cols Sabularse, Duenas, and Atayde, Deputy Commander of the 205 HW, met with Lt Gener del Rosario of 16 IB, 2 ID, who referred them to ex-Lt Col Bernarte, who in turn, directed them to Col Reynaldo Samaco. Unable to decide on Abadia's terms, Samaco escorted them to Gojo who was at the HPAF area. While initially insistent that Abadia and his men first lay down their arms, Gojo finally agreed not to fire as long as Abadia and his men would not fire. Col Sabularse and company returned to the 205 HW area but found the 205 HW personnel already disarmed; Abadia, however, was nowhere to be found. He was still inside a building together with four unidentified lieutenants.³⁹⁶

Atayde stayed behind while Sabularse and Duenas proceeded to the Air Force Research and Development Center. The two were tasked to see Gojo at the HPAF area to arrange a meeting with either BGens Acot or Protacio.³⁹⁷ Acot was able to talk to Gojo.³⁹⁸ The rebel Marines at the 205 HW area were then fetched by trucks, later consolidating at the HPAF.³⁹⁹ Loven Abadia managed to escape, and boarded a taxi for Camp Aguinaldo.

Then at about 3:00 p.m., news of a government offensive was received. Poquez received a call from Capt Edgardo Samonte, CSAFP Aide, that loyal F-5s strafed and destroyed the rebel air assets in Sangley. Unconfirmed news that the F-5s will also go to VAB to target the tanks at the 205 HW flight line made Poquez instruct his personnel

to retreat behind the HQ. The F-5s did not arrive. Instead, three USAF F-4s flew over VAB on persuasion flights.⁴⁰⁰

President Aquino made a call at 3:34 p.m. to Capt Eustaquito Manalo, Wing Commander, 205th Presidential Airlift Wing. Manalo briefed the President about the situation in his area.⁴⁰¹

Movement of Rebel Marines to Camp Aguinaldo

The Marines disabled the helicopters located at the VAB tarmac and those inside Hangars B and C by breaking their chin bubbles and cutting the electrical wirings.⁴⁰² After doing so, the Marines left the hangars and started converging near the HPAF.

At about 10:00 p.m., a large number of Marines prepared to leave the HPAF. Three LVTs, three V-150s, two of them with serial nos F-301 and F-302, and several trucks, joined the Marines.⁴⁰³ 2Lt Gelvezon ordered his troops to move.⁴⁰⁴ The 4 MC MBLT 4 left Villamor and headed north.⁴⁰⁵ Some of his men thought they were returning to Fort Bonifacio; but instead, they headed for EDSA on foot. There was some shooting as they crossed the Magallanes overpass, but they were able to continue towards White Plains.⁴⁰⁶ The rebel Marine troops passed through Mandaluyong, then Valle Verde and ended up near the Mormon Church at White Plains.⁴⁰⁷ Although some of the Marines returned to barracks during this night march, the rebels numbered about 600 by the time they were in the vicinity of Camp Aguinaldo.⁴⁰⁸

BGen Gerardo Flores, PC-INP Intelligence Chief (C2), received a report on the departure of the rebel Marines from VAB. The 701 Bde under Col Edgardo Batenga was dispatched from Camp Aguinaldo to block the rebel Marines at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue.⁴⁰⁹ At around 1:00 p.m., the Marines (with some PA and GHQ troops) under Lt del Rosario were fired upon by a government Sikorsky helicopter as they were headed towards White Plains, causing them to retreat to an abandoned house.⁴¹⁰

C.4.c. 2 December

Government Forces Retake Control of VAB and Assess Damage

By midnight, rebel Marines had completely withdrawn from VAB, and government troops once again took control of the base.⁴¹¹ Capt Lauro de la Cruz, Security Officer, went down from the third floor and assessed the damage at the HPAF.⁴¹² 2Lt Abner Awang with 14 men, took over

the 529 SOS building. The commander of 529 SOS also found that their armory had been ransacked, and the cabinets plus table drawers were forcibly opened. An inventory was made of the supply and the armory. The 529 SOS personnel were then directed to secure Gate 2. The DACE and 501 CS personnel worked round the clock and reinstalled 28 AFP and PLDT telephones that were disconnected in the HPAF offices, including the PLDT cable destroyed during the fire at the 205 HW.⁴¹³

As a precautionary measure against a possible return of the rebels, the Explosives Detection and Demolition Team (EDDT), was directed to plant claymore mines and improvised bombs (drums of gasoline) at Gates 1 and 2 of VAB to prevent possible re-entry of rebel tanks. The EDDT also scoured the area for bombs that may have been planted by rebel forces. In the process, they discovered three boxes of ammunition taken from the 205 HW HQ and the Presidential Airlift Wing and a PLDT transmission line in a plastic container at the 520 ABW Commander's Office.⁴¹⁴

C.4.d. 3 December

The AFP TRACOM convoy under BGen Pedro Juachon, which included two V-150s and a crew from NCRDC, arrived at VAB at early dawn with instructions from MGen de Leon to stay in VAB, defend the base from possible enemy attacks, and apprehend withdrawing rebel forces holed up in Makati or Manila intending to regroup at VAB.⁴¹⁵

C.5. Manila Domestic Airport and Cavite Coastal Road Incident

To the rebels, control of airports is necessary to stop the movement of government troops from other areas and to facilitate the arrival of rebel troops and armaments from the provinces.

C.5.a. Before 30 November

Planning for the Takeover of Manila Domestic Airport

As early as 15 and 16 November 1989, a group composed of ex-Maj Lyle Tugbang and Maj Jose Gamos, TSgt Inocentes Dionesa and some members of the NAIA Police led by P/Lt Romeo Raquion held a conference at the office of Viking Brokerage located at the old Manila International Airport (MIA) in preparation for the launching of a coup d'etat. During the meeting, Raquion assured Gamos that he could supply 15 of his men,

mostly members of the Guardians.⁴¹⁶ It seemed that the purpose of the meeting was to recruit volunteers to augment rebel forces in their takeover of NAIA and the Manila Domestic Airport (MDA). Raquion, however, denied any participation in the coup.⁴¹⁷

C.5.b. 30 November

Mobilization of the Guardians

In the early evening, Rodolfo Morit, Jr, a ranking national officer and Honasan's co-incorporator of the Guardian Centre Foundation Inc (GCFI), went inside the prison reservation of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and gathered about 30 Guardians.⁴¹⁸ Morit was dressed in a military uniform. He directed them to attend a meeting of the Guardians at Baltao Subdivision in Parañaque, Metro Manila that same evening.

The 30 Guardians were composed of 26 prison guards, including Manuel Garces, Jr, the founder and leader of the Bureau of Corrections Muntinlupa Guardian Brotherhood Inc Chapter, and four civilians identified as Baggy Sacco, Rolando Pascual, Eduardo Franco and Roger Borja.⁴¹⁹

The group left Muntinlupa at about 10:00 p.m. in three civilian vehicles (two Harabas and a jeepney) driven by one Brasil, Garces and Sacco. On their way to Baltao Subdivision, Morit told them that their mission was to assist the government forces at the NAIA against the expected attack of NPA rebel forces.⁴²⁰ They arrived at Baltao Subdivision at around 11:00 p.m.

The movement of the prison guards was reported by Bureau of Corrections Superintendent Vicente Apurong to Prisons Director Meliton Goyena, a retired PC brigadier general. Goyena was told that the reason for the movement was to assist the RAM-HF soldiers stage a coup in Manila.⁴²¹

Troop Movement of Maj Jose Gamos and ex-Maj Lyle Tugbang

At about 11:00 p.m., some 70 uniformed armed men led by Maj Gamos and ex-Maj Tugbang, met at the Barangay Hall of Brgy Vitales, Parañaque.⁴²²

C.5.c. 1 December

This group of 70 armed men proceeded to MDA.

At about 1:35 a.m., the government monitoring team at VAB reported heavy exchange of gunfire at the vicinity of MDA.⁴²³ The PAFSECOM soldiers, defending the airport terminal, fought the RAM-HF forces. At around 2:00 a.m., another heavy exchange of gunfire in front of the area took place lasting for ten minutes.⁴²⁴

Danilo "King" Cruz, a broker representative, received a radio call from ex-Lt Col Bibit to proceed to Baltao Subdivision fronting the Cargo Terminal at NAIA. Cruz was PRO of the Customs Gun Club when Bibit was the president. Cruz is said to be an ex-PC Sergeant and former bodyguard of Jackie Ponce Enrile. At the NAIA, Cruz saw Bibit and 40 other armed men, one of whom was Tugbang. From NAIA, the group proceeded to MDA.⁴²⁵

Gamos arrived at Baltao Subdivision with his armed companions and led them and the Guardians from the Bureau of Corrections to the Ding Velayo Sports Complex across MDA, arriving there at 5:00 a.m. Gamos instructed the Guardians to stay there and await the delivery of food.⁴²⁶ The group of Gamos positioned themselves at the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service office at the old MIA.

About 100 RAM-HF soldiers arrived at the Baggage Terminal Area of MDA and demanded from Lina Precalla, a lady security guard, the keys to the parked vehicles outside. Since Precalla did not have the keys, Capt Bistro, the leader of the rebels, ordered the rigging of the ignition system so the vehicles could be used.⁴²⁷

By 5:45 a.m., the forces of Gamos and Tugbang, now numbering about 100, had taken control of the MDA Terminal Building. They overpowered the PAFSECOM personnel guarding the building and herded them into a room inside the terminal.⁴²⁸

By morning the RAM-HF forces began using PAL facilities at MDA. At about 9:00 a.m., a van resembling a PAL delivery truck arrived at the Velayo Sports Complex bringing food in packs similar to that served during in-flight meals. The Guardians partook of the food and shared it with their fellow rebels inside the sports complex.⁴²⁹

At 10:00 a.m., a V-150 with "RAM-SFP" markings⁴³⁰ earlier captured at VAB by the rebel forces led by Lt Caraig, arrived at the MDA.⁴³¹ Then,

three PAL vehicles arrived in front of the PC/INP Hangar loaded with about 20 fully-armed men, either in military or civilian attire. One alighted and talked to P/Lt Ricardo Espiritu, a police officer stationed at the hangar. To avoid armed confrontation and destruction of PC/INP assets, an agreement was reached allowing P/Lt Espiritu and his men to retain their arms and equipment, while the rebel soldiers in the PAL vehicles stayed in the area.⁴³²

The V-150 returned to VAB by early evening and then proceeded to the South Expressway to wait for other rebel troops coming from Calamba, Laguna.⁴³³ It was reported that these troops stopped upon reaching the Calamba gate of the South Expressway, when a government helicopter flown by BGen Loven Abadia hovered over and poised to attack them if they proceeded.⁴³⁴

Government Troops Take Defensive Action

At the Quick Reaction Center at the old MIA, a Battle Staff was created by the PAFSECOM. There were reports that Bibit used the telephone facilities of DHL office located at the old MIA building.⁴³⁵ A detailed check of DHL phone bills did not disclose any use by Bibit of DHL phones. However, DHL Philippines General Manager Jose Feliciano told the Commission that Crismel Verano has been DHL's tax consultant for more than ten years now.⁴³⁶ Verano is linked to the coup in the Galido affidavits.⁴³⁷ In coordination with NAIA General Manager Eduardo Carrascoso, PAFSECOM personnel barricaded runways 06-24 and 13-31 with fire trucks, baggage containers and other obstruction to prevent the use of the runways by the rebels.⁴³⁸

Withdrawal from the Manila Domestic Airport and Confrontation at the Cavite Coastal Road

By afternoon, the RAM-HF forces led by Gamos and Tugbang, withdrew from MDA and proceeded to the vicinity of Quirino Avenue and Coastal Road in Parañaque. They were blocked by government forces from the South Sector Command (SSC) of PC CAPCOM led by its CO, Lt Col Jose Bandung, Jr. The roadblock was earlier established at 2:00 a.m. by BGen Aguirre to prevent the entry of rebel forces from Cavite.⁴³⁹

The RAM-HF troops sent an emissary in the person of TSgt Inocentes Dionesa, PC, to request Bandung not to block their way. Because Bandung would not give way, a firefight lasting for about two hours occurred.⁴⁴⁰ After a while, Gamos again sent a feeler to Bandung and

when that effort failed, shooting erupted between the contending forces until the rebels started to withdraw towards Tambo, Parañaque.⁴⁴¹

At about 5:00 p.m., the troops of P/Lt Col Romeo Maganto, CO MPFF, in two 6 x 6 trucks, arrived at the Coastal Road area to augment the blocking force of Bandung and to establish another road block there.⁴⁴²

During the firefight, Bandung, PC SSgts Leonardo de la Rosa, Melvynne Luzuriaga, Reynaldo Montforte, and Chito Mercado, all of the government side, were wounded.⁴⁴³ On the rebel side, Cpl Uy was killed and others were wounded including Danilo Cruz. A Red Cross volunteer was similarly wounded and Airport policeman Ruben de la Cruz was killed.⁴⁴⁴

Withdrawal of the Guardians

The Guardians from Muntinlupa stayed in front of the Ding Velayo Sports Complex up to 3:00 p.m., waiting for the promised delivery of guns and uniforms. No delivery was made. When the RAM-HF soldiers occupying MDA left, the Guardians felt abandoned.⁴⁴⁵ They started leaving the place one by one; the last one to leave was Manuel Garces, Jr. According to the latter, they abandoned their three vehicles prior to their return to Muntinlupa to avoid detection.⁴⁴⁶ They were able to return to the New Bilibid Prison Reservation in Muntinlupa that same afternoon, unnoticed by the guards at the main gate, despite the augmented guards and the two machine guns earlier mounted at the main entrance of the prison reservation.⁴⁴⁷

No formal administrative investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Correction officials and no formal report had been submitted to the Department of Justice about the activities of these guards during the last coup.⁴⁴⁸ The Commission, through Resolution No. 089⁴⁴⁹ dated 4 July 1990, recommended to the Department of Justice their investigation.

RAM-HF Soldiers Withdraw

By 9:30 p.m., majority of the RAM-HF soldiers inside MDA had pulled out and moved towards VAB on board private cars and vans.⁴⁵⁰ Moments after, the armed group that arrived at the PC/INP Hangar premises also left the area.⁴⁵¹

C.6. PTV-4 Incident

C.6.a. 30 November

The takeover of the government television station, PTV-4, located at Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, was crucial for the coup considering that television is a vital medium for propaganda. When informed about an impending coup, Conrado Limcaoco, network manager of PTV-4, instructed his security aide, MSgt Jesus de Guzman, to advise 2Lt Alfredo Javillonar, PC OIC Security Platoon assigned at PTV-4, that a red alert had been declared at about 5:00 p.m. Javillonar was then at his camp at Bago Bantay.⁴⁵² Later that night, Javillonar went to PTV-4 and briefed his personnel, assigning some of them to the entrance gate at Scout Albano St and the others to the barracks inside the compound.⁴⁵³

Movement of Rebels to PTV-4 Complex

At about midnight, the 34 MC of the MBLT 4 under Lt Rolando Cal, arrived at the PTV-4 compound from VAB aboard two ten-wheeler civilian trucks, taxis, and Ford Fieras, accompanied by two V-150s. According to Pfc Cadera,⁴⁵⁴ the movement was upon orders of Gojo. Other units were also mobilized by the RAM-HF troops.

C.6.b. 1 December

At around 1:40 a.m., Capt Nestor Bernardino, CO 221 PC Coy stationed in Taytay, Rizal, told his men of the directive for them to establish checkpoints in Taytay. However, instead of doing so, he brought his men to PTV-4 compound where they were met by several soldiers upon their arrival at around 2:00 a.m. Three unidentified officers fetched Capt Bernardino. When he returned, he distributed white patches to his men for countersign purposes. Some soldiers withdrew from the area and returned to their station⁴⁵⁵ because they sensed that Capt Bernardino deceived them.

By 1:00 a.m. an undetermined number of RAM-HF soldiers stopped a ten-wheeler truck (Plate No CFL 333) at the Nichols underpass. The truck driver, Anastacio de la Cruz, said that he was delivering construction materials to Pasay City when he was commandeered by men in military uniform.⁴⁵⁶ The truck was brought to PTV-4 at about 3:00 a.m. where the soldiers disembarked.⁴⁵⁷

Attack at PTV-4 Complex

At 1:10 a.m., some 250 Scout Rangers and Marines clad in black and camouflage uniforms, respectively, with one Scorpion tank and a V-150 arrived and deployed at Scout Esguerra and Albano Streets near PTV-4.⁴⁵⁸ Lt Col Ernesto Salvador, CO of the NCRDC Security Battalion, called 2Lt Javillonar and instructed him to prepare as rebel soldiers were likely to enter the area.⁴⁵⁹ By 1:30 a.m., two ten-wheeler trucks loaded with uniformed men followed by two V-150s and one APC tank approached the PTV-4 gate. The two trucks stopped at the pedestrian gate and the men under Lt Cal rushed inside the compound and occupied strategic points. The V-150s and the APC proceeded to Scout Albano St. Javillonar ordered the duty technicians to immobilize the television and radio stations.⁴⁶⁰ Cal asked Javillonar to join them but he refused.⁴⁶¹

A reinforcement platoon from Alpha Coy, Security Battalion, under Lt Manuel Visperas and 2Lt Oscar Fajardo, was dispatched to PTV-4 to aid Javillonar and his unit.⁴⁶² The platoon, aboard a 6 x 6 truck, arrived at PTV-4 at 1:40 a.m.⁴⁶³ Fajardo, was instructed by Lt Col Salvador through the radio to assault the rebel forces. Fajardo hesitated because the rebel forces were superior in number. Moreover, government troops and civilian employees of PTV-4 were still inside. Instead, Visperas tried to negotiate for the peaceful and safe evacuation of Javillonar and his men.⁴⁶⁴ Javillonar introduced Cal to Visperas. Cal gave Visperas the choice of either joining them or remaining neutral. Salvador arrived to personally assess the situation. He negotiated with an unidentified soldier who told him that the rebels were led by Kapunan and Batac. After negotiations, civilian employees and government troops were allowed to leave the PTV-4 compound.

Javillonar then proceeded to their barracks situated at PTV-4's tennis court which was also surrounded by rebel forces. One of his men reported that the armory of the Security Platoon was opened and unidentified Scout Rangers took, among others, three M-16 rifles, one .50 cal machine gun, and a recoilless rifle. It was reported that "RAM boys" entered the barracks and held at gunpoint SN1 Ricardo Peña, Sgt Tambot PAF, JN1 Galit, Cpl Bataan, A1C Canlas, and SSgt Baybayan. Personal belongings such as fatigue uniforms and shoes were also taken. He then directed his men to join Visperas' men at the gate of PTV-4.⁴⁶⁵

Salvador ordered Javillonar to move to GMA-7 and Visperas to proceed to Broadcast City.⁴⁶⁶ At the main gate, Salvador ordered his men to move out since they were outnumbered.⁴⁶⁷

Government Troops Regroup

Salvador's men regrouped at GMA-7 at about 3:30 a.m. and from there proceeded to Broadcast City where they linked up with the unit of Maj Marcelino Yacat, PMAR, head of the military detachment at the Batasang Pambansa. BGen Biazon gave orders for Salvador to act as negotiator with the rebels at PTV-4, and for Yacat to lead the combined units of the Security Battalion and the Marine forces to launch a tactical assault against the rebels should the negotiations fail.⁴⁶⁸

At 4:00 a.m., some Officer Candidate School (OCS) students of AFP TRACOM led by Maj Wilhelm Doromal arrived at PTV-4 to support the rebel forces.⁴⁶⁹ Meanwhile, armed men with white armbands entered the PTV-4 penthouse. A certain Mr Bilbao recognized "Red" Kapunan among them.⁴⁷⁰

By 5:00 a.m., the streets leading to PTV-4 were blocked by the rebels with the assistance of some civilians. Rebel troops blocked the corner of Quezon Blvd and EDSA with a ten-wheeler truck.⁴⁷¹ NCRDC COC received a report that rebel Scout Rangers and Marines were also blocking the vicinity of Bohol Avenue and Scout Albano St.⁴⁷² Cal pulled out the 34 MC from PTV-4 and stationed it at a nearby street corner.⁴⁷³ Some rebels went to Quezon Blvd staying there till nightfall of 1 December.⁴⁷⁴

Government Troops Try to Retake PTV-4

At 5:00 a.m., the four platoons of the Marine Security Group (MSG), with orders from higher HQ arrived at PTV-4 to retake it. At the back of PTV-4, RAM-HF soldiers started firing at the first MSG platoon. An exchange of gunfire ensued. A grenade from an M-79 grenade launcher exploded, injuring Pfc Binanitan and Pfc Tironez.⁴⁷⁵

The other government troops moved to the intersection of Quezon Blvd and EDSA. The fourth MSG platoon under Capt Javier and the 22 MCMBLT 2 under 2Lt Ramon Mitra III moved towards south of Quezon Blvd while the other platoons turned left towards Cubao. At the vicinity of Aristocrat Restaurant, about 200 enemy troops were positioned. As Capt Javier's troops were taking cover, heavy fire came from a Tora-Tora plane killing Pfc Villaces and Cpl Galpo and wounding Sgt Lasang, Sgt Rafallo, Cpl Rudam, Pfc Rivero, TSgt Catbugan, SSgt Hernandez, Pfc Caasi, and Sgt Vitales.⁴⁷⁶

The government troopers returned fire, retaliating with their V-150. The first, second and third platoons under Capt Bucsit stationed themselves at the corner wall of PTV-4 in Mother Ignacia and Scout Albano intersection. Another firefight started at about 5:30 a.m. During a lull in the fighting, Maj Yacat took the opportunity to negotiate for the surrender of the rebels.

Meanwhile, the fourth platoon was deployed by Capt Javier within 50 meters from PTV-4. They planned to redeploy by squads. When they were about to do so, they were hit by gunfire from 90 RR mortar and bombing from a Tora-Tora plane.⁴⁷⁷

The elements of the MSG and the Marine Contingency Battalion failed at this time to retake PTV-4 due to strong enemy resistance and the presence of civilians. They instead established blocking positions at the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Blvd.⁴⁷⁸ At 6:45 a.m., armed confrontation continued. While the 22 MC MBLT 2 soldiers were resting at a corner not far from PTV-4, enemy soldiers fired at them. They fired back causing the rebels to retreat.⁴⁷⁹

Enemy Airstrikes and Reinforcements

At 7:00 a.m., the 15 SW Operation Center monitored that PTV-4 was a target of the rebel Tora-Tora planes.⁴⁸⁰ Upon sighting the convoy of government troops heading for PTV-4, two Tora-Toras strafed them, killing a number of civilians and soldiers at EDSA and Quezon Blvd. The rebel planes were also observed flying over Camp Aguinaldo and bombing NCRDC Headquarters by 7:20 a.m.⁴⁸¹

At 8:00 a.m., a rebel Sikorsky helicopter joined the two Tora-Toras in strafing government forces under Salvador and Yacat.⁴⁸² The helicopter also bombed NCRDC Headquarters.⁴⁸³ It attacked elements of the Security Battalion positioned at the transmitter of RPN 9 in Panay Avenue.⁴⁸⁴

At 9:00 a.m., the 44 MC MBLT 4 left VAB on board a 6 x 6 truck, and proceeded to PTV-4 to reinforce the 34 MC MBLT 4. With the former were Capt Romulo Gualdrapa, Capt Edgardo Cabalquinto, Lt Santos Petalio, and 2Lt Adonis Fernandez.⁴⁸⁵

From late morning till noontime, radio reports were heard about ongoing negotiations between government forces and the rebels. DZRH reported the negotiations between Capt Javier representing the government, and for the rebels, Lt Paterno Reynato Padua of the Scout Rangers

and Lt Rolly Tan of the Marines. However, the negotiations were interrupted due to the presence of civilians ("uziseros").⁴⁸⁶

DZRH also reported that Marine Sgt Lloma, one of the APC personnel, defected to the rebel side, allegedly because, their leader Maj Marcelino Lakap was gone and they had no support nor reinforcement from Camp Aguinaldo. Speaker Ramon Mitra, through the radio, urged Sgt Lloma to take charge of the command and not to defect.⁴⁸⁷ Subsequent information disclosed that this was a rebel psywar tactic.

At noontime, rebel troops posted at EDSA corner Quezon Blvd were able to surround two government APCs near the Ninoy Aquino Park.⁴⁸⁸

Rafael Recto Arrives at PTV-4

At about 8:00 a.m., rebel soldiers under Lt Col Eduardo Kapunan took over PTV-4 and established a temporary command post in the office of Network Manager Conrado Limcaoco on the third floor.⁴⁸⁹ Around 2:00 p.m., a group led by Rafael Recto arrived at PTV-4. With Recto were Joaquin Rodriguez and Edgardo Castro, an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs and one of those involved in processing the issuance of a passport to Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. Both Rodriguez and Castro testified that they accompanied Recto to PTV-4 because he (Recto) claimed his daughter Plinky was at the adjoining ABS-CBN station and he wanted to fetch her.

According to PTV-4 Chief Security Officer, Orlando Fontanilla, Recto's group was allowed entry into the compound by a rebel Scout Ranger officer who instructed him to bring Recto and his group to the third floor of PTV-4. Fontanilla complied and brought Recto and his companions to Limcaoco's office where Recto inquired from the rebel officers there about a press conference.⁴⁹⁰ One of the rebels replied, according to Fontanilla, "*wala daw presscon, walang order na may presscon*"⁴⁹¹ (There's no presscon. We have no orders for a presscon). With that, Recto and his group departed from PTV-4. Fontanilla testified that Recto neither entered the premises of ABS-CBN nor asked him about Plinky. In their testimony before the Commission, Rodriguez and Castro also confirmed that Recto did not enter ABS-CBN.

In his sworn statement, Fontanilla stated that he saw Lito Gorospe in the Master Control booth of ABS-CBN with a written statement which Gorospe intended to read and 12 videocassettes which he would show, if they were able to operate ABS-CBN.⁴⁹² However, both ABS-CBN and PTV-4 had been disabled so none of these events took place.

Government Troops Retake PTV-4

The rebel soldiers left the PTV-4 premises at 9:00 p.m.⁴⁹⁸

Rebel MBLT 4 troops which occupied PTV-4, moved to Ortigas Avenue.⁴⁹⁴ Some of them regrouped at the nearby JUSMAG area while the others, at the vicinity of Camelot Hotel.⁴⁹⁵

At 9:30 p.m., Salvador, and a composite team from GHQ, reoccupied PTV-4.⁴⁹⁶ At 10:00 p.m., 2Lt Javillonar returned to PTV-4 and inspected the building together with the Administrative Manager, Emmanuel de Asis. They discovered that the vault (of money) had been forced open. The lockers of the soldiers assigned at the station and the armory in the general manager's room on the third floor were likewise ransacked. Guns, ammunition, and personal belongings of the soldiers were gone.⁴⁹⁷

At 11:30 p.m., Maj Ducusin, CO MBLT 2, left Camp Aguinaldo and established blocking positions at the vicinity of corner EDSA and East Avenue, Quezon City.⁴⁹⁸

C.6.c. 2 December

At 1:30 a.m., rebel troops left ABS-CBN for Timog/Circle, accompanied by some civilians in T-shirts and "maong" pants and escorted by two V-150s.⁴⁹⁹ One of the V-150s (Body No. 401) developed engine trouble and was abandoned. Elements of the Security Battalion under MSgt Tanganan recovered the V-150 and towed it to their HQ.⁵⁰⁰

By 5:00 a.m., MGen Ramon Montano ordered BGen Cesar Nazareno, RECOM 3 Commander, to block all enemy forces withdrawing from PTV-4 heading towards Camps Crame and Aguinaldo.⁵⁰¹

By 6:00 a.m., the 34 MC MBLT 4 under Lt Cal had moved to the Camp Aguinaldo area near White Plains to join their comrades.⁵⁰²

D. Camp Aguinaldo and its Vicinity

It appears that the ultimate objective of the rebels were to take over Camp Aguinaldo because this meant the fall of the symbolic seat of military power and to gain control of the center for AFP military operations. Inside Camp Aguinaldo are the headquarters of the AFP's top military officers, the main office of the Department of National Defense, the Logistics Command (LOGCOM) which controls and supplies the fire power, ammunitions and equipment requirement of the entire

AFP, and the Joint Operations Center (JOC) which Col Edgardo Batanga, CO 701 Bde, describes as "the heart and soul of GHQ AFP."⁵⁰³

D.1. Pre 30 November Events

Intelligence Receives Mixed Signals of a Coup

As early as June 1989, the AFP Intelligence Office (J2) received information on a joint Zumel-Honasan attempt to destabilize government on the first or second week of June 1989. The plans did not materialize, although there was information of recruitment inside PAF bases by ex-Lt Col Neon Ebuena.⁵⁰⁴

Information on recruitment continued to be received up to August 1989 when Honasan was reportedly meeting unidentified top military officers and government officials.⁵⁰⁵ During this month, the Bureau of Customs uncovered a shipment of one million primers used for the manufacture of ammunitions for .45 cal guns consigned to Honasan. The Bureau turned them over to the PC Firearms and Explosives Unit (FEU).⁵⁰⁶

Around 26 November, NCRDC Intelligence under Col Benjamin Libarnes received information that a coup would be staged either on 1-5 December, 16-21 December, or 28-31 December of 1989, or 15-16 January 1990 by the joint forces of Marcos-Ver Loyalists and the RAM-HF.

There were also information about other plots. Military intelligence believed that the so-called "Peoples' March for Justice" from Ilocos Norte to Manila from 26 October to 4 November was preparatory to a coup. When the coup failed to materialize, a second "Peoples' March for Justice" was planned for 16-20 December with the Pambansang Salubungan Para Sa Katarungan (PSPK), an affiliate of the Movement for Filipino Ideology, as the front group.⁵⁰⁷

NCRDC Intelligence further reported that the security force under Gamos assigned to Vice President Laurel was preparing plans, code names and numbers, sketches of streets and buildings, and vehicles for a coup. The most compelling evidence was the information given by the wife of Lt Rodolfo Cachola, who was undergoing Scout Ranger training in San Quintin, Pangasinan.⁵⁰⁸ Upon instruction of her husband, Mrs Cachola revealed to the Philippine Marines that her husband and another officer who was also undergoing training, were called to the FSRR HQ in Fort Bonifacio and were briefed on the forthcoming coup.⁵⁰⁹

Infiltration from Within

On rotation, a Senior Command Duty Officer (SCDO) is designated for the 77-hectare Camp Aguinaldo Complex. By practice, the SCDO's lasts for a period of two weeks.⁵¹⁰ A Command Duty Officer (CDO) at LOGCOM is likewise designated. On 30 November, rebel officers Commo Domingo Calajate and Cmdr Proceso Maligalig, Operations Officer LOGCOM, were SCDO of Camp Aguinaldo and the CDO of LOGCOM respectively. LOGCOM occupies two-thirds of the land area of Camp Aguinaldo. AFP GHQ occupies the remainder.

In September 1989, Navy Capt Manuel Ison, the newly installed CO of the Maintenance Depot of the AFP LOGCOM, completely reorganized and reshuffled the unit, replacing key personnel with his own. His recommendee, Lt Joel Cantos, took charge of the keys to the warehouses which contain oils, lubricants and spare parts. Ison also replaced some of the personnel of the Supply Accountability Office (SAO) with his own men and at the same time restricted Josue Duque, SAO Officer, from entering the warehouse.

On 29 November, troops started to mass in Camp Aguinaldo. NCRDC Intelligence failed to assess the importance of the arrival at LOGCOM that day of a Marine company from MBLT 1⁵¹¹ based in Bulacan headed by Capt Wilfredo Codiactal, EX-O, with a V-150. Pfc Marcelino Peralta said that the company was ordered to proceed to LOGCOM by Capt Codiactal without revealing their mission.⁵¹² This company first went to VAB, then proceeded to LOGCOM. Another Marine guard company, which was assigned to escort supplies to be picked up from LOGCOM, arrived on 30 November from Olongapo.⁵¹³

D.2. 30 November

At about 11:00 a.m., Col Thelmo Cunanan, CO 202 Bde 2 ID, came to the office of Commo Virgilio Marcelo, CG GHHSC, and told the latter "There is gonna be a coup to be staged by the Marines and the Rangers". Thereupon, Marcelo mobilized all his troops and by 4:00 p.m., they were all ready. At the same time, he relayed the information to BGen Roman Gavino, Jr, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and asked for confirmation. The latter could not confirm.⁵¹⁴

At 5:30 p.m., a group of soldiers held a meeting at one of the houses at the Enlisted Men's Barrio inside Camp Aguinaldo near Gate 5. They discussed plans to ransack the Civil Relations Service (CRS) for arms. Commo Marcelo received information that ex-Lt Col Bibit's group was already inside the camp to seize its armories.

Government Holds Top Command Conference

The Tagaytay incident led Secretary Ramos, together with Gen de Villa, to call a Command Conference which was held at ISAFP in Camp Aguinaldo starting at 5:00 p.m. The General Staff, the major service commanders, BGen Cardones, BGen Cabanlig, BGen Orlando Antonio, CG NOLCOM, BGen Tereso Isleta, CG 15 SW, BGen Biazon, BGen Galido, BGen Loven Abadia, Commo Calajate and other major unit commanders attended the conference which lasted until 10:00 p.m.⁵¹⁵

The major service commanders relayed to Gen de Villa their assessment of the military situation in relation to the previous day's attack by Scout Rangers on the AFP communications system in Tagaytay City. After the conference, Gen de Villa informed the country through a nationwide broadcast that a coup d'etat was about to be carried out by rightist forces. He added though that it had been aborted.⁵¹⁶

BGen Biazon, in order to augment the forces defending the camp, told Gen de Villa: "I am calling our reserve (MBLT 4) from Fort Bonifacio to Aguinaldo".⁵¹⁷ However, Biazon was told that his reserve MBLT 4 had gone over to the rebel side.

That evening, Col Edgardo Batenga, CO 701 Bde, placed his command under BGen Biazon's control. Batenga went to Sta Rosa, Laguna to consolidate his forces. He told one of his battalion commanders, Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, CO 72 IB, to proceed to Camp Aguinaldo with two armored vehicles and to engage all rebel troops coming from the south.⁵¹⁸

D.3. 1 December

Early Signs of Rebel Activity at Camp Aguinaldo

At 2:00 a.m., half of the First Marine Brigade Contingency Force left LOGCOM aboard two V-150s for Fort Bonifacio to join the rebels.⁵¹⁹

By 3:00 a.m., some unidentified armed soldiers entered the AFP Finance Center (AFPFC) and woke up the enlisted men, saying the camp has been infiltrated.⁵²⁰ The armed men allegedly forced them at gunpoint to join their cause.⁵²¹ These men were ordered to join the mutineers by Capt Pimentel, a finance officer, on the pretext that the exercise was "*para sa kinabukasan ng ating mga anak*" (for our children's future). They gave the men M-16 guns and ammunition. They then took some AFPFC vehicles—three mini-cruisers and one hi-ace van—and proceeded

towards the Enlisted Men's Barrio near Gate 5.⁵²² Sgt Borbe, one of those in the group, said he saw many armed troops.

One of the vehicles was driven by Cpl Lucio Cabil of AFPFC. With him were SSgt Manlangit, SSgt Aloquin, and Wenceslao Lagradilla. The others riding the other vehicles included SSgt Asuncion, SSgt Borbe, Sgt Juni, Sgt Aguirre, Cpl Encotro, Edwin Velcorsa, Sixto Rodriguez and others. The men got off when they reached the area near Gate 5.⁵²³ At Gate 5, several government soldiers suddenly arrived with a V-150 and arrested them. Only then, claimed SSgt Asuncion, did he realize that he was with the rebel group.⁵²⁴

At the same time, about 50 armed military men were reportedly seen at the vicinity of Lambat Disco and Euro Car Sales near the corner of EDSA and P Tuazon St in Cubao, Quezon City.⁵²⁵ TSgt Henry Aquino recognized former NISA Lt Col Rodolfo Tor as one of the armed men who fired upon the NCRDC intelligence team monitoring Euro Car Sales.⁵²⁶

Ransack of the Civil Relations Service Office

Inside the GHQ premises, rebel troops started to mass. The AFP Civil Relations Service (CRS) armory was ransacked by 12 to 14 armed men at 4:30 a.m.⁵²⁷ Sgt Macario Mabazza narrated that, while sleeping at the CRS, armed men wearing masks woke him up and forced him to jump over the wall and flee.⁵²⁸ Some of the men were recognized as organic personnel of CRS. Later it was discovered that various firearms were stolen.

At about 5:00 a.m., some Military Police (MP), believed to be rebels, arrived at Camp Aguinaldo aboard a 6 x 6 truck, a pick-up and a V-150. However, Capt Duque rounded them up and brought them to the grandstand of Camp Aguinaldo, then to the HSC stockade. Confiscated from the rebel MPs were four M-14 rifles and one M-16 rifle.

First Rebel Airstrikes at Camps Aguinaldo and Crame

As the rebel MPs were being brought to the stockade at about 7:00 a.m., a rebel Sikorsky and Tora-Tora planes started bombarding Camp Aguinaldo.⁵²⁹ Sgt Aloquin, along with the other detainees, escaped as everyone scampered to save their own lives.⁵³⁰ LCdr Vicente Botero, CO, HHSG instructed his men to defend NCRDC HQ.

At 7:00 a.m., Biazon ordered the establishment of a Tactical Command Post at Camp Aguinaldo Grandstand in view of reports that rebel planes

would hit Malacañang and military camps.⁵³¹ By 8:00 a.m., this command post was set up.⁵³²

Later, government F-5 jets were seen encircling the rebel Tora-Tora planes. The two rebel Tora-Tora planes augmented by a Sikorsky helicopter, again attacked and bombed Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame at 9:15 a.m.⁵³³ HPC in Camp Crame was hit while Gen de Villa's residence and other buildings in Camp Aguinaldo were razed to the ground.⁵³⁴

At 9:45 a.m., a rebel Sikorsky helicopter fired rockets at Camp Crame hitting the Narcotics Command, HPC, and the COMMEL buildings. The PC-INP forces in Camp Crame fired at the aircraft using .30 and .50 cal machineguns. Because of the burning of HPC, a tactical and operations command post was organized at the Constabulary Security Group (CSG) building and at the Constabulary Adjutant Building.⁵³⁵

The rebel Tora-Toras and the Sikorsky helicopter again went back to strafe and bomb different strategic areas inside Camp Aguinaldo after bombing Malacañang, Camp Crame and strafing PTV-4.⁵³⁶

Commo Domingo Calajate Convinces LOGCOM to Join Rebels

At 8:00 a.m., Commo Calajate convened the officers and soldiers of LOGCOM at the front of the LOGCOM main building. At the meeting, Calajate said that there was already a failure in the chain of command and that GHQ was no longer functioning as of 4:00 a.m. He further revealed his affiliation with the rebels after telling them that he was the highest link in the AFP's chain of command. He then said that he was joining the rebel cause and urged "everyone to do the same". At the meeting, Calajate asked the men who were with him.⁵³⁷ Many raised their hand. Among them were Cmdr Maligalig Jr, Capt Manuel Ison, Lt Col Narciso Daus, Lt Col Nicolas Cabrera, Maj Raul Heredia, and some doctors and nurses.⁵³⁸ All those who did not want to join were given 15 minutes to leave. Col Manuel Mariano, Deputy Commander LOGCOM, after reflecting, approached Calajate and told him that he would not join the rebels,⁵³⁹ after which Mariano left.

The other soldiers were ordered to take measures to secure LOGCOM against government forces.⁵⁴⁰ Pfc Antonio Kabigting said that Calajate ordered them to defend the camp. Lt Col Ramon Palad gave Kabigting masking tape to attach on his left sleeve as a countersign. Maligalig, also wearing a countersign with a drawing on it, told him and the men to

withdraw firearms and bullets and secure their offices.⁵⁴¹ Calajate, meanwhile, ordered the Philippine flag inverted. At this point, LOGCOM stopped supplying NCRDC with ammunition. Calajate also instructed that the gate at the Administration Building be barricaded.⁵⁴²

Also at the meeting with Calajate were Col Francisco Deocarís and Capt Manuel Santos. After the meeting, they returned to the Logistics Training Center. Fearing that there may be instructions to shoot those who went out of the camp, Deocarís stayed put and instructed Capt Santos to secure the office and safeguard their things.⁵⁴³

Cmdr Maligalig Takes Over JOC

After the meeting, Maligalig with 50 LOGCOM personnel went to the JOC located nearby and tried to take it by force. When BGen Lisandro Abadia, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (J3), heard this, he and troops from 72 IB under Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, began operations to retake JOC.⁵⁴⁴ JOC was then surrounded by Cmdr Maligalig's troops. Lisandro Abadia confronted the rebels at about 11:00 a.m. and without a shot being fired, Maligalig and his renegades withdrew to LOGCOM. Some laid down their arms after the confrontation.⁵⁴⁵ JOC was again safely in GHQ's control.

Government Consolidates Troops

Realizing Camp Aguinaldo's vulnerability on 1 December due to lack of men and defection of his reserves, Biazon had to wait for reinforcements from the commands of BGen Blando, Galido, Nazareno, Carbonell, Abella and Juachon.

First of the government reinforcements to arrive in Camp Aguinaldo were the 72 IB troops of Lt Col Lasan, followed shortly by additional soldiers led by Lasan's commander, Col Batenga of the 701 Bde. Their first task was to assist BGen Lisandro Abadia to clear JOC of rebels. They succeeded and even captured Maligalig. However, after the rebel Tora-Toras attacked, Maligalig escaped.⁵⁴⁶

Batenga's and Lasan's troops were divided: half was assigned to retake LOGCOM and the other half to defend the grandstand. Just about then, troops led by BGen Javier Carbonell, CG 2 ID, and troops from AFP TRACOM under BGen Juachon, arrived and took over the attack of LOGCOM.⁵⁴⁷

Over the telephone, BGen Carbonell tried to persuade Commo Calajate to surrender. When the latter refused, the government forces advanced.⁵⁴⁸ There was a firefight followed by the surrender of the rebels.

During the firefight, some of the 400 officers and men at LOGCOM started to escape. At 2:30 p.m., Calajate, Maligalig, Ison, and 2Lt Ragasa escaped on board Calajate's staff car.⁵⁴⁹ They proceeded to VAB.⁵⁵⁰ By 3:00 p.m., the flagpole which originally had the inverted flag was now replaced by a white one. Col Edgardo Kasilag, Chief of Staff of AFP LOGCOM, told the men defending LOGCOM that Calajate had left, and that they were to follow the chain of command.⁵⁵¹ Kasilag led them in surrendering to BGen Lisandro Abadia and Carbonell at the CSG grandstand.⁵⁵² The surrenderees were processed by Col Manuel Mariano, Acting Chief of AFP LOGCOM. The troops from the 701 Bde secured LOGCOM by 4:00 p.m.

RECOM 3 troops arrived at 5:27 p.m. to reinforce Camp Aguinaldo.

The order to consolidate troops from the 1st Marine Brigade (1 MBde) under BGen Cesar Abella deployed in Bulacan was given the night before. By 11:45 a.m., one battalion had arrived in Norzagaray. The second battalion was ready to move from their headquarters in Malabon by 2:00 p.m. The two battalions, MBLT 1 and MBLT 2, plus three separate companies, 52 MC, 61 MC and the HQS Coy, left Norzagaray by 4:00 p.m. These Marines arrived in Camp Aguinaldo at 7:00 p.m.⁵⁵³

During the whole day, 202 Bde and 203 Bde under Col Thelmo Cunanan and Col Clemente Mariano, respectively, were consolidating their troops preparatory to moving them to the vicinity of Camp Aguinaldo.⁵⁵⁴

MGen Montano ordered a PC Special Action Force (SAF), acting as a reserve and maneuver force, to proceed to Camp Crame with armor elements. The PC and elements of the WPD were directed to deploy blocking forces.⁵⁵⁵

Rebel Marine Troops Start to Consolidate

The major force of the rebels composed of the Marines from MBLT 4 and their armor vehicles started to consolidate at Camp Aguinaldo by late afternoon of 1 December.

withdraw firearms and bullets and secure their offices.⁵⁴¹ Calajate, meanwhile, ordered the Philippine flag inverted. At this point, LOGCOM stopped supplying NCRDC with ammunition. Calajate also instructed that the gate at the Administration Building be barricaded.⁵⁴²

Also at the meeting with Calajate were Col Francisco Deocarís and Capt Manuel Santos. After the meeting, they returned to the Logistics Training Center. Fearing that there may be instructions to shoot those who went out of the camp, Deocarís stayed put and instructed Capt Santos to secure the office and safeguard their things.⁵⁴³

Cmdr Maligalig Takes Over JOC

After the meeting, Maligalig with 50 LOGCOM personnel went to the JOC located nearby and tried to take it by force. When BGen Lisandro Abadia, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (J3), heard this, he and troops from 72 IB under Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, began operations to retake JOC.⁵⁴⁴ JOC was then surrounded by Cmdr Maligalig's troops. Lisandro Abadia confronted the rebels at about 11:00 a.m. and without a shot being fired, Maligalig and his renegades withdrew to LOGCOM. Some laid down their arms after the confrontation.⁵⁴⁵ JOC was again safely in GHQ's control.

Government Consolidates Troops

Realizing Camp Aguinaldo's vulnerability on 1 December due to lack of men and defection of his reserves, Biazon had to wait for reinforcements from the commands of BGens Blando, Galido, Nazareno, Carbonell, Abella and Juachon.

First of the government reinforcements to arrive in Camp Aguinaldo were the 72 IB troops of Lt Col Lasan, followed shortly by additional soldiers led by Lasan's commander, Col Batenga of the 701 Bde. Their first task was to assist BGen Lisandro Abadia to clear JOC of rebels. They succeeded and even captured Maligalig. However, after the rebel Tora-Toras attacked, Maligalig escaped.⁵⁴⁶

Batenga and Lasan's troops were divided: half was assigned to retake JOC and the other half to defend the grandstand. Just as BGen Javier Carbonell, CG 2 ID, and troops from the 701 Bde, arrived and took over the

Over the telephone, BGen Carbonell tried to persuade Commo Calajate to surrender. When the latter refused, the government forces advanced.⁵⁴⁸ There was a firefight followed by the surrender of the rebels.

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By early evening, the rebel Marines at Gate 3 of Camp Aguinaldo started moving to the Mormon Church area, together with the tanks.⁵⁶⁶ At 10:00 p.m., three Marine companies (HQ Coy, 4 MC, 24 MC) MBLT 4, supported by tanks and armor vehicles and led by Maj de la Peña and 2Lt Delfin Actas, moved from VAB through EDSA towards Camp Aguinaldo. Shooting ensued when these troops moved through the overpass by Mantrade Bldg in Makati.⁵⁶⁷ The Marines reached the EDSA-Ortigas Avenue intersection by 11:00 p.m., after breaking through the blockade at Guadalupe bridge set up by Regional Special Action Force. The 701 Bde and elements of the 1st MBde, established blocking positions at the intersection of EDSA-Ortigas Avenue to prevent enemy movements towards Camp Aguinaldo. When they reached the White Plains area by midnight, government forces engaged them in a firefight which resulted in the death of Lt Ireneo Galigana on the rebel side.⁵⁶⁸

D.4. 2 December

At 1:00 a.m., the 34 MC and 44 MC, also of MBLT 4, joined other rebel Marine units in White Plains⁵⁶⁹ area and came under attack by government aircrafts. Some of the rebel Marines took shelter in nearby residences, as well as in the Christ the King Parish in Pasig.⁵⁶⁰

The Second Wave - Breaking through the Barricade

To fortify defensive positions, Maj Amando Melo, CO MBLT 1, moved his Command Group Bravo Coy from EDSA-Ortigas Avenue to the Green Meadows-White Plains area.⁵⁶¹ BGen Cesar Abella, CG 1 MBde, dispatched two V-150s (with body nos. M418 and M421) to augment the blocking forces of MBLT 1.⁵⁶² MBLT 2 under Maj Edgardo Ducusin relocated their blocking position from EDSA-East Avenue in Quezon City to EDSA-Aurora Blvd.⁵⁶³

Seeing the blockade of two 6 x 6 trucks set up by Maj Melo's forces, rebel MBLT 4 officers led by Maj Antonio Bisenio and Capt Calimag sought to speak with Maj Melo. Eventually, negotiations transpired between Melo and Gojo with the former appealing for the MBLT 4 to return to Fort Bonifacio. Gojo, on the other hand, along with Lt Col Felimon Gasmin, Majs Bisenio, Franklin Casipit, and Capt Ariel Querubin tried to convince Melo and his men to join them. The rebels proved more persuasive. Forty-four enlisted men of Maj Melo, with one V-150 (body no M421) defected to the rebel side.⁵⁶⁴

At 3:00 a.m., rebel attacks began. Using an LVT, Gojo's troops rammed through two 6 x 6 trucks blockade put up by the MBLT 1 forces

at Katipunan corner White Plains Roads.⁵⁶⁵ The LVT maneuvered along Katipunan Avenue followed by V-150s and went towards Gate 1.⁵⁶⁶ Lt Col Jerry Albano was reported seen manning a V-150 (body no F-302) moving together with another V-150 (body no F-301).⁵⁶⁷

Arrival of Government Reinforcements

The 202 Bde and 203 Bde arrived at Guadalupe about 2:00 a.m. and linked up with the 701 Bde at corner Ortigas Avenue and EDSA. Col Cunanan's 202 Bde, together with two LVTs, proceeded to the area of Green Meadows and White Plains. Their mission was to pursue the enemy and hit them from the rear.⁵⁶⁸ By 5:00 a.m., the 202 Bde and Batanga's 701 Bde used 90 mm recoilless rifles and 105 mm Howitzers to deter the LVTs and V-150s from entering Camp Aguinaldo.⁵⁶⁹

NCRDC dispatched one company from AFP TRACOM under Cmdr Mario Ollero to augment the troops from MBLT 1 and the 203 Bde at corner Katipunan and White Plains to form a blocking force against enemy attempts to break through Gates 3, 4 and 5.⁵⁷⁰ The blocking force was subjected to assaults by rebel troops, and one LVT tried to break through at the concrete northeast wall near the AFP LOGCOM watertank. The rebel tanks continued to attack until 6:00 a.m.

Government Air Strikes Continue

At the same time, government air strikes continue. One UH-1H (Huey) helicopter piloted by Loven Abadia made three air strikes. Rebel gunfire wounded his co-pilot. Likewise, PAFF-5s and Sikorsky helicopters made two airstrikes along Katipunan, dropping bombs at rebel positions. Unfortunately, the bombs hit the men of the 202 Bde under Col Cunanan who were mistaken for rebels since they were moving towards Boni Serrano St.⁵⁷¹ Five of Col Cunanan's men perished while 30 others were injured. Of this event, Col Cunanan relates

The Chief of Staff asked me to assemble the brigade and he went there and he apologized to the soldiers in public for the sad incident and he said . . . Gen de Villa said, 'I accept full responsibility for this'. And this was a very big boost to the morale of the soldiers.⁵⁷²

Arrival of Marine Troops from PTV-4

The 34 MC MBLT 4 under Lt Cal, upon arriving at White Plains area in the morning, was attacked by government Sikorsky helicopters. To lessen their vulnerability to air attacks, Cal ordered his men to proceed to Gate 1 of Camp Aguinaldo.⁵⁷³

A number of rebels had become discouraged by this time. Some left their units and entered nearby houses, changed into civilian clothes, and joined other civilians in evacuating the area.⁵⁷⁴ The rockets fired by the Sikorsky forced the soldiers to seek refuge in houses in White Plains.⁵⁷⁵ At 10:00 a.m., the NCRDC Tactical Command Post received telephone calls from rebel Marine soldiers at the Mormon Church negotiating for surrender.⁵⁷⁶

Government aircrafts continued strafing, firing rockets, and bombing rebel positions at various times of the day.⁵⁷⁷

The Third Wave - More Attacks by Rebels

The subsequent sporadic burst of rebel artillery fire hit the JOC compound. Tasked to defend the GHQ area,⁵⁷⁸ the 72 IB troops under Lt Col Lasan received information that enemy Marines with LVT support were on their way to assault their positions at 4:30 p.m.⁵⁷⁹ Together with the soldiers from the 203 Bde, they repulsed the rebel offensive which attempted to break through the AFP LOGCOM perimeter on Katipunan Avenue. More shooting occurred until 7:00 p.m.⁵⁸⁰

Camp Aguinaldo Defense Plan Implemented

A conference was held at about 8:30 p.m. to coordinate plans for the defense of Camp Aguinaldo and offensive action against rebel positions. At the ISAFP Battle Staff room, de Villa and Ramos met the COs of the 203 Bde, 701 Bde, and the PC SAF Commander. The 203 Bde was tasked to secure the AFP LOGCOM area.⁵⁸¹ Elements from the GHQ, HSC, 203 Bde, MSG and the trainees of the AFP TRACOM under Col Yamzon would secure Camp Aguinaldo. The 72 IB was assigned as a screening force.⁵⁸²

At 11:30 p.m., the government launched its counter attack. BGen Biazon directed one section of the weapons platoon of 72 IB under 2Lt Miravello Miranda to counter attack the advancing rebel forces at LOGCOM. They immobilized one rebel LVT with two shots of their 90 RR. A second LVT withdrew after encountering heavy fire from Miranda's troops. Miranda then re-directed the artillery fire at rebel positions at the Veteran's building.⁵⁸³

D.5. 3 December

The Final Wave - Massive Assault of Rebels

By early morning of 3 December, the rebels prepared their most massive offensive to take over Camp Aguinaldo. Heavy gunbursts of different calibers, cannons, as well as mortars were heard all over Camp Aguinaldo.⁵⁸⁴ The 34 MC under Lt Cal persisted in entering the Camp through Gate 1 at about 1:00 a.m. But as they neared the gate, they were repelled by mortar fire.⁵⁸⁵

At the same time, more than a thousand RAM-HF soldiers coming from White Plains started simultaneous attacks at GHQ with supporting fire from 81 mm mortars, 105 mm Howitzers, V-150s and three LVTs.⁵⁸⁶ The preparation fires were followed by ground assaults, spearheaded by tanks and armor vehicles on the northern and eastern perimeter.⁵⁸⁷ The rebels intensified their effort to break through Gate 1.⁵⁸⁸

Other rebel forces initiated assaults using combined artillery and mortar attacks to enter Camp Aguinaldo alternating between Gates 1 and 2 near LOGCOM. The men of the 203 Bde under Clemente Mariano defended the gates with heavy fire,⁵⁸⁹ causing the attacking Marines to retreat.⁵⁹⁰

The government fortified their defense positions. The 32 MC, MSG, which arrived earlier from PTV-4 retaliated with their 105 mm Howitzer and hit one of the LVTs.⁵⁹¹ Recoilless rifle fire from the troops from GHQ HSC and the 701 Bde and 105 mm Howitzer fire from the 1 MBde and the 202 Bde repulsed the LVTs. The troops of Maj de la Peña were able to enter Camp Aguinaldo behind the burning LVT and took positions at the St Ignatius Chapel, AFPCES and the GHQ Medical Dispensary. The rest of the rebel forces withdrew and consolidated at 18th and 20th Avenues in Cubao.

Surrender Feelers Sent

By 5:30 a.m., surrender feelers through Lt Col Rodolfo Gallardo, Camp Aguinaldo Post Chaplain, were received from Maj de la Peña, who with his men were trapped at the area of St Ignatius Chapel.⁵⁹²

At 9:00 a.m., negotiations pushed through with the assistance of Col Daranchang. At first, Maj de la Peña refused to surrender, vowing to fight to the last man. However, Col Daranchang tried to talk him out of his decision, warning him that Biazon was ready to give the signal to

"wipe them out."⁵⁹³ At 11:00 a.m., about 203 Marine officers and men from 44 MC, 24 MC, 34 MC, and 4 MC led by dela Peña and Calimag surrendered.⁵⁹⁴

At 4:00 p.m., Ramos and de Villa held a press conference to formally announce the government victory. The Government reported that NCRDC and other units deployed 6,932 men. They said, government forces suffered one officer and 31 enlisted men killed in action, 29 officers and 224 enlisted men wounded in action.⁵⁹⁵

The Government also reported that rebel forces suffered one officer and 16 enlisted men killed in action, and 8 officers and 84 enlisted men wounded in action. A total of 390 firearms, 15 military vehicles, six tanks, and a civilian delivery truck were recovered from the rebels.⁵⁹⁶

E. Fort Magsaysay - Greenhills

E.1. Before 30 November

Various Activities at Fort Magsaysay and BGen Blando

BGen Marcelo Blando became the CO of the 7th Infantry Division (7 ID) based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, on 8 August 1989. In the August 1987 attempted coup, Honasan's main force came from Fort Magsaysay. It is also the training center of the Scout Rangers and one of the venues of Exercise Balikatan 1989. The area of operation of the 7 ID cover the Army units deployed in the provinces of Aurora, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Bataan, Zambales and parts of Rizal, Cavite, and Laguna.⁵⁹⁷

Prior to taking command of 7 ID, Blando was CG of the FSRR and was given by the Scout Rangers the code name of "Tatang One".⁵⁹⁸

By October 1989, using his prerogative as CG 7 ID, Blando removed the operational control of the First Scout Ranger Company from Col Oswaldo Villanueva, Brigade Commander, 703 Bde, and placed them under 56 IB of Lt Col Levy Zamora.⁵⁹⁹

Blando's closeness to Zamora, Lt Col Arsenio Tecson, CO 68 IB and Maj Alfredo Oliveros, CO 24 IB, was shown by his frequent visits to their commands which were done without the normal advise to their respective brigade commanders.⁶⁰⁰

Col Villanueva noticed this "closeness" between Zamora and Blando to the point that there were several instances when Blando would visit 56 IB and Zamora without informing him. Col Villanueva testified that before the December 1989 attempted coup, BGen Blando seemed to act suspiciously. He said

I do not have any premonition whatsoever, on his [BGen Blando's] participation in the coup d'etat but it was quite strange that whenever he visits my unit, he does not tell me, [he] just tried [to] proceed directly to 56th IB that is Lt Col Zamora and then Lt Col Zamora will not also tell me what they took up together and it is not only once that he did it, he [did] it repeatedly . . .⁶⁰¹

Sometime in September 1989, MGen Cacanando visited the 703 Bde. When he found out that Maj Ernie Amboy, who was involved in the August 1987 coup attempt, was the EX-O of Zamora, he directed that Amboy be assigned elsewhere. Cacanando also found out that the 56 IB had transferred four sacks of firearms to the rear command post. This was reported to Blando, but the latter seemed unconcerned.⁶⁰²

Blando ordered the 73 IB under Lt Col Rolan Erasmo pulled out from the control of the 703 Bde and had it assigned to Fort Magsaysay for retraining and cross training with US Armed Forces under Exercise Balikatan.⁶⁰³ There were reports that the RP-US Exercise Balikatan was used as a cover for the build up and movement of troops by the rebels.⁶⁰⁴

Sometime in October 1989, President Aquino visited Fort Magsaysay. Col Villanueva, who was the Honor Guard Commander of the Brigade for the ceremonies in honor of the President, narrated

... When President Aquino was our guest, one of the honor guards there [was] caught with one live ammo inside the chambers of his rifle, although we were told that BGen Blando himself was the one who inspected personally the guards before they were called in front of the Division headquarters.⁶⁰⁵

The soldier, from whom the live ammo was discovered, was investigated by the Inspector General and Provost Marshall of 7 ID.⁶⁰⁶ The report that Blando himself inspected the guard came from Col Josefino Manayao, 7 ID Assistant Chief of Staff for Education and Training.⁶⁰⁷

At Fort Magsaysay, at about 6:00 p.m. of 30 November, Lt Lucero informed Blando that Maj Nestor Senares and ex-Lt Col Eduardo Matillano, both of whom were involved in the 1987 coup attempt, were sighted in Cabanatuan City.

E.2. 30 November

Order for Roadblocks in Nueva Ecija

At 1:15 p.m., troops in full combat gear aboard 6 x 6 trucks, one jeep and one pick-up were monitored by Nueva Ecija Constabulary Command under Col Ferdinand Lagman, PC Provincial Commander, passing through Nueva Ecija. After verifying the movements with Lt Col Artemio Cacal PA, based in Camp Aquino, Tarlac, Col Lagman learned that the movement was authorized.⁶⁰⁸

However, Lagman entertained doubts which made him take other actions. He testified

... in my mind however, I was already in doubt because said troops were in full combat gear. So I [gave] instructions to all my company commanders to implement OPLAN Regal⁶⁰⁹ and at the same time informed the Regional Tactical Operations Center of my action. I requested clearance to implement OPLAN Regal immediately. I also instructed my intelligence officer to proceed to the Commanding General of the 7 ID, who is BGen Blando, to find out if such troops came from his unit.⁶¹⁰

Meanwhile, in the afternoon, Lagman found out that no troops from the 7 ID moved out of Fort Magsaysay. He concluded that the units he saw were Scout Rangers coming from Isabela and he became convinced that the troop movements were signals of a forthcoming coup. Hence, at 11:40 p.m., after conferring again with his operations and intelligence officers, he instructed all company commanders to establish road blocks as part of OPLAN Regal.

Using trucks and other vehicles as obstacles, PC elements established road blocks along Maharlika Highway in Nueva Ecija particularly in Brgy Malasin in San Jose, Brgy Baloc in Sto Domingo, Brgy Sumacab in Cabanatuan City and in Brgy Castellano in Gapan.⁶¹¹ Verbal instructions were given to Capt Brigido Undan, CO 182 PC Coy, to establish road blocks at Brgy Kita-Kita in San Jose City. Capt Undan also ordered Lt Ronald Estilles to establish road blocks at Brgy Ceban.⁶¹²

E.3. 1 December

Consolidation of Troops under Blando

Lt Col Rolan Erasmo, while sleeping at the bivouac area at Fort Magsaysay, was awakened at about midnight of 30 November and told to report to the Office of the Operations Officer, at the Division HQ to attend an emergency conference with Blando.

At 1:30 a.m., Blando held an emergency conference at the Division HQ in Fort Magsaysay, attended by the General and Special Staffs and Post Unit Commanders. Blando, in civilian clothes but fully armed, gave instructions to prepare to reinforce government forces in Camp Aguinaldo.

PC SAF Company Leaves Fort Magsaysay

At 2:00 a.m., a PC Special Action Force (PCSAF) Company led by Lt Dennis Peter Peña, composed of six officers and 54 enlisted personnel left Fort Magsaysay for Manila aboard a 6 x 6 truck, a Kennedy jeep, a communication van, a Ford Fiera and Dodge van. MSgt Mendoza, Duty Officer NOLCOM Operations Office, called up Fort Magsaysay to verify the movement of the troops. NOLCOM cleared the movement. They reached Manila without any incident but it was not clear what happened to them there or what they did.⁶¹³

In the meanwhile, BGen Antonio, CG NOLCOM, contacted CSAFP de Villa, and was directed to organize and lead one battalion from Fort Magsaysay. The NCRDC COC also received a report from AFP JOC regarding the movement of the PC SAF.⁶¹⁴

Twenty minutes after the PC SAF left, CSAFP and NOLCOM called to hold the troops. The group, however, had already left and could not be recalled.⁶¹⁵ At 2:25 a.m., the NCRDC COC received a report from AFP JOC that NOLCOM has cancelled the movement of PC SAF.⁶¹⁶ This made the troop movement of the PC SAF unauthorized.

Lt Col Erasmo's 73 IB Troops Mobilized

At 6:00 a.m., Antonio called Blando to ask if the battalion was ready. By 8:00 a.m., 73 IB under Lt Col Erasmo, composed of 15 officers and 294 enlisted personnel, were already assembled at the grandstand. Blando briefed the men, asking them to support the duly constituted authority. According to Col Alejandro Trespeces, Chief of Staff 7 ID, Blando also insinuated that he might not leave or go with the troops to Manila.

Erasmo commented that his troops could have moved for Manila by early morning. However, no adequate transportation facilities for his entire battalion were available until 10:00 a.m., when cargo trucks arrived at Fort Magsaysay. Blando ordered Erasmo to proceed to GHQ in Camp Aguinaldo and then report to Lisandro Abadia at JOC for instructions. Later, Blando told Erasmo "*Mahirap yata ang sitwasyon sa Maynila* (The situation in Manila is bad). I think we better stay put.

Just stand by for any further orders".⁶¹⁷ Thus, Erasmo's troops did not move until after lunch.

Mobilization of Scout Ranger Trainees

According to Capt Herbert Avinante, Deputy Commander of the SR Training Center (SRTC) FSRR, Blando ordered him at about 8:00 a.m. to prepare a company of Rangers to go to Camp Aguinaldo. Capt Avinante claimed that the movement was to support GHQ upon orders of de Villa and Antonio.⁶¹⁸ It should be noted that since the SRTC is located at Colado Village inside Fort Magsaysay, the 7 ID under Blando can use the Scout Ranger students for operations. Blando, however, denied giving such orders to Avinante, saying that the Scout Rangers merely attached themselves to his troops on their way to Manila.⁶¹⁹

Avinante then ordered Lt Felipe Sangalang, Administrative Officer, SRTC to alert one company to be led by him. After 124 officers and men were assembled, they moved out from the SRTC to the 7 ID HQ, where they joined other troops from 73 IB. Other elements from 3 LABde and armor units from the Headquarters Service Battalion also joined the troops under Blando.⁶²⁰

Mobilization of Maj Gutierrez's 71 IB Troops

Because de Villa asked Blando for another battalion, Blando instructed his Operations Officer, Capt Baylon, to direct Maj Pedro Gutierrez, CO 71 IB, to consolidate his battalion from Muñoz, Nueva Ecija and proceed to Fort Magsaysay. Upon receiving the orders, Gutierrez called for the different units of the 71 IB, composed of about 250 officers and men, to regroup.⁶²¹ Gutierrez tried to reach his Brigade Commander, Col Villanueva, at his Command Post for instructions and guidance on what is happening. However, Col Villanueva was not there.⁶²² He was then at his quarters in Fort Bonifacio. By 9:30 a.m., the units of the 71 IB, except one company, had regrouped at Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.⁶²³ Capt Undan intercepted two platoons of soldiers belonging to C Coy, 71 IB under Lt Canes on board one 6 x 6 truck and two ten-wheeler trucks which were stopped by the road blocks set up at Brgy Malasin, San Jose City.⁶²⁴ Gutierrez went to Brgy Malasin checkpoint, and talked to Undan to intercede for the passage of his troops. Undan asked permission from his commander, Col Lagman, who granted clearance.

Gutierrez arrived at Fort Magsaysay at 11:30 a.m. with 14 officers and 266 EPs. He reported to Blando at the Office of the Division SgtMajor. Blando was with Col Trespeces, Lt Col Josefino Manayao, Lt

Danilo Lucero, Lt Rafael Valencia and Capt Herbert Avinante. Blando directed Gutierrez to proceed to Metro Manila and report to NCRDC at Camp Aguinaldo but to return to Nueva Ecija if the situation does not permit. BGen Blando decided to accompany the 71 and 73 IBs.⁶²⁵

Helicopter Sightings at Fort Magsaysay

During this time, the rebel Rangers in Fort Bonifacio were waiting for Blando to arrive by helicopter. There were unconfirmed reports that Blando would be CG PA if the coup succeeded.⁶²⁶ At about 1:00 p.m., one Sikorsky helicopter gunship with white RAM-SFP markings on its side landed at the Aeroscout area in Fort Magsaysay.⁶²⁷ This helicopter, believed to be refueling, was piloted by Lt Gregor Panelo, PAF.⁶²⁸ The helicopter took off at 3:00 p.m. without Blando and headed east of Fort Magsaysay.⁶²⁹ It was later confirmed that this helicopter was the same one found abandoned and covered with dried leaves at Fort Magsaysay after the attempted coup.⁶³⁰

BGen Blando Prepares Troops for Convoy

The troops from 73 IB and 71 IB were ready for movement by 1:30 p.m. Blando gave a pep talk to the men at the 7 ID grandstand. He reportedly said: "*Sayang ang pagpunta natin sa Maynila kung babaliktad kayo*" (It will be useless for us to go to Manila if we end up joining the rebels). He talked about the plans to proceed to Camp Aguinaldo to reinforce government forces.⁶³¹ Blando still remained in contact with Antonio who instructed him to move for Manila right away.

Blando instructed Trespeces to assemble all the vehicles along the road in preparation for loading the troops in the following order: the first column of vehicles would be utilized by elements of 71 IB under Maj Gutierrez, followed by the command group composed of Blando's close-in security, then elements of the 73 IB under Lt Col Erasmo, and finally, elements of the Scout Rangers. The whole group comprising of more than a thousand men, used two V-150 commandos, 17 M-35 trucks, 13 Kennedy jeeps, two Land Rovers, one van and two cars.⁶³²

Blando rode the V-150 going to Manila, leaving behind Trespeces, who was designated to be the OIC of Fort Magsaysay with orders to get in touch with Blando by radio from time to time.⁶³³

The convoy, led by Blando, left Fort Magsaysay at 3:30 p.m.⁶³⁴ He traveled from Fort Magsaysay to Cabanatuan, then Gapan and Cabiao, in Nueva Ecija, then Arayat and San Fernando, in Pampanga, and then

south through the North Expressway.⁶³⁵ The convoy passed through the PC checkpoints in Nueva Ecija after Col Samonte, CS NOLCOM, at around 4:00 p.m., instructed the Nueva Ecija Constabulary Command to give Blando's troops safe passage. The convoy was reportedly cleared at the Nueva Ecija checkpoints at 6:00 p.m.⁶³⁶

Meeting at Malinta, Bulacan

Blando maintained radio silence during the trip from Fort Magsaysay. The convoy was stopped at Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, by roadblocks placed by government troops and the Bulacan provincial government. To check the movement of the group, Col Saturnino Dumlao, an emissary from GHQ, met the convoy at about 10:00 p.m.

Dumlao talked to Blando who was at the middle of the convoy. Curious as to what caused the stop, Gutierrez, who was at the front column, went to see Blando who was by then meeting with Manayao, Avinante and Dumlao.⁶³⁷ While the officers were conversing, Erasmo, who was at the back of the convoy, went forward and joined the group which included Valencia and Crucero.⁶³⁸

According to Gutierrez, Manayao and Avinante were trying to persuade Blando not to go to Camp Aguinaldo, and suggested that they go to Fort Bonifacio instead and consolidate there.⁶³⁹ As reported by Erasmo, Blando gave instructions to proceed to Fort Bonifacio saying "Let us make that our last stand."⁶⁴⁰ Blando, however, denied that he wanted to go to Fort Bonifacio. In his testimony, he said that a certain "Officer-in-charge of the Rangers who was a Captain" threatened him at gunpoint not proceed to Camp Aguinaldo and that they should support the rebels.⁶⁴¹ Capt Avinante, the head of the Rangers which joined Blando's troops, however, denied that he threatened Blando.⁶⁴²

Knowing that the rebels already controlled Fort Bonifacio by that time, Gutierrez objected to the instruction and threatened to break away from the group and return to Fort Magsaysay. In view of his objection, it was decided to proceed to a neutral ground instead.⁶⁴³

E.4. 2 December

The group left Malinta at about 12:00 midnight and proceeded to Metro Manila, passing through Balintawak and Muñoz Market until it reached Ortigas Avenue. It then turned towards the Greenhills area in San Juan. The convoy avoided passing through EDSA because of reports

that it was blockaded. They stopped at the area near the Greenhills Commercial Complex at about 3:00 a.m.⁶⁴⁴

Tired and hungry, the men and officers of the convoy rested at different areas around the parking lot of the Greenhills Commercial Complex. Because of Blando's stand to stay neutral, Erasmo had discussions with Gutierrez regarding the matter. According to Erasmo, they were both by this time harboring doubts as to the loyalty of Blando.

Erasmo suggested that they call Blando for a "no-holds-barred discussion" to which the other officers like Crucero and Valencia agreed.⁶⁴⁵ By 5:00 a.m., Blando agreed and a conference was held, attended by Blando, his HQ staff and all officers of 71 IB and 73 IB. Erasmo testified that

... as a result of this discussion seemingly majority of the officers present were convinced against the government in order to effect change for the better, finally it was decided by BGen Blando to change his stand from being neutral [to supporting] the Reform Movement. Then he consulted us if he can already declare his stand openly against the government. Maj Gutierrez and myself objected by telling him that we will not commit without also consulting the consensus of our men and BGen Blando readily acceded ...⁶⁴⁶

Erasmo explained that, he did not categorically disagree with Blando's decision to side with the rebels because of his training in "obedience and the custom of the service". He claimed that his indirect hint "was a better way to tell him [Blando] that he [Erasmo] does not agree with his [Blando] decision".⁶⁴⁷

E.5. 3 December

Negotiation at Greenhills

Prior to this no-holds-barred meeting, Gutierrez on the evening of 2 December, informed Col Villanueva by telephone that he was in Greenhills. After the call, Villanueva talked to MGen Cacanando for instructions. Villanueva then proceeded from his quarters in Fort Bonifacio to Greenhills. When he arrived at about 5:30 a.m., he sought to talk to Blando, but the latter ignored him. Villanueva then spoke to Gutierrez and asked to be briefed. The latter related the discussion they had earlier. Villanueva, in turn, reiterated to Gutierrez that his stand was for the government.⁶⁴⁸

Villanueva reported to Cacanando at around 7:30 a.m. about the situation in Greenhills and that Blando was for the rebels. Cacanando

reacted by appointing Villanueva as OIC of 7 ID, relieving Blando of his command. Villanueva talked to Blando, Manayao, and Gutierrez, reiterating his position and asking Blando to give up. Blando refused to listen. Villanueva then talked to the troops and instructed them to follow his orders. He also set up his HQ at the nearby Mandarin Villa Restaurant and there reported to PA Operations Officer GHQ about the situation.⁶⁴⁹

Firefight with the Scout Rangers

At 8:00 a.m., Capt Avinante briefed his men who were by then wearing rebel countersigns about his plan to go to Camp Aguinaldo and link up with other rebel troops.⁶⁵⁰ They started moving through the streets in Greenhills towards Camp Aguinaldo. At 12:30 p.m., loyal Marines from 2 MC MBLT 2 under Maj Ducusin backed up by three V-150 Commandos arrived to intercept the Scout Rangers.⁶⁵¹

Fighting broke out in Connecticut Street, Greenhills and at the area near Belson House, some 300 to 400 meters away from Greenhills Shopping Center. The firefights were sporadic.⁶⁵² During the shooting, Avinante was hit in the leg and was brought to Cardinal Santos Hospital for treatment.⁶⁵³ There were reports that reinforcements from 24 IB, 68 IB, and 56 IB were expected by the rebel Rangers. When these troops did not arrive despite the prodding of BGen Blando,⁶⁵⁴ the SRTC surrendered and were turned over to BGen Manuel Bruan, CO of the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.⁶⁵⁵

Surrender of Blando

In the afternoon, Villanueva ordered Gutierrez to arrest Blando. Gutierrez asked that he talk to BGen Biazon first before arresting Blando. Biazon gave the go signal to Gutierrez. By the time Gutierrez was about to arrest Blando, BGen (Ret) Restituto Padilla, de Villa's emissary, had persuaded Blando to surrender peacefully.

Blando was then brought to Villanueva who asked him to stop the movement of 24 IB, 56 IB, and the 68 IB. Blando cooperated. He contacted Maj Oliveros, who stopped the movement of 68 IB under Col Tecson. Blando, however, was not able to contact 56 IB under Zamora.⁶⁵⁶ Blando advised the 7 ID Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations in Fort Magsaysay to stop elements of 56 IB from proceeding to Metro Manila, and gave further instructions to tell the COs of 24 IB and 68 IB that he was revoking his orders to move the troops to Metro Manila.⁶⁵⁷

At around midnight, Villanueva brought Blando and Manayao to de Villa. Upon instructions of de Villa, Villanueva accompanied the troops of 71 IB, 73 IB and HQ personnel to their respective barracks in the North.⁶⁵⁸

F. Activities in Northern Luzon

F.1. Scout Rangers in Isabela

Defense of the Cagayan Valley Region was undertaken by NOLCOM under BGen Orlando Antonio. In December 1989, many Army troops were deployed in Cagayan Valley to fight communist insurgency, which was prevalent in the area. Hence, part of the PA units present in the area were Scout Rangers under the FSRR, which the rebels utilized in the December 1989 attempted coup.

F.1.a. 30 November

Antonio Orders Red Alert in NOLCOM

At the 5 ID HQ in Echague, Isabela, a grievance survey was reportedly made a week before the coup. Lt Enriquez and Lt Vinuya, student officers of the Special Intelligence Training School (SITS), ISAFP, arrived with survey questionnaires focusing mainly on issues and problems confronting the AFP and the present administration. Part III of the questionnaire tended to suggest courses of action against the government such as non-violent civil disobedience or a coup. So-called compelling reasons for certain elements in the AFP to resort to a coup were presented in the survey.⁶⁵⁹

BGen Antonio received an intelligence report about the coup at 1:20 p.m. on 30 November while on troop inspection in Ilagan, Isabela. He then called his Assistant Chief for Intelligence, Col Rubio and instructed him to place all NOLCOM units on red alert. Hence, by 3:00 p.m., red alert status was declared in Fort Magsaysay. Troop movements at night were disallowed.⁶⁶⁰

Movements of Rebel Rangers in Isabela

In the morning of 30 November, Lt Col Rafael Galvez, CO 4 SRB, directed Capt Lauro Gordula, EX-O 4 SRB, to take charge, since he was going to Manila that evening. Galvez also dispatched a group of Scout Rangers for Fort Bonifacio.⁶⁶¹ This group was later monitored to have passed through Nueva Ecija at 1:30 p.m.⁶⁶²

Before leaving for Manila, Galvez had an occasion to talk to Lt Jose Rene Jarque, Operations Officer 4 SRB, who had just arrived at the battalion base in Cordon, Isabela from Manila. Lt Jarque testified

At Cordon, I found out that many of our troops were already gone. They were not in their company headquarters as they were supposed to be, and as the Operations Officer, it was my duty to find out. So, I had a talk with Lt Col Galvez who was then at our Battalion headquarters and he informed me that the troops had gone down to Manila. So, I said 'OK sir, what is the plan?' He told me 'You know', and I said 'Yes, sir.' But he also told me that 'I am giving you the decision whether you should go to Manila or not', and I said, 'OK sir, I will think about it.' Then, being tired from the travel, it was almost a 9 or 10 hour travel from Manila, I decided to take a rest. At around 8 or 9 in the evening, I was called by one of the of the escorts and he told me that Lt Col Galvez was leaving for Manila along with some escorts. And, as always, he is a Lt Col and I am only a lieutenant. [So] I said 'Yes, sir.'⁶⁶³

Lt Jarque further explained what Galvez meant by "You know"

Well, there had been discussions before, sir, about that and he told me that they (referring to Lt Col Galvez) were going down to Manila, because, I mean, he explained it further. I asked, and he said, 'You know, the same as August 27 and 28'. So I said, 'Yes, sir.'⁶⁶⁴

Galvez left Cordon, Isabela for Manila with some companions at about 6:00 p.m.⁶⁶⁵

F.1.b. 1 December

At about 4:00 a.m. of 1 December, BGen Antonio left Ilagan, Isabela and reached the 5 ID HQ in Camp Melchor de la Cruz, Echague, Isabela an hour later. He then instructed BGen Manuel Dizon, CG 5 ID, to prepare a minimum of two battalions to augment government forces in Manila.⁶⁶⁶ At 6:00 a.m., DZRH interviewed Antonio who confirmed the ongoing coup d'etat staged by RAM-HF soldiers in Metro Manila. Antonio and Dizon announced that they are following the chain of command.

Antonio also directed Dizon to alert the 41 IB and 45 IB with the commanding officer of the 503 Bde as Task Force Commander, to consolidate forces and to prepare to move on orders to Camp Tito Abat in Manaoag, Pangasinan, as NOLCOM reserve for possible deployment in Manila.⁶⁶⁷ At 7:30 a.m., Maj Mendoza of NOLCOM called for safe passage of elements of 41 IB and 45 IB under Col Guillermo from Isabela to Camp Abat in Pangasinan.

At 8:40 a.m., Antonio arrived in Camp Aquino in Tarlac and immediately called for a conference. He contacted BGen Cesar Nazareno, Regional Commander of RECOM 3 who informed him that troops (68 IB and 24 IB) in Bataan had already left by then. Antonio also talked with BGen Armando Garcia, CG 5th Fighter Wing at Basa Air Base to reiterate his position of following the chain of command.⁶⁶⁸

F.1.c. 2 December

In the morning, Capt Gordula received orders from Lt Col Galvez, who was in Fort Bonifacio, to bring the Scout Ranger troops to Manila. Gordula assembled about 50 men aboard two 6 x 6 trucks. The 4 SRB troops left Isabela and passed through Nueva Vizcaya. The 4 SRB troops were stopped, however, by roadblocks at Bgy Malasin, San Jose City in Nueva Ecija placed by Capt Undan who was manning the PC checkpoint.⁶⁶⁹

A company of Scout Rangers headed by Capt Danny Panandigan belonging to the 2 SR Coy, FSRR stationed in Lallo, Cagayan, also moved towards Manila to join the other Scout Rangers in Fort Bonifacio. They were able to pass through the checkpoint in San Pablo, Isabela at 11:00 a.m. by positioning themselves in prone positions aboard dump trucks. The movement was immediately reported to 5 ID HQ. Instructions were given to the Commander of the 2nd Regional Command Defense Unit (2 RCDU) to intercept the trucks at Camp Upi in Gamu, Isabela. Before reaching Gamu, the rebel Rangers commandeered three aircon buses.⁶⁷⁰

At about 12:00 noon, the three buses were stopped at the checkpoint at Camp Upi. The rebel Rangers alighted with raised arms. Capt Panandigan was able to talk with Capt Quilang, the OIC of the checkpoint. Shortly after, the rebel Rangers suddenly boarded the three buses and sped away going South.⁶⁷¹

The Rangers led by Panandigan proceeded towards Cauayan, Isabela where they stopped to pick up a platoon of about 25 men from the 4 SRB. There, they were joined by a group composed of five enlisted personnel of the Division Training Unit headed by SSgt Romero and 33 students undergoing CAFGU Cadre Training aboard a ten-wheeler truck and a Dodge pick-up.⁶⁷²

When the group reached Cordon, Isabela by 1:00 p.m., they stopped at the 77 IB 5 ID HQ. Some men belonging to the 4 SRB under Lt Col Galvez joined Capt Panandigan's men. Lt Jarque, at this time was at their Division HQ in Camp Melchor de la Cruz in Echague, Isabela. He went there to coordinate matters because of reports about the coup in

Manila. Upon returning to Cordon, he found out that the troops moved because of (1) orders given by Capt Lim, Operations Officer FSRR, (2) a personal call by Lt Col Galvez, and (3) a radio message purportedly coming from MGen Cacanando.⁶⁷³

The group of Capt Panindigan was later stopped at a PC checkpoint in Brgy Kita-Kita in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Capt Undan negotiated with the Ranger officers but failed to convince them. Undan then ordered deployment of his troops as the SR officers were determined to break through.⁶⁷⁴

Lt Jarque said that knowing the temperament of the soldiers and anticipating the roadblocks set up from Isabela to Manila because of the coup, he decided to follow the troops. In his testimony, Jarque said

... [as the] Operations Officer, knowing that most of the troops went with the First Scout Ranger Company, my first instinct was to follow them. I followed them with the thinking that there will be roadblocks coming from Isabela going to Manila and knowing the temperament of some of our soldiers I wanted somehow to avert bloodshed on those checkpoints and at the same time, convince them that it's a losing cause and we should already start to go back.⁶⁷⁵

He followed the troops with some escorts aboard two Kennedy jeeps and reached them at Brgy Kita-Kita, San Jose City.

Lt Jarque reached the San Jose PC roadblock composed of ten-wheeler trucks, buses and other small vehicles at about 6:00 p.m. There, he met Undan, Panandigan, Gordula and two unidentified officers. Since it was already getting dark, Undan invited the officers to dinner while waiting for the arrival of Col Lagman, PC Provincial Commander. They went to a house where they ate and watched television to monitor the coup events in Manila. They learned from the TV that Lt Col Galvez had already surrendered. In the meantime, Lt Jarque received a radio message from Col Matabalao, CS FSRR, ordering them to go back to their battalion base in Cordon, Isabela. Jarque approached Gordula and Panindigan, who were senior officers, and told them

Sir, ano kaya kung babalik na lang tayo, wala na rin ito. Saka malabo itong dito tayo makapasok, sir (Sir, why don't we just go back? We are in a very uncertain situation, sir). At the same time I also got the radio message at that point in time, sir. I used that as an excuse to them by saying, 'Sir, mayroon po tayong order galing sa itaas, and so by virtue of chain of command, kailangan sundin natin ito, sir' ⁶⁷⁶ (Sir, we have orders from the top. We have to follow them, sir).

Convinced of the futility of their effort to go to Manila, the rebel officers agreed to go back. By 8:00 p.m., Jarque organized the

transportation of the troops back to Isabela.⁶⁷⁷ Before the troops could leave, Col Lagman arrived and talked to the officers. Gordula informed Undan that they were abandoning their plans and would leave for Cagayan.⁶⁷⁸

The Scout Rangers left at about 9:00 p.m. and proceeded to their respective stations in Gamu, Isabela and Lallo, Cagayan.⁶⁷⁹ Col Capulong, CO 502 Bde, who was manning a checkpoint in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, reported that at about 10:00 p.m., the Scout Rangers were moving back North.⁶⁸⁰

F.2. Movement of Lt Col Levy Zamora's Troops

F.2.a. 3 December

The 56 IB troops under Lt Col Levy Zamora, CO 56 IB, stationed in Imelda Valley, previously moved in the morning of 3 December towards Manila on orders of BGen Blando. They reached Arayat, Pampanga, at about 5:00 p.m.

RECOM 3's OPLAN REGAL, which is to check and control troop movements in their area of command with roadblocks, was very effective. Zamora's troops were checked at Arayat by troops under Lt Col Julius Yarcia, CO, Angeles METRODISCOM. Upon monitoring over the radio that 56 IB troops were approaching the boundary of Pampanga and Nueva Ecija, and knowing that the 56 IB CO is his PMA classmate, Lt Col Efren Fernandez, Pampanga Provincial Commander, called BGen Cesar Nazareno, RECOM 3 Commander, and volunteered to confront the 56 IB.⁶⁸¹

Fernandez proceeded to Arayat, specifically to Brgy Camla and there met Zamora. The latter was insisting on pushing through, saying he was under orders from his "boss", BGen Blando. Fernandez checked with RECOM 3 HQ if the 56 IB movement was authorized. RECOM 3 HQ replied that it was not.⁶⁸²

Fernandez tried to dissuade Zamora from proceeding. He told Zamora that it was physically impossible for Zamora to move forward because "all the people from Arayat to Mexico [Pampanga] have blocked already the highways with vehicles, trucks and jeeps."⁶⁸³

Once informed of the movements, BGen Nazareno called Col Lagman, who was still in Brgy Malasin, San Jose City, and told him to confront Lt Col Zamora. Lagman immediately went to Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, and

arrived there at 5:30 p.m. of 3 December. Lagman narrated the position of Lt Col Zamora's troops as follows

They were strewn [along] the highway, starting about ten kilometers in Cabiao [going to] the boundary of Cabiao and Arayat. Then from there, I walked. I walked for about four kms and as I faced [them] I was already reconnoitering his defensive position of heavy weapons. So, to go there, if I [would] bring my troops, for sure we would do battle. So I decided to go there alone so that I [would] not provoke the soldiers.⁶⁸⁴

F.2.b. 4 December

Lagman's estimate of Zamora's strength was about a hundred men armed with a recoilless rifle, a mortar, M-16s, and machineguns. According to Fernandez, the government side had two battalions, two V-150s, two recoilless rifles and a helicopter gunship.⁶⁸⁵

At about early morning, Lagman and Zamora had a dialogue, with the former persuading the latter to go back. Zamora, however, said that he would go back only if ordered by Blando. Lagman then tried to contact Blando through BGen Nazareno. The latter informed Lagman that Blando was already in custody. Zamora then decided to give up but requested that they wait for dawn, since his troops were scattered on the highway.⁶⁸⁶

Troops Escorted Back to Fort Magsaysay

Before midnight of 3 December, Lagman had requested 7 ID at Fort Magsaysay for an officer to join him. Upon orders of BGen Antonio, Col Trespeces was sent to Arayat, Pampanga to escort Zamora and the men of the 56 IB back to Fort Magsaysay.⁶⁸⁷

Col Villanueva, who was proceeding to Fort Magsaysay with CHPG units as escorts,⁶⁸⁸ passed through Cabiao, Nueva Ecija from Greenhills with troops belonging to the 73 IB and 71 IB. The 56 IB, escorted by Trespeces, linked with the troops under Villanueva at about 4:00 a.m. and all of them proceeded to Fort Magsaysay.⁶⁸⁹

The combined troops arrived at Fort Magsaysay by morning and assembled at the grandstand⁶⁹⁰ where they were formally turned over to Col Trespeces⁶⁹¹, while Col Villanueva turned over Zamora to BGen Antonio. On orders of Nazareno, Lagman together with Antonio later escorted Zamora to Camp Olivas, Pampanga by helicopter.⁶⁹²

Other Troops Intercepted

At about 1:30 p.m., personnel manning the checkpoint at Brgy Malasin, San Jose City, intercepted four officers and 12 enlisted men of the 48 IB with assorted high-powered firearms on board a Kennedy-type jeep from Manila. They also intercepted two soldiers belonging to the HQ and HQ SGB, 5 ID.⁶⁹³

F.3. Aguinaldo's Support for the Rebels

The then Governor of Cagayan Province, Rodolfo Aguinaldo was vocal in his support for the rebels.

F.3.a. 1 December

By morning, radio stations aired news about the takeover of Fort Bonifacio and VAB by rebels. Aguinaldo, formerly a PC Lt Col, in an interview by DZNC-BOMBO radio's Grace Padaca and Bong Roxas, expressed his support for the rebel troops, and stated that he would lead troops to Manila to augment the rebel forces.

The airwaves in the Cagayan Valley region became full with counter-statements of support for the government. At 7:44 a.m., Col Aguda expressed his support for the Constitution and the government over DZNC radio in Nueva Vizcaya. At 8:25 a.m., Gov Maning Pimentel of Quirino Province, also stated over DZNC, that the situation in his province was normal and that he was supporting the Constitution and the government. The same broadcast was made by Gov Lurnece of Kalinga, Apayao at 8:30 a.m. PC Col Clyde Fernandez of RECOM 2, stationed in Ilagan, Isabela, expressed support for the government and said that he would prevent Gov Aguinaldo's troops from passing through Ilagan.⁶⁹⁴

After his radio announcement, Aguinaldo went to RECOM 2 HQ and spoke with BGen Pedro Sistoza, Regional Commander of RECOM 2 at 8:00 a.m. As reported by BGen Antonio, Aguinaldo urged Sistoza to dispatch troops and join the rebel forces but he reportedly refused.⁶⁹⁵ Aguinaldo again went on the air by about 10:30 a.m. through DZNC in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and announced that his troops were already prepared to go to Manila to reinforce the rebels. He urged all soldiers listening to support their (rebels) forces.⁶⁹⁶

By noontime, Aguinaldo appealed over DZRH to his "fellow soldiers" to join the rebels, referring particularly to the government troops who put up blockades to prevent his men from going to Manila.⁶⁹⁷ At 5:30 p.m., Sistoza reported to Antonio that Aguinaldo would probably send some members of the 17 IB and some Scout Rangers to augment the rebel troops in Manila. Antonio ordered Sistoza to stop Aguinaldo's troops. Instructions were also given to Col George Moleta, CO 503 Bde, to control 17 IB. Antonio also talked to Aguinaldo at about 6:00 p.m. and asked the latter to exercise his leadership to maintain peace and order.⁶⁹⁸

G. Sangley Point Incident

The military significance of controlling Sangley Point in launching a coup attempt is obvious. It is a shared camp housing both the Philippine Fleet (PHILFLEET) of the Philippine Navy and the 15th Strike Wing (15 SW) of the Philippine Air Force.

As later events showed, Sangley Point was in fact quickly occupied by rebels employing a two-pronged strategy: a swift attack from the outside and simultaneous mutiny of some officers and men from within. But, just as quickly, Sangley was recovered on the same day by the government.

G.1. Rebel Troops from Bataan

G.1.a. 30 November

Because of the ongoing preparations for Exercise Balikatan, raw intelligence reports of troop movements received in the morning of 30 November elicited no more than monitoring measures from the military authorities. But, as more definite indications of a forthcoming coup attempt were observed, Sangley Point tried by nightfall to prepare for the worst.⁶⁹⁹ By then, however, the die was cast for Sangley Point. For a seemingly long span of time from midnight of 30 November to mid-afternoon of 1 December, the fate of the country was to be significantly affected by what was to occur at Sangley.

Sangley was the target of rebel forces coming from Bataan and Laguna.

Movement of Troops from Bataan

In the evening of 29 November, at Camp Aquino, Tarlac, the Commanding General of 702 Bde, BGen Liberato Manuel, received a

report that a coup d'etat would be staged in the early morning of 1 December 1989. He immediately declared a red alert, informed Gen de Villa about the report and subsequently called for a conference of all his battalion commanders.

The conference was held the next day, 30 November at 1:00 p.m., and was attended by Lt Col Arsenio Tecson CO 68 IB, Lt Col Romeo Dominguez CO 69 IB, Maj Alfredo Oliveros CO 24 IB, and Maj Rene Rapisura, CO 60 IB. In the conference, BGen Manuel informed them of intelligence reports of an impending coup and emphasized his support for the Republic. After the conference, a *despedida* party was held for Manuel who was about to retire. During the party, Manuel noticed that Lt Col Tecson was talking to someone on the radio in his jeep. The person on the radio was asking *Bakit hanggang ngayon, wala pa kayo sa Maynila?* (Why are you still not in Manila?) Manuel later learned that the person on the other line was BGen Blando. Tecson then informed Oliveros that Blando called with instructions to proceed to Sangley Point in Cavite.⁷⁰⁰

Tecson went to his base at Hermosa, Bataan at 4:00 p.m. and called Lt Siegfried Mison CO Alpha Coy 68 IB. Tecson asked Lt Mison if he was willing to bring his troop to secure Sangley Point in Cavite. The conversation, as told by Lt Mison, was as follows

Col Tecson told me [Lt Mison] that . . . 'Ako ay nakapag-commit na to . . . dito sa gagawin natin na . . . gagawin bukas' (I have committed to what we're attempting tomorrow), and then he told me that, 'Can you take your company with me to secure Sangley?', and I said, 'Sir, nakabibigla naman iyan (That is quite startling), let me think.' . . . And then he said, 'there's no more time to think, wala nang panahon na mag-isip pa (There's no time to think things over). So you better decide.' So I told him, 'sir pass muna ako rito (I can't do it). I cannot join you sir.' And then from there, he told me, 'Okay, you just go with Maj Dimaapi to go to Samal, and he'll take care of you', and that was it.⁷⁰¹

Tecson instructed Lt Mison to go with Maj Danilo Dimaapi, Battalion EX-O, to the Tactical Command Post in Samal, Bataan, located eight to nine kilometers away from the highway. It must be noted that the company under Lt Mison was not stationed in Samal, but in Orani, Bataan. Lt Mison left for Samal immediately and stayed there for three days before returning to Orani.⁷⁰²

At 8:00 p.m., upon hearing rumors of troop movements in Bataan, Blando instructed Col Manayao to inquire on the whereabouts of 24 IB. Upon verification with CG 702 Bde, the latter reported that Tecson and Oliveros went to Camp Aquino for a conference, and for the *despedida* in his honor.⁷⁰³

Lt Col Ocampo Meets Lt Col Tecson

At 9:00 p.m., Manuel went to the HQ of Lt Col Ramsey Ocampo, PC Provincial Commander of Bataan, to seek his assistance to stop Tecson and his troops from moving to Metro Manila. Together, they went to see Tecson between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. at the Marsteel wharf in Limay, Bataan. Ocampo and Tecson are third cousins and are PMA classmates.⁷⁰⁴ Tecson confirmed that he and his troops were going to Sangley⁷⁰⁵ for the purpose of "securing" it.⁷⁰⁶ Ocampo understood this to mean securing Sangley "for the rebel forces".⁷⁰⁷ Both Ocampo and Manuel failed to convince Tecson not to leave Bataan.⁷⁰⁸ Tecson told Ocampo that he had a "previous commitment" to BGen Zumel and also, that he was "under orders".⁷⁰⁹ These orders, according to Tecson, came from his "immediate Commander" who, Ocampo came to know later, referred to Blando.⁷¹⁰ That was what Tecson told him on 4 December 1989 when Tecson was already in military custody at Camp Olivas, Pampanga.⁷¹¹ When Blando testified before the Commission, he denied having ordered Tecson to go to Sangley Point.⁷¹²

From Marsteel wharf, Ocampo returned to his camp around or past midnight. He reported the matter to Col Agerico Kagaoan, Operations Officer RECOM 3⁷¹³ for transmission to the Regional Commander of RECOM 3.⁷¹⁴

G.1.b. 1 December

BGen Manuel — who stayed behind in the Marsteel wharf — followed Ocampo to his HQ. Around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m., Manuel talked to the Aide-de-camp of Gen de Villa, suggesting that some ships be deployed in Manila Bay to stop Tecson's troops.⁷¹⁵

Even before 30 November, Ocampo had heard reports of a "probable destabilization", i.e., that "there was supposed to be a coup in the offing".⁷¹⁶ He learned about these in Camp Olivas, during one of their conferences with BGen Nazareno. In that conference, Nazareno gave "guidance to effectively prepare to defend or reinforce the seat of government, just in case there would be a coup."⁷¹⁷

Tecson and Oliveros travelled from Bataan to Sangley on board what was initially known as an unidentified fishing vessel. The indications of troop movements in Bataan and the involvement of a civilian fishing vessel figured early in raw intelligence reports. However, intelligence reports and after-battle reports said nothing definite about this boat and it continued to be described as an "unidentified fishing vessel".

G.2. Finding the Fishing Vessel

The Commission considered the involvement of this vessel significant, not only because it ferried two battalions, but also because being a non-military craft, its full story could shed light on an aspect of civilian resources available to the coup plotters. The Commission, however, had difficulty gathering facts as it was "unidentified" in all the after-battle reports. It was only towards the close of its investigations that the Commission was able to discover that the fishing vessel was actually "Lady Vi-T-1", owned by Odessa Fishing and Trading Corporation (Odessa) with offices at Navotas, Metro Manila.

G.2.a. Pre 30 November

According to Rufino Tiangco, Chairman of the Board of Odessa, about a week after 1 November 1989, a person representing himself as Artemio Tan of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, went to his office and sought to charter a fishing vessel to be used by the middle of November up to December 1989 and possibly up to January 1990. Tiangco informed Tan regarding the terms and conditions for the charter. Tan left bringing with him a sample copy of Odessa's standard charter agreement along with other papers pertaining to the vessel.

Although Tan represented that he was from Puerto Princesa, Palawan, the evidence received by the Commission belies it. The Election Registrar of Puerto Princesa said that there is no Artemio Tan listed as a registered voter in Puerto Princesa. The City Treasurer reported that Residence Certificate No. 0828116 allegedly issued in 1989 to Artemio Tan was not issued in Puerto Princesa and that there is no business establishment known as Artemio Tan Trading registered in Puerto Princesa.⁷¹⁸ Furthermore, the Station Commander of Puerto Princesa wired the Commission to advise that their efforts to locate Artemio Tan in Puerto Princesa City and in the Province of Palawan were "negative".⁷¹⁹

Tiangco Charters Out Vessel

On 10 November 1989, Tan returned to Odessa's office and, on that occasion, reached a final agreement with Tiangco for the charter of Lady Vi-T-1. Tan and Gabriel Cruz, the President of Odessa, signed the charter agreement. Tan then paid Odessa the amount of ₱ 80,000 in cash, corresponding to one month's advance rental and one month's deposit. Carmelita Villanueva, Odessa's office secretary, confirmed

having received the payment which she turned over to Tiangco. Receipt of the money is not recorded in the books of account of Odessa.

On 27 November 1989, Tan went back to the Odessa office, accompanied by a man he introduced as Rudy Jimenez. Upon Tan's request, Tiangco issued a letter authorizing Jimenez to board and take over the vessel as Tan's "encargado". That afternoon, Jimenez went to the Navotas Fish Port where Lady Vi-T-1 was docked, and presented himself, with Tiangco's authorization letter, to the vessel's captain, Pepito Dalivenancio. Jimenez was accordingly allowed to board the vessel.

Between 27 and 30 November 1989, two persons on board a service jeep arrived at the fish port, bringing with them five cavans of rice and three boxes of canned goods which they loaded on the vessel. They were allowed to board the vessel, upon Jimenez' instructions.

G.2.b. 30 November

At 6:00 a.m., Jimenez ordered Dalivenancio to clear (*idispacha*) the vessel for Palawan. Before leaving the port, Dalivenancio obtained the necessary Coast Guard clearances for the departure to Palawan around 3:00 p.m. of that day. When the vessel crossed the breakwater of North Harbor, Jimenez ordered Dalivenancio to divert the course of the vessel and proceed to Bataan instead. Dalivenancio testified that he was threatened and intimidated by Jimenez and his two armed companions. Dalivenancio accordingly diverted the vessel and proceeded to Bataan, reaching Limay past 5:30 p.m. Before arriving in Limay, at a distance of about a mile from the shore, Dalivenancio, allegedly upon orders from Jimenez, instructed his crew to remove the name of Lady Vi-T-1. This was done by prying loose the piece of wood on which the vessel's name was inscribed. At this point, Jimenez and his two companions changed to fatigue uniforms.⁷²⁰

Shortly after arrival in Limay, Lady Vi-T-1 shipsided by a tanker. Later on, around 500 uniformed soldiers boarded Lady Vi-T-1 using a barge for this purpose. While still in Limay, countersigns (i.e., square pieces of white paper, with a figure sketched in the middle) were distributed among the soldiers.⁷²¹

G.2.c. 1 December

From Limay, Lady Vi-T-1 proceeded to Sangley Point at about 8:00 a.m. Dalivenancio reported that upon their arrival, they were met by a

Coast Guard vessel which escorted his ship into Sangley. Jimenez and his two companions disembarked hurriedly and so did the rest of the soldiers from Bataan. Dalivenancio and his crew stayed on board the vessel.

G.3. Takeover and Recovery of Sangley - 1 December

Laguna Troops Move Towards Sangley

Another rebel force consisting of around 200 men from 16 IB stationed at Nagcarlan, Laguna, were motoring to Sangley Point. The driver of one of the 6 x 6 trucks carrying the rebels, Sgt Benito Cuaresma, claimed that their initial destination was Mauban, Quezon. However, enroute, he was ordered to proceed instead to Sangley where the troops were to serve as security for Exercise Balikatan.

The rebel troops from Laguna arrived at Sangley close to midnight of 30 November.⁷²² Again, the rebels used the Balikatan Exercise as a ruse and sought entry through the Main Gate by presenting a written authorization signed by Cmdr Maligalig.⁷²³ The gate guards refused them entry on orders of PHILFLEET Commander Commo Proceso Fernandez. The rebels led by ex-Lt Cmdr Jaime Lucas, ex-Capt (PN) Felix Turingan and ex-Lt Col Oscar Legaspi PAF disarmed and overpowered the guards and let the rest of the rebel troops in.⁷²⁴

15th Strike Wing Grounded

BGen Tereso Isleta, Wing Commander 15 SW returned to Sangley at around 11:00 p.m. of 30 November. He met his staff to discuss the information he gathered after attending the Command Conference at Camp Aguinaldo. Before 1:00 a.m., he ordered his men to evacuate the aircrafts to Basa or Clark. The rebels at the gate must have overheard his order given through the radio. From the Main Gate, the rebels proceeded to take control of the flight line and neutralized the choppers and other aircrafts. All the units of the 15 SW — 16th Attack Squadron, 594th Air Police Squadron, 20th Air Commando Squadron, 590th Air Base Group — were left intact but effectively neutralized.⁷²⁵ The pilots were taken hostage just before they could takeoff for other bases.⁷²⁶

The government pilots were captured by a team led by Lucas. The pilots were detained in the area of the Tora-Toras. One of the raiding officers, Lt Pierre Robert Pel, identified one of the hostaged pilots, Lt Gregor Mendel Panelo, as a fellow PMA'er. Pel called Lucas' attention to Panelo. Turingan came to try to convince the hostaged pilots to join

the rebels. They refused. Turingan and Lucas took Panelo with them. Legaspi, in civilian clothes, came to their area and allowed them to use the telephone. The hostaged pilots reported their situation to their Wing Commander who told them to stay put.⁷²⁷

Augmenting the troops that came in the 6 x 6 military trucks were some 80 rebels, who were reported to have arrived at about 2:30 a.m. on board a Philtranco Bus with body number 3023.⁷²⁸ The bus passed through the Cavite Gate of the 15SW⁷²⁹ and unloaded its passengers at the supply area⁷³⁰ near the BOQ.⁷³¹ The bulk of the heavily armed troops deployed themselves at the Armory No. 1.⁷³²

Mutiny at the Philippine Fleet

The Philippine Fleet was having its share of problems. Close to midnight of 30 November, Commo Fernandez, upon arriving at the PHILFLEET HQ from Camp Aguinaldo, called for an officers' conference at his office. In attendance were Capt (PN) Francisco Tolin, Commander of the Fleet Support Force; Capt (PN) Jose Agudelo, Chief of Staff; Commander Naval, Fleet Intelligence Officer; Lt Alfredo Ramos, Special Warfare Group Officer of the Day; Lt Manolito Malig-On, Fleet Security Officer; Capt (PN) Alex Nebres, Deputy Commander, Fleet Support Force; and Cmdr Precioso Filio, CO Headquarters Service Unit. Commo Fernandez discussed the matters taken up during the GHQ conference and instructed that the Fleet be put in readiness. He directed the command duty officer to alert patrol boats PS 29 and 19 for possible deployment.⁷³³

While the meeting was in progress, ex-Capt Turingan, Capt (PN) Danilo Pizarro and Capt Fermin Cuison entered the office and tried to persuade Fernandez to join them. Unable to persuade Fernandez, they left.⁷³⁴ Fernandez did not attempt to apprehend the rebels at this point because they were heavily armed. But immediately thereafter, he took steps to secure the HQ and relieved Pizarro as commander of the patrol force, naming Capt Tolin as acting commander. The other officers at the meeting went back to their respective units to prevent them from joining the rebels.

Bataan Rebel Troops Arrive

The two battalions led by Tecson and Oliveros, on board the Lady Vi-T-1, arrived at Sangley mid-morning and disembarked at the Philippine Fleet area.

Attempts to Intercept Lady Vi-T-1

Cmdr Carlos Damian, Commander, Naval Intelligence Security Group II, personally received at around 3:00 p.m. of 30 November a message from RAdm Carlito Cunanan, Flag-Officer-in-Command, Philippine Navy (FOIC), which was transmitted at around 10:30 a.m., to verify the reported troop movement by ship from Bataan to Sangley. He relayed the message to his Olongapo Office situated inside the Subic Naval Base. Nothing was done. It was only on 1 December at around 2:00 p.m. that Cmdr Damian received word from his San Felipe Fort, Cavite City Station that the vessel from Bataan had already landed at around 10:30 a.m. in Sangley.⁷³⁵

At around 6:30 a.m. Commo Antonio Empedrad, Commander, Naval District II, received from PN HQ (HPN) a message assigning to him ships/crafts identified as PS 19, LT 502, AU 100, PG 62, and DF 334 for the purpose of interdicting rebel vessels going to the North and South Harbors, Manila. He directed Capt (PN) Romeo Meana, Commander Task Force 21, whose flagship was the auxiliary ship, AU 100, docked at Pier 15, to intercept the fishing vessel loaded with rebel troops coming from Limay, Bataan. The order was given at 7:00 a.m., but AU 100 came under the operational control of Task Force 21 only at around 7:55 a.m.

This was followed by another order at around 11:55 a.m. Meana, upon receipt of this order from Empedrad, ordered all his ships to intercept the vessel. He thought all along that the vessel was bound for Manila and they waited for it at the breakwater of Manila Bay.

A third order was given by Empedrad to Meana at 6:45 p.m., this time to intercept the same vessel withdrawing from Sangley to Bataan.⁷³⁶ Meana confirmed having received this order of Empedrad at 6:45 p.m. He sent out PG 62 and DF 334. The two vessels reached the vicinity of Corregidor and Limay, Bataan but reported that there was no sighting of the fishing vessel as late as 11:00 p.m.⁷³⁷

Commo Fernandez maintained, on the other hand, that his failure to prevent the successful landing of the fishing vessel was due in part to the directive of HPN on 1 December at around 7:00 a.m., which ordered the transfer of some of his vessels to Naval District II.⁷³⁸

When the Lady Vi-T-1 docked at the Philippine Fleet Port, it was escorted by Navy light craft No. 308. At about 11:40 a.m., the troops disembarked and marched towards the Sangley Gate.⁷³⁹ According to Tecson, at 2:00 p.m. he met Turingan who told him to go to Manila and

attack the Western Police District HQ. Tecson said he was receiving orders only from Blando who he tried to contact by radio but failed.⁷⁴⁰ Isleta was allowed to maintain his HQ. He negotiated with Turingan and agreed that he would not attack the latter's troops, which were in control of the air assets, in exchange for the safety of the WOC and his HQ, from where he continued both to monitor the rebel movements as well as keep in constant touch with GHQ. Isleta claimed that he called for assistance from Capt (PN) Jesus Durian, Naval Base commander, who gave him a cold response.⁷⁴¹ Durian denied that Isleta asked for assistance.⁷⁴²

Commo Fernandez reached a similar stand-off arrangement with the rebels led by Capt Pizarro. He was able to retain control of his HQ but could not offer any resistance to the rebels.⁷⁴³

Rebels Briefly Control the Skies

The rebels using three Tora-Toras, one Sikorsky helicopter and an Islander as a forward air controller attacked Malacañang, PTV-4, Crame, and Aguinaldo. The Tora-Toras were piloted by Capt Vergel Nacino, Capt Elmer Amon and Lt Joey Sarroza while the Sikorsky was flown by Lt Panelo. The Islander was piloted by Lt Orlando Caballegan.

At Midday The Tide Turns

Air superiority was regained by the government when Maj Danilo Atienza, at the cost of his life, and other pilots of PAF F-5 jets, from Basa Air Base destroyed the rebel air assets. (For details, see Commission Interim Report No. 2)

The end quickly followed. By about noon, the task force earlier created by MGen Montano, composed of the PC-INP of Cavite under Lt Col Nicetas Katigbak, of Laguna under Lt Col Edgar Aglipay, and Batangas under Lt Col Rogelio Regalado, plus other contingents of RECOM 4, augmented by two V-150s and charged with the mission of recapturing Sangley Point for the government, held a coordinating conference to synchronize their movements.⁷⁴⁴ But even before they arrived at the Sangley Main Gate at about 3:00 p.m., some of the rebels had began dispersing from the shipyard area, taking the shoreline route towards Varadero and Naval Base Cavite. Many were seen still carrying their firearms but others had changed to civilian clothes.⁷⁴⁵ A brief firefight occurred at about 100 meters away from the Main Gate in front of the Combank branch office. Tecson and Oliveros, with their troops, were stopped by PC troops and escorted to Lt Col Katigbak who was at

the Main Gate. An agreement was reached for the rebel soldiers to return to Bataan and by about 5:30 p.m., they were on board the Lady Vi-T-1 on their way home. Lady Vi-T-1 could not, however, dock at Limay because of the low tide. It docked instead at Mariveles from where the troops returned to their respective command posts. Tecson and Oliveros proceeded to Camacho, Bataan and surrendered to BGen Manuel.⁷⁴⁶

Capt Pizarro, Capt Cuison, LCdr Fred Tuvilla, LCdr George Uy, Lt Michael Angelo Asperin, Lt Vicente Agdamag, LCdr Ruperto Borromeo and Ens Gerold Josue surrendered to Commo Fernandez. Later, on information given by Capt Pizarro, LCdr Perfecto Pascual, acting commanding officer of AD 614, was picked up from his ship.⁷⁴⁷

G.4. Activities of Lady Vi-T-1 Owners

G.4.a. 2 December

Lady Vi-T-1, now with only Capt Dalivenancio, and his crew on board, proceeded to the Navotas Fish Port where it eventually docked, reaching the Navotas port at around 3:45 a.m. Before reaching Navotas, a Navy boat approached to a distance of around 100 meters, but did not board Lady Vi-T-1, confining itself to focusing its search lights on the latter vessel.⁷⁴⁸

At around 10:00 a.m., Dalivenancio went to the Odessa office and claimed that he gave a verbal report of the incident to Tiangco and Cruz. In the process, the question of whether or not to make a report as required by law to the Coast Guard was allegedly discussed. Dalivenancio, according to him, was afraid to do so; hence, he requested Tiangco and Cruz to make the report to which the two answered "sige" (Okay). Cruz instructed Dalivenancio to make a written report which the latter completed by the evening of the same day. He then delivered the written report to the Odessa office that evening and was received there by Mrs Villanueva.⁷⁴⁹

G.4.b. 4 December

According to Cruz, at past 1:00 p.m., Tiangco and he went to the police station of Navotas to report the alleged hijacking, saying that it was perpetrated by armed persons, but without identifying Tan or Jimenez, and also, without furnishing P/Cpl Florencio Castillo, the desk officer then on duty, with a copy of Dalivenancio's written report; nor did Cruz and Tiangco bring with them Dalivenancio when they went to the police station. Castillo suggested that the matter be reported to the

Coast Guard and Tiangco said they would take care of it. Castillo said that Tiangco and Cruz merely wanted to have the incident recorded but not investigated.⁷⁵⁰

The police blotter of the Navotas Police contains the description of reports and events which the desk officer enters in chronological order. Each entry is given a number. The Commission observed that the entries usually contain a detailed description of what happened and the full names and addresses of persons included in the entry. The incident involving the Lady Vi-T-1 is unusual in that the entry was at the bottom of a page squeezed into only four lines; that its assigned number is the same as the next entry; and no address, company name nor ages are given for Odessa and either Cruz or Tiangco.⁷⁵¹

Cruz admitted that neither he, nor Tiangco, nor Odessa, nor Dalivenancio made a report to the Coast Guard concerning the incident. Dalivenancio also said that he did not execute or file a marine protest although he knew it was his duty to do so.⁷⁵²

Tiangco, in the course of his testimony before the Commission, mentioned that he knew Gregorio Honasan, having been introduced to the latter by Romeo Rivera. This happened in 1987 during a stag party given by Rivera for Don Honasan, who was about to be married. Rivera and Tiangco are both members of the Bullseye Gun Club. At the time Tiangco joined the club, Rivera was its president. Since that stag party, Tiangco claims that he never saw Gregorio Honasan again, although he admitted to regularly buying cement from Don Honasan.⁷⁵³

H. Malacañang and Sta Mesa Incident

H.1. 30 November

Government Troops Prepare for Defense of Malacañang

In response to reports of rebel troop movement from Bataan to Manila received at 9:00 p.m. of 30 November by P/Col Ernesto Diokno, then Acting Superintendent of the Western Police District (WPD),⁷⁵⁴ the entire district, consisting of ten stations and other organic units in the General Headquarters, went on full red alert. P/Col Diokno ordered the mobilization of all WPD personnel and summoned all field commanders to report to HQ for briefing.⁷⁵⁵

Meanwhile, Col Voltaire Gazmin, Commander Presidential Security Group (PSG), told the Commission that the PSG is always on red alert.

However, because of information regarding a possible coup, Gazmin declared Defense Condition three, the highest state of preparedness, at 6:00 p.m.

H.2. 1 December

Bombing of Malacañang

At about 3:00 a.m., President Aquino convened an emergency Cabinet meeting, and after the meeting, at 3:45 a.m., the President went on television to calm the nation. Demonstrating to the viewers that she was "sitting here safely at this moment at my office,"⁷⁵⁶ she informed the nation of an ongoing coup attempt and assured the people that "our forces have the situation under control."⁷⁵⁷ At about 6:30 a.m., three Tora-Toras took off from Sangley and flew towards Malacañang.⁷⁵⁸ Legaspi, reportedly acting as general control, directed the planes to fire rockets at Malacañang, Camp Aguinaldo, PTV-4 and Camp Crame.⁷⁵⁹ The planes strafed and bombed Malacañang Complex with machine gunfire and small bombs at 6:45 a.m. The bombings were apparently intended to kill President Aquino, judging from the fact that what was hit was the intended place of safety for President Aquino in case of attack. This was known to the rebels because Noble, being formerly with the Presidential Security Group (PSG), had access to their security plan for the President. However, unknown to the rebels, Gazmin had changed the security arrangements for the President.⁷⁶⁰

Capt Crisanto Reboya, CO of the 1 LACS stationed at Malacañang Park, ordered all gunners of the Armor Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV) to fire their 25 mm (anti-aircraft) weapons at the attacking rebel planes. Some dismounted troops also fired their issued firearms at the Tora-Toras.⁷⁶¹

At 7:40 a.m., the President again went on the air to declare "the mutiny . . . is contained," informing the people that fighter planes from Basa Air Base were at that moment attacking the Tora-Toras. She warned "never [to] give over this nation to tyranny."⁷⁶²

Close to noon and after the Tora-Tora attack, US Ambassador Nicholas Platt called up the President and, on instructions of Washington, expressed American support and willingness to assist the government. The President expressed her thanks for the supportive gesture of US President Bush and informed Ambassador Platt that in order to facilitate communication, Secretary Ramos would get in touch with him directly.

Ambassador Platt took the initiative and, contacted him straight away. Ramos, assessing the need of the hour to keep rebel planes away from Metro Manila, asked for a "couple of persuasion flights." This, was done by US Phantom jets from about 2:00 p.m. to the evening of 1 December.

Attack of Malacañang from Ground Forces

Before midnight of 30 November, thirty rebel Scout Rangers were sighted on Quezon Bridge and 80 soldiers in civilian attire were reported at the foot of Sta. Mesa bridge.⁷⁶³

As Malacañang was bombed by rebel planes, rebel soldiers with most of them in civilian clothes, and civilians, armed with high caliber firearms such as M-16, M203, M60 and anti-tank weapons placed roadblocks and checkpoints in various strategic places in Sta Mesa. The rebels blocked the approaches leading to Malacañang in order to isolate it from friendly government troops coming to its defense.⁷⁶⁴

At one point, these rebel soldiers intercepted at their checkpoint PC Lt Wilbur Naldo of the CAPCOM West Sector Command, holding him hostage for an hour until he was able to trick his captors by pretending to have joined them. He was even introduced to the leader of the rebels at the vicinity of Stop and Shop, as Col de la Cruz.⁷⁶⁵

In the afternoon, Col Gazmin began offensive operations against rebel ground forces threatening Malacanang. He designated Maj Agustin Dema-ala, CO of HHSSB PSG, as Task Group Green Commander to lead a company of Scout Rangers under Capt Jessie Dellosa, and a reserve platoon under Capt Nestor Castro, augmented by seven AIFV to assault the rebel soldiers in Sta Mesa.⁷⁶⁶ They were to join the forces of P/Col Diokno in fighting the rebels.

Police and military forces conducted a mopping-up operation along Magsaysay Blvd. In the afternoon, this was augmented by the troops under Maj Dema-ala.⁷⁶⁷ At about 7:00 p.m., Sta Mesa area was cleared of rebel soldiers.⁷⁶⁸ The only casualty on the government side was one unidentified tank gunner who was wounded during the Sta Mesa encounter.⁷⁶⁹

While the fighting to secure Malacañang was going on, the President stayed in Malacañang and went on the air confirming the government's acceptance of the US offer of assistance, and acknowledging expressions of support from friendly governments. She cautioned against complacency, since the enemy "is routed but he is not yet vanquished."

Mobilization of Police Forces

By morning, contingents from Chinatown Sub-Station and Police Station No. 6 of the WPD were dispatched to the Metropolitan Theater to neutralize rebel soldiers atop the Quezon Bridge. Members of the City Hall Police Detachment were ordered to establish a roadblock at Concepcion-San Marcelino, Arroceros, and P Burgos Sts to defend the Manila City Hall from possible enemy attack.

H.3. 2 December

Earlier in the afternoon, the operatives of the Operations Bureau and Intelligence Division of the WPD, apprehended Clifford Cobsilen Yequitan, 27 years old, single and native of Bontoc Province from whose possession one Ultimex rifle, cal 5.56 mm with serial number 102260 and several rounds of ammunitions were recovered.⁷⁷⁰

H.4. 3 December

P/Maj Gen Alfredo Lim, WPD Superintendent, arrived in Manila via Clark Air Base from an Interpol conference abroad. He immediately called for an emergency meeting of all WPD officers and issued orders to provide round-the-clock security detail at the Senate, Supreme Court, Manila Pavilion, Bay View Hotel and the Manila Hotel, where the Chief Justices of Asia and Western Pacific were holding a conference.

I. North and South Harbor Incidents

The RAM-HF also sought to control the Manila North and South harbors as docking facilities for vessels presumably loaded with rebel troops.

I.1. 30 November

Recruitment at North and South Harbors

The coup plotters wanted to win to their side the police forces guarding the harbors particularly the North Harbor Police stationed at the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Building. Billy Bibit⁷⁷¹ telephoned P/Capt Job Gavino, Station Commander (STACOM), North Harbor Port Police at 7:30 a.m. to say that he would send his representatives to see him regarding some important matters. At 11:00 a.m., 20 men in civilian clothes, presumably military men, arrived at the North Harbor Police

Station, on orders of Bibit, looking for Gavino. They tried to convince Gavino to join the rebel forces but he allegedly refused.⁷⁷²

Calling of Guardian Center Foundation, Inc Members

At about 7:00 a.m., Elmer Sagsago, 4th Assistant City Prosecutor of Baguio City, was informed by his niece, Nena Duba, that an unidentified soldier, who showed his Guardian tattoo, came earlier to his residence at Naval Base, Baguio City with a message about an emergency meeting of the Guardian Center Foundation, Inc (GCFI) to be held that day at Pier 8, North Harbor, Manila. Being the President of the GCFI Region I Chapter, he felt bound to attend the meeting but decided to verify it first.⁷⁷³

Eito Ikeuchi, a full time martial arts instructor at the Department of Physical Education in PMA since August 1979 and a GCFI member, confirmed to Sagsago that there indeed was going to be a general meeting of the GCFI at Pier 8, North Harbor, Manila.⁷⁷⁴ They agreed to go to Manila. They left Baguio at about 9:30 a.m. on board a private jeep.⁷⁷⁵

Declaration of Red Alert at Harbor Area

By late morning, the different military and police units at the Port Area started receiving information of a forthcoming coup. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Intelligence Unit received reports of the movement of armed men from Bataan to Manila on board an unidentified vessel.⁷⁷⁶

P/Capt Gavino declared red alert at 4:00 p.m., although as early as 7:30 a.m., he was already approached by Bibit to join the rebel forces.

At about 10:00 p.m., Capt Esmeralda Saplada, Staff Duty Officer of the Enforcement and Security Services (ESS), Bureau of Customs, received information from Antonio Tigno of the WPD that rebel troops known as "RAM boys" coming from Northern Luzon would be passing by South Harbor by boat. The information was immediately relayed to the Headquarters Philippine Coast Guard (HPCG).⁷⁷⁷

Meeting of the Guardian Center Foundation, Inc

Sagsago and Ikeuchi arrived at Pier 8, North Harbor, Manila, at about 6:30 p.m. They entered a restaurant where they saw Sgts Rodolfo Mendez and Rodolfo Ocon and some 15 GCFI member soldiers from the PMA in civilian clothes sitting inside the restaurant. Ocon informed

Mendez that there would be a national meeting of the GCFI.⁷⁷⁸ Their number later increased to about 30.⁷⁷⁹

Sagsago asked Sgts Ocon and Mendez what the meeting was all about. He was told by Ocon that they were supposed to wait for other GCFI members from Manila.⁷⁸⁰ At that time, there were already about 40 persons in the restaurant, including Sgt Jaime Camacho, Sgt Alimbuyao, and other members from the PMA.⁷⁸¹

That evening, somebody whom Sagsago did not recognize, fetched his group and led them to a nearby building which he later on learned was the PPA office. There, he saw about 50 people, some in military uniform and armed, and others in civilian attire. Sagsago observed that not all of those gathered bore the GCFI tattoo. These individuals were in a festive mood. Some were saying it was the birthday of someone for which a goat was butchered and drinks were served. Sagsago identified Cagurangan, a retired soldier who went by the GCFI name of "Founder Barorot" and a certain Morit,⁷⁸² a businessman who went by the GCFI name of "Magic Hermes".⁷⁸³

Unidentified persons inside the PPA building told Mendez and other GCFI members of the "good news". The unidentified persons declared that they would change the Government. Concluding that the gathering was not really a meeting, Sagsago claimed he called Mendez and Ocon, and other members of the Baguio Chapter, and told them he had decided to leave the place.⁷⁸⁴

Ocon informed Sagsago that there was going to be a coup and that they (GCFI-Baguio Chapter) were being asked to join. Sagsago, Ocon and Mendez and Ikeuchi discussed the matter. Sagsago claimed they all decided to leave. They passed the word around, among their other members, with instructions to leave in groups of two or three so as not to attract the attention of the rebel soldiers.⁷⁸⁵

Sagsago and Ikeuchi said they could not take their jeep out of the Port Area because by about 11:00 p.m. the gates were already blocked by the rebels. Both went back to the restaurant where they earlier met and stayed there until the next day leaving the premises only when the RAM-HF forces abandoned the harbor areas.⁷⁸⁶

I.2. 1 December

Attack at North Harbor / South Harbor Areas

Bibit's troops started attacking the different units at the Harbors. The RAM-HF forces simultaneously took over entry and exit gates of South and North Harbors, the HPCG and the Customs Police Station located at the PPA building.

Twenty men in civilian clothes led by TSgt de la Cruz arrived at the PPA at 1:00 a.m. and tried to convince Gavino to join the rebel forces. Gavino claims he again refused. TSgt de la Cruz requested that they be allowed to stay at the North Harbor Area. Gavino relented to this request.⁷⁸⁷

As of 2:00 a.m., at the South Harbor Gate 3, soldiers in full battle gear, armed with high powered weapons, were already deployed all over the area. Their strength was estimated to be around 200 and were commanded by Bibit.⁷⁸⁸

Capt Esmeraldo Saplala with several customs policemen proceeded to Gate 3 of the South Harbor to alert the guards regarding the arrival of rebel soldiers. Upon reaching Gate 3 they saw that Bibit's men had taken it over. Bibit asked Saplala to relay his message to the HPCG to "lay down their arms and join them on their mission". Saplala contacted the HPCG but they refused. Saplala and his men were told to stay at Gate 3.⁷⁸⁹

At the PCG Station at the North Harbor (PCGS), a group of more than ten armed soldiers in camouflage uniform accompanied by PPA policeman Arturo Navarro arrived at 2:10 a.m. One of them, with a Philippine Marine insignia, ordered the PCGS personnel to place their firearms and ammunitions at the side of the gate. When OIC Jaime Daquilanes refused, a certain Capt Tapitan confiscated their arms consisting of: three M-16 Armalite rifles, four long and short magazines and one US caliber .45 pistol with two magazines and 14 rounds of ammunition. Tapitan told the PCGS personnel to deposit the firearms at Bibit's office in the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Services (CIIS). They also tried to convince the personnel to join the rebel forces but they allegedly refused. RAM-HF soldiers barricaded the Lauro de la Cruz gate with commandeered dump trucks and left.⁷⁹⁰

The RAM-HF group at the Harbor was initially composed of some 60 fully armed soldiers and six Customs personnel namely: Bibit, Audie

Serrano, Benjamin Cepe of CIIS, Arthur Garcia, Catalino Bondoc of ESS and Crisostomo Balneg, storekeeper. This complement later increased to about 300.⁷⁹¹

Takeover of North Harbor

At about 3:00 a.m., PCGS personnel conducted discreet investigation of rebel forces who took control of the Zaragoza and Moriones gates of the North Harbor. The rebels were based at PPA Headquarters.⁷⁹²

At 3:00 a.m., RAM-HF soldiers took control of the South and North Harbors. They raided the ESS Headquarters, disarmed the personnel on duty and carted away 16 handguns and eight long firearms of various caliber. Using a bolt cutter, they also forced open Security Warehouse No. 9 and took 25 cartons of corned beef and several cartons of Marlboro cigarettes. They closed down the piers and barricaded Gate Nos. 3, 4 and 6 of the Port of Manila with container vans.⁷⁹³

At about 4:00 a.m., Capt Rafael Crisol, North Harbor Section Commander, arrived at Gate 1 and found it barricaded by container vans and manned by heavily armed men in military uniform, with some in civilian clothes, and PPA Police with white headbands. He estimated the number of the rebels at 200.⁷⁹⁴

The PCGS at the North Harbor received reports that PPA Police and heavily armed men had barricaded the Moriones Gate (Gate 2) and Zaragoza Gate (Gate 1) with container vans and cargo trucks. The PPA Police and the heavily armed persons prevented the entry and exit of vehicles at these gates.⁷⁹⁵

The North Harbor gates were secured apparently in preparation for the landing of reinforcements for the rebel forces. Elements of 339 PC Coy based in Bacolod tried to commandeer a vessel to take them to North Harbor.⁷⁹⁶

Many persons, some in civilian clothes, and others in fatigue uniforms, but all wearing white headbands, were seen converging at the PPA Headquarters which is just four meters away from the PCGS. PPA policemen allegedly constantly seen with rebel forces were P/Capt Job Gavino, Augusto Pilapil, Manuel Coching, Danny Fonbuena, Renato Villanueva, Ernesto Domingo, Matias Tamayo, Jesus Tolosa, Ronnie Abunao, Wilfredo Lira, Francisco Casio, and two persons known only by their nicknames Vanguard and Bogard.⁷⁹⁷

RAM-HF Sets Up HQ at PPA Building, North Harbor

A group of about 30 RAM-HF soldiers went to the PPA Building on the night of 30 November. The group increased to about 150 persons by 4:00 a.m. Some soldiers, armed with Galil, M203 grenade launchers, armalites and all kinds of assorted firearms, went to the nearby PCGS. The leader who introduced himself as Capt Pilapil, said he was sent by Bibit. However, when STACOM of the Coast Guard, Cmdr Velasco later talked to Gavino, Velasco said that Pilapil was really ex-Capt Dante Pimentel, a GCFI member.

At about 8:00 a.m., Pimentel asked his brother GCFI, P/Capt Gavino, to join them in the fight against the Government. In his testimony, Gavino admitted joining the GCFI in January 1986.⁷⁹⁸ There were two media men present at this time. Gavino claimed he refused to join their group.⁷⁹⁹ Pimentel then asked the number of firearms stored in the armory. Gavino informed him that all the firearms had been issued to PPA police personnel. Pimentel requested that he and his group be allowed to stay at the Headquarters.⁸⁰⁰ The RAM-HF soldiers roamed around the area and closed the Zaragosa and the Moriones Gate.⁸⁰¹ Pimentel ordered some of his personnel to man these gates. Then, he proceeded to the PCGS.⁸⁰²

Recruitment at the Coast Guard Station

Pimentel, Sgt Willy Lira and others identified as Bibit's agents, entered the PCGS at 9:00 a.m.⁸⁰³ There, Pimentel tried, without success, to convince Velasco, to join the rebel forces.⁸⁰⁴

Meanwhile, Gavino, by telephone, informed his immediate superior, Port Manager Atty Salialam, about the presence of almost 300 rebels at the area near the PPA Police Station. Atty Salialam gave instruction for the men to stay put and to secure the place particularly the Cashier's Office and the armory.⁸⁰⁵

Pedro Salazar, Arnold Navarette, and Hilconido Oira, members of the Law Enforcement Team, Coast Guard Station, noticed several uniformed armed men and civilians with white headbands, together with P/Capt Gavino and PPA policemen Ronnie Abundo, Ernesto Domingo, Augusto Pilapil, and Renato Villanueva standing, in front of the PPA Station.⁸⁰⁶ The Coast Guard Station Manila under Velasco monitored the actions of Gavino.⁸⁰⁷

RAM-HF Soldiers Withdraw from North Harbor

The RAM-HF soldiers under Pimentel stayed at the North Harbor area near the PPA police and PCGS from about 1:00 a.m. until late afternoon. At 5:30 p.m., they started to leave the PPA Police station bringing with them one shotgun from the station. Atty Salialam reported that the reinforcements of the RAM-HF, from the AFP LOGCOM, did not arrive.⁸⁰⁸

By early evening, the North harbor had been cleared of about 100 RAM-HF soldiers.⁸⁰⁹ At 8:00 p.m., the remainder of the RAM-HF men reportedly left the area. Government troops immediately took over and established checkpoints.

Assessing the Situation at the South Harbor

Lt Col Virgilio Danao, Acting Chief of the Customs Police, received information at about 3:00 a.m. that a coup d'etat was in progress, and VAB had been taken by rebel forces. To assess the extent of rebel deployment, he checked the NAIA District Command under Maj Alpapara, who told him that his area was not bothered by the rebels. Danao also called POM Command, and was advised by Desk Officer Customs Policeman (Cpm) Felix Simangan, that everything was normal and quiet in their area of responsibility.⁸¹⁰

Danao went to South Harbor at 5:45 a.m., and was surprised to see the vicinity of ESS HQ surrounded by men in uniform with white arm bands and fully armed with high powered weapons. He made rounds in the area to assess the situation and found that all his men on duty had been overwhelmed by Bibit's soldiers. The rebels were atop the new ESS Building with a .50 cal machine gun aimed at the HPCG Building.⁸¹¹

During the rounds at the Customs Police Division, the Desk Officer reported to Danao that their firearms were confiscated by the rebels led by Cpm Arthur Garcia. The office of Lt Antonio de Guzman of Logistics was also ransacked and firearms were carted away. Danao tried to get in touch with Bibit at 6:30 a.m. but the latter refused to talk to him.⁸¹²

Danao called a staff meeting at about 7:00 a.m. for briefing and assessment of the situation. He learned that the entire South Harbor was occupied by the rebels led by Bibit as early as 1:30 a.m. and that most of the zone gates were barricaded. He received a report that Garcia and other RAM-HF men commandeered the blue pick-up of the Customs Police Division. To avoid damage to said vehicle, Danao ordered Cpm

Lino Bondoc to drive the vehicle and to keep him (Danao) informed on activities on the rebel side.⁸¹³

Customs Commissioner Salvador Mison, a retired LtGen and former Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP, called up Danao at 7:30 a.m. and asked for developments. Danao informed Mison of the loss of ₱400,000.00 in cash from the Cashier's Office. Mison gave instructions to secure the area to prevent looting, pilferage and damage to government properties. Danao also received a report that Capt Saplala, his Deputy Staff Officer, was being detained and held hostage at Gate 3 by the rebels. He sent Cpm Eugenio Monforte to take custody of Saplala from the rebels.⁸¹⁴

At 10:30 a.m., Danao received a report that the Office of the Customs Commissioner at South Harbor was ransacked. When he, Cpm Ely Abiog, and Eugenio Monforte went there, they found no sign that the office had been ransacked, although there were some tell-tale signs of break-in. Danao called up Bibit and together, they conducted an inventory. Bibit took two portable transceivers and, after talking to Mison over the phone, left a note acknowledging custody of the transceivers.⁸¹⁵

Government Forces Arrive at South Harbor

At 10:00 p.m., the HPCG received unconfirmed reports from BGen (Ret) Benjamin Cruz, ESS Chief, of rebel troops landing at South Harbor.⁸¹⁶

I.3. 2 December

At 4:00 a.m., RAM-HF troopers abandoned the ESS HQ compound and regrouped at the Commissioner's Office Building.⁸¹⁷

At noontime, CAPCOM and WPD elements led by P/Col Diokno arrived at the South Harbor with the intention of assaulting rebel groups there. Being unfamiliar with the area, Diokno decided to call for reinforcements. He then conferred with the HPCG Battle Staff at the HPCG regarding the joint operations to be conducted against the rebels.⁸¹⁸

Two patrol cars from the CAPCOM, with sirens blowing, unexpectedly entered the Port Area through Gate 1. This prompted the HPCG to sound the General Quarters alarm even before the scheduled arrival of reinforcements from the WPD. A RAM-HF unit withdrew through Gate

6 where they boarded waiting vehicles and trucks parked at the area fronting the Lustevco Office.⁸¹⁹

Later, Diokno and his group, composed of P/Col Proceso Almando, P/Lt Col Robert Barbers, P/Capt SA Straebel and other WPD Officers and men, in coordination with BGen (Ret) Cruz, drove away 30 to 40 soldiers headed by Bibit. The rebels escaped through Gate 6 of South Harbor on board different vehicles. A box containing 140 dynamite sticks and four vehicles used by the rebels were recovered.⁸²⁰

At 1:00 p.m., the expected reinforcement led by BGen (Ret) Cruz arrived at the ESS HQ. Majs Generoso Halican, Maglipon, Capt Rolando Sacramento, and some policemen of POMDC checked the area and confirmed that the area was clear of rebels.⁸²¹

The North and South Harbor areas were clear of RAM-HF forces by 2:00 p.m.⁸²²

J. Other Hostile Events in Luzon

J.1. Solcom Incident (RSAF 4)

At around 7:00 p.m. of 30 November, 2Lt Eliseo Rasco, CO, ISAC, RSAF 4 stationed at Brgy Sto Cristo, Sariaya, Quezon, together with Lts Herminio Cantaco, Jonas Calleja and 47 enlisted personnel, commandeered a Philtranco Bus and proceeded to Sangley Point upon instructions given to Rasco by an army officer two days earlier. Arriving at Sangley at around 6:00 a.m. of 1 December, they beefed up the group of Navy Capt Turingan in guarding the gate, port and airstrip. After the rebels' air assets were destroyed in the afternoon, Rasco and his men joined Lt Col Tecson and Maj Oliveros in boarding a fishing vessel, with Mariveles, Bataan as destination.⁸²³

Maj Rosalio Magsino, Battalion Commander of RSAF 4, explained that although Rasco's unit was under him, its operational control was under Col Miguel Fontanilla, head of Task Force Hunter. Magsino failed to arrive at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, despite orders from BGen Evaristo Carino because along the way he received conflicting orders from Lt Cols Nicetas Katigbak and Aglipay.⁸²⁴

J.2. Legazpi City Incident

At 9:30 a.m., 1 December, Capt Florencio Flores, CO 3 SRB, with two V-150s and a whole compliment of 3 SRB occupied Legazpi City Airport.

Elements of his unit simultaneously took over DZRC radio station and PLDT office. Upon receiving a report of Flores's activities, Col Marino Filart, RECOM 5 Commander, constituted a provisional brigade under Col Ernesto Maristela to cope with the situation.⁸²⁵

At 10:00 a.m., 1 December, Maristela met with Flores, Lts Jay Tindoy, Marcel Mercado and Emmanuel Martin to convince them to return to barracks. They would not accede because according to Flores: "I am here in compliance to a directive from the regimental commander of the 1st Scout Ranger Regiment which I belong." However, Maristela succeeded in having Flores agree to vacating the premises of DZRC and PLDT, consolidating his forces at and confining them to one end of the airport. In return, Maristela confined his troops to the other end of the airport.⁸²⁶

Maristela then ordered his battalion commander, Maj Julius Ovilla, CO RSAF 5, to position his men in strategic places and park two dump trucks on the runway. As Ovilla was deploying his men, Capt Reynaldo Rafal, Deputy R1, RECOM 5, arrived at 2:00 p.m., with his men and some soldiers from 3 SRB on board a 6 x 6 truck driven by Sgt Asistio Cerillo. They joined the forces of Flores at the airport.⁸²⁷

At 6:00 p.m., 1 December, Col Filart ordered Maristela to disengage his troops at the airport. He met with Flores to advise him that he was disengaging to avoid a confrontation but he asked Flores to continue confining his troops to the airport.⁸²⁸

At 6:00 a.m. of 2 December, Maristela, Rafal, Tindoy and Martin met at the Mayon Restaurant inside the airport terminal and again Maristela tried to persuade them to vacate the airport for the sake of public convenience. The rebel officers left to confer with Flores who arrived shortly and told Maristela that he has to consult BGen Blando. When Flores returned, he said he was unable to reach Blando. Maristela continued his dialogue with Flores because he could sense that Flores was starting to weaken.

At 9:30 a.m., 2 December, Gov Romeo Salalima arrived followed by Capt (PN) Rex Robles, both of whom were given permission to talk to Flores and his men. At 10:00 a.m., the rebels received an ultimatum from Col Filart. One of the rebel officers asked through Maristela for an hour's extension which was granted. Gov Salalima returned with Msgr Quiambao and Msgr Sarte of the Legazpi Diocese to intercede with the rebels. At the same time, Flores requested a one-on-one meeting with

Maristela which culminated in Flores and his men returning around 12:30 p.m. to their camp in Villahermosa, Daraga, Albay.⁸²⁹

J.3. Sorsogon

On 1 December at around 6:30 a.m., Col Rene Bautista, Provincial Commander of Sorsogon, assembled his men inside Camp Escudero, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. During the briefing, Capt Leovic Dioneda, an officer previously implicated for leading with Capt Rafal the siege of Legazpi Airport during the August 1987 coup, spoke to Col Bautista's men. Capt Ruben Liwanag, OIC, 253rd PC Company, and his EX-O, Lt Gualberto Macalos, decided to join the rebel side. They commandeered two passenger buses, a Philtranco and a JB Liner. With 100 men, they boarded the buses at around 8:30 a.m. bound for Manila. Col Bautista did not report the troop movement to RECOM headquarters.⁸³⁰

The blocking force of P/Lt Jacinto Sison, Field Force Commander stationed at Brgy Binogsocan, Guinobatan, Albay, failed to stop this troop movement since they received the order ten minutes after the rebels passed by them. At around 11:30 a.m., the two buses were intercepted by the blocking force established by Camarines Sur Constabulary Command in Camarines Sur, however, the rebels were able to proceed as planned. The Provincial Commander of Camarines Sur tried but failed to convince the rebels to turn back.⁸³¹ However, in Camarines Norte, the Provincial Commander, after seven hours of negotiation, successfully convinced the rebels to return to Camp Escudero which they reached before midnight.⁸³²

In the late evening of 2 December, Cpts Liwanag, Dioneda and Lt Macalos organized a second troop movement this time originating from Villahermosa, Daraga, Albay where the 3 SRB is based. It fizzled out because the rebel Rangers would no longer follow.⁸³³

When asked while testifying before the Commission if he had heard that Capt Dioneda had the reputation of being something of a Robin Hood, BGen Filart (who was promoted to BGen sometime after December 1989) replied

Yes sir, as a matter of fact, . . . that was one of the reasons why he [Dioneda] should be transferred out of the region because he or his family was operating a jueteng operation in Sorsogon.⁸³⁴

Filart also added

... during my interview with Capt Liwanag about any money involved, he told me, according to Capt Dioneda, he [Dioneda] was given P500,000 to support the Bicol operation ... to defray expenses for the movement.⁸³⁸

K. Mactan Incident

Historic Mactan Island, site of the alternate international airport and Mactan Air Base (MAB), was in the public eye for a period of nine days during the December 1989 attempted coup d'etat, as rebel forces led by BGen Jose Comendador, Commanding General 2nd Air Division (CG 2 AD) took control of MAB and the airport, including aircrafts belonging to the Philippine Air Lines (PAL).

Of specific interest were the PAF air assets, particularly the F-5 jets and the Sikorsky helicopter gunships, which could provide ample air support to whomsoever controlled MAB. There were 27 PAF aircrafts at MAB at the time: four F5s, three C130s, one T-28, one T-33, seven Nomads, two S-76s (Sikorsky), and nine Hueys. The C130s and the Hueys are capable of moving troops. There were also 13 commercial aircrafts at the Mactan alternate international airport; two 747s (which were diverted to Cebu since NAIA was closed to air traffic), two BAC-111s, six Sunrisers, two Fokkers, and one LBC AVRO. Apparently, the intended use of the base, the airport, and the PAF and PAL air assets would have provided a convenient means of moving combat troops to Luzon from Visayas and Mindanao and vice versa.⁸³⁶

K.1. 30 November

BGen Comendador Briefs his Men

At about 8:00 p.m., red alert was declared at the MAB. Thirty minutes later, Comendador talked to his personnel at the 2 AD and told them "You have got to put your trust in me, get orders from me, and follow the chain of command." At that particular time, 2 AD personnel thought that BGen Comendador was still their legitimate commander and was receiving orders from BGen Renato Palma, COMVISCOM.⁸³⁷

Meanwhile, at 11:00 p.m., of the same evening, some elements of the 23 IB 4 ID in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur were told by Lt Gerry Amante that they would go to Nasipit, Butuan City for a security mission.⁸³⁸ Cpl Elmer Barrientos drove Lt Col Ericson Aurelio, CO 23 IB, in his service

jeep for Nasipit, followed by two 6 x 6 trucks loaded with soldiers and one V-150. At Nasipit, Barrientos was informed that they were going to secure MAB.⁸³⁹

At about the same time, Lt Pedro Sumayo informed his men, a segment of 23 IB personnel at their Headquarters in Bidcor Compound, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, that they would be proceeding to MAB to secure government facilities there. After the briefing, they were issued firearms, given a basic load of ammunitions, and proceeded to Nasipit wharf, where they boarded the M/V Our Lady of Lourdes and sailed for Mactan. Aside from Lt Sumayo, the officers included Aurelio, Amante and 2Lt Ramos.⁸⁴⁰ At about 11:00 p.m., members of the Alpha Coy, 30 IB 4 ID, based in Bad-as (Placer) Surigao del Norte, were told by Lt Ricardo Nepomuceno that they will proceed to Mactan to secure the air base. Forty three enlisted personnel boarded a 6 x 6 truck. Nepomuceno with his escort boarded a mini cruiser and all of them, together with a V-150 commando vehicle, left their Command Post and proceeded to Surigao pier where they boarded M/V Sweet Pearl and left for Mactan.⁸⁴¹

K.2. 1 December

Upon BGen Comendador's instructions, Lt Rodolfo de la Torre, Junior Aide-de-camp of Comendador and Intelligence Officer of 2 AD, with about 20 enlisted personnel, manned a checkpoint at the foot of the Mactan bridge (Lapu-Lapu side) at about 2:00 a.m. to prevent any Cebu City troops from reaching Mactan.⁸⁴²

Troop Movements Toward Cebu

VISCOM headquarters received information of unauthorized troop movements of the 23 IB and 30 IB, which were on their way to the Cebu Headquarters, 4 ID and Headquarters PC/INP RECOM 7. They learned that 23 IB was headed by Aurelio, while 30 IB elements, identified as A Coy was headed by Nepomuceno. Their combined strength was estimated at 550-600 soldiers, with two V-150s, 90 mm recoilless rifles and 81 mm mortars.⁸⁴³

With the confirmation that the Mindanao troops were in fact bound for Cebu, BGen Palma contacted Naval District V Headquarters and instructed them to intercept the two vessels by all means. BGen Comendador was also called upon to help the Navy in preventing the ships from docking and to coordinate directly with Capt Vicente Escala, Jr, of Naval District V.⁸⁴⁴

Request for PAF F-5 Planes

At around 7:00 a.m., Col Filamer Artajo, EX-O for Operations, talked to Lt Col Romeo Lood, Director for Operations of 2 AD, to release four F-5 aircrafts for Basa Air Base.⁸⁴⁵ Not getting any result, MGen Jose de Leon, Jr, CG PAF, personally called and ordered Comendador to give clearance for the four F-5 jets to take off from MAB. The latter answered in the affirmative but did not comply with the instruction.⁸⁴⁶

At around 9:00 a.m., Col Artajo again called Lood to follow the direct order of de Leon to Comendador for the release of the four F-5 jets, but was informed that Comendador had countermanded the order.⁸⁴⁷

Interception of M/V Sweet Pearl

PO1 Restituto Baring, Captain of Naval Gunboat DF 338, received instructions at around 9:00 a.m., from his Operations Officer, Lt Jimenez, to intercept M/V Sweet Pearl. The vessel was seen inside Cebu Harbor and was contacted by radio to drop anchor. Instead, M/V Sweet Pearl maneuvered and headed for the General Milling Corporation (GMC) wharf. From the Operations Center, DF 338 fired warning shots but M/V Sweet Pearl nevertheless proceeded. DF 338 was then instructed to fire directly at the propeller of the vessel to disable the same, but due to the presence of civilian passengers on board M/V Sweet Pearl, DF 338 just fired another warning shot. Upon seeing a bazooka aimed at its direction, DF 338 moved to a safer distance, but continued to guard the ship.⁸⁴⁸

M/V Sweet Pearl was able to dock at the GMC wharf at around 9:10 a.m. M/V Our Lady of Lourdes followed suit at past 10:00 a.m. that morning by shipsiding with M/V Weasel, a vessel owned by Load Star Shipping which was discharging bulk grain white corn. When soldiers in full battle gear started disembarking, Security Guard Norvie Craus observed that the soldiers had no name patches, while guard Ceferino Lopez testified that PAF soldiers led by ex-Lt Col Ebuena with 6 x 6 trucks from the PAF, with plate numbers SAG 961, SCV 676, SCV 677, SBY 931, BBY 843, SBY 483 and a civilian truck with plate number CAW 436, fetched the soldiers at around 1:30 p.m. that day, and brought them inside MAB near the office of 2 AD.

Some soldiers immediately proceeded to the ramp where the air assets were. Other soldiers were left on board M/V Sweet Pearl and M/V Our Lady of Lourdes to guard the heavy armaments and vehicles

which could not be unloaded from the vessels because of low tide. They were finally unloaded the following day, 2 December.⁸⁴⁹

Comendador Instructs Pilots Not to Fly

Before the arrival of the vessel in the morning, BGen Comendador held a conference with some 25 pilots, instructing them to follow the chain of command, not to go near the aircrafts, and not to take off without his prior clearance.⁸⁵⁰

Lt Col Fusilero was at the headquarters of the 348 PC Coy located at the foot of the Mactan bridge (Mandaue City side) at about 8:00 a.m. carrying a hand-held radio. While there, Fusilero informed Maj Rolando Irizari of the arrival of the troops from Mindanao on board two commercial vessels, and gave instructions for Irizari's troops to be on standby position. Irizari then proceeded to the METRODISCOM Headquarters where an updated briefing on the coup was held. Irizari informed Col Wahing, the Acting METRODISCOM Commander and Maj Ernesto Padua, METRODISCOM Intelligence Officer, of the presence of Fusilero at the 348 PC Coy.⁸⁵¹

At about the same time that Fusilero was at the 348 PC Coy HQ, Ebuena, together with Maj Ricardo Mutya, PAF, were at the middle of the Mactan bridge monitoring the arrival of the two vessels from Mindanao through their hand-held radios. Airmen Dominino Recla and Efren Tabanas testified that Fusilero was seen inside MAB in the morning of 30 November 1989. Ebuena was also seen with Comendador and Col Pablo Regullano at about 5:00 p.m. of the same date, near the office of the 2 AD.⁸⁵²

After BGen Comendador's meeting with the pilots at around 8:00 a.m., he ordered Lt Col Antonio Anciano, PAF, Commander of the Mactan-based 208 Tactical Helicopter Squadron of the 205 HW (under the over-all command of BGen Loven Abadia), to report to him. BGen Comendador asked Lt Col Anciano if they can possibly work together, apparently as a way of gauging the latter's loyalty.⁸⁵³

During all this time, Palma was trying to contact Comendador without success. He was informed that Comendador was at the ramp.⁸⁵⁴ This was only a ploy as MAB was already preparing for the arrival of troops from Mindanao.

At about 11:15 a.m., Maj Almario Hilario, Lt Col Anciano's PMA classmate and Intelligence Officer of VISCOM, called up the latter and

asked him (Anciano) to remind Comendador to call up VISCOM Headquarters. Comendador told Anciano that he would call VISCOM, particularly Palma in due time. By this time, Anciano doubted Comendador's loyalty.⁸⁵⁵

In the afternoon, Ebuen suggested that C130 pilots be located for the purpose of ferrying the Mindanao troops to Manila. Lt Col Romeo Lood, Operations Director of the 2 AD was informed by the Wing Operations Center of 220 Airlift Wing that there were no available pilots. The alternative plan, to utilize the PAL BAC-111 aircraft for the same purpose, met the same fate — no PAL pilot could be found. It was clear at this point that the troops from Mindanao had nowhere to go. At sundown, Aurelio wanted the aircrafts at the ramp crippled or destroyed, as they had become useless inasmuch as there were no pilots to fly them. Besides, it was so cumbersome for the troops to guard the aircrafts, and they might as well concentrate on guarding the Mactan Bridge. Lood was able to convince Comendador that destroying the aircrafts would be senseless. Heeding Lood's advise, Comendador instead ordered the removal of the batteries and starting units of the aircrafts.⁸⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Fusilero was again seen in the afternoon at the Headquarters of the 348 PC Coy. This time, there was merriment and clapping among PC soldiers and some Navy personnel, while the Philippine flag at the headquarter's flagpole hung inverted, i.e., red side up and blue side down, a sign of a declaration of war.⁸⁵⁷ It took an order coming from the RECOM 7 Chief of Staff, Col Superable, to have the flag returned to its normal position.⁸⁵⁸ It would appear that the soldiers at the 348 PC Coy had been misled by Fusilero that the chain of command of RECOM 7 had sided with the rebels. Seen in the company of Fusilero were LCdr Danilo Abinoja, LtSG Napoleon Estilles, Lt Reynaldo Esquerra, and LtJG Leodegardo Acebedo of the Coast Guard, PN.⁸⁵⁹

Inversion of the Philippine Flag

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Irizari, during the August 28, 1987 coup attempt, had also allowed the inversion of the flag in his Headquarters in Siquijor for which offense he was found guilty, reprimanded, and his salary for one month forfeited.⁸⁶⁰

In the afternoon, Comendador was seen fuming mad, after having monitored through commercial radio that Phantom jets of the US Air Force flew persuasion flights in Metro Manila. Around this time, Comendador openly admitted to all and sundry, including the media, BGen Imperial and BGen Palma that he was supporting the rebels.⁸⁶¹

K.3. 2 December

In the early morning, Lts Sumayo and Amante led teams of the 23 IB from MAB to the foot of the Mactan-Mandaue bridge instructing them to check movements of vehicles and people coming in and out of Mactan Island.⁸⁶²

Inside MAB that morning, Anciano, clad only in shorts and T-shirt, jogged around the base, slipped out surreptitiously and went to VISCOM Headquarters. Anciano briefed Palma on what transpired inside the base and assured him that not one of his pilots would fly for Comendador. Anciano later returned to the pilot's quarters at MAB with Palma's instructions for the pilots to immediately leave the base. The pilots left on board a convoy of an ambulance, a private car, and a tricycle and proceeded directly to VISCOM HQ.⁸⁶³

At about 2:00 p.m., Cerge Remonde, Radio Station DYLA broadcaster and Cebu City newspaperman, received a telephone call from former PC RECOM 7 Commander BGen Abenina requesting that he be allowed to air a statement over the radio station. Abenina went on the air expressing support for the RAM-HF.⁸⁶⁴

Negotiations with BGen Palma

Negotiations between COMVISCOM and BGen Comendador began at about 8:00 p.m. Comendador told Palma that he would surrender only when rebel forces in Manila gave up the struggle. At that time also, the Mindanao Independence Movement, led by former Assemblyman Reuben Canoy, expressed firm support for the rebels' cause and distributed anti-government materials in Cebu City.⁸⁶⁵

Later that evening, Gen de Villa ordered Palma to take Mactan. However, VISCOM at that time was seriously handicapped by lack of manpower and firepower as they had but one company of infantry from the 57 IB, based in Negros Oriental, which only arrived earlier in the morning.⁸⁶⁶

K.4. 3 December

BGen Cesar Go, Wing Commander of the 220 Airlift Wing based in Mactan, who was in Manila when the coup started, was designated by MGen de Leon as Acting Commander, 2 AD, vice Comendador, because the latter had publicly announced his support for the rebel forces. Upon his designation, Go proceeded to Cebu using the old Lahug Airport and,

upon arrival immediately proceeded to VISCOM HQ and reported to Palma. Although Go had at first intended to proceed to MAB, he was prevailed upon by Palma not to do so, since he might be taken hostage by the rebels.

While at VISCOM headquarters, Go contacted Comendador and attempted to convince him to give up in order to avoid a bloody confrontation. Comendador refused, and advised Go not to enter MAB nor initiate an air assault upon his forces; otherwise, he (Comendador) would blow up all the aircraft in the base. Comendador also told Go that despite the lack of pilots to fly the aircraft in MAB, they could still avail of it for strategic purposes. In another talk with Comendador, the latter told Go that he would submit himself to Palma, once the rebel forces in the Manila area had surrendered. Even after the surrender of rebel troops in Makati's Commercial District, however, Comendador still clung to the belief that this was only a ruse played by government forces on him.⁸⁶⁷

K.5. 4 December

Comendador Establishes Command Post

In the early morning, Comendador left MAB and established a command post at Heidelberg Restaurant situated at the foot of the Mactan-Mandaue Bridge, Lapulapu City side.⁸⁶⁸ Comendador had no more troops to command as most 2 AD personnel had deserted him and had reported to the newly-installed 2 AD Commander, BGen Go. The rebels, therefore, had to consolidate their forces at the foot of the bridge because of continuing threats of invasion from the government forces coming from the other end of the bridge.

At 6:30 a.m., combined elements of R2 Division, RECOM 7, NISC and NDV took into custody former Assemblyman Canoy. After due investigation, Canoy was charged with the crime of rebellion before the local RTC. Earlier, Canoy was seen conferring with Comendador and other rebel soldiers at the former's office at 2 AD.⁸⁶⁹

Armed with the necessary clearance from COMVISCOM and RECOM 7 Commander, Mayor Alfredo Ouano of Mandaue City, Vice Mayor Paterno Canete, Acting Mayor Camilo Eyas of Lapulapu City, ABC President Paulino Dy and Councilor Manuel Masangkay spoke to Comendador inside MAB at about 6:00 p.m. about the latter surrendering peacefully. Comendador assured the group he would not fire the first shot but he would not surrender. He complained that the country was "prostituted" when help was sought from the US Air Force in fighting the

rebels, adding that the people surrounding the President were communist-leaning and should be dismissed. He also stated that the present leadership was not sincere with the armed forces and that he wants a snap election.⁸⁷⁰

K.6. 5 December

At 3:00 p.m., Palma informed de Villa, that the ultimatum given for the surrender of rebel forces in Mactan Island had lapsed and that he was preparing for a military offensive against the rebels. This time, augmentation troops from nearby islands had arrived, enhancing the capability of VISCOM to retake Mactan.⁸⁷¹

Efforts by Mediators

Earlier efforts made by Cardinal Vidal, Msgr Achilles Dakay, and some public officials for the surrender of Comendador proved futile. Authorities consequently got in touch with relatives of Comendador as a last ditch effort to persuade the latter to give up peacefully. At around 5:00 p.m., Cardinal Vidal and Msgr Dakay, this time in the company of Ruth Comendador, daughter Pinky and son Dexter, himself an air force pilot with the rank of captain, in a tearful reunion at Heidelberg Restaurant tried to convince Comendador to surrender, but without success.⁸⁷²

K.7. 7 December

After his arrival from Hongkong, Cebu Governor Emilio Osmena joined Cardinal Vidal, Msgr Dakay and Ernest Weigel in a series of talks with Comendador that started about 2:20 p.m. of 7 December at the Heidelberg Hotel. As the discussion progressed, Comendador made clear his refusal to recognize the Constitution. Hence, the negotiators felt that there was no point in further talks. Besides, Comendador asked, as a pre-condition for his surrender, the resignations of President Aquino and the entire Cabinet. Given such demands, the negotiators informed President Aquino and Palma that the negotiations had bogged down.⁸⁷³

K.8. 8 December

At about 8:00 p.m., Comendador and his seven close-in security men left Heidelberg Hotel and checked-in at the Traveller's Inn, Reclamation Area, Cebu City.

K.9. 9 December

In the early morning of 9 December Comendador, with Sgt Ursal left Traveller's Inn for an undisclosed place.⁸⁷⁴ At 10:35 a.m., Palma announced that rebel soldiers were willing to give up and return to their barracks. It was about this time also that de Villa instructed Palma to proceed to Mactan and accept the surrender.

Fusilero relayed certain conditions for their meeting at the Mactan Bridge. There were to be no troop movement at the bridge, no one should carry long arms, each party to be made up of only nine persons should meet each other at the middle of the bridge for final negotiations, and the time of the meeting to be at 1:30 p.m.⁸⁷⁵

At 12:01 p.m. of 9 December, negotiations between the government side led by Palma and Imperial and the rebel side led by Fusilero, Aurelio and Nepomuceno began. The government guidelines for the surrender issued by de Villa were: "for the rebel forces to subject themselves to military control of their respective commanders, to turn in their firearms, to return to barracks; and to meet the consequences of their actions."⁸⁷⁶

Negotiations at the bridge were concluded at 2:00 p.m. Comendador submitted himself to Palma and was placed under the custody of Go, while Fusilero was placed under the custody of Imperial. All others were brought to VISCOM HQ. Army soldiers boarded M/V Our Lady of Lourdes bound for Cagayan de Oro City with their two V-150s and APC, accompanied by Congressman Vicente de la Cerna of Cebu. Ebuena eluded the military cordon around Mactan Island and continues to be at large.⁸⁷⁷

K.10. 10 December

Surrender of Comendador

At around 12:40 a.m. of 10 December, M/V Our Lady of Lourdes left Cebu for Cagayan de Oro with five officers, 114 enlisted personnel, two V-150s, two 6 x 6 trucks and jeeps.⁸⁷⁸

The following day, at 12:18 p.m., Comendador and Fusilero were brought to Manila aboard Fokker plane NR 210⁸⁷⁹ and thus ended the saga of Mactan Air Base.

L. Hostile acts in the province

L.1. Bacolod (NICOM) Incident

On 1 December at around 2:00 a.m., a group of 50 fully armed soldiers under Capt Leonardo Villanueva, Company Commander of the 339th PC Company, stationed at Victorias, Negros Occidental and later joined by MSgt Felizardo Espinosa, Patrol Base Commander of the 331st PC Company, assigned in Brgy Granada, Bacolod City and Lt Emil Ong, PA Team Leader of the 7 Riverine Assault Company 3rd Special Forces Battalion, and four of his men, occupied the Bacolod Airport.⁸⁸⁰ Their presence there, together with some civilians, was confirmed from footages taken by the crew of the local station, Channel 4 of ABS CBN.⁸⁸¹

Apparently, the rebels went to the airport to wait for a plane expected to come from MAB, to ferry them to Manila. With the development in Mactan, the rebels decided to secure other means of transportation. At around 2:00 p.m., 103 rebels proceeded to Banago wharf to board a vessel there. Lt Col Miguel Coronel, Negros Occidental Provincial Commander, prevented the sailing of a ship by not making the master and crew available and at the same time feigning that certain parts of the ship were malfunctioning. At 5:00 p.m., after negotiations, the rebels capitulated.⁸⁸²

At around 10:00 a.m., two platoons of the 11 IB under Lt Fidelino Agustin were sent to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, where a port of entry is situated. They were later augmented by two more platoons under Capt Augusto Go. At around 11:00 a.m., Lt Ong and his men tried but failed to persuade Lt Agustin to side with them.⁸⁸³

To secure the V-150 of the 332nd PC Company under the command of Capt Rolando Lopez, Coronel had it parked at the police station in Bago City on 1 December between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m.⁸⁸⁴

L.2. Fernando Air Base

At about 8:30 in the morning of 1 December 1989, Col Hector M. Tarrazona called a meeting of 26 officers stationed at the Fernando Air Base. Those who attended included the Wing Chaplain, the Legal Officer, the Medical Officer, the members of the Wing staff and some junior officers. The purpose of the meeting was to sound out their concern about the ongoing coup attempt.⁸⁸⁵ In the course of the meeting, Col Tarrazona stepped out and, by phone, informed the Wing Commander that some junior officers wanted to fly two of the Marquette aircrafts in

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the Base as a show of support for the rebels. The Marquette aircraft is essentially a training plane and is not armed. The Wing Commander, Col Felipe Abando, Jr, instructed Col Tarrazona to dissuade the officers from carrying out their plan, and instead, follow the chain of command.⁸⁸⁶

As Col Tarrazona proceeded to try and change the minds of the junior officers sympathetic to the rebels, Col Abando directly contacted the maintenance officers of the 443 Field Depot and Maintenance Squadron to place all the aircrafts inside the hangar and remove from the planes all batteries and parts needed to make them operational, keep the planes in a secured place, and otherwise prevent the planes at all costs from flying.⁸⁸⁷

After about an hour and a half of an open and candid discussion, to which Col Tarrazona promised confidentiality, the meeting was adjourned with the group deciding to stay loyal to the government. During that meeting, only five junior officers were very vocal and sympathetic to the rebels, although Col Tarrazona observed, "if we go by head count, most of the pilots were sympathetic to [the] rebels".⁸⁸⁸ Nevertheless, after the meeting, these same five outspoken officers assisted in strengthening the security of the base.⁸⁸⁹

L.3. Davao Incident

On 30 November at around 9:30 p.m., BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, PC INP Region XI Commander, convened and directed his commanders to uphold the Constitution and follow the chain of command. It was gathered from Col Franco Calida of the Davao METRODISCOM that some junior officers were conducting clandestine meetings in Davao City and that one of these officers was 2Lt Cesar Mancao III assigned to PC CIS, District XI. Baccay ordered Mancao to cease and desist from trying to recruit PC/INP junior officers for the rebel cause.⁸⁹⁰

On 1 December at around 8:00 a.m., Baccay assembled his men and reiterated the need to follow the chain of command. At around 11:40 a.m., he received information that elements of the 25 IB stationed in Pintatagan, Banaybanay, Davao Oriental were about to commandeer passenger buses to go to Davao City, and from there on to Manila. However, the soldiers abandoned their plan after their commander talked to them.⁸⁹¹

On 2 December at around 5:00 p.m., a group of company grade officers numbering about 25, accompanied by Lt Col Teodorico Viduya, Provincial Commander Davao del Norte, went to Baccay at Camp

Panacan in Catitipan, Davao City, to seek guidance regarding the ongoing coup and other issues such as violence and US intervention. For two and a half hours, Baccay emphasized the theme that an abrupt change in the government was not the cure to the present problems. Apparently, the officers were convinced so they promised to adhere to the Constitution, observe the chain of command and return to their respective stations.⁸⁹²

In the morning of 3 December, Capt Gregory Ramos, CO Alpha Coy 2 LABde PALAR stationed in Tuburan, Mawab, Davao del Norte, left his station with 20 of his men and proceeded to Davao City. He had with him five armored vehicles consisting of two V-150, two AIFV and one APC. The vehicles were commanded by Lt Oscar Singson, Company EX-O, Sgts Leon Admachelo, Feliciano Gayla, Magin Montalban, and Nereo Macabenta. In Brgy Sasa, Davao City at around 10:00 a.m., they encountered a roadblock of ten wheeler trucks manned by elements of the PC METRODISCOM. They turned around and met Col Danilo Olay, CO 602 Bde, 6 ID, the immediate superior of Ramos. Olay observed that while they were at the roadblock, several junior officers from RSAF, CIS, METRODISCOM, and RSU spontaneously arrived. When Olay learned what the movement was all about, he brought Ramos and the whole group to Baccay at Camp Panacan. Some junior officers had prepared a manifesto expressing support and sympathy for the rebels' cause and sentiments against the AFP,⁸⁹³ which Ramos handed to Baccay. There were two other armored vehicles from Calinan, Davao which arrived in Panacan. After a dialogue, the officers returned to barracks at 5:40 p.m.⁸⁹⁴

L.4. Nasipit

On 3 December 1989, the rebels tried to put on board the M/V Nasipit Princess and the M/V Don Calvino four armored personnel vehicles and an undetermined number of men from 402 Bde.⁸⁹⁵

Sometime during the day, Lt Anito Alfajardo, station commander, received a report that the radio operator of the M/V Nasipit Princess, while it was docked at the Nasipit wharf in Agusan del Norte, was approached by a man in civilian clothes and told to turn off all communications equipment. Later, at about 6:00 p.m., the Coast Guard sighted armed soldiers aboard six 6 x 6 trucks in the Nasipit wharf area. Lt Alfajardo forthwith motored from Butuan to Nasipit and, upon arrival, ordered elements of the Nasipit detachment to look for the ship master of M/V Nasipit Princess. The ship master, Capt David Escalera, Jr was found at about 8:00 p.m. When he was informed of the situation,

he voluntarily placed himself under the protection of the Coast Guard which hid him in a safehouse somewhere in Nasipit.⁸⁹⁶ He remained there until the situation normalized in Metro Manila. This prevented the rebel group, of about 50 enlisted men of 30 IB, led by Lt Generoso Bolina, from using the vessel to proceed to Mactan.⁸⁹⁷

On the same day 3 December, a group of about 11 rebel soldiers commandeered the M/V La Lealtad, while it was docked at the Lumbacan pier in Butuan City, and forced its master, Capt Antonio Ambray, to proceed to the entrance of the Nasipit wharf, possibly to rendezvous with the M/V Nasipit Princess had the latter been able to set sail, or at least pick up some troops if for some reason the latter could not proceed. However, upon reaching the vicinity of the Nasipit pier, the master deliberately ran the vessel aground thereby disabling it.⁸⁹⁸

A third vessel which the rebels tried to board was the M/V Don Calvino. Their plans were likewise frustrated when the captain and the key crew members abandoned it.⁸⁹⁹

L.5. Resignations at Cagayan de Oro

In the late afternoon of 7 December, a number of officers of the 4 ID met somewhere in Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. A few of those who were at the meeting claimed that they were invited by Lt Amador Tabuga "to meet some of our classmates and co-peemayers in a get-together party."⁹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, it appears that on account of their concern with news reports of a possible bloody confrontation of rebel and government forces in Cebu as well as the media accounts of US military intervention in Metro Manila, the participants decided to arrange a dialogue with their CG, BGen Rogelio Villanueva. For this purpose, Maj William Dormitorio was told to see the General at his office.⁹⁰¹

Villanueva advised Dormitorio that, because a dialogue will involve a confrontation with his junior officers in Camp Evangelista away from their posts, he would talk to them only if they resigned.⁹⁰² Maj Dormitorio relayed the General's response to Lt Col Reynaldo Rivera who informed the rest.⁹⁰³

Accordingly, the officers individually signed resignation letters. The resignations were not filled out in the official form but simply in a pre-printed half-sheet of paper with blanks for their names distributed by one of the officers under Rivera.⁹⁰⁴ Since Rivera was the most senior officer in the group, he was requested to carry the letters of resignation. Just before he left to see the General, Rivera requested Capt Santiago

Pascual to accompany him and carry all the resignations except Rivera's, which he carried himself.⁹⁰⁵

Villanueva, upon being presented the letters of resignation, met with the officers from 9:00 p.m. of 7 December up to 3:00 a.m. of 8 December. The dialogue, though centering on the grievances of the officers, consisting mostly of national issues, was described as "conducted in a cordial manner."⁹⁰⁶ At the end, Villanueva told the officers that he was not accepting their resignations and ordered them to return to their posts.

Before the officers could do so, they were told to stay because MGen (Ret) Mariano Adalem and BGen Arturo Enrile were en route from Metro Manila to see them. At 8:00 a.m. of 8 December, a second dialogue was thus held. The officers repeated their grievances to Adalem and Enrile and thereafter were told to return to their respective stations.

The affidavits submitted by the officers uniformly maintain that the affiants did not intend to resign and that they did so only to fulfill the condition precedent set by their CG for a dialogue. Thus, Capt Ruben Clarito claimed to have torn up his resignation letter after it was returned to him.⁹⁰⁷

M. Possible US Involvement

Newspaper accounts every now and then have appeared since 1986 reporting the alleged presence of American intelligence personnel on the occasion of past coup attempts. For example, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was reported to have promised to deliver food and aviation fuel to the RAM in case they launched a coup against then President Marcos in 1986. DIA, it was said, did not keep its promise.⁹⁰⁸

Thereafter, a US Embassy spokesman by the name of Allan Croughan, confirmed that a US Vice Consul, in the absence of Ambassador Stephen Bosworth who was then on leave, privately conferred with Arturo Tolentino when the latter and other Marcos loyalists occupied the Manila Hotel in July 1986. Croughan justified his actions by saying that: "We do it everytime [something like this develops] to get an appraisal of the situation."⁹⁰⁹

In early January 1987, Col James Nicholson, officially a US Military Attache, was photographed talking with the rebels at the GMA-7 during the occupation of the station.⁹¹⁰

Then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, officially wrote to former Secretary of National Defense, Rafael Iletto, that several Americans were said to have been seen closely following the 28 August 1987 coup attempt. Lt Col Victor Rafael, who was formerly a US Military Attache to the Philippines, allegedly tried to dissuade Col Dado from attacking Camp Aguinaldo, where Gregorio Honasan was at the time. Col Rafael was said to be the godfather of Honasan's son. Also, Maj Dennis Fayler was supposedly seen at the perimeter of the Villamor Air Base on board his armored car, monitoring the events there. Finally, a certain Stephen Herry was purportedly observed monitoring the August 1987 coup attempt.⁹¹¹

In the December 1989 coup attempt, the rebels took advantage of the Balikatan Exercise (Balikatan), a RP-US military exercise, to provide cover for their troop involvements. According to BGen Lisandro Abadia, Balikatan is a regular annual joint RP-US activity. It was scheduled for 4 December 1989. The Balikatan consisted of field exercises, where actual troops were involved, and command post exercises where simulated war games were conducted. It is normal for the JUSMAG people, particularly the American officers, to participate. The American participants usually billeted themselves in hotels (in December 1989, in Nikko) from where they are bussed every morning and every night to and from Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. The Americans participating normally arrive one week before the scheduled opening. Thus, these American military personnel were already in the Philippines prior to 1 December 1989.⁹¹²

A noteworthy part of Balikatan 1989 was the use of sophisticated communications equipment by the American participants. The communications equipment are such that from where they are or from where they were, "You can lift up the phone and you can call anywhere in the world."⁹¹³

Col Samson Mahimer, 1989 Director of Balikatan, testified that the intended role of the US military personnel, was "as tutors for group training". Col Mahimer also stated that the communications system held by the Americans at that time were "state of the art communications system, either wired or wireless."⁹¹⁴

Upon inquiry by the Commission, BGen Cardones stated in a letter that, during the period, 1 September 1987 to 1 December 1989, American military personnel participated in communications training activities for the appropriate units in the entire PA, including FSSR personnel and FSSR HQ communication facilities at Fort Bonifacio.⁹¹⁵ Furthermore,

Col Urgello confirmed in a letter to the Commission that "11 special communications courses had been evaluated by five US instructors at the FSSR Compound in Fort Bonifacio from 1987 to 1989."⁹¹⁶

At Sangley, during the morning of 1 December, there were two US Navy ships anchored, reportedly as part of Balikatan.

It is reasonable to suppose, regardless of whether or not US military persons were in Philippine military camps only coincidentally because of Balikatan, that they were, at least, closely monitoring the developments of the December 1989 coup attempt.

During his testimony before the Commission, Press Secretary Tomas Gomez mentioned an H Natzke as supposedly having been a CIA agent attached to the US Embassy in Manila during the early '70s and now working for Lucio Tan in San Francisco. Secretary Gomez remembered Natzke because a photograph of his daughter with rebel soldiers in Makati appeared in one of the Honolulu newspapers. According to Secretary Gomez, he inquired and was told that Natzke was here during the last coup.⁹¹⁷ The Commission, on the other hand, discovered that Apt 19-C in Twin Towers, Ayala Ave., Makati, is listed as occupied by Helbert Natzke and owned by Arithmos International.⁹¹⁸

A video tape provided the Commission shows a helicopter load of US Marines landing and deploying at the US Embassy grounds on 2 December.⁹¹⁹

While the Commission does not believe that the foregoing events constitute proof of US involvement in past coup attempts, the Commission, nevertheless, urges the government to look deeper into this matter. Considering American strategic interests in the Philippines, it is both logical and prudent for the government to do so. The Commission, not having any military intelligence capability or recourse to diplomatic channels, is neither equipped nor possessed of the necessary authority to effectively pursue such an investigation. For example, when the Commission sought to interview US Naval Attache Capt Thomas Mann in connection with his having reported to AFP GHQ that a wall of Camp Aguinaldo had been breached by the rebels during the last attempted coup, the US Embassy invoked, *pro forma*, his diplomatic immunity.

N. Some of the Damages Due to the Coup

N.1. Coup Casualties

As of 18 January 1990, the Department of National Defense Special Investigating Committee (DNDSIC) reports 669 confirmed casualties.

Table V-1—DNDSIC Record of Casualties

	KIA*	WIA**	TOTAL
Government Forces	31	252	283
Military Rebel Forces	17	79	96
CAFGU	1	0	1
Civilians	50	239	289
TOTAL	99	570	669

The casualties from the military (government and rebels) came from the following units:

Table V-2—DNDSIC Military Casualty Breakdown

SERVICE	KIA*	WIA**	TOTAL
Philippine Army	21	126	147
Philippine Air Force	2	11	13
Philippine Constabulary	5	33	38
GHQ/AFPWSSUS	2	44	46
INP	2	22	24
CAFGU	1	0	1
TOTAL	33	236	269

* Killed in action

** Wounded in action

On the other hand, the Philippine National Red Cross reported on 26 April 1990 a total of 575 casualties.⁹²⁰

Table V-3—PNRC Record of Casualties

	KIA*	WIA**	TOTAL
Military	34	265	299
Civilian	42	234	276
TOTAL	76	499	575

N.2. Armed Forces

According to Gen de Villa's report dated 17 January 1990⁹²¹ the total damage sustained by the AFP is estimated at ₱469 million.

Table V-4—Summary of Losses/Damages in Peso Value

Branch of Service	Facilities	Equipment	Armaments	Critical Items	Total
PA	12,500	5,681,476	17,279,609	165,280	23,138,865
PAF	15,583,000	104,717,358	14,234,000	82,016,516	216,550,874
PC	16,872,000	10,498,200	8,750	403,148	27,782,098
PN	4,933,413	26,708,318	11,273,259	126,592,146	169,507,136
AFPWSSUS	12,533,347	5,059,973	5,262,839	9,092,884	31,949,043
TOTAL	49,934,260	152,665,325	48,058,457	218,269,974	468,928,016

* Killed in action

** Wounded in action

N.3. Philippine Airlines

Levy Rebanal, vice president of PAL for Risk and Insurance Management, testified that the net revenue loss due to the coup amounted to P112 million plus P9 million attributable to the takeover of Mactan. The loss of revenue after the coup for the months of January to March, based on a projected growth rate of 10 percent to 12 percent, was estimated at P226 million.⁹²²

N.4. Tourism

At the time, right after the coup, Tourism Secretary Peter Garrucho estimated that the hotel occupancy in Metro Manila could plunge to a low 40 percent.⁹²³

N.5. Stock Trading, Investments, and Prices

Stock trading slumped to a volume of 2.6 billion shares from 3.9 billion shares in 29 November 1989. Since then, volume and value of stock traded generally remained on the low side reflecting the reluctance of investors to raise their market exposure.⁹²⁴

A marked drop in the initial paid-up capital investments was recorded during the week of the coup. Investments declined by 83.7 percent, from P297.8 million during the week of 7 November to 1 December, to P48.4 million after 1 December. For the month of December, initial paid-up capital investments dropped to P343.86 million from P963.77 million recorded during November.⁹²⁵

N.6. Total Losses

Combined financial losses due to the December 1989 failed coup attempt, based on the figures above, would be in the order of P800 million to P1 billion. But the loss of lives, loss of confidence and damage to our international image are worth far more than the financial losses.

ENDNOTES

- (1) Except for Abenina, Honasan and Zumel were at large at this time. Honasan escaped from detention in April 1988 while Zumel was already the object of a manhunt ordered by then CSAFP Gen Ramos as early as January 1987. Both were subsequently dropped from the military rolls.
- (2) Sworn Testimony of Gen Renato de Villa, CSAFP, given before the Fact-Finding Commission (FFC) on 7 April 1990; Sworn Testimony of BGen Galileo Kintanar, former Chief, ISAFP, given before the FFC on 26 July 1990.
- (3) Sworn Testimony of Capt Oscarlito Mapalo, former security officer of BGen Alejandro Galido, given before the FFC on 9 August 1990; Exh. "B-5-Cardones", Memorandum Re: Alleged Involvement of BGen Edgardo Abenina (Table C of Enclosure 2, AFPSIC) submitted by BGen Rene Cardones, former Commanding General, FSRP, dated 16 April 1990.
- (4) Exh. "B-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia", Intelligence Developments on the Sixth Coup Attempt, submitted by Gen Renato S. de Villa, CSAFP, to President Corazon C. Aquino, dated 3 January 1989.
- (5) Exh. "KKKKK-8"-Commission, Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Capt Oscarlito Mapalo, dated 27 January 1990; Exh. "KKKKK-10"-Commission, Supplemental Sworn Statement of Capt Mapalo, dated 17 March 1990; Affidavit of Capt Mapalo, dated 12 January 1990 and 17 March 1990, respectively; Mapalo Testimony, *op. cit.*
- (6) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, Sworn Statement of BGen Alejandro Galido, former CG SOLCOM AFP, given before Col Benjamin Libarnes PC at AFPCIC, dated 17 January 1990.
- (7) Exh. "B-BGen Raul Aquino", Letter of BGen Raul Aquino (Ret) addressed to MGen Mariano Adalem, CG PA, dated 5 May 1989, photocopy.
- (8) Mapalo Testimony, *op. cit.*
- (9) Sworn Testimony of Col Juan Mamorno, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Command Info Office, SOLCOM, given before the FFC on 9 August 1990.

- (10) Ellen Gallardo, "US Embassy Confirms Magleo, Galido Meeting," Philippine Star, 4 April 1990, pp. 1-2; "US Confirms Magleo Was Here," Manila Bulletin, 4 April 1990, p. 1.
- (11) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.; Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (12) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, ibid.
- (13) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.; Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, ibid.
- (14) Ibid.
- (15) Sworn Testimony of BGen Artemio Tadiar, Jr, Deputy CG, Subic Naval Base, given before the FFC on 15 June 1990.
- (16) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (17) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.; Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, ibid.
- (18) Tadiar Testimony, op. cit.
- (19) Sworn Testimony of Cmdr Bernardo Patino, Chief of Staff, Naval District VI, given before the FFC on 15 June 1990.
- (20) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (21) Ibid.
- (22) Exh. "KKKKK-8"- Commission, op. cit.
- (23) Exh. "B-Diana Aguas", Letter of Diana Z. Aguas addressed to the Chairman of FFC, dated 7 August 1990.
- (24) Sworn Testimony of Diana Z. Aguas, given before the FFC on 16 August 1990.
- (25) Exh. "A-1-Cobarrubias", Philippine Village Hotel's registration cards of occupants of Room 317 from the period of 1 November 1989 to 7 December 1989, photocopies.
- (26) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (27) Ibid.

- (28) Mamorno Testimony, op. cit.
- (29) Ibid.
- (30) Exh. "KKKKK-6"- Commission, Affidavit of Col Juan Mamorno, given at AFPCIC, dated 1 February 1990; Mamorno Testimony, ibid.
- (31) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (32) Sworn Testimony of Luis Tabuena, given before the FFC on 7 May 1990.
- (33) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (34) Tabuena Testimony, op. cit.
- (35) Exh. "KKKKK-3"- Commission, Additional Sworn Statement of BGen Galido, dated 23 January 1990.
- (36) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (37) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (38) Exh. "KKKKK-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (39) Ibid.
- (40) Ibid.
- (41) Ibid.
- (42) Exh. "21-LOGCOM", Sworn Statement of Lt Col Gimeno C. Villanueva, dated 8 December 1989.
- (43) Sworn Testimony of Col Manuel Mariano, Commander, LOGCOM AFP, Camp Aguinaldo, given before the FFC on 28 May 1990.
- (44) Ibid.
- (45) Sworn Testimony of BGen Oswaldo Villanueva, CG 6 ID, given before the FFC on 21 May 1990.

- (46) Exh. "B-4-Villanueva", also marked as Exh. "B-Fortich", colored photograph showing former Gov Fortich, dated 26 February 1990; Exh. "B-7-Villanueva", also marked as Exh. "C-Fortich", colored photograph showing Gov Fortich (marked Exh. "C-1-Fortich"), Reuben Canoy (marked Exh. "C-2-Fortich"), Alexander Noble (marked Exh. "C-3-Fortich"), and Atty Romeo Montalban (marked Exh. "C-4-Fortich"), dated 26 February 1990.
- (47) Exh. "B-Dejarne", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Asterio Dejarne, given before SSgt Domingo Doctor, dated 29 December 1989.
- (48) Sworn Testimony of Sgt Asterio Dejarne, given before the FFC on 24 March 1990.
- (49) Ibid.
- (50) Ibid.
- (51) Ibid.
- (52) Ibid.
- (53) Ibid.
- (54) Ibid.
- (55) Exh. "C-Dejarne", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Asterio Dejarne, dated 3 January 1990.
- (56) Exh. "G-3-Dejarne", Real Property Tax Declaration No B-067-01962 issued by the City Assessor of Quezon City, dated 29 June 1990.
- (57) Exh. "G-2-Dejarne", Sworn Statement of Emmanuel Lao given before Special Counsel Alejandro Bijasa at the FFC, dated 5 July 1990.
- (58) Dejarne Testimony, op. cit.
- (59) Ibid.
- (60) Ibid.
- (61) Ibid.

- (62) Ibid.
- (63) Exh. "C-BGen Ruiz", Sworn Testimony of BGen Federico Ruiz, Jr, CG 8 ID, Camp Lukban, Catbalogan, Samar, given before the FFC on 13 March 1990; Exh. "B-BGen Flores", Special Report on the December 1 Coup and Involvement of AFP Units in Mindanao submitted by BGen Guillermo Flores, CG SOUTHCOM, dated 14 December 1989.
- (64) Sworn Testimony of Salvador Mison, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs, given before the FFC on 22 February 1990.
- (65) Ibid.
- (66) Sworn Testimony of Fe de los Reyes, given before the FFC on 16 April 1990.
- (67) Ibid.
- (68) Exh. "L-Holiday Inn", Report in response to the request for verification made by the FFC submitted by Lt Col Reynaldo V. Velasco, PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental, dated 25 June 1990.
- (69) Ibid.
- (70) Sworn Statement of Eladio D. Fasinal (with attached logbook entries), a security guard at Holiday Inn, dated 6 April 1990.
- (71) Exh. "C-1-Salialam", Incident Report submitted by P/Capt Job Gavino, dated 4 December 1989.
- (72) De los Reyes Testimony, op. cit.
- (73) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (74) Exh. "A-SOLCOM", Special Report on the Actions Taken by COM SOLCOM regarding the 1989 coup d'etat, made by BGen Galido.
- (75) Sworn Testimony of BGen Javier Carbonell, CG 2 ID, given before the FFC on 7 August 1990.
- (76) Manila Chronicle, 13 September 1986, as shown by the NBI

records check on ex-Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero (PRO File No F-246, dated 24 November 1986).

- (77) Sworn Testimony of Maj Anacleto Chagas, CO 347 PC Coy, Toledo City, given before the FFC on 4 April 1990.
- (78) Exh. "D-Maj Crucero", Special Report to the Chief of Staff, 3 ID, COMNCOM, by Maj Alphonsus Crucero, Chief of Intelligence, 3 ID, Camp Peralta, Capaz, Tarlac, dated 18 September 1989.
- (79) Sworn Testimony of Rogelio Osmeña, given before the FFC on 29 March 1990.
- (80) Ruiz Testimony, op. cit.
- (81) Osmeña Testimony, op. cit., p. 6.
- (82) Exh. "A-Mactan", After Mactan Crisis Report, submitted by BGen Renato Palma, CG VISCOM, dated 19 December 1989.
- (83) Sworn Testimony of Lt Augusto Marquez, Jr, Chief of Operations, R3 Division, RECOM 7, Cebu City, given before the FFC on 28 March 1990.
- (84) Chagas Testimony, op. cit.
- (85) Sworn Testimony of Capt Cecil Ezra Sandalo, CO 342 PC Coy, Cebu City, given before the FFC on 28 March 1990.
- (86) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.
- (87) Sandalo Testimony, op. cit.
- (88) Chagas Testimony, op. cit.
- (89) Sandalo Testimony, op. cit.
- (90) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.
- (91) Ibid.
- (92) Ibid.
- (93) Ibid.

- (94) Chagas Testimony, op. cit.
- (95) Sandalo Testimony, op. cit.
- (96) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.
- (97) Sworn Testimony of Col Andres Superable, Chief of Staff, PC/INP RECOM 7, Cebu City, given before the FFC on 28 March 1990.
- (98) Chagas Testimony, op. cit.
- (99) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.
- (100) Sworn Testimony of BGen Victor Natividad (Ret), former Deputy Chief, PC, given before the FFC on 17 April 1990.
- (101) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rene Cardones, CG FSRR, given before the FFC on 9 March 1990.
- (102) Exh. "A-Salac", Memorandum prepared by the office of Col Dominador Salac, Chief A2, Villamor Air Base, as an aid for his testimony before the FFC, dated 24 February 1990.
- (103) Exh. "JJJJJ-4"- Commission, Confidential Intelligence Report Re: Ambassador Eduardo Cojuangco, prepared by NBI Senior Agent Isabelo Cerna, dated 22 January 1987, photocopy.
- (104) Exh. "A-3-Executive and Tourist Aviation, Inc", Aircraft Flight Log Book entry made by Capt Adriano Morales, dated 20 November 1989, photocopy; Exh. "B-Executive and Tourist Aviation, Inc"; Sworn Statement of Capt Adriano Morales, dated 25 July 1990.
- (105) Sworn Testimony of ex-Capt Adriano Morales, General Manager, Executive and Tourist Aviation, Inc, given before the FFC on 10 August 1990.
- (106) Supplementary Sworn Statement of Capt Adriano Morales, dated 7 September 1990.
- (107) Exh. "A-4-Executive Tourist and Aviation, Inc", Aircraft Flight Log Book entry for RP-C 585, dated 23 November 1989.

- (108) Morales Testimony, op. cit.; Sworn Testimony of Capt Loreto Vergeire, given before the FFC on 22 August 1990; Supplemental Sworn Statement of Capt Adriano Morales, dated 31 August 1990.
- (109) Exh. "A-2-Agricultural Investors, Inc", Aircraft Flight Log Book Report No. 6249, submitted by Armando S. Narciso, dated 21 November 1989.
- (110) Exh. "A-Agricultural Investors, Inc", Affidavit of Armando S. Narciso, General Manager of Agricultural Investors, Inc, dated 9 July 1990; Exh. "A-2-Agricultural Investors, Inc", op. cit.; Exh. "A-3-Agricultural Investors, Inc", Aircraft Flight Logbook Report No 6250, submitted by Armando S. Narciso, dated 22 November 1989; Exh. "A-4-Agricultural Investors, Inc", Aircraft Flight Logbook Report No 6301, submitted by Armando S. Narciso, dated 23 November 1989.
- (111) Sworn Testimony of Capt Jose Castillo, given before the FFC on 17 August 1990.
- (112) Morales Testimony, op. cit.
- (113) Exh. "A-4-Executive Tourist Aviation", op. cit.
- (114) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rodolfo Biazon, CG NCRDC, given before the FFC on 21 December 1989.
- (115) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", Intelligence After-Operations Report, submitted by Col Benjamin Libarnes, GSC PC, dated 29 December 1989.
- (116) Ibid.
- (117) Sworn Testimony of Col Raul Urgello, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, PA, given before the FFC on 9 February 1990.
- (118) Sworn Testimony of Col Rene Dado, Brigade Commander, 702 Bde PA, Bataan, given before the FFC on 12 February 1990.
- (119) Cardones Testimony, op. cit.
- (120) Exh. "A-Salac", op. cit.

- (121) Ibid.
- (122) Ibid.
- (123) Ibid.
- (124) Ibid.
- (125) Exh. "B-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia", op. cit.
- (126) Sworn Testimony of Capt Melito Mabilin, PC Station Commander, San Pedro, Laguna, given before the FFC on 20 June 1990.
- (127) Sworn Testimony of Capt Felizardo Serapio, Jr, Company Commander, 74 PC Coy, Angeles City, given before the FFC on 8 May 1990.
- (128) Marquez Testimony, op. cit.
- (129) Exh. "D-Crucero", op. cit.
- (130) Ibid.
- (131) Sworn Testimony of BGen Renato Palma, Commander, VISCOM, given before the FFC on 15 January 1990.
- (132) Exh. "D-Crucero", op. cit.
- (133) Ibid.
- (134) Exh. "B-NICOM", Investigation Report submitted by Lt Col Wilfredo Alejaga (GSC) to AFPSIC, dated 23 January 1990.
- (135) Exh. "A-NICOM", After-Coup Report submitted by Maj Alphonsus Crucero, dated 10 December 1989.
- (136) Ibid.
- (137) Exh. "B-NICOM", op. cit.
- (138) Ibid.
- (139) Exh. "JJJJJ-5"- Commission, Pertinent Documents Re: Coup-

Related Incidents in Davao, submitted by Special Counsel Amor Sunodan to the FFC (containing the report of BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr on coup related incidents in Region XI, submitted by BGen Baccay to Chief, PC/Director General INP, Camp Crame, Quezon City), dated 9 December 1989.

- (140) Exh. "B-Villanueva", Summary Report on December 1989 Coup Attempt, submitted by BGen Rogelio Villanueva, CG 4 ID, Cagayan de Oro City, dated 23 February 1990.
- (141) Sworn Statement of Constantino Alcaraz, Mayor of the Municipality of Moncayo, Davao del Norte, given before Special Counsel Amor Sunodan at FFC, dated 24 February 1990.
- (142) Exh. "JJJJ-5"- Commission, op. cit.
- (143) Exh. "B-Flores", op. cit.
- (144) Exh. "A-Ilano", Special Report on the December Coup, submitted by Col Cesar Ilano, Office of the Chief of Staff, PA, Fort Bonifacio, dated 8 December 1989.
- (145) Exh. "A-Dado", Report to CG PA submitted by Col Rene Dado, CO 4 IBde, dated 4 December 1989; Exh. "B-Tagaytay", Sworn Statement of SSgt Angeles Pascual given before Maj Mario Abundo (JAGS), dated 30 November 1989.
- (146) Ibid.
- (147) Exh. "C-Tagaytay", Sworn Statement of SSgt Mario Maitim, given before Maj Mario Abundo (JAGS), dated 29 November 1989.
- (148) Exh. "A-Dado", op. cit.
- (149) Cardones Testimony, op. cit.
- (150) Sworn Testimony of BGen Loven Abadia, CG, 205th Helicopter Wing, Villamor Air Base, given before the FFC on 3 August 1990.
- (151) Cardones Testimony, op. cit.
- (152) Ibid.

- (153) Exh. "B-BGen Cardones", Report with Respect to Involvement of Scout Rangers in the December 1989 coup, submitted by BGen Rene Cardones, CG FSRR, dated 20 December 1989.
- (154) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (155) Exh. "O-VP Laurel", "Chronology of Events," The Philippine Star, 3 December 1989, p. 3.
- (156) Exh. "D-Makati", Affidavit of Capt Jaime Yangzon, given before Capt Mauro Abalos (INF) PA at OG3, HPA, Fort Bonifacio, dated 19 December 1989.
- (157) Exh. "C-Makati", Affidavit of Capt Edgardo Gurrea, given before Capt Mauro Abalos (INF) PA at OG3 HPA, Fort Bonifacio, dated 19 December 1989.
- (158) Exh. "A-Ilano", op. cit.
- (159) Sworn Testimony of Col Cesar Ilano, Group Commander, SISG, given before the FFC on 8 February 1990.
- (160) Sworn Testimony of Capt Danilo Estropia, Special Activity Unit, Fort Bonifacio, given before the FFC on 12 February 1990.
- (161) Sworn Testimony of BGen Manuel Cacanando, CG PA, given before the FFC on 1 February 1990.
- (162) Sworn Testimony of Col Abraham Paray, Commander, Light Armor Brigade, given before the FFC, dated 12 February 1990; Exh. "A-Paray", Sworn Statement of Col Abraham Paray, dated 8 December 1989.
- (163) Exh. "C-Makati", op. cit.
- (164) Exh. "A-Ilano", op. cit.
- (165) Exh. "A-Lagman", Sworn Statement of Col Ferdinand Lagman, dated 14 February 1990.
- (166) Ilano Testimony, op. cit.
- (167) Exh. "A-Ilano", op. cit.

- (168) Exh. "A-1-Ilano", Memorandum Re: Planned Coup Attempt, from Col Cesar Ilano, dated 30 November 1989.
- (169) Ilano Testimony, op. cit.
- (170) Exh. "B-Makati", Sworn Statement of Capt Jose Cruz, given before Maj Mario Abundo at NCRDC, AFP, Camp Aguinaldo, dated 4 December 1989.
- (171) Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", After-Operations Report of the 1st Marine Brigade (Annex "P" of the After-Operations Report of the NCRDC) submitted by BGen Cesar Abella, dated 5 January 1990.
- (172) Exh. "A-Ilano", op. cit.
- (173) Exh. "C-Makati", op. cit.
- (174) Cacanando Testimony, op. cit.
- (175) Exh. "B-Ligot", Letter of Lt Col Jacinto C. Ligot, former Deputy and Executive Officer, G3, PA, sworn to before Col Francisco Paredes, dated 11 December 1989, photocopy.
- (176) Exh. "A-3-Ligot", Affidavit of Lt Col Jacinto C. Ligot, dated 6 February 1990.
- (177) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (178) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (179) Exh. "C-Crame", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni SSgt Gabriel Alecojole, dated 18 December 1989.
- (180) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (181) Exh. "A-Ilano", op. cit.; Estropia Testimony, op. cit.
- (182) Exh. "A-Ilano", op. cit.; Cacanando Testimony, op. cit.
- (183) Ilano Testimony, op. cit.
- (184) Exh. "A-Paray", Report Re: Personal Observations During the Coup submitted by Col Abraham Paray, CO LABde, PA, to CG PA, dated 4 December 1989.

- (185) Paray Testimony, op. cit.
- (186) Exh. "Q-Makati", Report to CSAFP, submitted by Col Reynaldo Gopilan, G4, AFP, dated 6 December 1989.
- (187) Estropia Testimony, op. cit.
- (188) Cacanando Testimony, op. cit.
- (189) Estropia Testimony, op. cit.
- (190) Exh. "Q-Makati", op. cit.
- (191) Exh. "QQQQQ"- Commission, "Recapitulation Summarizing the Number of Officers and EP of Different Units of PA Allegedly Involved in the December 1989 Coup," undated.
- (192) Exh. "A-1-Ligot", op. cit.
- (193) Ibid.
- (194) Exh. "C-Makati", op. cit.
- (195) Exh. "A-Gutierrez", Narrative Report Re: Activities of 71st Infantry Battalion During the Coup d'Etat, submitted by Maj Pedro Gutierrez, dated 8 December 1989.
- (196) Ibid.
- (197) Exh. "B-1-Cardones", op. cit.
- (198) Cacanando Testimony, op. cit.
- (199) Ilano Testimony, op. cit.
- (200) Exh. "A-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia", Affidavit of BGen Lisandro Abadia, dated 10 February 1990.
- (201) Exh. "A-1-Ligot", op. cit.
- (202) Sworn Statement of Lt Col Efren Fernandez, Provincial Commander, PC/INP, San Fernando, Pampanga, dated 17 February 1990.

- (203) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (204) Exh. "A-1-Ligot", op. cit.
- (205) Dado Testimony, op. cit.
- (206) Estropia Testimony, op. cit.
- (207) Ibid.
- (208) Exh. "C-Sangley", Affidavit of Capt Jose T. Agudelo (with narrative events from 30 November 1989 to 4 December 1989), dated 13 December 1989.
- (209) Ibid.
- (210) Ibid.
- (211) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col C. Jacinto Ligot, Deputy Executive Officer for Operations, G3, PA, given before the FFC on 7 March 1990.
- (212) Exh. "A-3-Ligot", op. cit.
- (213) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Salvador S. Limsiaco, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G3, Light Armor Brigade, given before the FFC on 13 February 1990.
- (214) Sworn Testimony of Capt Danilo Lim, Operations Training Officer, FSRR, given before the FFC on 20 February 1990.
- (215) Dado Testimony, op. cit.
- (216) Paray Testimony, op. cit.
- (217) Exh. "C-Makati", op. cit.
- (218) Paray Testimony, op. cit.
- (219) Ibid.
- (220) Ilano Testimony, op. cit.

- (221) Sworn Testimony of Capt Eugenio de los Santos, Head of the Battery Command, given before the FFC on 12 February 1990.
- (222) Exh. "A-Col Abraham Paray", op. cit.
- (223) Ibid.
- (224) Exh. "C-Makati", op. cit.
- (225) Exh. "QQQQQ-2"- Commission, Sworn Statement of Pfc Pedro Daga, dated 3 January 1990.
- (226) Exh. "S-Aguinaldo", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Pfc Romualdo D. Timupig, dated 16 December 1989.
- (227) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (228) Exh. "A-15-NCRDC", NCRDC COC Journal (Annex "N" of the After-Operations Report of the NCRDC), dated 5 January 1990.
- (229) Sworn Testimony of BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, CO Philippine Marines, given before the FFC on 20 December 1989.
- (230) The Rangers thought that BGen Galido's troops would come from SOLCOM and go to Fort Bonifacio to defend the same against the rebels.
- (231) Exh. "A-de los Santos", Affidavit of Capt Eugenio de los Santos, dated 12 February 1990.
- (232) Exh. "A-Col Abraham Paray", op. cit.
- (233) Ibid.
- (234) Exh. "A-de los Santos", op. cit.
- (235) Exh. "C-Makati", op. cit.
- (236) Exh. "QQQQQ-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (237) Exh. "A-Dado", op. cit.
- (238) Exh. "C-Makati", op. cit.

- (239) Exh. "A-Dado", op. cit.
- (240) Exh. "D-Makati", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Capt Jaime C. Yangzon, dated 19 December 1989.
- (241) Exh. "A-1-Ligot", op. cit.
- (242) Exh. "D-Makati", op. cit.; Exh. "A-1-Ligot", op. cit.
- (243) Urgello Testimony, op. cit.
- (244) Exh. "A-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia", op. cit.
- (245) Dado Testimony, op. cit.
- (246) Exh. "A-Col Ilano", op. cit.
- (247) Affidavit of Lt Col Efren Fernandez, op. cit.
- (248) Exh. "A-Dado", op. cit.
- (249) Exh. "A-1-BGen Lisandro Abadia", op. cit.
- (250) Ibid.
- (251) Exh. "A-Gutierrez", op. cit.
- (252) Sworn Testimony of BGen Alexander Aguirre, CG CAPCOM, given before the FFC on 15 January 1990.
- (253) Sworn Testimony of Jejomar Binay, Mayor of the Municipality of Makati, given before the FFC on 15 January 1990.
- (254) Maj Abraham Purugganan, Interview by Sheila Coronel, 14 January 1990, transcript submitted to the FFC by the latter.
- (255) Exh. "A-15-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (256) Exh. "34-LOGCOM", Sworn Statement of Capt Manuel Ison, dated 12 December 1989 (also marked as Exh. "A-1-Ison").
- (257) Binay Testimony, op. cit.

- (258) Sworn Testimony of Blas Ople, former Commissioner, Constitutional Commission of 1986, given before the FFC on 7 May 1990.
- (259) Sworn Testimony of Emelinda Santos, given before the FFC on 28 February 1990.
- (260) Exh. "A-Intercon Hotel", Hotel Intercontinental Manila Action Reservation Form for Nacionalista Party Meeting, dated 2 December 1989, photocopy.
- (261) Sworn Statement of Ramon Isberto, given before the FFC on 9 May 1990.
- (262) Ople Testimony, op. cit.
- (263) Sworn Testimony of Gloria Diaz, given before the FFC on 29 January 1990.
- (264) Sworn Testimony of Pedro Rojo, Chief Security Officer, Hotel Intercontinental, Manila, given before the FFC on 25 June 1990.
- (265) Sworn Testimony of Jean Pierre Etroit, Resident Manager, Hotel Intercontinental, Manila, given before the FFC on 28 February 1990.
- (266) Ibid.
- (267) Rojo Testimony, op. cit.
- (268) Ibid.
- (269) Lim Testimony, op. cit.
- (270) Exh. "SSSSS"- Commission, Edited Radio Reports on the Attempted Coup from 1-7 December 1989, submitted by the Loyola House of Studies.
- (271) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", After-Operations Report of the NCRDC, submitted by BGen Rodolfo Biazon, CGNCRDC, dated 5 January 1990.
- (272) Exh. "I-DND", Final Report of the Department of National Defense Special Investigating Committee, submitted by Leonardo

- A. Quisumbing, Chairman, DNDSIC, dated 22 March 1990.
- (273) Exh. "A-27-de la Peña", Transcript of Radio Broadcast over Station DZNC from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. on 1 December 1989, submitted by Lilia de la Peña, Director of the National Telecommunications Commission, NCR.
- (274) Sworn Testimony of MGen Ramon Montano, former Chief of the Philippine Constabulary and Director General of the INP, given before the FFC on 25 January 1990.
- (275) Ibid.
- (276) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.
- (277) Exh. "B-Maganto", After-Operations Report, submitted by P/Lt Col Romeo B. Maganto, Commander, Metropolitan Police Field Force, dated 9 December 1989.
- (278) Sworn Testimony of P/Lt Col Romeo Maganto, given before the FFC on 22 January 1990.
- (279) Exh. "A-2-B-NCRDC", Annex "A" to After-Operations Report of NCRDC by BGen Rodolfo Biazon, dated 5 January 1990.
- (280) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.
- (281) Ibid.
- (282) Exh. "A-27-de la Peña", op. cit.
- (283) Exh. "A-Montano", Report of BGen Ramon Montano, former Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Director General, INP, dated 12 January 1990.
- (284) Exh. "SSSSS"-Commission, op. cit.
- (285) Ibid.
- (286) Ibid.
- (287) Exh. "B-Maganto", op. cit.
- (288) Ibid.

- (289) Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.
- (290) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.
- (291) Ibid.
- (292) Exh. "A-21-NCRDC", After-Operations Report submitted by BGen Alexander Aguirre to the PC Chief, dated 11 December 1989.
- (293) Exh. "A-1-J-Montano", Re: Incident Report (Annex "I" to the Report of MGen Ramon Montano), dated 12 January 1990.
- (294) Ibid.
- (295) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (296) The Philippine Star, 10 December 1989.
- (297) Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.
- (298) Sworn Testimony of Peter Garrucho, Jr, Secretary, Department of Tourism, given before the FFC on 20 December 1989.
- (299) Exh. "A-21-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (300) Sworn Testimony of Virgilio Poblete, Chief Security Officer, Rustan's Commercial Corporation, given before the FFC on 13 June 1990.
- (301) Garrucho Testimony, op. cit.
- (302) Exh. "A-21-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (303) Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (304) Ibid.
- (305) Ibid.
- (306) Exh. "C-Crame", op. cit.
- (307) Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.

- (308) Exh. "A-27-NCRDC", Chronology of Events during the December 1989 Failed Coup, submitted by Commo Antonio Empedrad, AFP, dated 18 December 1989.
- (309) Garrucho Testimony, op. cit.
- (310) Exh. "A-21-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (311) Exh. "OOOOO-2"- Commission, op. cit.
- (312) Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (313) Exh. "A-21-NCRDC", op. cit.; Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.
- (314) Sworn Testimony of BGen Arturo Enrile, PMA Superintendent, given before the FFC on 5 March 1990.
- (315) Exh. "A-27-de la Peña", op. cit.
- (316) Exh. "D"-Commission, Initial Report on the Attempted Coup d'Etat, submitted by BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, dated 20 December 1989.
- (317) Exh. "A-21-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (318) Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.
- (319) Sworn Testimony of Rafael Alunan, Undersecretary, Department of Tourism, given before the FFC on 20 December 1989.
- (320) Ibid.
- (321) Garrucho Testimony, op. cit.
- (322) Exh. "L-Makati", Report to CSAFP on the Negotiations with RAM-SFP Rebel Forces in Makati, submitted by BGen Arturo Enrile, dated 16 December 1989; Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (323) Garrucho Testimony, op. cit.
- (324) Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.
- (325) Ibid.

- (326) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.
- (327) Sworn Testimony of BGen Cabanlig, op. cit.
- (328) Exh. "LLLLLL-6-A"- Commission, Amended List of Red Alert Status Declarations of the Philippine Marines Headquarters, Fort Bonifacio for the period 1 September 1987 to 1 December 1989, submitted by Lt Col Armenio Cristal, Jr, AC of S, G3, dated 5 September 1990.
- (329) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.
- (330) Sworn Testimony of Capt Jonathan Martir, Deputy Operations Officer, PM, given before the FFC on 19 April 1990.
- (331) Ibid.
- (332) Ibid.
- (333) Ibid.
- (334) Ibid.
- (335) Ibid.
- (336) Exh. "D"- Commission, op. cit.
- (337) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.
- (338) Ibid.
- (339) Martir Testimony, op. cit.
- (340) Ibid.
- (341) Exh. "DD-V Luna", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni 3CT Felipe Bernabe PN (M), dated 7 December 1989.
- (342) Exh. "48-Marines", Sworn Statement of 3CT Gilbert Alejandro, dated 7 December 1989; Exh. "61-Marines", Sworn Statement of 3CT Arsenio Rivera, dated 8 December 1989.
- (343) Exh. "61-Marines", op. cit.

- (344) Exh. "81-Marines", Sworn Statement of Pfc Danny Palaruan, dated 9 December 1989.
- (345) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (346) Exh. "NN-V Luna", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Pfc Alibundin S. Maing PN (M), dated 16 December 1989.
- (347) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.
- (348) Sworn Testimony of Col Romeo Daranchang, Chief of Staff, Philippine Marines, given before the FFC on 26 February 1990.
- (349) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.
- (350) Exh. "D"- Commission, op. cit.
- (351) Cabanlig Testimony, op. cit.
- (352) Exh. "D"- Commission, op. cit.
- (353) Exh. "A-6-B-de Leon", Chronology of Events at the Headquarters of the PAF, submitted by MGen Jose de Leon, CG PAF, dated 7 December 1989.
- (354) Exh. "A-26-NCRDC", After-Operations Report, submitted by BGen Rogelio Estacio to CG, NCRDC, dated 15 December 1989.
- (355) Exh. "A-6-de Leon", op. cit.
- (356) Exh. "A-26-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (357) Exh. "C-Tarrazona", Special Report on the December 1989 Coup Attempt, submitted by Col Felipe Abando, Jr, Wing Commander, 100th Training Wing, PAF, Fernando Air Base, to the Commanding General, PAF, dated 7 December 1989, photocopy.
- (358) Exh. "A-6-BGen de Leon", Narrative Report of PAF Activities During the Failed Coup, submitted by MGen Jose de Leon, Jr, dated 22 December 1989.
- (359) Time ranged from 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight.

- (360) Sworn Testimony of BGen Loven Abadia, Wing Commander, 205th Helicopter Wing, given before the FFC on 3 August 1990.
- (361) Exh. "A-1-Ligot", op. cit.
- (362) Sworn Statement of TSgt Armando Padilla, given before the FFC on 30 December 1989.
- (363) Exh. "A-6-de Leon", op. cit.
- (364) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.
- (365) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rogelio Estacio, CG PAFSECOM, given before the FFC on 7 August 1990.
- (366) Exh. "A-de la Torre", Narrative Report Re: Attempted Coup d'Etat, submitted by Maj Julius de la Torre, Squadron Commander, 529th Special Operations Squadron, 520 ABW, dated 7 December 1989.
- (367) Ibid.
- (368) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.
- (369) Exh. "A-de la Torre", op. cit.
- (370) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.
- (371) Exh. "A-de la Torre", op. cit.
- (372) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.
- (373) Exh. "A-6-de Leon", op. cit.
- (374) Ibid.
- (375) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.
- (376) Exh. "A-6-de Leon", op. cit.
- (377) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (378) Exh. "M-Aguinaldo", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Benjamin T. Taton, dated 16 December 1989.

- (379) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.
- (380) Ibid.
- (381) This captain was later identified as Capt Dante Grafil.
- (382) Exh. "A-Maceda", Sworn Statement of Capt Jose Z. Maceda, dated 14 December 1989.
- (383) Exh. "A-6-B-de Leon", op. cit.
- (384) Ibid.
- (385) Exh. "O-VP Laurel", op. cit.
- (386) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.
- (387) Exh. "A-6-B-de Leon", op. cit.
- (388) Exh. "A-15-NCRDC".
- (389) Exh. "A-6-B-de Leon", op. cit.
- (390) Ibid.
- (391) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.
- (392) Sworn Statement of Lt Lopito Gonzales, Aide-de-camp of Col Iletto, given before the FFC on 29 June 1990.
- (393) Exh. "A-de la Torre", op. cit.
- (394) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (395) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.
- (396) Ibid.
- (397) Sworn Testimony of Col Roberto Sabularse, EX-O, Office of Air Comptroller, VAB, given before the FFC on 27 February 1990.
- (398) Exh. "A-2-Bulos", Affidavit of Col Roberto Sabularse, EX-O, Office of Air Comptroller, VAB, dated 28 December 1989.

- (399) Exh. "A-6-B-de Leon", op. cit.
- (400) Ibid.
- (401) Ibid.
- (402) Ibid.
- (403) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.
- (404) Exh. "11-Marines", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Rolando Ridao, dated 11 December 1989.
- (405) Exh. "32-Marines", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Cpl Danilo O. Bernaid, dated 19 December 1989.
- (406) Exh. "M-Aguinaldo", op. cit.
- (407) Sworn Statement of TSgt Padilla, op. cit.; Exh. "3-Marines", Sworn Statement of 3CT Nelson Marino, dated 4 December 1989.
- (408) Exh. "O-VP Laurel", op. cit.
- (409) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (410) Exh. "I-V Luna", Affidavit of Pfc Victorio V. Botulan, dated 7 January 1990.
- (411) Exh. "A-6-de Leon", op. cit.
- (412) Ibid.
- (413) Ibid.
- (414) Exh. "A-de la Torre", op. cit.
- (415) Exh. "A-OCS", Operations Report on December 1989 Coup, submitted by BGen Pedro Juachon, dated 11 January 1990.
- (416) Exh. "D-DND", Third Progress Report of the Department of National Defense Special Investigating Committee, submitted by Leonardo A. Quisumbing, dated 15 January 1990.

- (417) Exh. "A-Raquion", Sworn Statement given by P/Lt Romeo Raquion before the FFC, dated 20 August 1990.
- (418) Rodolfo Morit, Jr is one of the incorporators of the GCFI. Job Gavino, an official of the Philippine Ports Authority, is reportedly also one of the incorporators. The latter is known to have contributed ₱1,000 for hospitalization expenses of one Guardian prison guard named Nicolas who got injured while trying to foil an escape attempt of some prisoners for the New Bilibid Prisons. See Sworn Testimony of Meliton Goyena, Director, Bureau of Corrections, given before the FFC on 15 June 1990.
- (419) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.
- (420) Sworn Testimony of Manuel Garces, Jr, Prison Guard, Bureau of Corrections, given before the FFC on 15 June 1990.
- (421) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.
- (422) Exh. "F-13-DND", op. cit.
- (423) Ibid.
- (424) Exh. "121-LOGCOM", Sworn Statement of PO3 Dante B. Cruz, dated 15 December 1989.
- (425) Exh. "C-4-Dumlao", Letter of BGen Pantaleon Dumlao to the Secretary of Justice, submitted by BGen Pantaleon Dumlao, Chief CIS (PC), dated 11 April 1990.
- (426) Garces Testimony, op. cit.
- (427) Exh. "3-Maganto", op. cit.
- (428) Exh. "A-26-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (429) Garces Testimony, op. cit.
- (430) Body number F-301.
- (431) Sworn Testimony of TSgt Armando Padilla, given before the FFC on 23 February 1990.
- (432) Exh. "A-I-J-Montano", op. cit.

- (433) Padilla Testimony, op. cit.
- (434) Loven Abadia Testimony, op. cit.
- (435) Rogelio Estacio Testimony, op. cit. However, the manager of DHL, Jose Feliciano, said that he was not aware of the use of the facilities by Col Bibit during the coup. See testimony of Jose Feliciano, given before the FFC on 15 August 1990.
- (436) Feliciano Testimony, op. cit.
- (437) Exh. "KKKKK-3"- Commission, op. cit.
- (438) Exh. "A-26-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (439) Exh. "A-22-NCRDC", Report on Command Preliminary Activities from 30 November to 7 December 1989, submitted by Lt Col Jose Bandung PC, CO South Sector Command, dated 12 December 1989.
- (440) Ibid.
- (441) Ibid.
- (442) Maganto Testimony, op. cit.
- (443) Exh. "A-22-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (444) Exh. "O-VP Laurel", op. cit.
- (445) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.
- (446) Garces Testimony, op. cit.
- (447) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.
- (448) Ibid.
- (449) In Re: Urging the Department of Justice to take Appropriate Administrative and/or Criminal Actions Against Prison Guards at the New Bilibid Prison who were Possibly Involved in the Attempted Coup of December 1989.
- (450) Exh. "O-VP Laurel", op. cit.

- (451) Exh. "A-1-J-Montano", op. cit.
- (452) Exh. "G-Ch 2/4", Sworn Statement of MSgt Jesus de Guzman, dated 15 December 1989.
- (453) Exh. "F-Ch 2/4", Sworn Statement of 2Lt Alfredo Javillonar PC, dated 13 December 1989.
- (454) Exh. "G-Aguinaldo", Sworn Statement of Sgt Augusto Borbe PA, dated 27 December 1989.
- (455) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (456) Exh. "A-de la Cruz", op. cit.
- (457) Ibid.
- (458) Exh. "A-30-NCRDC", After-Operations Report of Security Battalion, NCRDC, (as Annex "CC" of BGen Rodolfo Biazon's Report), dated 1 January 1990.
- (459) Ibid.
- (460) Ibid.
- (461) Exh. "F-Ch 2/4", op. cit.
- (462) Exh. "A-30-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (463) Exh. "F-Ch 2/4", op. cit.
- (464) Exh. "A-30-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (465) Exh. "F-Ch 2/4", op. cit.
- (466) Exh. "A-30-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (467) Exh. "O-CH 2/4", op. cit.
- (468) Exh. "A-30-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (469) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (470) Exh. "W-Ch 2/4", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Arturo Bilbao,

Housekeeper/Janitor of PTV-4, dated 14 December 1989.

- (471) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (472) Exh. "A-15-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (473) Exh. "KK-V Luna", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Mario Cabigin PN (M), dated 19 December 1989.
- (474) Exh. "E-Aguinaldo", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni SSgt Nolasco Aloquina, dated 26 December 1989; Exh. "K-Aguinaldo", Affidavit of Sgt Pecilo Dancalan PN (M), dated 20 December 1989.
- (475) Exh. "S-V Luna", Affidavit of Pfc Adelaido Tironez, dated 3 January 1990.
- (476) Exh. "B-Ch 2/4", op. cit.
- (477) Exh. "L-V Luna", Affidavit of Cpl Ruben C. Rivera, dated 2 January 1990.
- (478) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (479) Exh. "KK-V Luna", op. cit.
- (480) Exh. "I-1-Isleta", "Unit Situation Assessment in the Aftermath of the Failed Coup, submitted by BGen Tereso Isleta, Wing Commander, 15th Strike Wing, Sangley, Cavite, to CG PAF, dated 9 December 1989.
- (481) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (482) Annex "A" of Exh. "A-30-NCRDC", After-Operations Report of Security Battalion, NCRDC, submitted by Capt Alfredo Javillonar, OIC Security Platoon, Channels 2 and 4, dated 5 December 1990.
- (483) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (484) Exh. "A-30-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (485) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (486) Exh. "A-27-de la Peña", op. cit.

- (487) Ibid.
- (488) Exh. "O-VP Laurel", op. cit.
- (489) Exh. "B-Fontanilla", Sworn Statement of Capt Orlando Fontanilla, dated 4 January 1990.
- (490) Sworn Testimony of Capt Orlando Fontanilla, PVSEA, given before the FFC on 14 May 1990.
- (491) Ibid.
- (492) Exh. "C-1-Fontanilla", p. 2 of Capt Orlando Fontanilla's Sworn Statement in Filipino, dated 13 December 1989.
- (493) Exh. "B-Ch 2/4", op. cit.
- (494) Exh. "9-Marines", Sworn Statements of Philippine Marine personnel involved in December 1989 Coup Attempt, dated 19 December 1989.
- (495) Exh. "A-30-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (496) Exh. "H-Ch 2/4", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni TSgt Ramon P. Mendoza PAF, dated 13 December 1989.
- (497) Exh. "F-Ch 2/4", op. cit.
- (498) Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (499) Ibid.
- (500) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (501) Exh. "O-VP Laurel", op. cit.
- (502) Exh. "KK-V Luna", op. cit.
- (503) Sworn Testimony of Col Edgardo Batenga, CO 701 IBde, VAB, given before the FFC on 25 January 1990.
- (504) Exh. "A-Salac", op. cit.
- (505) Ibid.

- (506) Sworn Testimony of Maj Nardito Yoro PC, Chief FEU, given before the FFC on 1 June 1990.
- (507) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (508) Ibid.
- (509) Ibid.
- (510) Sworn Testimony of Cmdr Proceso Maligalig PN, Former Deputy Commander, AFP LOGCOM, given before the FFC on 12 March 1990.
- (511) Exh. "A-Aguinaldo", Evaluation of the Evidence of the Camp Aguinaldo/White Plains Incident during the Last Failed Coup in December 1989, submitted by Capt Nilo Villarte, dated 3 January 1990.
- (512) Exh. "T-Aguinaldo", Sworn Statement of Pfc Marcelino Peralta, dated 20 December 1989.
- (513) Exh. "N-Aguinaldo", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt Macario B. Mabazza, dated 27 December 1989.
- (514) Sworn Testimony of Commo Virgilio Marcelo, Commander, HQS and HQS Service Group, AFP, given before the FFC on 5 May 1990.
- (515) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.; Cardones Testimony, op. cit.
- (516) Cardones Testimony, op. cit.
- (517) Biazon Testimony, op. cit.
- (518) Batenga Testimony, op. cit.
- (519) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (520) Exh. "B-Aguinaldo", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni SSgt Domingo M. Cuenco, dated 26 December 1989.
- (521) Exh. "H-Aguinaldo", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Benjamin B. Asuncion, dated 26 December 1989.

- (522) Ibid.
- (523) Exh. "E-Aguinaldo", op. cit.
- (524) Exh. "H-Aguinaldo", op. cit.
- (525) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (526) Ibid.
- (527) Sworn Testimony of BGen Oscar Florendo, CO, Civil Relations Service, AFP, given before the FFC on 15 February 1990.
- (528) Exh. "N-Aguinaldo", op. cit.
- (529) Exh. "M-V Luna", Affidavit of SN1 Danilo Tolentino, dated 4 January 1990.
- (530) Exh. "E-Aguinaldo", op. cit.
- (531) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (532) Ibid.
- (533) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (534) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.; Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (535) Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.
- (536) Exh. "A-20-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (537) Exh. "22-LOGCOM", Sworn Statement by Maj Nelson Albano, given at AFP Logistics Training Command, dated 15 December 1989.
- (538) Exh. "6-LOGCOM", Affidavit by BGen Javier Carbonnel and Col Jovencio Mendoza, given before Col Manuel Mariano at Camp Aguinaldo, dated 3 December 1989.
- (539) Sworn Testimony of Col Manuel Mariano, Commander, AFP LOGCOM, Camp Aguinaldo, given before the FFC on 28 May 1990.

- (540) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.; Exh. "6-LOGCOM", op. cit.
- (541) Exh. "188-LOGCOM", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Pfc Antonio Cabigting, dated 19 December 1989.
- (542) Exh. "34-LOGCOM," op. cit.
- (543) Ibid.
- (544) Exh. "A-18-NCRDC", After-Operations Report of the 701 IBde, submitted by Col Edgardo Batenga, dated 5 January 1990.
- (545) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (546) Batenga Testimony, op. cit.; Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, CO 72 IB, given before the FFC on 22 December 1989; Lisandro Abadia Testimony, op. cit.
- (547) Batenga Testimony, op. cit.
- (548) Ibid.
- (549) Exh. "13-LOGCOM", Sworn Statement of Ramon Palad, dated 9 December 1989.
- (550) Exh. "34-LOGCOM", op. cit.; Exh. "A-1-Ison", op. cit.
- (551) Affidavit of Maj Nelson Albano, dated 15 December 1989.
- (552) Exh. "5-LOGCOM", op. cit.
- (553) Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", After-Battle Report, submitted by BGen Cesar Abella, dated 16 December 1989.
- (554) Exh. "A-19-NCRDC", After-Operation Report Re: Counter-Coup Operation, submitted by Col Clemente Mariano, dated 22 December 1989.
- (555) Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.
- (556) Exh. "DD-V Luna", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni 3CT Felipe Bernabe, dated 8 January 1990.
- (557) Exh. "I-Aguinaldo", Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sgt B. Orena, dated 20 December 1989.

- (558) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (559) Ibid.
- (560) Exh. "A-Aguinaldo", op. cit.
- (561) Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (562) Ibid.
- (563) Ibid.
- (564) Ibid.
- (565) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (566) Exh. "N-Aguinaldo", op. cit.; Exh. "V-Aguinaldo", Affidavit of 3CT Ernesto Cancheta, dated 20 December 1989.
- (567) These V-150s are the same ones which came from VAB; Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (568) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (569) Ibid.
- (570) Ibid.
- (571) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (572) Sworn Testimony of Col Thelmo Cunanan, CO 202 Bde, given before the FFC on 29 January 1990.
- (573) Exh. "NN-V Luna", op. cit.
- (574) Exh. "A-Padilla", Sworn Statement of TSgt Armando Padilla, dated 30 December 1989.
- (575) Exh. "Q-Aguinaldo", Affidavit of Pfc Donato C. Ildelfonso PN, dated 20 December 1989.
- (576) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (577) Exh. "SSSSS"-Commission, op. cit.

- (578) Exh. "A-20-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (579) Ibid.
- (580) Exh. "W-Aguinaldo", Sworn Statement of 3CT Romeo R. Recosana, dated 20 December 1989, at the AFP Medical Center.
- (581) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (582) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (583) Exh. "A-20-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (584) Exh. "G-V Luna", Joint Affidavit of Sgt Castor Wagan, Sgt Victor Flores, et al, dated 2 January 1990.
- (585) Exh. "KK-V Luna", op. cit.
- (586) Exh. "B-Ch 2/4", op. cit.
- (587) Exh. "C-V Luna", Sworn Statement of MSgt Jaime Ranopa, given at the AFP Medical Center, dated 4 December 1989.
- (588) Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (589) Exh. "A-19-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (590) Ibid.
- (591) Exh. "B-Ch 2/4", op. cit.
- (592) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (593) Daranchang Testimony, op. cit.
- (594) Exh. "B-5-Cardones", op. cit.
- (595) Exh. "A-1-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (596) Ibid.
- (597) Sworn Testimony of BGen Marcelo Blando PA, former CG 7 ID, Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija given before the FFC on 5 March 1990.

- (598) Dado Testimony, op. cit.
- (599) Exh. "B-1-BGen Villanueva", Special Report on Coup Attempt Participated in by 7 ID PA, dated 4 December 1989.
- (600) Ibid.
- (601) Sworn Testimony of BGen Oswaldo Villanueva, CG 6 ID, given before the FFC on 21 May 1990.
- (602) Ibid.
- (603) Ibid.
- (604) Exh. "D-DND", op. cit.
- (605) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.
- (606) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit., the result of the investigation is not known.
- (607) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.
- (608) Exh. "A-Lagman", Sworn Statement of Col Ferdinand Lagman, dated 14 February 1990.
- (609) OPLAN Regal was the setting up of roadblocks along the major roads in Nueva Ecija to check the movement of rebel troops. See Sworn Testimony of Col Ferdinand Lagman, PC, Provincial Commander, Nueva Ecija given before the FFC on 15 March 1990.
- (610) Lagman Testimony, op. cit.
- (611) Ibid.
- (612) Exh. "A-Undan", op. cit.
- (613) Sworn Testimony of Col Alejandro Trespeces, Jr, former Chief of Staff, 7 ID, Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, now CO, Task Force Reserve Service, Q-46, Fort Bonifacio, given before the FFC dated 14 March 1990.

- (614) Exh. "A-15 NCRDC", op. cit.
- (615) Trespeces Testimony, op. cit.
- (616) Exh. "A-15-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (617) Ibid.
- (618) Sworn Testimony of Capt Herbert Avinante, former Deputy Commander of Scout Ranger Training Center, Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, given before the FFC on 21 March 1990.
- (619) Blando Testimony, op. cit.
- (620) Avinante Testimony, op. cit.
- (621) Sworn Testimony of Maj Pedro Gutierrez, Chief, Research and Special Studies Branch, G7 Division, PA, given before the FFC on 13 March 1990.
- (622) Exh. "A-Gutierrez", op. cit.
- (623) Ibid.
- (624) Exh. "A-Undan", op. cit.
- (625) Exh. "A-Gutierrez", op. cit.
- (626) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit. He said that the rumor came from his neighbor Maj Ricardo Brillantes, assigned at the J1 GHQ.
- (627) Trespeces Testimony, op. cit.
- (628) Sworn Statement of Capt Richard Parcon, AUH-76 Pilot assigned at 20th ACS station, 15 Strike Wing, Sangley Air Base, dated 18 December 1989.
- (629) Ibid.
- (630) Trespeces Testimony, op. cit.
- (631) Exh. "A-Trespeces", Affidavit of Col Alejandro Trespeces, CO, Task Force Reserve Service, dated 15 January 1990.

- (632) Ibid.
- (633) Ibid.
- (634) Exh. "A-Gutierrez", op. cit.; Exh. "A-Trespecas", op. cit.; Sworn Testimony of BGen Orlando Antonio, COMNOLCOM, given before the FFC on 2 February 1990; Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (635) Exh. "A-Gutierrez", op. cit.
- (636) Exh. "A-Lagman", op. cit.
- (637) Gutierrez Testimony, op. cit.
- (638) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.
- (639) Gutierrez Testimony, op. cit.
- (640) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.
- (641) Blando Testimony, op. cit.
- (642) Avinante Testimony, op. cit.
- (643) Gutierrez Testimony, op. cit.
- (644) Blando Testimony, op. cit.
- (645) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.
- (646) Quote from a sworn statement submitted by Lt Col Erasmo during his testimony before the FFC (see Erasmo Testimony op. cit.).
- (647) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.
- (648) Ibid.
- (649) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.
- (650) Gutierrez Testimony, op. cit.
- (651) Exh. "A-17-NCRDC", op. cit.

- (652) Erasmo Testimony, op. cit.
- (653) Avinante Testimony, op. cit.
- (654) Dejarme Testimony, op. cit.
- (655) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.
- (656) Exh. "B-1-Gen Villanueva", op. cit.
- (657) Ibid.
- (658) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.
- (659) Exh. "B-1-Cardones", op. cit.
- (660) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.
- (661) Exh. "A-Gordula", Sworn Statement of Capt Lauro Gordula dated 15 December 1989.
- (662) Exh. "A-Undan", op. cit.
- (663) Sworn Testimony of Lt Jose Rene Jarque, 4SRB, given before the FFC on 22 March 1990.
- (664) Ibid.
- (665) Jose Rene Jarque Testimony, op. cit.
- (666) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.
- (667) Exh. "B-1-Cardones", op. cit.
- (668) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.
- (669) Undan Testimony, op. cit.
- (670) Ibid.
- (671) Exh. "B-10-Cardones", Special Report, to CG PA submitted by BGen Manuel Dizon, dated 20 December 1989.
- (672) Ibid.

- (673) Jose Rene Jarque Testimony, op. cit.
- (674) Ibid.
- (675) Ibid.
- (676) Ibid.
- (677) Ibid.
- (678) Exh. "A-Undan", op. cit.
- (679) Exh. "B-10-Cardones", op. cit.
- (680) Oswaldo Villanueva Testimony, op. cit.
- (681) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Efren Fernandez, Provincial Commander PC/INP, San Fernando, Pampanga, given before the FFC on 17 February 1990.
- (682) Ibid.
- (683) Ibid.
- (684) Lagman Testimony, op. cit.
- (685) Efren Fernandez Testimony, op. cit.
- (686) Ibid.
- (687) Exh. "A-Trespecies", op. cit.
- (688) Exh. "A-Montano", op. cit.
- (689) Exh. "C-BGen Villanueva", Affidavit of Col Oswaldo Villanueva, dated 30 March 1990.
- (690) Exh. "D-Trespecies", Report of Lt Col Dumag submitted by Col Alejandro Trespecies, dated 9 December 1989.
- (691) Exh. "A-Trespecies", op. cit.
- (692) Ibid.

- (693) Exh. "A-Undan", op. cit.
- (694) Exh. "A-27-Dir De la Peña", op. cit.
- (695) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.
- (696) Exh. "A-27-Dir De la Peña", op. cit.
- (697) Ibid.
- (698) Antonio Testimony, op. cit.
- (699) Exh. "I-1-Isleta", op. cit.; Exh. "GGGG"- Commission, Intelligence Report submitted by the Director for Intelligence, 15 Strike Wing, PAF, dated 14 December 1989; Exh. "A-Sangley", Narrative Report of the Failed Coup submitted by Commo Proceso Fernandez, dated 11 December 1989.
- (700) Exh. "V-Sangley", Letter Re: Suspected Leaders, submitted by Amado D. Espino, dated 14 December 1989.
- (701) Sworn Testimony of 2Lt Siegfried Mison, given before the FFC on 16 March 1990.
- (702) Ibid.
- (703) Exh. "A-Trespecies", op. cit.
- (704) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Ramsey Ocampo, PC Provincial Commander of Bataan, given before the FFC on 16 April 1990.
- (705) Ibid.
- (706) Ibid.
- (707) Ibid.
- (708) Ibid.
- (709) Ibid.
- (710) Ibid.
- (711) Ibid.

- (712) Blando Testimony, op. cit.
- (713) Ocampo Testimony, op. cit.
- (714) Ibid.
- (715) Ibid.
- (716) Ibid.
- (717) Ibid.
- (718) Exh. "H-Rufino Tiangco", a copy of the telegram sent by the FFC to the Station Commander of the INP of Puerto Princesa, dated 13 August 1990; Exh. "H-1- Rufino Tiangco", Puerto Princesa City Treasurer's telegram received by the FFC on 20 August 1990; Exh. "I-Rufino Tiangco", the telegram of the Station Commander which was received by the FFC on 25 August 1990; Exh. "I-1-Rufino Tiangco", reply telegram sent by the Election Registrar to the FFC.
- (719) Exh. "I-Rufino Tiangco", op. cit.
- (720) Sworn Testimony of Capt Pepito Dalivenancio, Ship Captain, M/V Lady Vi-T-1, given before the FFC on 16 August 1990.
- (721) Ibid.
- (722) Exh. "132-LOGCOM", Sinumpaang Salaysay of Capt Jacinto Sanga, dated 11 December 1987.
- (723) Ibid.
- (724) Exh. "A-Sangley", op. cit.
- (725) Sworn Testimony of LCdr Fred Tuvilla PN, Phil Marines Brigade, given before the FFC on 18 June 1990.
- (726) Sworn Testimony of BGen Tereso Isleta, Wing Commander, 15th Strike Wing, Sangley, Cavite, given before the FFC on 29 January 1990.
- (727) Affidavit of Capt Artemio Orozco, dated 6 December 1989.

- (728) Exh. "A-14-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (729) Exh. "GGGG"-Commission, op. cit.
- (730) Exh. "I-Isleta", op. cit.
- (731) Exh. "GGGG"-Commission, op. cit.
- (732) Exh. "I-1-Isleta", op. cit.
- (733) Exh. "A-Sangley", op. cit.
- (734) Ibid.
- (735) Sworn Testimony of LCdr Damian Carlos, Commander, Naval Intelligence Security Group II, given before the FFC on 27 March 1990.
- (736) Sworn Testimony of Commo Antonio Empedrad, Commander, Naval District II, given before the FFC on 26 March 1990.
- (737) Sworn Testimony of Capt Romeo Meana, Deputy Commander, Naval District II and Commander, Task Force 21, given before the FFC on 4 April 1990.
- (738) Sworn Testimony of Commo Proceso Fernandez, Philippine Fleet Commander, given before the FFC on 14 February 1990.
- (739) Exh. "A-Sangley", op. cit.
- (740) Sworn Statement of Col Arsenio Tecson, former CO, 68 IB, PA, given before the FFC, dated 1 March 1990; Exh. "1-Sangley", Sinumpaang Salaysay of Manolito Caquitta, dated 19 December 1989.
- (741) Isleta Testimony, op. cit.
- (742) Sworn Testimony of Capt Jesus Durian, Base Commander, Cavite Naval Base, given before the FFC on 8 March 1990.
- (743) Exh. "AA-Sangley", Sworn Statement of Lt Fernando C. Romero dated 8 December 1989.
- (744) Exh. "A-28 NCRDC", After-Operations Report of Task Group

RECOM IV (Annex "AA" of Exh. "A-1-NCRDC").

- (745) Exh. "11-Isleta", op. cit.
- (746) Exh. "V-Sangley", op. cit.
- (747) Exh. "A-Sangley", op. cit.
- (748) Dalivenancio Testimony, op. cit.
- (749) Ibid.
- (750) Sworn Testimony of Rufino Tiangco, given before the FFC on 10 August 1990.
- (751) Exh. "B-1-B-Rufino Tiangco", copy of pp. 381-382 of the police blotter where entry on alleged hijacking appears it was reported on 4 December 1989.
- (752) Tiangco Testimony, op. cit.
- (753) Tiangco Testimony, op. cit., Sighting of Don Honasan, Fat Puzon and Rico Puno at the PPSA c/o video by a CIS operative.
- (754) This is the 68 IB and the 42 IB forces led by Lt Col Arsenio Tecson and Maj Alfredo Oliveros.
- (755) Affidavit of P/Col Ernesto L. Diokno, op. cit.
- (756) Exh. "B-Sec Azcuna", Statement No. 1 of the series of statements of President Corazon Aquino issued at 7:40 a.m. of 1 December 1989.
- (757) Ibid.
- (758) Exh. "C-Malacañang", Sworn Statement of Capt Rolando D. Medrano, PAF, dated 27 December 1989.
- (759) Exh. "C-2-Lucas", Resolution of the Department of Justice against LCdr Lucas for the December 1989 coup.
- (760) Exh. "A-Malacañang", Affidavit of Col Voltaire T. Gazmin PA, dated 19 December 1989.

- (761) Ibid.
- (762) Exh. "C-Sec Azcuna", Statement No. 2 of President Corazon C. Aquino issued at 7:40 a.m. of 1 December 1989.
- (763) Exh. "A-5-Aguirre", After-Battle Report of the Western Sector Command submitted by Maj Ricardo Quinto PC, Sector Commander, dated 12 December 1989.
- (764) Exh. "B-Malacañang", Affidavit of Maj Agustin Dermaala, dated 15 December 1989.
- (765) Exh. "H-Malacañang", Sworn Statement of Lt Wilbur Naldo, dated 20 December 1989.
- (766) Exh. "B-Malacañang", op. cit.
- (767) Exh. "A-Malacañang", op. cit.
- (768) Ibid.
- (769) Exh. "B-Malacañang", op. cit.
- (770) Sworn Statement of P/Col Ernesto L. Diokno, op. cit.
- (771) Ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit, PMA '72, was the classmate of ex-Lt Col Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Maj Crisolito Balaoing and Capt Rodolfo Tor.
- (772) Exh. "C-1-Salialam", op. cit.
- (773) Sworn Testimony of Fiscal Elmer Sagsago, 4th Assistant City Prosecutor, Baguio City, given before the FFC on 5 May 1990.
- (774) Sworn Testimony of Eito Ikeuchi, Martial Arts Instructor, PMA, Fort del Pilar, Baguio City, given before the FFC on 17 April 1990.
- (775) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.
- (776) Exh. "B-Garrido", Special Report of Commo Pio H. Garrido, Commandant of Philippine Coast Guard, dated 13 December 1989.
- (777) Exh. "C-2-Mison", Memorandum Re: Staff Duty Officer's Spot

- Report of Entry of Rebel Troops at South Harbor, Port Area, Manila, from Capt Esmeraldo Sapla to the Commissioner of Customs, dated 4 December 1989.
- (778) Sworn Testimony of Sgt Rodolfo Mendez, given before the FFC on 31 May 1990.
- (779) Exh. "E-Sagsago", Sworn Statement by Elmer Sagsago, 4th Assistant City Prosecutor, Baguio City, dated 9 May 1990.
- (780) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.
- (781) Mendez Testimony, op. cit.
- (782) "Morit", or Rodolfo Morit, Jr is the person alleged to have organized the Guardians at the Bureau of Corrections. See Garces Testimony, op. cit.
- (783) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.
- (784) Mendez Testimony, op. cit.
- (785) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.
- (786) Ibid.
- (787) Ibid.
- (788) Exh. "C-2-Mison", op. cit.
- (789) Ibid.
- (790) Exh. "E-Salialam", op. cit.
- (791) Exh. "A-Mison", Letter of Commissioner Salvador Mison to President Corazon Aquino reporting the incident on 1 December 1989 at the Bureau of Customs, dated 4 December 1989.
- (792) Exh. "A-27-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (793) Exh. "A-Mison", op. cit.
- (794) Exh. "C-Crisol", Letter of Capt Rafael Crisol, dated 4 December 1989, photocopy.

- (795) Exh. "A-27-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (796) Exh. "A-NICOM", After-Coup d'Etat Report by BGen Raymundo Jarque, Negros Island Command, VISCOM, dated 16 December 1989; Affidavit of Lt Col Miguel Coronel, Provincial Commander, Iloilo PC/INP, dated 14 December 1989.
- (797) Exh. "B-3-Garrido", Annex "3" of Special Report of Pio Garrido, Commandant, Philippine Coastguard, dated 19 March 1990; Exh. "A-27-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (798) Sworn Testimony of P/Capt Job Gavino, Customs Police, PPA, North Harbor, Manila, given before the FFC on 31 May 1990.
- (799) P/Capt Job Gavino organized the Guardian PPA Chapter in June 1986, after joining the Guardian Centre Foundation in January 1986. He was recruited by his brother, Sgt Allan Gavino, BGen Templo's driver. P/Capt Gavino identified Maj Pimentel as a member of Guardian-Luzon by his mark on the left hand between the thumb and the pointer. See Gavino Testimony, op. cit.
- (800) Exh. "E-Salialam", Resolution in the case of "Philippine Ports Authority vs Job Gavino, et al," I.S. No DOJ-SC-90-007, dated 7 March 1990, photocopy.
- (801) Gavino Testimony, op. cit.
- (802) Exh. "C-1-Salialam", op. cit.
- (803) Exh. "C-Crisol", op. cit.
- (804) Exh. "B-3-Garrido", op. cit.; Exh. "A-27-NCRDC", op. cit.
- (805) Gavino Testimony, op. cit.
- (806) Exh. "E-Salialam", op. cit.
- (807) Gavino Testimony, op. cit.
- (808) Exh. "B-3-Garrido", op. cit.
- (809) Exh. "B-Garrido", op. cit.

- (810) Exh. "C-1-Mison", Re: Sequence of Events and Courses of Action Taken during the period 1-2 December 1989, from Lt Col Virgilio M. Danao, Acting Chief, Customs Police Division, to Commissioner of Customs, dated 4 December 1989.
- (811) Ibid.
- (812) Exh. "C-1-Mison", op. cit.
- (813) Ibid.
- (814) Ibid.
- (815) Ibid.
- (816) Exh. "B-Garrido", op. cit.
- (817) Exh. "C-1-Mison", op. cit.
- (818) Exh. "B-Garrido", op. cit.
- (819) Ibid.
- (820) Sworn Statement of Diokno, op. cit.
- (821) Exh. "C-1-Mison", op. cit.
- (822) Exh. "A-Mison", op. cit.
- (823) Sworn Statements of Lts Eliseo Rasco, Herminio Cantaco & Jonas Calleja, given before the FFC on 21 March 1990.
- (824) Sworn Statement of Maj Rosalio D. Magsino.
- (825) Exh. "NNN"-Commission, Report of FFC Special Counsels Gubaton and Bijasa Re: Interviews Conducted With Witnesses Concerning Legaspi City and Sorsogon Incidents, dated 15 March 1990.
- (826) Sworn Statement of Col Ernesto Maristela, dated 9 December 1989.
- (827) Ibid.

- (828) Sworn Testimony of BGen Marino Filart, Regional Commander, RECOM 5, given before the FFC on 13 March 1990.
- (829) Ibid.
- (830) Exh. "A-Filart", After-Operations/Activity Report by Gen Marino Filart, Regional Commander, RECOM 5, dated 8 December 1989.
- (831) Exh. "NNN"-Commission, op. cit.
- (832) Exh. "A-Filart", op. cit.
- (833) Filart Testimony, op. cit.
- (834) Ibid.
- (835) Ibid.
- (836) Exh. "A-Mactan", op. cit.
- (837) Exh. "LLL-3"- Commission, Sworn Statement of Lt Col Diosdado Docdocil, dated 3 April 1990.
- (838) Exh. "R-Mactan", Sworn Statement of TSgt Ramon Famolera, dated 4 January 1990.
- (839) Sworn Statement of Cpl Elmer Barrientos, dated 5 January 1990.
- (840) Sworn Statement of TSgt Normito Pacaldo, dated 4 January 1990.
- (841) Ibid.
- (842) Sworn Statement of 2Lt Rodolfo de la Torre, dated 18 December 1989.
- (843) Exh. "A-Mactan", op. cit.
- (844) Ibid.
- (845) Sworn Statement of Col Filamer Artajo, dated 5 January 1990.

- (846) Sworn Statement of MGen Jose L. de Leon, dated 10 January 1990.
- (847) Sworn Statement of Artajo, op. cit.
- (848) Sworn Statement of PO1 Restituto Baring, dated 4 January 1990.
- (849) Sworn Statements of Ceferino Lopez & Norvie Craus.
- (850) Exh. "C-Lood", Sworn Statement of Lt Col Romeo Lood, Assistant Chief, Division Staff for Operations, 2nd Air Division, Mactan Air Base, dated 20 December 1989.
- (851) Sworn Testimony of Maj Rolando Irizari, CO, 347 PC Coy, given before the FFC on 29 March 1990.
- (852) Sworn Statement of AM Dominino Recla, dated 1 June 1990; Exh. "A-Tabanas", Sworn Statement of AM Efren Tabanas, dated 1 June 1990.
- (853) Sworn Testimony of Lt Col Antonio Anciano, Squadron Commander, 208 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, given before the FFC on 30 March 1990.
- (854) Exh. "A-Mactan", op. cit.
- (855) Anciano Testimony, op. cit.
- (856) Sworn Statement of Lood, op. cit.
- (857) Exh. "FFF"- Commission, Sworn Statement of Sgt Emerson Gallos, dated 21 December 1989.
- (858) Irizari Testimony, op. cit.
- (859) Sworn Statement of Gallos, op. cit.
- (860) Irizarri Testimony, op. cit.
- (861) Sworn Statements of Sgt Cecilio Ursal, MSgt Virgilio Gongora and BGen Raul Imperial, dated 17 December 1989.
- (862) Sworn Statement of Pacaldo, op. cit.
- (863) Anciano Testimony, op. cit.

- (864) Sworn Testimony of Cerge Remonde, Manager of Radio station DYLA in Cebu City, taken at RECOM 7, Camp Osmeña, Cebu City, given before the FFC on 21 February 1990.
- (865) Exh. "J-Mactan", Report on Mactan Air Base Crisis, submitted by the Office of the AC of SAC2 at Camp Lapu-Lapu, Cebu, to COMVISCOR, dated 12 December 1989.
- (866) Exh. "A-Mactan", op. cit.
- (867) Sworn Statement of BGen Cesar L. Go, Wing Commander of the 220th Air Lift Wing, dated 19 January 1990.
- (868) Exh. "H-Mactan", After-Operations Report submitted by Lt Col Ernesto Lumaug, Jr, Group Commander, Military Intelligence Group 7, ISAFP to COMVISCOR, dated 13 December 1989.
- (869) Exh. "A-Mactan", op. cit.; Exh. "C-Mactan", op. cit.
- (870) Affidavit of Alfredo Ouano, Mayor of Mandaue City, dated 26 December 1989.
- (871) Exh. "A-Mactan", op. cit.
- (872) Exh. "H-Mactan", op. cit.
- (873) Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of Gov Emilio Osmeña, dated 22 January 1990.
- (874) Sworn Statement of Sgt Francisco Balondo, dated 20 December 1989.
- (875) Exh. "A-Mactan", op. cit.
- (876) Sworn Testimony of BGen Raul Imperial, Regional Commander, Regional Director, INP RECOM 7, Camp Osmeña, given before the FFC on 18 April 1990.
- (877) Exh. "H-Mactan", op. cit.
- (878) Ibid.
- (879) Exh. "A-Mactan", op. cit.

- (880) Exh. "A-NICOM", op. cit.
- (881) Exh. "A-NICOM", op. cit.; Affidavit of Lt Col Wilfredo B. Alejada; Affidavit of Lt Col Miguel Coronel, Provincial Commander, Iloilo PC/INP, dated 14 December 1989.
- (882) Affidavit of Coronel, op. cit.
- (883) Sworn Statement of Antonio Suatengco, Mayor of the Municipality of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, dated 25 April 1990.
- (884) Sworn Statement of Capt Rolando Lopez, given at the NBI Regional Office, Iloilo City, dated 23 April 1990.
- (885) Sworn Testimony of Col Hector M. Tarrazona, Director for Operations, 100th Training Wing, given before the FFC on 12 March 1990.
- (886) Ibid.
- (887) Exh. "C-Tarrazona", Special Report on the 1 December 1989 Coup Attempt submitted by Col Felipe R. Abano, Jr to the Commanding General, PAF, dated 7 December 1989.
- (888) Tarrazona, op. cit.
- (889) Ibid.
- (890) Exh. "B-Baccay", Sworn Statement of BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, dated 26 February 1990; Sworn Testimony of BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, Regional Commander, PC/INP RECOM 11, Camp Catitipan, Davao City, given before the FFC on 29 March 1990.
- (891) Exh. "C-Baccay", Memorandum from Lt Col Manolo Gorospe to the FFC Chairman, dated 21 May 1990.
- (892) Exh. "A-Viduya", Sworn Statement of Lt Col Teodorico Viduya, dated 23 February 1990.
- (893) Sworn Statement of Capt Gregory Ramos, dated 12 March 1990; Sworn Testimony of Capt Gregory Ramos, CO, "A" Coy, 2 LABde PALAR, given before the FFC on 27 March 1990.
- (894) Affidavit of Col Danilo Olay, dated 18 December 1989; After-

- Battle Report, submitted by BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, Regional Commander, PC/INP RECOM 11, Camp Catitipan, Davao City, dated 9 December 1989.
- (895) Exh. "LLLLL"- Commission, Report of the Flag-Officer-in-Command, Rear Admiral Carlito Y. Cunanan PN, dated 6 February 1990.
- (896) Affidavit of Lt Anito A. Alfajardo, dated 21 February 1990.
- (897) Exh. "A-Villanueva", Summary Report of Lt Col Manuel O. de Leon, Chairman Investigation Team, 4 IB, PA, dated 23 February 1990.
- (898) Affidavit of Alfajardo, op. cit.
- (899) Ibid.
- (900) Affidavit of Lt Arnulfo Matanguihan, dated 13 February 1990.
- (901) Affidavit of Maj William V. Dormitorio, dated 5 February 1990.
- (902) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rogelio Villanueva, Commander, 4 ID, given before the FFC on 26 February 1990.
- (903) Affidavit of Dormitorio, op. cit.
- (904) Joint Affidavits of Lt Amador T. Tabuga and Lt Rene V. Ferenal, dated 12 February 1990; Joint Affidavits of Lt Macatoon M. Bobong and 2Lt Manolo M. Samarita, dated 10 February 1990.
- (905) Affidavit of Santiago P. Pascual, dated 27 January 1990.
- (906) Affidavit of Capt Ernesto S. Monteros, dated 27 February 1990.
- (907) Affidavit of Capt Ruben Clarito, dated 29 January 1990.
- (908) Jarius Bondoc, "Setting Things Straight", Daily Globe, 5 December 1989, p. 7.
- (909) Rey Arquiza, "No Sanctuary for Turing and Henchmen," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1986, pp. 1-2.
- (910) Arquiza, op. cit.

- (911) Frankie Tuyay, "Two More US Diplomats Spotted During Coup", Philippine Star, 6 October 1986, pp. 1 and 8.
- (912) Sworn Testimony of BGen Lisandro Abadia, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, given before the FFC on 9 February 1990.
- (913) *Ibid.*
- (914) Sworn Testimony of Col Samson Mahimer, Director of the RP-US Project "Exercise Balikatan", given before the FFC on 23 March 1990.
- (915) Letter of BGen Rene Cardones to FFC, dated 10 September 1990.
- (916) Letter of Col Raul Urgello to FFC, dated 13 September 1990.
- (917) Sworn Testimony of Tomas Gomez III, Press Secretary, given before the FFC on 18 May 1990.
- (918) Exh. "A-Twin Towers", List of Unit Owners of the Twin Towers Condominium, submitted by Mariebeth Cobangbang, dated 9 February 1990; Exh. "B-1-Twin Towers", List of Occupants of the Twin Towers Condominium as of 30 November 1989.
- (919) Exh. "YYYYYY"- Commission, Video tape provided by broadcast journalist Maria Ressa.
- (920) Exh. "B-Rosal", Philippine National Red Cross, "Total Number of Casualties as of April 26, 1989".
- (921) Exh. "F-DND", Report of the CSAFP to DND Secretary Fidel Ramos, dated 17 January 1990.
- (922) Sworn Testimony of Levy Rebanal, Vice President of PAL for Risk and Insurance Management, given before the FFC on 22 May 1990.
- (923) Garrucho Testimony, *op. cit.*
- (924) Sworn Testimony of Cayetano Paderanga, NEDA Director General, given before the FFC on 25 May 1990.
- (925) *Ibid.*

VI

THE FAILED DECEMBER 1989 COUP: WHO?

Who staged it?

This is the first question that is asked when a coup d'etat occurs. In the Philippines, because the same groups of plotters led by the same key conspirators surfaced again and again in the seven coup attempts after the historic EDSA People Power Revolt, this question is no longer asked with a sense of urgency. Media have served to satisfy the curiosity of the public. However, the conclusions that one can derive from media reports are not sufficient for purposes of establishing legal accountability or for recommendations to deter coups in the future.

The Fact-Finding Commission's mandate includes the identification of military personnel and civilian personalities, including public officials and employees, who may be involved in the failed December 1989 coup attempt. The Commission is tasked to turn over to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities all pertinent evidence when in the course of its investigation it finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that an individual appears to be liable for a criminal offense in connection with the coup.

This chapter provides statistical data for a general profile of the coup participants, particularly the military rebels. It also focuses on the leaders. Civilian personalities who were probably involved in the coup are discussed separately. The chapter ends with the Commission's recommendations on what in its judgment should be the appropriate action in each case.

It is not, however, the duty of the Commission to determine whether they are guilty of participating in the coup. The Commission is required under RA No. 6832 to find out if the evidence in its possession is sufficient to create a reasonable ground to believe that one appears to be liable for an offense in connection with the coup. Reasonable ground exists when

there is a rational basis to conclude that an individual was indeed involved. The function of the Commission is neither to prosecute, indict nor convict, but only to provide leads for investigatory and prosecutorial agencies to pursue them in accordance with the requirements of due process.

A. Sourcing of Evidence

To fulfill its mandate, the Commission took the testimonies of 332 witnesses in open or closed-door sessions, and received the sworn statements or affidavits, or caused the re-affirmation of sworn statements or affidavits earlier executed, of 226 witnesses. The Commission also obtained various records and documents, produced before it either during its sessions or in the taking of the sworn statements, or by virtue of *subpoenas duces tecum* or official requests, which were then marked as Exhibits. The latter included documents from, but not limited to, (1) the Office of the AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (J1), (2) the Office of the AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J2), (3) the AFP Office of The Inspector General (AFPTIG), (4) the Investigating Committees of the Major Service Commands, (5) the AFP Special Investigating Committee (AFPSIC), and (6) the Department of Justice (DOJ).

From the above oral and documentary evidence, the names of individuals probably involved in the failed December 1989 coup were gathered and classified either as military or civilian participants.

B. Creating the Data Base for Military Participants

Considering the sheer number of military personnel involved, two types of computer data bases were made to facilitate evaluation and analysis. The first, described as **Masterlist of Military Officers Probably Involved in the Failed December 1989 Coup**, is attached to this Report as Appendix J. The other, known as the **Masterlist of Enlisted Personnel Probably Involved in the Failed December 1989 Coup**, is attached as Appendix K of this Report. Appendix K-1 is the **Masterlist of OCS Students Probably Involved in the Failed December 1989 Coup**.

An analysis of the officers' data base was undertaken to obtain a better profile of the principal leaders and unit heads involved in the coup.

The computer data base for the officers includes the name listing and the particulars for each name such as rank, serial number, service

command, unit of assignment, personnel status, source of commission, present disposition, category of involvement, nature of participation, reference, and the status of investigation with recommendations of the Commission whenever appropriate.

Present Disposition shows the present whereabouts of the subject — whether at-large, detained, released, resigned, or cleared after investigation.

Category of Involvement identifies the individual listed as any of the following:

- (a) **Implicated** means that the Commission's records show that the individual participated in the coup by direct action;
- (b) **Sympathizer** means that the individual indirectly supported the coup by some outward act such as orally expressing support for the rebel cause, e.g., by tendering his resignation or by inverting the flag;
- (c) **Suspected** means that the name of the individual appeared in one or more documents submitted to the Commission showing some involvement in the coup but his specific participation is not clear.

Under the column of Nature of Participation, the Commission describes the acts committed by the military personnel involved. The descriptions were made on the basis of testimonies, sworn statements and affidavits, and other exhibits submitted to the Commission. This column is the basis for the Commission's recommendations as to what further action should be taken, if any, for each military personnel listed as probably involved. It must be noted that other government agencies, particularly the military and the DOJ, have already taken steps towards the prosecution, or the release of some of those in the list.

Reference indicates the basis for the involvement or the nature of the participation.

The action taken by military authorities on each of those appearing in the list are indicated under the column Status of Investigation. This column shows the status of the military's investigation. There are four classes under this category:

- (1) For PTI (Pre-Trial Investigation) means that the case has been

transmitted to the Trial Judge Advocate General (TJAG) for PTI pursuant to Article of War (AW) 71¹ and Section 35(a), Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM)² and for trial before a General Court-Martial (GCM) for violation of AW 67,³ AW 94⁴ in relation to Articles 6 and 248 (Murder) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and AW 96⁵ and for such other violations and crimes as may be found during the course of the PTI;

- (2) For GCM (General Court-Martial) means that a PTI had been conducted and that violation/s liable to a GCM had been committed;
- (3) Released with Reprimand means that the case was closed and the person released was given a reprimand by his commanding officer and/or a forfeiture of base pay in favor of the government pursuant to Section [a] [1] [b] [4] MCM as amended;⁶
- (4) Cleared means that the case has been dropped or closed by AFPSIC and approved by the Chief of Staff;
- (5) Under Investigation means that the person is currently detained either in stockade, house arrest, or camp arrest by order of a Commanding Officer and/or a General Order of the most senior officer while his case awaits resolution; and
- (6) Referred to DOJ means that the case of the person, being a retired or dismissed military personnel, has been referred to the Justice Department.

Those released with reprimand and cleared would have to (a) undergo a seminar on military discipline (AFPR G 131 dated 7 November 1974) and on crimes against public order (Article 134 - 142, RPC), and (b) pledge support to the Constitution, the duly constituted authorities, and the AFP chain of command verbally and in writing and in appropriate ceremonies before they are restored to duty status.

C. General Profile of Coup Participants

The report from the AFPSIC dated 30 April 1990⁷ gives a total number of 2,290 (470 officers and 1,820 enlisted men) military personnel allegedly involved in the December 1989 failed coup. For consistency in comparison, the number of enlisted personnel deemed cleared by the AFPSIC was not included as the Commission's own figures already excluded such data. The Commission's own tally sheet, which includes

retired, resigned, and dismissed officers, has a total of 2,911 (469 officers, 70 officer candidates and 2,372 enlisted men), which is 27.1 percent more than the listing of the military referred to in the above. Of the 469 officers, 238 were classified as implicated, 40 of whom have been released after study of their cases by the AFPSIC or the AFPTIG and the meting out of appropriate penalties, where necessary. Majority of those classified as sympathizers, about 40 of the total of 69, were from the 4 ID. More than one-third (162) of the officers remain in the suspected category. The Commission did not include in its list those cleared without penalties, except for 20 cleared cases where the Commission recommends that they be reviewed.

The above total of 2,911 military personnel is 130.5 percent more than those in the August 1987 episode which had 1,263 participants.⁸ The total number in the December 1989 incident exceeds the combined rebel manpower of 1,683 for of all the four coup attempts in 1987⁹ as shown in Table VI-1.

Table VI-1 — Comparison of the Total Number of Probable Participants in the 1987 and 1989 Coup Attempts and AFP Population Profile in 1987 and 1989

Service Command	No. of Military Personnel Probably Involved in the 1987 & 1989 Coup Attempts		Population Profile by Service Command, 1987 and 1989**	
	1987* (all four attempts)	1989	No. of Men in 1987	No. of Men in 1989
PA	928	1,611	61,907	67,531
PN	64	844	21,811	23,887
PC	353	328	38,860	47,352
PAF	218	115	14,536	14,901
Not Identified	120	13	0	0
TOTAL	1,683	2,911	137,114	153,671

* Figures do not include the cleared enlisted personnel

** Summary of the Historical Profile of the AFP from 1987-1990, Exh. "SSSSSS"- Commission.

Among the major service commands, the Philippine Army (PA) contributed the biggest number to the rebel military group. As shown in

Table VI-1 above, the Army accounted for 55 percent of military personnel probably involved (MPPI) in both the 1987 and 1989 incidents. Such a result could be expected since the Army has the largest population in terms of personnel as shown in the same table. The reverse is true with respect to the Philippine Air Force (PAF). It has the least number of men, which therefore accounts for the smallest number of MPPI in 1989. Operationally, the coup plotters will naturally target the Army for its vast number of infantry men and the Air Force for the destructive power of its fighter planes with only a small number of pilots needed to fly them.

Much more revealing are the data on the service command which has the lowest number of MPPI. In the 1987 coup attempts, the Philippine Navy (PN) had the least number of MPPI. In 1989, however, the Navy had the second highest number of MPPI due to the involvement of the Philippine Marines.

An interesting comparison is the increase of MPPI in the 1987 and 1989 failed coup attempts as shown in Table VI-2. The MPPI from the Army almost doubled. The main cause is the direct participation of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR), several Ranger companies, and several Ranger battalions. The participation of rebel Marines gave rise to a 1,218.8 percent increase in MPPI from the Navy. There is also the notable decrease in Air Force MPPI in the December 1989 failed coup. This highlights the steadfastness of most of the Air Force officers and men in resisting rebel attempts to use them and their aircrafts against the government.

Table VI-2 — Increase of MPPI and Number of Military Personnel, 1987 - 1989

Service Command	1987			1989			Increase (%) 1987-1989	
	No. of Men	No. of MPPI	% of Participants Over Men	No. of Men	No. of MPPI	% of Participants Over Men	No. of Men	No. of MPPI
PA	61,907	928	1.5	67,531	1,611	2.4	9.1	73.6
PN	21,811	64	0.3	23,887	844	3.5	9.5	1,218.8
PC	38,860	353	0.9	47,352	328	0.7	21.9	(7.1)
PAF	14,536	218	1.5	14,901	115	0.8	2.5	(47.2)
Not Identified	—	120	—	—	13	—	—	—
TOTAL	137,114	1,683	1.2	153,671	2,911	1.9	12.1	73.0

It is obvious that the December 1989 coup plotters targeted the Scout Rangers and the Marines for recruitment. The plotters were only too aware of the distinct culture of cohesiveness of these units, and their extreme loyalty to their commanders.

Table VI-3 below provides a breakdown of the aggregate number of military personnel probably involved in the December 1989 coup.

Table VI-3 — Total Number of MPPI in the Failed December 1989 Coup, by Service Commands

Service Command	Officer	Enlisted Personnel	OCS	TOTAL
PA	255	1,324	32	1,611
PN	101	734	9	844
PC	75	249	4	328
PAF	33	61	21	115
Not Identified	5	4	4	13
TOTAL	469	2,372	70	2,911

As thus shown, out of the 2,911 MPPI, 469 were officers. More than half were from the Army. As stated earlier, the list includes officers who had retired, resigned, or been dismissed. The ratio of officers to the total number of military personnel is 1:5, i.e., one out of every six MPPI was an officer. This is a marked increase in officer participation when compared to 1987 which had one officer out of ten MPPI.¹⁰

Majority of the OPI in the last coup, 304 or 64.8 percent, are under detention. Seventy three, however, remain at-large. The rest have been cleared, released or resigned; a number have yet to be investigated.

Of the officers involved in the 1989 coup, 77 were repeaters meaning they were involved in at least one other previous coup attempt. Among the enlisted personnel, at least 123 were found to have been involved in the 1987 coup attempts. Repeaters among officers and men comprise 6.9 percent of the total MPPI in 1989.

An observation made in the Commission's first Interim Report was that the operational execution of the failed coup attempts before 1989 was in the hands of junior officers. A similar case is noted for the December 1989 incident where officers with ranks of lieutenants and captains form 73.8 percent of the total number of officers probably involved (OPI). This confirms the reports that the recruiters were concentrating on battalion and company commanders as part of the strategic and tactical mobilization and deployment of forces plan for the coup.

Table VI-4 — Rank Profile of Military Officers Probably Involved in the December 1989 Coup

Rank	Service command					
	PA	PN (PNM)*	PC	PAF	Not Identified	TOTAL
BGen/Commodore	3	1 (0)	1	2		7
Colonel/Captain	6	10 (0)	3	2		21
Lt Col/Comdr	16	9 (3)	8	8		41
Maj/LCdr	21	19 (5)	10	4		54
Capt/LTSG	78	28 (14)	28	8	3	145
1LT/LTJG	79	20 (14)	14	6	2	121
2LT/Ens	52	14 (12)	11	3		80
TOTAL	255	101	75	33	5	469

*Figures are abstracted from that of the Philippine Navy.

Table VI-5 — Source of Commission of Military Officers Probably Involved (OPI) in the December 1989 Coup, PMA or Non-PMA

Service Command	PMA			Non-PMA		
	Total No. of Officers from PMA	No. of OPI From PMA	% of PMA	Total No. of Non-PMA Officers	No. of Non-PMA OPI	% of Non-PMA
PA	1,044	108	10.3	3,766	145	3.9
PN	602	39	6.5	2,022	63	3.1
PC	220	44	20.0	3,909	31	0.8
PAF	370	16	4.3	1,867	17	0.9
Not Identified	—	3	—	—	3	—
TOTAL	2,236	210	9.4	11,564	259	2.2

Another interesting data is the comparison of figures of OPI who are either PMA or non-PMA graduates. Although PMA alumni comprise only 15 percent of the AFP officer corps, a segment of them were very visible and quite active in the past coup attempt.¹¹

A little over nine percent of officers from the PMA are listed as OPI in the December 1989 coup attempt while only 2.2 percent of officers who are non-PMA are OPI (See Table VI-5).

While indeed the major players of the December 1989 coup came from the country's premiere military school, the figures bear out the fact that rebel PMA alumni is an aberration, not the norm. Nevertheless, the figures should provide directions for the national and military leadership in concentrating their efforts in reforms.

Table VI-6 below shows a list of officers involved in at least two of the seven post-EDSA coup attempts.

Table VI-6 — Officers Involved or Investigated in At Least Two of the Seven Failed Coup Attempts after the EDSA Revolt

NAME	JULY 1986	NOV 1986	JAN 1987	APR 1987	JULY 1987	AUG 1987	DEC 1989	Involved More than Twice
1. ABADILLA, ROLANDO	X		X	X	X	X		5
2. ABENINA, EDGARDO M.						X	X	
3. AGUINALDO, RODOLFO	X					X	X	3
4. ALBANO, JERRY						X	X	
5. AMARILLE, ROLAND C.						X	X	
6. AMON, ELMER		X					X	
7. APOLINARIO, RAMON C.						X	X	
8. AROMIN, SAULITO		X		X		X		3
9. AVENIDO, ANSELMO JR. S.						X	X	
10. AVENIDO, PACIFICO JR. A						X	X	
11. BAILEN, ROSALINO R.						X	X	
12. BALTAZAR, FERNANDO E.						X	X	
13. BATAAC, VICTOR		X				X	X	3
14. BAYANGOS, TITO			X				X	
15. BERNARTE, DANTE						X	X	
16. CABAUTAN, REYNALDO	X		X	X		X		4
17. CAPAYCAPAY, MARIO G.						X	X	
18. CARAIG, HERNANDO JR. D.						X	X	
19. CRUZ, JOSE S.						X	X	
20. DACLAN, ROMEO			X	X				
21. DARIO, PAUL POMPEYO M.						X	X	
22. DE GUZMAN, ROLANDO	X				X			
23. DELA CRUZ, ANTONIO						X	X	
24. DIONEDA, LEOVIC R.						X	X	
25. DOROMAL, WILHELM						X	X	
26. DUQUE, SERGIO JR. S.						X	X	
27. EBUEN, NEON D.						X	X	
28. ECHEVARRIA, JAIME	X						X	
29. ELEFANTE, ROMEO G.					X		X	
30. ESCOTO, ARMANDO						X	X	
31. FUSILERO, TIBURCIO						X	X	
32. GAURAN, ANDY						X	X	
33. GENETE, WILFREDO M.						X	X	
34. HONASAN, GREGORIO		X				X	X	3

NAME	JULY 1986	NOV 1986	JAN 1987	APR 1987	JULY 1987	AUG 1987	DEC 1989	Involved More than Twice
35. IRIZARI, ROLANDO						X	X	
36. JAVIER, AGRIPINO B.						X	X	
37. KAPUNAN, EDUARDO		X				X	X	3
38. LAZARO, RODOLFO S.						X	X	
39. LEGASPI, OSCAR B.		X				X	X	3
40. LEGIRALDE, FIDEL JR. E.						X	X	
41. LINA, DOMINADOR A.						X	X	
42. LUCAS, JAIME T.		X				X	X	3
43. LUMIBAO, RENATO V.						X	X	
44. MALABANJOT, EDMUNDO D.						X	X	
45. MALAJACAN, MARCELINO		X					X	
46. MALIGALIG, PROCESO L.						X	X	
47. MAMARIL, DANIEL V.						X	X	
48. MANAED, DEMETRIO S.						X	X	
49. MARANON, ROQUE JR. S.						X	X	
50. MATILLANO, EDUARDO S.						X	X	
51. NICOLAS, PEDRO V.						X	X	
52. NOVERAS, CLIFORDO						X	X	
53. OCHOSA, JOSE REYNALDO						X	X	
54. ORDOÑEZ, REYNALDO O.						X	X	
55. ORQUINA, RODOLFO L.						X	X	
56. PABALE, ELMER C.						X	X	
57. PANELO, GREGOR MENDEL		X					X	
58. PANTE, CONSTANCE V.						X	X	
59. PURUGGANAN, ABRAHAM						X	X	
60. QUERUBIN, ALLEN TEODORO						X	X	
61. RAFAL, REYNALDO S.						X	X	
62. RAFANAN, ABRAHAM						X	X	
63. RANAY, ROMEO						X	X	
64. RASCO, ELISEO T.						X	X	
65. RIVERA, REYNALDO D.						X	X	
66. ROBLES, REX		X				X		
67. SAMPOL, JESUS			X				X	
68. SANARES, NESTOR B.						X	X	
69. SANCHEZ, LUISITO G.						X	X	
70. SANDALO, CECIL EZRA						X	X	
71. SANTOS, MANUEL D.						X	X	
72. SARMENTA, CEFERINO JR.						X	X	
73. SILVA, ELY T.						X	X	
74. TOR, RODOLFO A.						X	X	
75. TURINGAN, FELIX		X				X	X	3
76. VALEROSO, DIOSDADO T.						X	X	
77. ZUMEL, JOSE MARIA	X			X			X	3

Sixty-six officers participated twice, nine officers thrice, one was implicated in four attempts, while another, ex-Col Rolando Abadilla, the current Vice Governor of Ilocos Norte, was allegedly involved in five coup attempts, but excluding December 1989. Sixty-three officers were involved in both the August 1987 and 1989 attempts. Seventy-one officers implicated in 1989 were also involved in previous coups.

D. The Leaders of the December 1989 Failed Coup

The December 1989 failed coup is no doubt the most serious and costliest attempt against the Aquino government, involving the most number of troops. This could be attributed to the tactical alliance forged between the RAM - Honasan Faction (RAM-HF) and the Loyalists. The latter refer to officers identified with the group of BGen Zumel and Gen Fabian Ver.

D.1. RAM-HF/MND Connection

The overall planning and plotting of the December 1989 coup appear to have been principally handled by ex-Lt Col Gregorio Honasan PA. The operational, tactical, and implementation responsibilities appear to have been placed in the hands of the core group of the RAM-HF, namely, Lt Cols Victor Batac PC and Eduardo Kapunan PAF, ex-Capt (PN) Felix Turingan, Ex-LCmr (PN) Jaime Lucas, ex-Lt Cols Oscar Legaspi PAF and Billy Bibit PC, and Maj Abraham Purugganan PA. All of them, except Bibit, were implicated in previous coup attempts. The members of this core group are representative of the four major service commands of the AFP. All are graduates of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), Classes '65 - '78.

The involvement of Honasan, Batac, Kapunan, Lucas, Legaspi, and Turingan is traceable to February 1986. They were also involved in the November 1986 "God Save The Queen" plot and the 28 August 1987 coup attempt.¹² Honasan, Batac, Kapunan, Lucas, Legaspi, and Turingan had spent the major part of their military service with the Ministry (now Department) of National Defense (MND) under then Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.¹³ Three years after his graduation from the PMA, Honasan was detailed to the MND beginning 1 September 1974 until Enrile was removed from his position in November 1986. By then, Honasan was Enrile's Special Assistant on Security Matters.

Batac, Kapunan, and Turingan started their assignment at the MND in 1979. By September 1986, Kapunan was a member of the security group at the Office of the Minister. Turingan, on the other hand,

was Chief of the Information Management Office (IMO) and Legaspi was Senior Aide-de-Camp to Minister Enrile.

Other major players in the last coup who are identified with the RAM-HF are Honasan's other classmates, Lt Cols Tiburcio Fusilero (who also served at the MND) and Marcelino Malajacan. Lt Col Ericson Aurelio, Col Alexander Noble, and Cmdr Proceso Maligalig also featured prominently in the last attempt. Aurelio, while at the MND from November 1984 to April 1986, was also consultant on security and police matters of the Export Processing Zone Authority under Atty Renato Cayetano, who was then Deputy Minister for Trade and Industry and now a law partner of Enrile. Maligalig was also assigned to MND during Enrile's incumbency. Enrile paid for his tuition fees at AIM where he graduated in 1982.¹⁴ Maligalig and Noble belong to PMA Class '69.

Other officers in the MPPI list who served at the MND during Enrile's incumbency are Lt Col Reynaldo Rivera, ex-Lt Andy Gauran, Navy Capt Jesus Durian, and Lt Rolando Cal.¹⁵

Batac, Honasan, Kapunan, and Legaspi were classmates at the PMA (Class '71). Except for Legaspi, these PMAers are also graduates of the Asian Institute of Management (AIM).

The other classmates of Honasan in the MPPI list are Lt Cols Levy Zamora, Diosdado Tabamo, Teodorico Viduya, Reynaldo Rivera, Eduardo Matillano, Neon Ebuen, and Rafael Galvez.

Bibit and Aurelio were classmates at the PMA (Class '72). Their other classmates who were involved in the last coup are ex-Lt Col Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Majs Alfredo Oliveros, Rodolfo Tor, and Leuvino Valencia. The latter could be the link with the 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion which took over the Legaspi Airport as this unit was under him from February 1987 to September 1989, as was Capt Jaime Junio of the 14th Scout Ranger Company who led the attack against the PAF Repeater Station in Tagaytay City.

Purugganan's links with Honasan may have begun when the former was the commanding officer (CO) of the 7th Scout Ranger Company stationed in Isabela and the latter was the CO of the Special Operations School of the Philippine Army Training Command (SOS PA TRACOM) at Fort Magsaysay in Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. Both were at Camp Aguinaldo during the August 1987 coup attempt. Honasan made full use of his SOS position. Also implicated in the last coup were Capts Edmundo Malabanjot, Fidel Legiralde, and Dominador Lina, all

reservists. The three were course directors of Scout Ranger Training Classes at the SOS.¹⁶

D.2. Honasan/GCFI Network

There can be no doubt that some members of the Guardian Centre Foundation, Inc (GCFI) were used by Honasan during the December 1989 coup attempt.

Honasan leads the list of the incorporators of the Foundation.¹⁷ Rodolfo Morit, Jr is the second in the list. Three other incorporators - SSgt Nicanor Cagurangan, MSgt Rogelio Attunaga, and MSgt Leovides Montehermoso - were with Honasan at the MND Security Group during Enrile's incumbency as Minister of National Defense.

It may be recalled that Honasan signed as an instrumental witness to the Articles of Incorporation of the Guardians Brotherhood, Inc (GBI).¹⁸

During the December 1989 coup, Morit met his brother-Guardians at the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa. In the evening of 30 November, he brought 26 prison guards (all Guardians) and four civilians to the Baltao Subdivision in Parañaque. In the early morning of 1 December, they were picked up by Gamos, Vice President Laurel's Chief of Security, and brought to the Velayo Sports Complex fronting the Manila Domestic Airport terminal where they were to be provided with firearms.

In the morning of 30 November, 30 to 40 GCFI members from Baguio City led by the chapter president, Assistant City Prosecutor Elmer Sagsago, went to the North Harbor, allegedly to attend a GCFI conference. At the same meeting were some 40 heavily armed men in military uniform and others in civilian attire. These men reportedly asked Sagsago and his group to join in the coup activity. Sagsago, however, claimed that they refused to do so and that he and the rest of the GCFI-Baguio Chapter members left in groups of two or three. The leader of the armed group was ex-Capt Dante Pimentel, also a GCFI member.

P/Capt Job Gavino, Station Commander (STACOM) of the North Harbor Port Police was contacted by RAM-HF core group member Bibit at 7:30 a.m. of 30 November. In his testimony before the Commission, Job Gavino admitted that he is a member of the GCFI.

The rebels who attacked and ransacked the Civil Relations Service (CRS) office of the late CRS Chief BGen Oscar Florendo in the early morning of 1 December were also Guardians. They were led by Dante Pimentel who used to be the Finance Officer of CRS. He has resigned his commission.¹⁹

D.3. The Loyalists

The Loyalist rebels who played prominent and visible roles and listed in the MPPI were, at one time or another, assigned to the Presidential Security Command (PSC) and/or the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) under Gen Fabian Ver. They include Zumel, Cols Anselmo Avenido, and Luisito Sanchez, Navy Capt Danilo Pizarro, Lt Cols Arsenio Tecson, Rafael Galvez, Jacinto Ligot, Jerry Albano, Romelino Gojo, and Maj Alfredo Oliveros. Tecson and Gojo are both classmates of Col Irwin Ver, son of Gen Ver, at the PMA.

Pizarro was at one time the commanding officer of *Ang Pangulo*, former President Marcos's presidential yacht. LCmdr Perfecto Pascual was already assigned to the PSC when Pizarro joined the unit.

Capt Danilo Lim, on the other hand, used to be Zumel's aide-de-camp when the latter was the PMA Superintendent.

Thus, while they were linked to Ver and Marcos, Oliveros, Galvez, and Gojo also have special links with Honasan. Galvez and Albano were Honasan's classmates at the PMA. Oliveros was in the batch behind Honasan's class and Gojo is a Honasan kin.

D.4. Abenina - The Middleman

Although there were indications of possible collaboration in past coup attempts between the Honasan group and the Loyalists, there was, for the December 1989 coup, a need for a more effective alliance. Both groups had the same objective — to remove President Aquino from power. Considering, however, that they were opposing forces during the EDSA Revolt, someone had to act as middleman. That role was tailor-made for BGen Edgardo Abenina, a known supporter of the rightist movement who was implicated and charged for involvement in the 28 August 1987 attempt.²⁰ BGens Abenina and Zumel were classmates at the PMA (Class '58). Abenina was Regional Command (RECOM) 7 commander during the August 1987 attempt, when he revealed his support for the rebels by inverting the Philippine flag at his headquarters. Charged with him were Avenido, Fusilero, and Tor.

D.5. BGens Comendador and Blando and Commo Calajate

A surprise to the AFP was the participation of BGen Jose Comendador, Commander 2nd Air Division, BGen Marcelo Blando, Commanding General (CG) 7 ID, and Commo Domingo Calajate, Commander AFP Logistics Command (LOGCOM). According to Chief of Staff Gen Renato de Villa, Comendador could have been recruited by Fusilero. Blando's pro-rebel stand was not known until he was at Greenhills Commercial Center, although the rebel Rangers at Fort Bonifacio expected his arrival there as early as 1 December. Blando used to be the CG of the FSRR. It must be noted that in a meeting with de Villa on the Monday preceding the coup, Blando pledged his loyalty to him. Calajate, in turn, attended the Command Conference called by de Villa at 5:30 p.m. on 30 November at the headquarters of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP).

D.6. Other Major Participants

The details of the activities of the other major participants in the December 1989 coup attempt like Fusilero, Bibit, Noble, and the officers of the various units which moved against the government are discussed in Chapter V and their names, category of involvement, and nature of participation are shown in Appendix J.

The following military officers are presently facing general court-martial proceedings:

NAME	SERIAL NO.	PMA YEAR
1. BGen Jose Comendador	0-4392 AFP	1959
2. BGen Marcelo Blando	0-4522 AFP	1960
3. Capt Danilo Pizarro	0-4747 PN (GSC)	1963
4. Capt Manuel Ison	0-4826 PN (GSC)	1964
5. Col Luisito Sanchez	0-5311 PA (GSC)	1967
6. Lt Col Romelino Gojo	0-5609 PN (M)	1970
7. Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero	0-5834 PC	1971
8. Lt Col Jacinto Ligot	0-5639 PA	1970
9. Lt Col Arsenio Tecson	0-5641 PA	1970

NAME	SERIAL NO.	PMA YEAR
10. Lt Col Rafael Galvez	0-5870 PA	1971
11. Lt Col Ericson Aurelio	0-6258 PA	1972
12. Lt Col Franklin Brawner	0-5836 PA	1971
13. Maj Alfredo Oliveros	0-6250 PA	1972
14. Maj Leuvino Valencia	0-6248 PA	1972
15. Maj Cesar de la Peña	0-6878 PN (M)	Integree
16. Capt Danilo Lim	0-7667 PA	WP 1978
17. Capt Elmer Amon	0-8406 PAF	1981
18. Capt Vergel Nacino	0-8413 PAF	1981
19. Capt Florencio Flores	0-106045 PA	Reserve
20. Capt Benigno Junio	0-109991 PA	Reserve
21. 1Lt Joey Sarroza	0-8758 PAF	1983

D.7. Enlisted Personnel

A total of 2,372 enlisted personnel were involved in the failed December coup and the category of their involvement is listed in Appendix K.

D.8. Civilian Participants

While a coup is primarily a military operation, the task of the Commission is to examine all the involvements in the December 1989 attempt including those of civilians. Thus, the Commission followed up on several leads about possible civilian participation.

The DND Special Investigation Committee (DND SIC) in its Third Progress Report²¹ mentioned foreigners as allegedly involved in the coup. One name mentioned was Eito Eikiuchi, who was described as a "likely coup supporter/participant."

The Commission took note of the sworn statements of former CG Southern Luzon Command BGen Alejandro Galido which named several civilians, including Homobono Adaza, Baby Asistio, Rafael

Ayoste (deceased), Cherry Cobarrubias, Enrique "Henry" Cojuangco, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Eduardo Figueras, retired BGen Romeo Gatan, Lito Gorospe, Cesar Lopez, former First Lady Mrs Imelda Marcos, Rico Mendoza (alleged friend of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, Jr), Luis Tabuena, Joaquin Venus, Jr, and a certain Mel Verano.²²

D.8.a. Cases Filed Before the DOJ

The Commission, likewise, obtained copies of the complaints or charges, and the supporting documents, filed with the Department of Justice against civilians allegedly involved in the coup attempt. Classified among civilians are retired, resigned or dismissed military officers. As of 29 August 1990 the following civilians have been charged before the DOJ²³

Abenina, Edgardo Jr.
Adaza, Homobono
Arillo, Cecilio
Balueg, Crisostomo
Canoy, Reuben
Castro, Edgardo
Cepe, Bienvenido
Cruz, Danilo
Dee, Pablo Jr
Enrile, Juan Ponce
Garcia, Arthur
Gracia, Rolando de
Gorospe, Lito

Gavino, Job with:
Abundo, Ronnie
Arriola, Antonio
Coching, Manuel
Domingo Ernesto
Manuel, Armando
Lt Col Rodolfo Aguinaldo
Lt Col Dante Bernarte
Lt Col Billy Bibit
Sgt Lambino Bicos
BGen Felix Brawner
Capt Antonio de la Cruz
BGen Jaime Echeverria
Lt Col Gregorio Honasan

Henson, Chito
Magsaysay, Vicente
Panlilio, Erlinda
Panlilio, Rebecca
Pestano, Medardo
Puyat, Vicente
Recto, Rafael
Rodriguez, Joaquin
Serrano, Audie
Uyson, Harry
Venus, Joaquin Jr
Verano, Crismel
Veroy, Leopoldo and Mrs

Navarro, Arturo
Pilapil, Augusto
Tamayo, Matias
Tamayao, Francisco
Villanueva, Renato
Lt Col Oscar Legaspi
LCmdr Jaime Lucas
Capt Roque Maranon, Jr
Lt Col Eduardo Matillano
Lt Col Rodolfo Tor
Maj Lyle Tugbang
Capt Felix Turingan

Matillano, Tor and de la Cruz were charged with Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Pablo Dee, Jr, Harry Uyson, and John Does for illegal possession of ammunitions and explosives in furtherance of rebellion.²⁴ The Department of Justice dismissed the cases against Uyson, Dee, and de la Cruz and referred the case of Matillano to the military authorities for appropriate action. The President waived court-martial jurisdiction over Tor and de la Cruz. In its Resolution in the case against Recto, et al,²⁵ the DOJ excluded/absolved Edgardo Castro and Joaquin Rodriguez for insufficiency of evidence.

The cases against Job Gavino, Antonio Arriola, Matias Tamayo, Manuel Coching, Ronnie Abundo, Francisco Tamayao, Augusto Pilapil, Renato Villanueva, Ernesto Domingo, Arturo Navarro, and Armando Manuel were dismissed by DOJ, without prejudice, for lack of evidence.²⁶

The case against BGen (Ret) Jaime Echeverria was similarly dismissed by DOJ.

As of 29 August 1990, the DOJ had filed the following information

1. *People of the Philippines vs Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Gregorio Honasan, Rebecca Panlilio and Erlinda Panlilio* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-10941, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, filed on 15 February 1990²⁷,
2. *People of the Philippines vs Senator Juan Ponce Enrile* (Criminal Case No. 90-777, RTC, Makati) for violation of PD No. 1829, filed on 15 February 1990²⁸
3. *People of the Philippines vs Felix Brawner, Jr* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-10944, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, filed on 22 February 1990²⁹
4. *People of the Philippines vs Rodolfo Aguinaldo* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-10942, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, filed on 21 February 1990³⁰
5. *People of the Philippines vs Rafael Recto, Lito Gorospe and Cecilio T. Arillo* for Rebellion with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, filed on 16 April 1990³¹
6. *People of the Philippines vs Felix Turingan, Oscar Legaspi and Jaime Lucas* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-11239, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder³²

7. *People of the Philippines vs Dante Bernarte* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-11670, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, filed on 3 April 1990³³
8. *People of the Philippines vs Medardo Pestano, Jose Ma Carlos de Leon Zumel, Crismel Verano, Joaquin Venus, Jr, Homobono Adaza, and Edgardo Abenina, Jr* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-11855, RTC, Quezon City), for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, filed on 19 April 1990³⁴
9. *People of the Philippines vs Vicente Puyat* (Criminal Case No. 851-M-90, RTC, Malolos) for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives in furtherance of Rebellion, filed on 24 April 1990³⁵
10. *People of the Philippines vs Lyle Tugbang* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-12209, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, filed on 2 May 1990⁶
11. *People of the Philippines vs Danilo Cruz* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-12595, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion, filed on 8 June 1990³⁷
12. *People of the Philippines vs Billy Bibit, Arthur Garcia, Audie Serrano, Crisostomo Balneg, and Bienvenido Cepe* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-10943, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, filed on 27 February 1990³⁸
13. *People of the Philippines vs Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, and John Does* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, RTC, Quezon City) for Illegal Possession of Ammunition and Explosives in Furtherance of Rebellion filed on 6 April 1990³⁹
14. *People of the Philippines vs Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicos, Rodolfo Tor, and John Does* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, RTC, Quezon City) for Attempted Homicide, filed on 6 April 1990⁴⁰
15. *People vs Roque Maranon* (Criminal Case No. 5305, RTC, San Fernando, Pampanga) for Rebellion - in connection with the 28 August 1987 attempted coup - filed on 14 May 1990⁴¹
16. *People of the Philippines vs Reynaldo Cabauatan, Jose Maria Zumel and Gregorio Honasan* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-12993,

RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion - in connection with the 28 August 1987 coup - filed on 18 June 1990⁴²

17. *People of the Philippines vs Reynaldo Cabauatan and William Quitolvo* (Criminal Case No. Q-90-12994, RTC, Quezon City) for Rebellion - in connection with the 27 January 1987 coup attempt - filed on 18 June 1990⁴³
18. *People of the Philippines vs Reynaldo Cabauatan* (Criminal Case No. 90-8491, RTC, Manila) for Rebellion - in connection with the July 1986 coup - filed on 18 June 1990.⁴⁴

As regards the others, the Commission pursued some leads to gather evidence. Some "informants" who wrote letters could not be contacted at the addresses given; others who appeared to testify before the Commission denied any role in the coup. "Eikiuchi", the Japanese mentioned in the DND SIC Report, is actually Eito Ikeuchi, a Filipino citizen (with a Filipina mother and a Japanese father) who was born in the Philippines. Ikeuchi is a martial arts instructor at the PMA and a member of the GCFI, Baguio Chapter.

D.8.b. Eduardo (Danding) Cojuangco, Jr.

Being the estranged cousin of President Aquino and one of the Twelve Disciples, Twelve Apostles or the Rolex 12 of former President Marcos, and having left with the Marcoses at the height of the EDSA Revolt, it was inevitable that there would be speculation as to Eduardo (Danding) Cojuangco's possible involvement in the coup.

Although the Commission did not uncover any direct evidence that Danding was a plotter or participant, the staging of the coup a few days after his mystery-shrouded arrival, in the light of some facts which surfaced during the hearings or which were unearthed through *subpoenas duces tecum*, raises reasonable ground to believe that he had prior knowledge of the staging of the coup.

In addition to the detailed discussions on the probability of his arrival on 23 November 1989 in Malita, Davao del Sur from Kota Kinabalu in Chapter V, the following facts further aid reasonable minds to such conclusion:

1. Danding got his passport when his counsel inquired from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) whether or not the Presidential

Commission on Good Government (PCGG) had lifted the hold order on him. The DFA checked with PCGG. The letter of inquiry was drafted by Edgardo Castro, then Acting Director of the Passport Division. The first and second letters to PCGG went unanswered. He persevered with a third letter which was answered in the affirmative. The telex to the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles with instructions to issue the passport was again drafted by Edgardo Castro.⁴⁵

Incidentally, the same Castro did not report to his office on 1 December; instead, after lunch, he went with a group headed by Rafael Recto to PTV-4. He testified that he had been listening to the radio that morning. Therefore, he clearly knew that PTV-4 was held by the rebels. His excuse for going there was to help look for Recto's daughter, Plinky. He knew Plinky worked for ABS-CBN, not PTV-4, but during their stay at the ABS-CBN/PTV-4 complex, not one in their group went to ABS-CBN to look for Plinky. Not one in their group asked any of the persons they met for the whereabouts of Plinky. None in their group even looked at the parking lot of Channel 2 to see if Plinky's car was there. On the other hand, witness Orlando Fontanilla swore that he overheard Recto asking about a press conference in PTV-4.

2. In his sworn statement, Galido declared that he had a meeting with Henry Cojuangco where the participation of Danding in the planned coup was discussed.

3. Danding is close to BGen Zumel as they both served under or were close to Marcos.

4. As to when and where he landed when he returned home was never disclosed by him. Although he was given the fullest opportunity when he testified before the Commission on 11 May 1990 to make such a disclosure if only to end speculations and unravel the mystery surrounding his arrival, he deliberately refused to do so. Although he has the opportunity to deny the imputations made against him in the sworn statement of Galido, the Commission is not aware that he has publicly done so.

5. Since he was given a proper Philippine passport, it is difficult to understand why he had to enter the country covertly, particularly since as a political and public figure, he presumably would want to rally his followers to his side.

D.8.c. Vice President Salvador Laurel

The actuations of Vice President Laurel are discussed in Chapter VII.

D.8.d. Other Civilian Participants

The Commission finds reasonable ground to believe that in addition to those charged before the DOJ, or whose cases had been dismissed by the DOJ, the civilians named below may also be liable for offenses in connection with the failed December 1989 coup.

1. Diane Aguas

she is linked to one Franco Sanchijo and Cherry Cobarrubias,⁴⁶

2. Roger Borja

one of the four civilians who, with 26 prison guards (members of the Guardians) of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa, were brought by Rodolfo Morit, Jr in the evening of 30 November 1989 to the Baltao Subdivision, Parañaque, from where they were picked up by Gamos in the early morning of 1 December and brought to the Velayo Sports Complex near the Manila Domestic Airport terminal where they were to be provided with firearms by the group of Gamos,⁴⁷

3. Nicanor Cagurangan

the Founder Barorot of GCFI, per sworn testimony of Elmer Sagsago given on 5 May 1990, who was expected to meet the GCFI members gathered at the PPA, North Harbor, in the evening of 30 November 1989; an incorporator of GCFI with Honasan and Morit,⁴⁸

4. Francisco Casio

he was among those who barricaded the Moriones and the Zaragosa gates of the North Harbor and was seen in the company of rebel soldiers,⁴⁹

5. Edgardo Castro

he was Acting Director of the Passport Division at the DFA when Danding Cojuangco's application for a passport was approved; did not report to his office on 1 December; went with Rafael Recto to PTV-4 which he knew was occupied by rebels ostensibly to look for Recto's daughter Plinky,

6. Cherry Cobarrubias or Serafia C. Cobarrubias

she is implicated in the sworn statement of Galido; she arranged an overseas call between Mrs Marcos and BGen Galido; per the testimony of Luis Tabuena, she is very close to the Marcoses and she also arranged his meeting with Galido at the Mandarin Hotel on 6 September 1989; per admission of BGen Tadiar, she attended the meeting at a house in Times Street, Quezon City between Tadiar, Galido and Cesar Lopez; and on 29 November 1989, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel, although she has a house in Quezon City and at Greenhills, Mandaluyong,

7. Gabriel Cruz

president of the Odessa Fishing and Trading Corp, of Navotas, Metro Manila, together with Rufino Tiangco, majority stockholder and chairman of Odessa, one Artemio Tan, and one Rudy Jimenez. He provided a fishing vessel of the corporation, the Lady-Vi-T-1, to ferry the rebel troops of the 24 IB and the 68 IB under rebel officers, Maj Oliveros and Lt Col Tecson, respectively, from Limay, Bataan, to Sangley Point and back to Bataan on 1 December 1989,⁵⁰

8. Pepito Dalivenancio

captain of the fishing vessel Lady Vi-T-1, for piloting the same to ferry the above rebel troops from Limay, Bataan, to Sangley, Point, and back to Bataan,

9. Danny Fonbuena

he was among those who barricaded the Moriones and Zaragoza Gates of the North Harbor with container vans and cargo trucks,⁵¹

10. Eduardo Franco

one of the four civilians who, with 26 prison guards (who are members of the Guardians) left the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, in the evening of 30 November 1989, and were brought by Morit, Jr to the Baltao Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, from where they were picked up by Gamos early morning of 1 December and thereafter brought to the Velayo Sports Complex near the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal, where they were to be provided with firearms by the group of Gamos,⁵²

11. Manuel Garces, Jr

Founder of the Guardians Chapter at the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, who headed the 26 prison guards of the Bureau of Corrections and four civilians who were brought by Morit, Jr to the Baltao Subdivision in Parañaque,

12. Jun Hizon

a gun club member who participated in the coup; photo and TV footages show that he was, with others, among heavily armed civilians at the Coastal Road during the coup,

13. Don Honasan

brother of Gregorio Honasan, someone answering to his description was identified by a CIS officer on a TV footage taken at the vicinity of the Manila Domestic Airport terminal during the coup; a friend of Rufino Tiangco,

14. Eito Ikeuchi

an instructor of the PMA, a member of the GCFI, Baguio chapter, who came all the way from Baguio City on 30 November 1989 to attend an alleged meeting of the Guardians at the PPA Building at North Harbor, Manila, at which occasion the participants were given firearms,

15. Rudy Jimenez

with Rufino Tiangco, Gabriel Cruz, and Artemio Tan, he, acting as alleged *encargado* of Artemio Tan and introduced as such to the captain of the fishing vessel by Tiangco, provided the fishing vessel Lady-Vi-T-1 which ferried the rebel troops of the 24 IB and the 68 IB from Limay, Bataan to Sangley Point and then back to Bataan,

16. Cesar Lopez

mentioned by Galido in his sworn statement (confirmed by Tadiar and Mapalo in their sworn statements before the Commission) as having been present at the meeting of Tadiar and Galido at a house in Times Street, Quezon City, which was likewise attended by Cherry Cobarrubias,

17. Rodolfo Morit, Jr

one of the incorporators, with Gregorio Honasan, of the GCFI;⁵³ he also contacted and brought the 26 prison guards of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, who are members of the Guardians, and four civilians to the Baltao Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila in the evening of 30 November 1989 from where, early morning of 1 December, they were picked up by Gamos and brought to the Velayo Sports Complex near the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal where they were to be provided with firearms;⁵⁴ per testimony of Elmer Sagsago, Morit is known as the Magic Hermes of GCFI who was also expected by the GCFI members at the PPA office, North Harbor, in the evening of 30 November,

18. Isidro Mutya

a former PAF Major who was with Lt Col Neon Ebuen at MAB in the morning of 1 December 1989,⁵⁵

19. Rolando Pascual

one of the four civilians who were brought by Morit, Jr with 26 prison guards of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa to the Baltao Subdivision, Parañaque, in the evening of 30 November 1989,⁵⁶

20. Romeo Rivera

a friend of Rufino Tiangco; incumbent president of the Philippine Rifle and Shotgun Association where Jackie Enrile is chairman; a friend of Honasan since 1979; a godfather of one of Honasan's children; in turn, Honasan is the godfather of one of Rivera's children; arms, ammunitions, and communications equipment were found by the military in his house during a raid after the coup; reportedly spotted with rebel troops in Sta Mesa, Manila during the coup,

21. Buggy Sacco

one of the four civilians brought by Morit, Jr, together with 26 prison guards of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa to the Baltao Subdivision, Parañaque in the evening of 30 November 1989,⁵⁷

22. Elmer Sagsago

an Assistant Prosecutor of the City of Baguio, President of Baguio Chapter of GCFI who, with Ikeuchi and Sgts Ocon and Mendez, left Baguio City in the morning of 30 November 1989 to attend an alleged meeting of GCFI members at the PPA Building, North Harbor, in the evening of the said date at which meeting the participants were provided with firearms; before the meeting, he met 30 to 34 GCFI members from the PMA among whom were Sgts Jaime Camacho and Alimbuyao,⁵⁸

23. Luis Tabuena

implicated by Galido; he admitted that he met Galido and Cherry Cobarrubias at a room in Mandarin Hotel on 6 September 1989 and that he is close to Imelda Marcos,

24. Artemio Tan

with Rufino Tiangco, Gabriel Cruz, Rudy Jimenez, and Capt Pepito Dalivenancio, he provided the fishing vessel Lady Vi-T-1 which ferried the rebel troops of the 24 IB and 68 IB from Limay, Bataan to Sangley Point and back to Bataan on 1 December 1989,

25. Rufino Tiangco

chairman and majority stockholder of the Odessa Fishing and Trading Corp, who, with Artemio Tan, Gabriel Cruz, Rudy Jimenez and Dalivenancio, provided and facilitated the use of the fishing vessel Lady Vi-T-1 to ferry the rebel troops of the 24 IB and the 68 IB from Limay, Bataan to Sangley Point and back to Bataan on 1 December 1989; he knows Gregorio Honasan; is a friend of his brother, Don, with whom he continues to have dealings in the cement business; he was the one approached by Artemio Tan for the charter of Lady Vi-T-1 and the one who introduced, in a note, to Capt Dalivenancio that Rudy Jimenez is the *encargado* of Tan; he is also a friend of Romeo Rivera,⁵⁹

26. Jesus Toloso

among those who barricaded the Moriones and Zaragosa gates of the North Harbor,⁶⁰

27. George Yap

a member of the PC Regional Security Unit 6, Bacolod City, who was called twice from Room 1701 of the Holiday Inn during the time that Bibit occupied the same from 28 November 1989; he went into hiding after the coup,

28. Job Gavino with

Ronnie Abundo, Manuel Coching, Ernesto Domingo, Armando Manuel, Augusto Pilapil (ex-Capt Dante Pimentel), Renato Villanueva, Matias Tamayo, and Francisco Tamayao

he was contacted by Billy Bibit at 7:30 a.m. of 30 November but did not report it until much later and he was seen with rebels; the rest were seen by witnesses with rebel soldiers barricading the Moriones and Zaragosa Gates of the North Harbor, and

29. The 25 other prison guards

of the Bureau of Corrections of Muntinlupa who were with Manuel Garces, Jr and Morit, Jr and four civilians in the evening of 30 November 1989 whose investigation by the Department of Justice had been recommended by the Commission per its Resolution No. 089 promulgated on 4 July

The Commission recommends to the DOJ for investigation the civilians below.

1. Mrs Angelina Isip Abenina

wife of BGen Edgardo Abenina who, on 1 September 1989, purchased from the Riviera Filipina, Inc a 257-square meter lot (Lot 5-A, Block 19) at Loyola Heights, Quezon City for ₱1.5 million.⁶¹ A house with a Tax Declaration for a fair market value of ₱441,600 is located on this lot. It appears, however, that on 15 September 1989, BGen Abenina sold for ₱1 million a lot at Masikap Street, Diliman, Quezon City,⁶²

2. Enrique (Henry) Cojuangco

in the sworn statement of BGen Galido, he represented his brother, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr, who, according to Galido, wanted to return and support a takeover of the government; he was on board aircraft RP-410, piloted by Capt Jose Castillo (who had piloted Cojuangco, Jr several

times in the past) which landed at the Malita airstrip of the Cojuangcos in Davao del Sur in the afternoon of 22 November 1989 from Bacolod City. This plane left for Manila at 4:33 p.m. the following day at about the same time another aircraft, CRP-585, piloted by Capt Morales and Capt Vergiere, was coming from Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia,

3. Doroteo Gaerlan

original owner of the barge Ray Patrick G-V, which was used to bring the rebel troops of the 24 IB and the 68 IB from the Marsteel wharf in Limay, Bataan to the waiting fishing vessel Lady Vi-T-1 on 1 December 1989,⁶³

4. Rico Mendoza

mentioned by Galido in his sworn statement, a close friend of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr,

5. Mabel Imperial Tecson

wife of Lt Col Arsenio Tecson; deposited P200,000 with the Union Bank (Cubao, Quezon City Branch) on 5 December 1989; she explained that the money represents proceeds of the sale of a condominium unit; it turned out, however, that there was no sale made by her as the unit belonged to Urban Planners and Development Inc which sold it to Edgardo Mangahas for P330,000 on 24 August 1989,⁶⁴

6. Amaro Ungotan

the patron of the barge Ray Patrick G-V which was used to bring the rebel troops of 24 IB and 68 IB from the Marsteel wharf of Limay, Bataan to the fishing vessel Lady Vi-T-1 on 1 December 1989,

7. Lourdes G. Unson

daughter of Doroteo Gaerlan and vice president of MGG Marine Services Inc, operator of the barge Ray Patrick G-V, which was used to bring the rebel troops of

the 24 IB and 68 IB from the Marsteel wharf at Limay, Bataan to the waiting vessel, Lady Vi-T-1,⁶⁵

8. Ruben Reyes

operations coordinator of MGG Marine Services, Inc.

E. Let Justice Be Done

Quoting the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 30233, the Commission stated on page 32 of its Interim Report No. 3 thus

... a coup d'etat is reprehensible because "its key leaders, contrary to their oath of office, take undue advantage of their key positions within the establishment to overthrow the very government they had pledged to uphold, protect and defend. In the case of the military, they draw their pay from the government and they enjoy the legal monopoly of the gun and other instruments of mass violence. In the case of civilian officials, they occupy positions of leadership which enable them to usurp the powers of government."

Because of the failed December 1989 coup, 99 were killed and 570 were wounded in action; and combined financial losses would be in the order of P800 million to P1 billion.

However, as stated in the preceding chapter, loss of lives, loss of confidence, and damage to our international image are worth far more than the financial losses.

The basic principles of justice then demand that those responsible for the coup answer for the consequences of their acts.

Accordingly, all military personnel which moved against the government in the failed coup of December 1989 must be prosecuted for violations of the appropriate provisions of the Articles of War as amended (CA No. 408 as amended), such as Articles 67, 68, 84, 94, 96 or 97, and should be imposed the commensurate penalty, taking into account the following considerations

- (a) whether the personnel was involved in the planning or plotting of the coup,
- (b) whether the personnel is a repeater, in the sense that he was involved in one or more previous coups,
- (c) the extent of the damage inflicted or caused by the illegal move,

- (d) the length of time the personnel resisted the government forces, and
- (e) in respect to junior officers and the enlisted personnel, the defense that they merely followed the orders of their commander should not be taken at face value and, where the movement of the unit appeared to be clearly illegal from the beginning, such as the attack on Malacañang or Camp Aguinaldo, or where such movement to another zone or area followed an attack of a camp and at a time when the coup was already known, such a defense should not be accepted. To illustrate, troops of the MBLT 4 which left Fort Bonifacio to attack Villamor Air Base (VAB) in the midnight of 30 November 1989 and who, after taking control of VAB, proceeded to attack Camp Aguinaldo or the PTV-4 complex should not be heard to plead innocence on the theory that they merely followed the orders of their commanders. The same rule should apply to rebels who did not offer to surrender even if they already knew that their movements were unauthorized and were directed against the government. The same rule should apply to the Rangers who went to Makati after having the opportunity to surrender in the morning of 2 December.

As to civilians against whom the Commission finds reasonable ground to believe that they are probably liable for offenses in connection with the failed coup, or those whom the Commission endorses for further investigation, the latter recommends to the Department of Justice their immediate investigation and prosecution should the requisite quantum of evidence be gathered. The evidence already obtained by the Commission against them would, pursuant to Section 1 (c) of RA No. 6832, be turned over to the Department.

ENDNOTES

- (1) Article of War 71: Action Upon Charges - A thorough and impartial investigation shall be made before any charge is referred to a general court-martial for trial, in A Manual for Courts-Martial, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Published by the authority of the President of the Philippines, 1987), p. 253.
- (2) Section 35(a): Investigation of Charges - Aside from what is provided in AW 71, this provision also indicates the proper procedure in investigating cases, in Ibid, p. 26.
- (3) Article of War 67: Mutiny or Sedition - Any person subject to military law who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes, or joins in any mutiny or sedition in any company, party, post, camp, detachment, guard, or another command shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, in Ibid, p. 234.
- (4) Article of War 94: Various Crimes - Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinance which is recognized as an offense of penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (a) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (b) outside any such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. In imposing penalties for offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such offenses provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or in such municipal ordinances shall be taken into consideration (As amended by Presidential Decree 11660), in Ibid, p. 240.
- (5) Article of War 96: Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman - Any officer, cadet, flying cadet or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service (As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516), in Ibid, p. 242.
- (6) Section 108 a(1) and b(4): Punishments - Forfeiture of pay of not more than one half of one month's base pay per month for three months, in Ibid, p. 121.

- (7) Seventh Progress Report on the Failed December 1989 Coup d'Etat from the AFP Special Investigating Committee to the Acting CSAFP, dated 30 April 1990, and its attachments, Exh. "N-AFPSIC".
- (8) Fact-Finding Commission (FFC), Observations and Recommendations on Military Justice as Related to Coups, Interim Report No. 1, 12 May 1990, p. 20. A total of 1,681 military personnel were allegedly involved in the August 1987 attempt, 418 of whom were cleared.
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Ibid.
- (11) NARAA, "The Philippine Coup d'Etat and NARAA Resolution No. 7" (Metro Manila: NARAA, 21 February 1989).
- (12) First Progress Report of the Department of National Defense (DND) Special Investigating Committee, dated 26 December 1989, Exh. "B-DND".
- (13) List of Military Officers on Detached Service With the Ministry of National Defense from 1970 to 1986, Exh. "MMMMM-Commission". Hereinafter referred to MND List from 1970 to 1986.
- (14) Sworn Testimony of Cmdr Proceso Maligalig before the FFC, 12 March 1990.
- (15) MND List from 1970 to 1986, op. cit.
- (16) Report on Camp Aguinaldo Incident during the August 1987 Coup Attempt, dated 8 February 1990, Exh. "000-5-A"-Commission.
- (17) Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Reg. No. 132118, Articles of Incorporation of the Guardian Centre Foundation, Inc, dated 15 April 1986, Exh. "B-1-Guardians". Hereinafter referred to as GCFI Articles of Incorporation.
- (18) Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Reg. No. 123899, Articles of Incorporation of the Guardians Brotherhood, Inc, dated 10 December 1984, Exh. "A-Guardians".
- (19) CRSAFP Command Report on December 1989 Coup, submitted by BGen Oscar Florendo, dated 6 February 1990, Exh. "A-Florendo".
- (20) Sworn Testimony of Gen Renato S. de Villa, CSAFP before the FFC, 7 April 1990.
- (21) Third Progress Report of the Department of National Defense Special Investigating Committee submitted by Undersecretary Leonardo Quisumbing, dated 26 December 1989, Exh. "D-DND".
- (22) Sworn Statement of BGen Alejandro Galido, former CG SOLCOM AFP, given before Col Benjamin Libarnes PC of AFP CIC, Exh. "KKKKK-2"-Commission.
- (23) Progress Report on the Status of Rebellion Cases submitted to the FFC by Silvestre H. Bello III, Undersecretary of Justice, dated 4 September 1990, Exh. "E-1-DOJ".
- (24) Department of Justice Resolution in the Case Sgt Sagario and AFP vs Lt Col Matillano, et al, IS No. DOJ-SC-90-002, dated 17 April 1990, Exh. "U-DOJ"
- (25) Department of Justice Resolution in the Case NBI vs Rafael Recto, et al, IS No. DOJ-SC-90-005, dated 17 April 1990, Exh. "C-J Rodriguez".
- (26) Department of Justice Resolution in the Case Philippine Ports Authority vs Job Gavino, et al, IS No. DOJ-SC-90-007, dated 7 March 1990, Exh. "E-Salialam". Hereinafter referred to as Gavino Case.
- (27) Marked as FFC Exh. "F-DOJ".
- (28) Marked as FFC Exh. "F-1-DOJ".
- (29) Marked as FFC Exh. "G-DOJ".
- (30) Marked as FFC Exh. "H-DOJ".
- (31) Marked as FFC Exh. "I-DOJ".
- (32) Marked as FFC, Exh. "J-DOJ".
- (33) Marked as FFC Exh. "K-DOJ".
- (34) Marked as FFC Exh. "L-DOJ".

- (35) Marked as FFC Exh. "M-DOJ".
- (36) Marked as FFC Exh. "N-DOJ".
- (37) Marked as FFC Exh. "O-DOJ".
- (38) Marked as FFC Exh. "T-DOJ".
- (39) Marked as FFC Exh. "U-1-DOJ".
- (40) Marked as FFC Exh. "U-2-DOJ".
- (41) Marked as FFC Exh. "P-DOJ".
- (42) Marked as FFC Exh. "Q-DOJ".
- (43) Marked as FFC Exh. "R-DOJ".
- (44) Marked as FFC Exh. "S-DOJ".
- (45) Sworn Testimony of Edgardo Castro before the FFC, 25 April 1990.
- (46) Various documents marked as FFC Exhs. "B-Aguas" to "P-Aguas", inclusive.
- (47) Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of Director Meliton Goyena, Bureau of Corrections, 25 June 1990; and Manuel Garces, Jr, 10 July 1990.
- (48) GCFI Articles of Incorporation, op. cit.
- (49) Report on the North Harbor Incident submitted by the Station Commander, Coast Guard Station Manila to the Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, dated 4 December 1989, Exh. "B-3-Garrido". Hereinafter referred to as North Harbor Incident Report. Gavino Case, op. cit.
- (50) Various documents marked as FFC Exhs. "A-Rufino Tiangco" to "I-Rufino Tiangco", inclusive. Hereinafter referred to as Tiangco Exhibits.
- (51) North Harbor Incident Report, op. cit.; Gavino Case, op. cit.
- (52) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.; Garces Testimony, op. cit.

- (53) GCFI Articles of Incorporation, op. cit.
- (54) Garces Testimony, op. cit.
- (55) Sworn Statement of AM Dominino Recla before the FFC, 4 June 1990.
- (56) Goyena Testimony, op. cit.; Garces Testimony, op. cit.
- (57) Sworn Testimonies given before the FFC of Elmer Sagsago, Assistant Prosecutor, Baguio City, 5 May 1990; Eito Ikeuchi, 17 April 1990; Sgt Rodolfo Ocon, 31 May 1990; Sgt Rodolfo Mendez, 31 May 1990.
- (58) Sagsago Testimony, op. cit.; Ikeuchi Testimony, op. cit.; Ocon Testimony, op. cit.; Mendez Testimony, op. cit.
- (59) Tiangco Exhibits, op. cit.; Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of Rufino Tiangco, 10 August 1990; Gabriel Cruz, 20 August 1990; Pepito Dalivenancio, 16 August 1990.
- (60) North Harbor Incident Report, op. cit.; Gavino Case, op. cit.
- (61) Copy of the Second Page of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Property between Riviera Filipina, Inc and Angelina Abenina, dated 1 September 1989, Exh. "HHHHH-9"-Commission.
- (62) Copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Property between Edgardo M. Abenina and Dante Lantin, dated 15 September 1989, Exh. "HHHH-1"-Commission.
- (63) Sworn Statement of Ruben Reyes, Operations Coordinator, MGG Marine Services, Inc, before the FFC 19 September 1990, Exh. "A-Gaerlan Shipping"; Sworn Statement of Atty Renato Unson before the FFC 24 September 1990, Exh. "B-Gaerlan Shipping". Hereinafter referred to as Unson Statement.
- (64) Various documents marked as FFC Exhs. "D-Puyat" to "G-Puyat", inclusive; North Harbor Incident Report, op. cit.; Gavino Case, op. cit.
- (65) Unson Statement, op. cit.

VII

CAUSES, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Fact-Finding Commission was tasked to inquire into the who (participants), why (causes), and how (events) of the December 1989 coup attempt and to make recommendations to prevent its recurrence. The narration of events is contained in Chapter V and the Commission's findings on participants in Chapter VI. This Chapter completes the Commission's mandated task.

A. The Causes

Invariably, those who openly admitted participating in the coup or are implicated in it offered the following reasons on why the coup occurred, which is another way of expressing why they joined the coup:

1. Failure of the government to deliver basic services especially in the rural areas;¹
2. Graft and corruption;²
3. Too much politics and grandstanding of politicians, and unfair criticism, even humiliation, at the hands of politicians;³
4. Bureaucratic inefficiency which exacerbates the alienation and poverty of the people;⁴
5. Poor and non-responsive military leadership which is manifested by a *tayo-tayo* system, factionalism, and inadequate financial and logistical support for the soldier in the field;⁵
6. Lack of genuine reconciliation;⁶
7. Uneven treatment of human rights violations committed by the military and the CPP-NPA;⁷

8. Absence of good government;⁸

9. Softness on the CPP-NPA and left-leaning elements;⁹ and

10. Failure of the civilian leadership to effectively address economic problems.¹⁰

The implication of their answers is that the governing body or junta to be established by the coup d'etat would correct or solve all these deficiencies in the present government.

The rebel witnesses, however, when pressed for a program of government were unable to answer exactly how reforms were going to be achieved or to name the persons who would implement it.

A review of the issues raised by the coup plotters in the previous six attempts against the Aquino administration also reveals an interesting pattern of similar answers with emphasis on the current issues of the day. For example, for the Manila Hotel and the "God Save The Queen" attempts, the emphasis was softness against communists; in the GMA-7 incident, the lack of genuine reconciliation, as exemplified by the government refusal to allow Marcos to come home; in August 1987, the bickerings in the Cabinet; and in December 1989, graft and corruption and congressional shenanigans.

On the other hand, when officers who fought for the government were asked what they thought were the causes of the coup attempt, they repeated many of those advanced by the coup participants¹¹ and, in addition, cited:

1. Obsession with the power which they thought they had won but handed over to Corazon C. Aquino in February 1986;
2. A desire by coup leaders to regain privileges enjoyed during the Marcos administration and the prospect of possible power or financial gain in the process;¹²
3. Personal grievances and perceived "dead end" in career path;
4. Strong fraternal or personal ties, with origins dating back to PMA days;¹³
5. Naive idealism, particularly on the part of younger officers;¹⁴

6. A messianic complex.¹⁵

Despite the attempts of the coup plotters and their sympathizers (wittingly or unwittingly) to project themselves as real reformers, the rebels had their own hidden agenda even as they rode on valid grievances.

Many of the grievances cited by the rebels as their reasons for joining were, unfortunately, objective realities and, hence, real for those who were successfully recruited by reason of their sincere desire, however misguided, to help effect reforms in the military establishment and the government. That the core group of rebels managed to mask their own agenda by invoking these grievances validates the reality of many of the shortcomings in the military and the government, and the need to address them decisively if future coup attempts are to be deterred.

There were also coup participants who were impelled by personal motives, and others by institutional factors. There were, in effect, several levels of motivation. The Commission classifies the rebels according to motives with examples which, however, are not exhaustive:

1. For the inner circle of the RAM splinter group or RAM-HF and its recruits (since the original composition and tendencies have changed) — a continuation of their original plan in 1986 to take power for themselves which evolved from a desire for reform initially within the military (i.e., Honasan, Batac, Kapunan, Turingan, Lucas, Legaspi, Malajacan, Aguinaldo, Purugganan);
2. For the Marcos-Ver Loyalist forces (Loyalist) — to regain the power and privileges enjoyed during the Marcos regime or to repay past favors (*utang na loob*) by honoring a "commitment" to help when called upon (i.e., Zumel, Tecson, Oliveros, Pizarro, Gojo);
3. For high ranking military officials — ambition which cannot be realized within the existing chain of command (i.e., Comendador, Abenina, Calajate);
4. For some senior officers and many junior officers — deference to peers, superiors, or "mistahs", and *pakikisama* (de la Peña, Calimag, Panelo); the attraction and excitement of a conspiracy that promises windfall gains in power and career opportunities (Fusilero); career "insurance" in the light of the perception after the EDSA Revolt that, regardless of who wins, the military establishment will continue as before with no apparent stake in

the form or structure of government. Thus, maintaining the network of camaraderie is more important to a career than taking a definitive stand against the coup; and

5. Misguided idealism or an expression of sympathy for "valid" causes (i.e. Gregory Ramos, Tomas, Ong).

Why did the December 1989 coup attempt happen?

Filipinos want change — some to the extent of "any change" in the belief that it can only be better than the present, at least for themselves. This pervading sentiment in Philippine society can easily be mistaken for support by the impatient or the ambitious. In the case of the military, as discussed in Chapters II and III, crossing the dividing line between being politicalized (awareness of societal problems) and politicized (taking power for themselves) can easily be rationalized, especially by the well-meaning.

This clamor for change is not solely a product of the EDSA Revolt. That would be an incomplete perspective of history. The EDSA Revolt is a convenient point of reference because it was a dramatic event that capsulized a long struggle for a new order of morality, economic progress, social justice, and enlightened leadership.

In this context, the shortcomings of the Aquino government cannot be the root cause of the coup. As pointed out in Chapter III, the political achievements and economic performance of the Aquino government, at least up to the December 1989 attempt, compare favorably with past regimes in the country and those of other countries in the region. However, the Aquino government could be faulted for failing to live up to the promise of its glorious beginnings.

Despite the genuine achievements of the EDSA Revolt and of the three years prior to December 1989, the country continued to experience structural tensions in the social fabric that called for more than piecemeal solutions.

Thus, the December 1989 attempt, as well as the other six attempts against the Aquino administration, happened as a result of a propitious conjuncture of motive, circumstance, and perceived opportunity.

1. There was a group of officers which enjoyed high credibility within the ranks of the military because of their service records and their cultivated reputation as reformists even during the

Marcos regime, and the perception within the military that they caused the Aquino government to improve the lot of the soldier.

2. This group of officers, highly politicized by the transformation, in general, of the military over the years (see Chapter II) and the group's special status during the Marcos regime, decided to grab power for themselves, representing that they could do better than civilians in governing the country.
3. They thought that it was a good time to launch the coup because of the declining popularity of the Aquino government and the reality of many of the issues being raised by media and various interest groups, and because the country was undergoing the difficult process of transition to a newly-restored democracy with structural and institutional weaknesses and a complex set of difficult problems.

The question may well be asked, if the clamor for change is so strong and the elements for success appeared to be present, why did the December attempt fail and turn out to be unpopular?

Because the people were not disposed to it, as they were for the EDSA Revolt. The December 1989 coup attempt was perceived as an attack on democracy, the EDSA Revolt as a return to it. Surveys showed that the unpopularity of the December 1989 attempt is not as much a reflection of high satisfaction at the performance of government as a natural aversion against violent and illegitimate means to effect change. The Filipino is essentially conservative and patient, and considers electoral change as a valid democratic exercise despite its imperfections. Furthermore, the motives of the coup participants were suspect. After all, they themselves acknowledged the electoral victory of President Aquino in 1986. The tactical alliance between the RAM-HF and the Loyalists that became public knowledge for the first time during the coup, although traceable to earlier signs of collaboration, contributed to the distrust. Finally, the economic indicators by December 1989 were positive compared to the severe recession prior to February 1986.

However, popular support is not a precondition for the success of a coup, only for the sustainability of the resulting dispensation. Sometimes, not even for that purpose, if the military regime is willing to resort to the indiscriminate use of force and violence to maintain itself. That the December 1989 attempt turned out to be unpopular was not the reason for its failure. Its failure was a combination of genuine heroism on the part of some government forces, tactical mistakes by the coup plotters

and the hesitancy of key rebel figures (i.e., Blando), timely intervention of military-civilian forces particularly at gateway roads to Metro Manila, and failure of the rebels to elicit a bandwagon effect from major military units in the country.

B. Analysis

B.1. The Context

Transitions are never easy. Political transitions from dictatorship to democracy are especially difficult because democratic processes are usually slow, cumbersome and diverted by the noisy. They involve competing interests of diverse groups, unequal in influence, which have to be harmonized for policy to emerge. There is also the resistance, if not deliberate obstruction, by vested interests and well-entrenched power blocs to any change that would reduce their privileged positions in the system.

Favored business elites, political leaders of the old regime, and military groups that propped it up and were handsomely rewarded in exchange are the natural opponents of democratization. Unfortunately, the weakness of political institutions inherent in the transition process limits their capacity to neutralize these opponents of desirable change.

If the dictatorship left a path of plunder and economic devastation, the problems of transition become exacerbated. Inherited economic problems cannot be solved overnight. Democratic space can become an open arena for unbridled, even violent political contestation where government is expected to uphold individual democratic rights, while it fights for its very survival. Among the poor and hungry, democracy provides a weak rallying point for political unity with and support for the political leadership. In the face of perceived government weaknesses, public alienation, or even indifference, those who wish to recapture their lost positions of privilege may engage in military adventurism.

The series of coup attempts against the Aquino government can be seen in this light.

B.2. Reaping the Whirlwind

The destruction of political institutions and processes during the Marcos dictatorship and the resulting military role expansion beyond defense and security and law and order provided the environment for the politicization of a significant number of officers in the Armed Forces of

the Philippines (AFP). The supremacy of civilian authority over the military, secured by various institutional controls, was transformed into one secured primarily by the person of Marcos.

Even that control was breached and weakened by the political rivalry between the Ver (former Chief of Staff Gen Fabian Ver) and Enrile (former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile) factions within the military during the last few years of the dictatorship. The failed coup attempt of February 1986 which was overtaken by the EDSA Revolt was the logical consequence of that rivalry. And because civilian control over the military was personal, when Marcos was removed, it exposed the political system to the peril of autonomous military adventurism, since institutionalized civilian control would take time to rebuild.

The ascension of a woman Commander-in-Chief for the first time in the country's history must have required a major adjustment in the operational and psychological world of the military, particularly since her style of leadership is a marked contrast to that of Marcos. The military's perception of a woman leader is graphically portrayed in a remark made by a retired officer when asked by the Commission whether a woman Secretary of National Defense would be acceptable to the AFP. He said the reaction of the military would probably be: "What? Another woman again?"¹⁶ But apart from being a woman, the military only knew her as the wife of Ninoy Aquino, a political prisoner who was later assassinated while under military custody. Perhaps the military could not believe that she could forgive and forget her husband's assassination for which members of the military were under prosecution, some of whom have been recently convicted. Somehow this background must have been a hindrance in forging an easier or more comfortable relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and the military she led.

The institutionalization of non-military functions for the AFP, seriously begun in 1966, facilitated the politicalization of officers as they acquired non-military skills from civilian graduate schools and exposed them to wider civilian public and socio-economic-political situations. In some cases, military officers became wielders of tremendous economic and political power, in addition to their original organized armed power.

The exigencies of dictatorial rule led to the erosion of the professional values of achievement and merit in promotions and assignments. They were replaced by the primary criterion of personal loyalty to the civilian and military leadership especially as popular dissent grew. Initially, this criterion seemed to have been a major consideration in the post-

EDSA period for the simple reason that the military President Aquino inherited was the same military that Marcos used in order to maintain his rule and which he coddled in return. Given the persistent coup attempts since July 1986, the officers' loyalty not only to the Constitution but also to the duly constituted authority was necessary if the constitutional order were to have a chance of surviving. Unfortunately, this had been perceived as a return to the old system. Hence, the complaint about the *tayo-tayo* and *bata-bata* systems by rebel military officers.

The persistence of this tendency is part of the Marcos legacy to the military, one that will take time to repair. The failed December 1989 coup indicated that even personal pledges of loyalty given to superior officers are no guarantee against participation in a coup. The case of BGen Marcelo Blando is one classic example. He pledged loyalty to AFP Chief of Staff Gen Renato de Villa even as the coup attempt was already underway. In the end, his commitment to the coup plotters prevailed, although his hesitation, presumably because of de Villa's repeated calls, might have been a fatal setback for the rebels since several units appeared to have been half-hearted while waiting for him to order or lead them.

The objective socio-economic-political environment was merely an excuse for military adventurism. As noted in Chapter III, the performance of the economy was positive and various indicators suggested some improvements in welfare. Even the soldier's pay and other benefits have been significantly improved since 1986.¹⁷ The military also continued to have a significant share in policy-making in areas related to its role. Even if there was a perception of weakness in the political leadership, this was not a sufficient reason for launching a coup. The failed coup attempt in December 1989, and even previous ones, was greatly influenced by the misperception among politicized officers that President Aquino owed her position to the original Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) of which ex-Lt Col Gregorio Honasan's faction (RAM-HF) is a splinter. This misperception was reinforced by media adulation after the EDSA Revolt, painting Honasan and his group as larger-than-life heroes, thereby muting the unseemly aspects of their careers.

The Commission received testimony that during their heyday at the Ministry of National Defense (MND), Honasan would call senior officers to his office, in obvious disregard of seniority and hierarchy norms. The fact that it was people power that installed President Aquino is a reality yet to be accepted by the RAM-HF and their civilian supporters. As former Undersecretary of National Defense Jose M. Crisol said, they have to be disabused of this misperception. Crisol added

that "Cory was the soul and spirit of the EDSA Revolution," and that even if Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Ramon Felipe was right in saying that there was no evidence she won the elections, the overwhelming ratification of the 1987 Constitution legitimized her rule.¹⁸

Supremacy of civilian authority over the military is the overriding principle governing the relations between the civilian government and the military under the new Constitution. The contraction of the military's role aimed at returning the soldiers to the barracks has not been possible after February 1986 because of the persistence of the twin communist and Muslim insurgencies which, though unsolvable through military means, nevertheless require a response with a strong and large military component. In some areas of the countryside, the weakness of the civilian bureaucracy and local governments continues to devolve civilian responsibilities to the military. Thus, the AFP's socio-economic functions continue to be discharged by soldiers, even in the stages of the counter-insurgency program assigned to the civilian government. Young rebel officers decry this situation as it forces them to spread their scarce resources too thinly. It is also unwise to use the military for this purpose as their extended exposure to local conditions tends to politicize them.

From the RAM side, it appears that their misperception about the EDSA Revolt led some of them to assume a role of guardian of the national interest, the country's gatekeeper to Malacañang as it were, in their mistaken belief that they are the arbiters of issues on legitimacy. This is reflected in their somewhat naive but presumptuous question, "Why was it right then and wrong now?" referring to the EDSA Revolt and their post-EDSA coup attempts. Because they mistakenly thought that their failed coup attempt against Marcos succeeded in the wake of people power, they expected an equal sharing of power with President Aquino. Thus, they objected to the release of political prisoners, the ceasefire and peace talks with communist and Muslim insurgents, and complained about what they believed were left-leaning members of the Cabinet. Military socialization into the ideology of anti-communism did not help ease their perception that President Aquino was too soft on the communists.

An unfortunate post-EDSA development was the ascendance to power of persons who faced the military across the barricades or who defended victims of political and military repression during the dictatorship. They brought with them anti-military sentiments and biases which, given the factors discussed above, probably foreclosed any

possibility of early reconciliation between the new government and specific sectors in the military.

B.3. If At First You Don't Succeed...

Enrile and the RAM-HF apparently did not give up their original coup intentions even after the EDSA Revolt and President Aquino had assumed office. He formed an elite group, a battalion purportedly organized to counter hijacking and other terrorist activities, in his capacity as chairman of the National Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH). Honasan headed the group. Although it aroused the suspicion of several high-ranking officers, nothing was done about it until after November 1986. He also recommended to the newly-installed President Aquino the designation of his trusted aide, Col Tirso Gador, to head the Presidential Security Command (PSC).

At first glance, the RAM-HF and the Loyalists seemed to be natural enemies whose coming together could materialize only out of desperation. However, contrary to this view, the December 1989 coup attempt may have been simply the culmination of a reconciliation process which started soon after the EDSA Revolt. The Manila Hotel incident of July 1986, perpetrated by Loyalists in and out of the military, was allegedly known to some members of the RAM-HF before it actually took place but the information was not passed on to the government or the AFP leadership. As noted in Chapter IV, Lt Col Eduardo Kapunan, Jr reportedly informed a correspondent about it at least six hours before the event. In fact, both President Aquino and the then Chief of Staff, Gen Fidel Ramos flew to Cagayan de Oro City, leaving the Executive Secretary (Joker Arroyo) and the Vice Chief of Staff (Lt Gen Salvador Mison) in charge of Malacañang and the AFP, respectively.

Having known of it in advance, it might be surmised that the RAM-HF intentionally kept the information to itself and could have welcomed it as a barometer of popular sentiment, i.e., if enough people rallied around the incident and a critical mass reached, they would have taken it over, come out on top, and subsequently obtained control of the government. The RAM-HF was also in the thick of negotiations between the Loyalists and the government during the incident. Its two leaders, Honasan and Kapunan, extricated loyalist officers like Cols Rolando Abadilla and Dictador Arquiza, and Maj Reynaldo Cabauatan from the Manila Hotel on 8 July one hour ahead of the evacuation schedule. Defense Minister Enrile pre-empted both President Aquino and Ramos in negotiating a settlement of the incident with the loyalist rebels even

before the two returned from Cagayan de Oro City to Manila. Enrile came out looking good in the eyes of the Loyalists for the leniency with which they were treated.

Such leniency set the tone for government handling of subsequent coup attempts. The rationale that the rebels did not fire a single shot and that there were no casualties from the incident became the standard yardstick for determining the extent of punishment for military adventurism. Leniency, however, tended to encourage, rather than deter, participation in subsequent coup attempts. As the military is socialized into its own system of reward and punishment to instill discipline, leniency only encourages undisciplined behavior among officers. A related question is one of amnesty for the rebel military. The gravity of their act lies in the fact that they are armed by the state and have taken a solemn oath to defend the Constitution and duly constituted authority. A coup attempt is nothing short of treason and the principals involved should not be treated lightly.

The "God Save The Queen" plot of November 1986 was potentially the most dangerous because, as narrated in Chapter IV, it could have been a chain-of-command coup and, in all probability, would have succeeded if Gen Ramos and his major service commanders had agreed to the coup overtures of the RAM-HF and Enrile. Despite the adroit management of the situation by Gen Ramos and the major service commanders, Army Commanding General Canieso, Air Force Chief Sotelo, Naval Chief Jardiniano, and Constabulary Chief de Villa, and their refusal to join, the RAM-HF nevertheless attempted to launch the "God Save The Queen" plot and to wrest power from President Aquino. Interestingly, Marcos's KBL (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) politicians were to have cooperated in the attempt by taking over the Batasang Pambansa and convening a rebel parliament, while RAM-HF took control of strategic targets. The attempt fizzled out without any shot being fired and without any casualty but for Enrile whom President Aquino unequivocally and decisively removed from the Cabinet. Unfortunately, Honasan and company were allowed to go free and none of them was even formally investigated. While subsequent coup attempts after November 1986 and before August 1987 had Loyalist forces as the main plotters and participants, the involvement of Honasan Guardians, who constitute a small segment of the total membership, suggests that a collaboration between the RAM-HF and the Loyalist forces must have already been taking shape. Moreover, Honasan interceded with Gen Ramos on behalf of the loyalist rebels who took over GMA-7 in January 1987 on the pretext that any drastic action would divide the AFP. On hindsight, it is likely that he was even then protecting potential allies.

Honasan signed as witness to the Articles of Incorporation of the Guardian Brotherhood, Inc. (GBI) and was the principal incorporator of the Guardian Centre Foundation, Inc. (GCFI). The latter was supposed to be a civilian-military group aimed at supporting the AFP.

In the Black Saturday mutiny of April 1987, both Loyalist forces and the Guardians were again involved. A collaboration may have also been arranged for the August 1987 coup attempt which is generally thought to be a RAM-HF conspiracy. Maj Cabauatan, who was one of the leaders of the Manila Hotel incident, the January 1987, and April 1987 coup attempts, was reportedly at the rebels' staging point at the Valle Verde Lodge in San Fernando, Pampanga during the attempt.

From the above, it may be concluded that the RAM-HF and the Loyalists, as the two principal military rebel groups continuously plotting against the Aquino government, must have started to develop collaborative ties as early as July 1986 which culminated in their joint launching of the December 1989 coup attempt. The same principals appear again and again as far back as February 1986: Enrile and the RAM-HF, primarily Honasan, Kapunan, Lt Col Victor Batac, ex-Navy Capt Felix Turingan, ex-Lt Col Oscar Legaspi, ex-LCdr Jaime Lucas, among others; and the Loyalists led by Zumel with Cabauatan, Abadilla, and others. The latter two were absent in the December 1989 failed coup. Cabauatan was in jail, while Abadilla had become the Vice Governor of Ilocos Norte.

The December 1989 coup attempt was the biggest as both factions were able to activate old ties and loyalties, as well as draft new recruits from disgruntled or idealistic officers. It appears from data in Chapter VI that the bulk of the rebel officers came from the PMA, in spite of the fact that from 75 to 80 percent of the AFP officer corps are non-PMA sourced. Old ties forged at the PMA appear to have been activated for the December 1989 failed coup. They might also have called in all their "chips" in the process and seriously depleted their resources. Among the disgruntled or idealistic officers could be the Young Officers Union (YOU), which could be a genuine splinter of the RAM-HF. In the same way that generational and leadership gaps gave birth to the CPP/NPA (Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples' Army) within the old communist movement and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) sprang from the original Mindanao Independence Movement (not Canoy's), controlled by older Muslim politicians, YOU could be an attempt to distance younger generation officers from their elders, many of whom could have been tainted by close association with powerful politicians in the previous regime. Seeking change possibly for reasons

different from their elders, these idealistic officers became easy recruits into the plot.

It must also be pointed out that factionalism exists in the AFP. As long as this is denied, it cannot be addressed. As the resources and the time of the Commission are limited, it could not look into this problem as thoroughly as required to recommend remedial measures. Together with grievances like the *bata-bata* system, anomalies in procurement and supplies, graft and corruption of senior officers, inadequate attention to the needs of the soldiers in the field, and others, factionalism must be studied in order to find their solutions. By doing so, the military, especially its politicalized members would realize that government is not insensitive to their grievances, that government cares enough to attend to the legitimate causes of the virus that has led some of them to conspire against the government, and that it is sympathetic to meaningful reforms.

B.4. A Fatal Miscalculation

Some people find what they hope to see in a situation. The rebels saw a psychomilieu they thought favorable to their interventionist enterprise. The polls indicated a decline of government popularity particularly that of President Aquino who started her presidency with an exceptionally high popularity rating. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives, already scoring low, scored even lower in the polls immediately preceding the December 1989 coup attempt. The rebels must have interpreted this as a propitious time to unseat President Aquino, expecting if not the support of the population at least their indifference or neutrality. They failed to understand that popular dissatisfaction is one thing, supporting an unconstitutional means of changing political leaders is another.

The scandals splashed in media involving government officials or institutions such as the much-publicized Garchitorena land scam, car and gun importations by members of Congress, gun smuggling by one Congressman, the "sexcapades" in the Senate, to name a few, were focal points for government critics and the opposition to attack the government. This influenced the perceptions of the rebels. While they often complain about graft and corruption, very few were able to cite specific cases. Instead, they name the media as their source of information.¹⁹ The scandals provided the rebels with an excuse to intervene in political affairs purportedly to put a halt to these perceived anomalies in government. They provided the proverbial fuel for the fires of rebellion already ignited by rebel leaders and recruiters.

Metro Manila's problems of power outages and inadequate public transport on its congested and pock-marked roads must have been generalized for the entire country and compounded their knowledge of the breakdown of the delivery of basic services in the countryside. The polls also indicated reduced optimism as to the people's perceptions about their economic prospects.²⁰

In addition, perceived unjustified attacks against some officers by politicians, especially relating to the confirmation of promotions and the PC-PNP bill, provided another source of grievance among some members of the military. In Cebu, the December 1989 coup attempt was preceded by discussions against the PC-PNP bill and could have been used as a venue for proselytization by Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero. It may be recalled that several military officers based there behaved suspiciously before and during the coup attempt. They have been recommended for further investigation by the Commission in its Resolution No. 059 dated 17 April 1990 and are so classified in Chapter VI of this Report.

The plotters must have been hoping to see another EDSA Revolt in subsequent plots. This is evidenced by their attempts to organize a civilian component to shield the military rebels from government troops. The civilian Marcos loyalists provided this function during the Manila Hotel incident and the GMA 7 takeover. They must have seen the potential for mass civilian support against the government in the reduced satisfaction ratings for government, alleged anomalies in government as widely publicized by media, and the reported failure to deliver basic services not only in the countryside but also in Metro Manila. Their miscalculation was fatal as Filipinos overwhelmingly rejected the coup attempt in various polls conducted nationwide after the failed coup. About 82 percent did not approve of the coup even as 30 percent agreed with many of the rebels' grievances.²¹

In fact, many civilians did more than just condemn the coup in opinion surveys. Despite the generally poor communication between the central and local government,²² civilians coordinated in their communities with the military in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Muntinlupa, Quezon City, Camarines Sur, and other places to stop rebel troops while allowing those considered friendly to pass through. Special mention must also be made of the management and technicians of ABS-CBN, PTV-4, and GMA-7, who had the presence of mind and the courage to disable the broadcast facilities and thereby prevent the rebels from using TV and radio for propaganda. And, of course, the Philippine Red Cross volunteers wrote their own passages of heroism in the nation's history. Filipinos unquestionably wanted to give democracy and the Constitution a chance.

B.5. Financing the Coup Attempt

In accordance with Sec (d) of RA No. 6832 and the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Resolution No. 004), the Commission applied with the Monetary Board of the Central Bank to inspect the bank accounts of several civilian and military persons, including the much publicized US\$100,000 allegedly deposited by the wife of a high ranking rebel officer, to determine whether there were any evidence that these individuals either financed or received money in connection with the failed 1989 December coup. The Commission in the course of its investigation examined accounts in no less than eight commercial banks. In each instance, the Commission found no evidence directly linking the accounts with the attempted coup.

Moreover, Central Bank Governor Jose L. Cuisia, by letter, confirmed to the Commission that there were no unusual withdrawals from foreign currency deposits during the period immediately preceding the coup attempt.

On the other hand, the Commission is not surprised by its findings regarding the possible use of bank accounts in the last attempted coup. It is reasonable to suppose that the conspirators and supporters of the attempted coup would not be so reckless as to use the commercial banking system to funnel funds to the rebels, and thus create an audit trail government prosecutors can trace. Also, it should be noted that the rebels utilized equipment, arms, vehicles, aircrafts, armor and, of course, personnel supplied by and paid for by the government. There is also no conclusive evidence that large amounts of money of the magnitudes initially talked about (up to \$50 million or ₱1 billion) was a major factor or consideration in launching the coup.

Nevertheless, the Commission is of the opinion that some money was distributed which was generated for the rebels mainly from local sources, particularly from those individuals and firms in whose interest it is to destabilize the government.

There is some evidence of money being held or distributed by the coup plotters. The nocturnal activities of Col Alexander Noble, Lt Col Victor Batac, and ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit in Heroes Hills, Quezon City and in Room 1701 of Holiday Inn, those of Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero in Cebu City, the undocumented source of some ₱200,000 deposited by Lt Col Arsenio Tecson's wife on 5 December 1989 at a Cubao branch of a bank, and the Galido expose on Luis Tabuena and Cherry Cobarrubias indicate that cash may have been provided to the coup conspirators. BGen Jose

Comendador was reportedly overheard requesting over the telephone a cash donation allegedly from a company in Cebu City, in order to avoid being accosted at the government checkpoints.²³ Customs Commissioner Mison also said that he heard about a high ranking officer's wife supposedly receiving a check for ₱500,000, some company commanders being offered ₱20,000 and some generals between ₱1 million and ₱2 million if they would join the plot.²⁴ Offers of private contribution, such as the one made to Navy Capt Re Robles by a Chinese businessman, or solicitation by some Makati-based professionals, must have also been one source of the attempted coup's funding.

Based on the testimonies it received, the Commission also believes that suspected coup plotters had their own "independent" sources of income. Capt Leovic Dioneda's family reportedly controlled *jueteng* operations in Sorsogon. Maj Abraham Purugganan allegedly had an independent source of income from gold-panning operations in Mt Diwalwal in Davao when he was assigned there.²⁵ Col Noble is known to have been in the payroll of loggers. According to businessman Cesar Magsaysay, a friend of Fusilero, Noble receives "allowances" from Agusan loggers. In fact, among the documents recovered from his get-away car at the checkpoint in Sta Rita, Samar was a receipt for ₱5,000.00 by Noble from one Bernie Manpatila. The latter is a brother of the deceased leader of the Higaonon tribe who was Noble's friend. Magsaysay, however, denies that his own Butuan Logs gives Noble a similar "allowance". Bibit's sources of independent income was the Bureau of Customs whose reputation as a lucrative source of graft money is well-known. However, among the alleged plotters, Rodolfo Aguinaldo's sources of such income are perhaps the biggest — he allegedly controlled illegal logging, illegal gambling, and the Small Town Lottery (STL) in Cagayan. Thus, he was able to buy, it is said, the loyalty of Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) and even military officers based in that province.²⁶

Cash was used to pay for the fishing vessel chartered by the mysterious Artemio Tan who allegedly claimed to be a businessman from Puerto Princesa, Palawan. The vessel, Lady Vi-T-1, brought Lt Col Arsenio Tecson's 68 IB and Maj Alfredo Oliveros's 24 IB from Bataan to Sangley and back. It is owned by Odessa Fishing and Trading Corporation of Navotas, Metro Manila. Curiously, Odessa's Board Chairman, Rufino Tiangco, admitted being a close friend of Romeo (Romy) Rivera and a business associate of Honasan's brother, Don.

Almost from the beginning of the Commission's investigation, this vessel has been a major object of interest for the simple reason that

nobody at Bataan, Sangley or Naval District II (ND II) seemed to have been able to either take a good look at it to be able to describe it, or to have found it after it ferried the rebel troops back to Bataan. Yet it reportedly carried about 800 troops. The Commission's finding the vessel was nothing short of serendipitous. In the process, another possible connection between conspirators was unearthed. The main actors in the charter of this vessel are linked through Honasan.

It will be recalled that Rivera was already implicated in the failed December coup. Arms, ammunition, and communications equipment were found by the military in his house after the coup attempt. Rivera is the incumbent President of the Philippine Rifle and Shotgun Association where Jackie Enrile is chairman. A friend of Honasan's since 1979, Rivera is the godfather of one of Honasan's children. In turn, Honasan is godfather to one of Rivera's children.²⁷ According to Tiangco, Rivera introduced him to Honasan and his brother, Don, at a stag party Rivera tendered in Don's honor three years ago. Since then Tiangco and Don had been engaged in business, with Don supplying Odessa's cement needs.

The suspicious nature of the charter, the equally suspicious behavior of Odessa's owners, and their personal relationship with the Honasans and persons close to them as described in Chapter V, may lead one to conclude that the said charter was fictitious and that the fishing vessel could very well be Tiangco's contribution to Don's brother's adventurism. Don was allegedly also involved in the "God Save the Queen" plot. His car was intercepted in Camp Aguinaldo by Commo Virgilio Marcelo filled with firearms which the latter confiscated. They included Galil and Ultimax weapons loaded in three Land Cruisers in addition to Don's car. They were later released presumably to Honasan.²⁸ A person who closely resembles Don Honasan was also seen on television tape among the rebels in the vicinity of the Domestic Airport during the December 1989 coup attempt by a CIS (Constabulary Intelligence Service) agent in the presence of one of the members of the Commission.

Cash was similarly used to pay for another mysterious charter, this time of an aircraft, by one Roberto Huang some ten days before the failed coup of December 1989. Curiously, the aircraft belongs to the Executive and Tourist Aviation owned by Chemical Industries of the Philippines, Inc., one of whose owners is known to have had close links with Marcos. The funds were allegedly sent by couriers from one Oliver Ker of Kota Kinabalu to Huang who paid the charter in cash and kept the remainder. Ker was connected with Jayapuri Brunei, Ltd.²⁹

As discussed in Chapter V, this mysterious charter, it seems, was timed to have been in Davao when Eduardo (Danding) Cojuangco, Jr reportedly took off from a private airstrip at Malita, Davao del Sur using another aircraft. Had they wanted to, it would have been possible, according to Capt Adriano Morales, for the chartered aircraft to have flown into Malita from Kota Kinabalu and then proceeded to Davao City Airport to formally record its re-entry into the Philippines with Immigration and Customs authorities.

The use of the aircraft and the fishing vessel could represent contributions of their owners to the coup plotters. One need not contribute funds to support the coup attempt. There were testimonies received by the Commission that civilians sent food to the rebels holed out in various buildings in Makati during the siege there. In fact, the rebels themselves agreed to take food and other supplies from Rustan Commercial Corporation in the Makati Commercial Center allegedly in exchange for sparing the building from being used as a machine gun nest.³⁰

In the end, it is apparent that most of the resources used by the coup plotters were from the government. Arms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies such as those issued to the units that moved against the government, those raided from government armories, and goods from the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs were among the principal resources from the government employed against its duly constituted authority by those who were supposed to defend it. The cash allegedly found on wounded rebels could have been their month's end salary received on 29 November since 30 November was a holiday. Even the initial reports about long lines of soldiers making big deposits in Makati banks turned out to be unsubstantiated.

B.6. Spreading the Coup Virus

In retrospect, the assignment of politicized officers, some of whom were already implicated in previous coup attempts, to sensitive positions like operations, intelligence, training, and logistics, was a serious mistake. This was demonstrated in the August 1987 coup attempt when those implicated in the November 1986 "God Save The Queen" plot were simply reassigned instead of being tried and, if found guilty, punished. Thus, they were able to spread with impunity the coup virus in critical units to which they were sent.

Honasan assumed command over the Special Operations School (SOS) of the PA Training Command (PA TRACOM) in Fort Magsaysay,

Nueva Ecija. The instructors under him included Lt Edmundo Malabanjot, Capts Dominador Lina, and Fidel Legiralde. These turned against the government on 28 August 1987 bringing with them their trainees. The timing of the coup attempt is significant, not only because of the restive political environment, but also because Honasan was supposed to appear before the AFP Anti-Graft Board on 30 August 1987 to account for a substantive number of firearms, radios, vehicles, and about P2 million for the purchase of equipment charged to him while he was commander of the elite anti-terrorist battalion at the Defense Ministry.

Kapunan was reassigned to the PMA after November 1986. Also at the PMA were Maj Wilhelm Deroñal and Capt Gregorio Catapang, RAM members of long-standing. The latter tried to move to Manila with PMA cadets during the August 1987 coup attempt. He was implicated but subsequently cleared. Like Honasan, they were able to influence officers at the PMA into sympathizing with their movement allegedly against anomalies in the military and the government. PMA classes 1988 to 1991 were infected with the virus and stated their support for the rebels during this coup attempt.

Prior to the December 1989 coup attempt, politicized officers were again in control of sensitive positions where they could gather intelligence, order troop mobilization and deployment, train military personnel whom they would bring with them in unauthorized troop movements, or control logistics and supplies. Lt Col Romelino Gojo and Capt Danilo Lim were their units' operations officers while Cmdr Proceso Maligalig and Commo Domingo Calajate were in logistics and supplies. Purugganan was commandant of the Officers Candidates School (OCS). They were able to operate within their areas of responsibility for the rebel cause without inviting suspicion until the crucial hour of the coup attempt's launching. Chapter VI discusses the rebel network.

The dispersal of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) after the December 1989 coup attempt may not have been a wise decision as it may only spread the coup virus to a wider area. Units that may not be coup prone could be infected by politicized Scout Rangers. It may have been more prudent to have put the regiment under a respected commanding officer who could reorient the men. Their dispersal could even exacerbate anti-government sentiments as Rangers are a very tightly-knit group and take pride in their distinction as an effective elite force. Their dispersal may be perceived as an unacceptable indignity to their unit.

B.7. Recruitment and Mobilization Factors

An important recruitment factor seems to be "old boy" networks in the AFP. Among older generation officers implicated in the failed December 1989 coup, a look at their service records tend to show their previous long association with either former Defense Minister Enrile or General Ver. Many occupied positions in the Jacinto group of companies managed by active-duty officers close to Enrile or were with the Presidential Security Command/National Intelligence Security Agency (PSC/NISA) under Ver. Among the latter are those who were attached to embassies or consulates abroad, either as defense attaches or intelligence officers with innocuous titles not normally found in embassy or consulate lists of personnel. These ties were apparently activated for the December 1989 coup attempt as we saw officers who were not involved in previous coups moving against the government together with well-known "repeaters" such as Honasan, Kapunan, Turingan, Batac, Abenina, and Zumel.

Gojo was described as Ver's "side-kick,"³¹ having spent more time with Ver at the PSC than with the Marines.³² He is also Honasan's third cousin. He reportedly held a grudge against the Aquino government for having pulled his younger brother, a pilot, from Manila after the EDSA Revolt. His brother was assigned to Mindanao where his aircraft crashed. His body was never found. Gojo is said to support his deceased brother's family.³³ In Gojo's case, both old ties and personal grudge against the government must have led him to join the failed December 1989 coup.

Younger officers, not previously implicated surfaced for the first time. Lt Emil Ong seems to represent the young idealistic officer, indignant over broad social issues like poverty, privileges of the wealthy, and injustice of the system. He believes in the goals of reform and wished a hastening of the coup plot in order to quickly accomplish the implementation of reforms in the military and in the government.³⁴ Other young officers like Capt Gregory Ramos and Lt Oscar Singson moved out of their barracks to show their sympathy for the rebels.³⁵ Still others who may not have been originally sympathetic to the rebels were indignant for what they perceived to be US intervention in Philippine domestic affairs. These included the 25 officers who dialogued with BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr in Davao City, as well as the 40 who met with BGen Rogelio Villanueva in Cagayan de Oro City (See Chapter V and VI). Disillusionment with the system, affected by what they perceive as continuing problems of poverty and the breakdown of basic services in the countryside, graft and corruption in the corridors of power,

insurgencies that do not go away, and foreign dependence, among others, must have been compelling reasons for young idealistic officers either to join the plot or to show sympathy for the plotters.

Among the known recruiters who called on their classmates and friends were Fusilero and Bibit. Fusilero used his motorcycle gang, the Cyclones (short for Cycling Lunatics), as his cover in recruiting allies during their trips throughout the country. Bibit undertook his recruitment in the Visayas where he comes from, with the gun club, and through his Custom's connections. He was reported by BGen Galileo Kintanar of ISAFP (Intelligence Service of the AFP) to Commissioner Salvador Mison, Bibit's superior at the Bureau of Customs. Col Carlos Tanega also called Mison's attention about Bibit's recruitment activities. Unfortunately, Mison did not take a personal interest in the matter, much less attempt to neutralize him, because Mison felt his "primary responsibility is to collect revenues for the government. "... I feel that the job of... going after these people fighting the government rests solely in the hands of the AFP." Mison did ask his chief of intelligence to watch Bibit.³⁶

Recruitment seems to have been done rather obliquely, as officers said, "*pakiramdaman lang muna*." This is why it may be difficult for officers to categorically state that they had been approached for recruitment into a conspiracy. Overtures usually begin by talking about the ills of society and when the recruiter senses that the object of recruitment is vulnerable, i.e., dissatisfied with the military and/or civilian government, desires change or is predisposed towards a coup, further discussions are arranged until the object becomes a recruit.

An effective mobilization factor is the political inclination of the units' commanding officer. BGen Blando's units were mobilized in large numbers, i.e., Tecson's 68 IB, Oliveros's 24 IB, Lt Col Levy Zamora's 56 IB, Lt Col Rolan Erasmo's 73 IB, Maj Pedro Gutierrez's 71 IB and the company from the Scout Ranger Training Center under Capt Herbert Avinante. Blando appeared to be the key factor behind these troop movements as their division commander. Although not directly under him, the rebel Rangers such as the FSRR HQ, 4 SRB under Lt Col Galvez, and 3 SRB under Capt Flores, appeared to look up to him for leadership. Because he was expected to fly by helicopter into Fort Bonifacio by the Scout Rangers who held that camp, he initially appeared not to join the troops of Erasmo, Gutierrez, and Avinante whom he ordered to proceed to Camp Aguinaldo. The Sikorsky helicopter flown by Lt Gregor Mendel Panelo which landed in the vicinity of Fort Magsaysay at about 1:00 p.m. of 1 December must have been the aircraft assigned to bring Blando to

Fort Bonifacio. When Gen de Villa once more urged him to bring troops to Camp Aguinaldo to reinforce it from rebel soldiers, Blando was overheard asking if GHQ (General Headquarters) could provide them with air cover. When de Villa answered in the affirmative, Blando must have realized that the rebel air assets had been destroyed and decided to go to Manila with the above-cited troops by land. He led the convoy from Fort Magsaysay not to Camp Aguinaldo but to a "neutral place" — Greenhills Commercial Center — where he established his post contrary to de Villa's orders.

There is reason to believe that Tecson and Zamora moved on Blando's orders. Tecson asked to be allowed to return to Bataan and refused a diversion of his mission to secure Sangley when this was lost to the government troops led by Lt Col Edgar Aglipay, Laguna Provincial Commander and Lt Col Nicetas Katigbak, Cavite Provincial Commander. He said this was the extent of his "commitment" and did not proceed to attack the Headquarters of the Western Police District (HWPd) to which he was allegedly directed.³⁷ Zamora, on the other hand, insisted on moving towards Manila allegedly on Blando's orders. He agreed to return to his post only after learning that Blando had already been compromised. It is also possible that the superior force of his classmate, Lt Col Efren Fernandez, Pampanga Provincial Commander, made him rethink his position.

The participation of officers closely associated with Ver, like Gojo and Navy Capt Danilo Pizarro, seems to have been a function of their long association at the PSC/NISA. To some extent, this may similarly apply to Tecson and Galvez (4 SRB) who were at the PSC during the last 14 years of Marcos's rule, some of which were spent abroad.

The deployment of some 26 prison guards and four civilians at the instance of Rodolfo Morit, Jr, an incorporator of GCFI, to fight on the rebel side is a mobilization through fraternal ties. Guardians have been in nearly each coup attempt since July 1986. Morit and Job Gavino, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Police Station Commander, were allegedly the contact persons of this group when it was fetched from the New Bilibid Prisons in the evening of 30 November for Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA).³⁸ Interestingly, Gavino was present at the PPA office when rebel soldiers took it over and enticed GCFI members from Baguio City to join the coup attempt.³⁹ Gavino denied participation in it.

Deception may have also been a mobilization factor. Members of the GCFI led by Baguio Assistant City Prosecutor Elmer Sagsago were told

to converge at the North Harbor on 30 November for an alleged GCFI meeting. It turned out that the North Harbor PPA office was used as a rebel recruitment and mobilization post. The GCFI members were invited to join the coup attempt but Sagsago said they instead quietly slipped out of the area in two's and three's to escape rebel detection.⁴⁰

When the MBLT 4 moved out of Fort Bonifacio into Villamor Air Base (VAB), they were told to "follow the tanks" without being told that the tanks were going to be used against the government. The 221st PC Company under Capt Nestor Bernardino was allegedly brought from Taytay on the pretext of going to a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation in Binangonan but ended up at the vicinity of PTV-4 on the rebel side.⁴¹ A similar claim was made by Pfc Victor Samonte, for the Bravo Company 16 IB based in Mauban, Quezon who was reportedly ordered by Lt General del Rosario to go to Magallanes Commercial Center with six others. They ended up at VAB where they found their gear and the rest of their company. There, del Rosario pointed to their uniforms and guns and told them: "*Wala na tayong pangamba dahil nakuha na natin ang Villamor*". They subsequently attacked Camp Aguinaldo.⁴²

In spite of the real possibility that enlisted men and others could have been deceived into joining the coup attempt, the Commission believes that they should have disengaged when they realized the deception, instead of remaining on the rebel side. While it is hard to distinguish between those who were genuinely deceived, of which there were some, and those who claim being deceived, of which there are many, deception could be the easiest excuse for joining a misadventure that failed.

B.8. The State of Government Readiness

The issue of failure of intelligence has been raised in relation to the last failed coup. Gen de Villa appeared on television's late news on 30 November announcing the discovery of the sabotage of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Repeater Station in Tagaytay City. He said the saboteurs had been taken into custody and while the act was related to a planned coup, the plot had been neutralized. Ironically, however, within the hour the rebel Marines moved out of their cantonment area in Fort Bonifacio and took over VAB.

The Commission received evidence that tends to support the view that one cause of the government troops' apparent unpreparedness may be due to their having become inured to coup rumors and to red alerts which, until 1 December 1989, turned out to be unwarranted. As a

consequence, there was a decline in the times the troops went on red alert from 1 September 1987 to 1 December 1989. It is reasonable to assume that their psychological readiness necessarily also declined. Dramatic declines in red alerts as percentage of days in both the headquarters of the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Marines are evidently clear. In the Navy, red alerts were called 70 days out of 131 (53.4 percent) in 1987, 60.04 out of 366 (16.4 percent) in 1988, and only 16.875 out of 333 (5.07 percent) in 1989. The Marines were on red alert 67 days out of 122 (55 percent) in 1987, 70.9 out of 366 (19.4 percent) in 1988, and 45.4 out of 333 (13.6 percent) in 1989. A less dramatic decline is also evident in the PAF Headquarters. They went on red alert 47 days out of 122 (38.5 percent) in 1987, 113 out of 366 (30.9 percent) in 1988, and 70 out of 333 (21 percent) in 1989.

The soldiers could have become alert-fatigued due to continuing, although declining, red alert days. During this time they have to be in camp without exception. This must be very difficult for them and their families. Persistence of coup rumors that remained rumors must have put them in the same psychological state as the victims of "the boy who cried wolf." When the coup plotters finally struck, they appeared unprepared.

There appears to have been failure of intelligence information being passed on to the appropriate commander or unit. This is what happened in the case of the failure of the Chief of Staff of Regional Command (RECOM) 7 to pass on to his superior the information he obtained at around 10:00 a.m. of 30 November about a coup taking place at 2200 H of the same day. The details were not transmitted to the Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary (HPC) whose highest ranking officer then was BGen Victor Natividad. This must have been the case, too, of the message simul-patched by the Flag Officer in Command (FOIC) that a vessel full of rebel soldiers from Bataan was bound not for Manila as alleged by ND II⁴³ but for Sangley. Lt Cmdr Damian Carlos claimed that the message transmitted by FOIC at 10:30 a.m., 30 November was received by him only at 3:00 p.m. since he was then at his quarters.⁴⁴ If it were simul-patched, the staff intelligence officers of all units should have received and transmitted it to the commanders of ND II, Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Naval Base Cavite (NBC), and Philippine Fleet (PHF). The fact that the vessel reached and left Sangley unmolested indicates the failure to either pass the intelligence on to the appropriate officers or to use the intelligence properly.

The failure to use intelligence information properly is best illustrated by the inaction by the AFP on the report of Maj Alphonsus Crucero of the

Negros Island Command (NICOM) about the recruitment activities of Bibit and Fusilero.

It also appears that Malacañang was not being properly informed about intelligence relating to coup attempts. It was left out in the July 1986 Manila Hotel incident; according to testimony received in Executive Session, Malacañang found out about it from a reporter calling in to verify the incident. Malacañang resorted to buying information from those present around Manila Hotel in order to be updated on the incident. In the November 1986 "God Save The Queen" plot, Malacañang obtained information from non-military sources and delicately leaked it to the press in a manner not traceable to Malacañang in order to alert whoever in the AFP and defense leadership may have been part of the plot that Malacañang was aware of it. More than three years after the event, Malacañang continued to be unaware of its details.⁴⁵

Because of the experience in July 1986, the Bengzon investigating committee organized to look into the Manila Hotel incident recommended an independent civilian source of intelligence gathering for the Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately, the recommendation was not totally acted upon. Little came out of the creation of a Crisis Committee tasked with the responsibility of dealing more effectively with situations like a coup attempt. Such a body, in coordination with the President's own intelligence agency, could have been the appropriate conduit for adequate and accurate information both to the President and the public. In the absence of such information, the public becomes manipulable by misinformation and disinformation unwittingly or deliberately passed on by radio and other media.

The strong camaraderie developed among officers may have been a hindrance in securing credible intelligence on coup attempts. Some soldiers may not be inclined to pass on information regarding their friends or classmates. In fact, some of them testified that it would be very difficult for them to arrest classmates or friends like Honasan. They would rather that the task is assigned to somebody else.⁴⁶ Moreover, their socialization into anti-communism taught them that the enemies are the communists. Consequently, there has been much better intelligence on the CPP/NPA than on the rebel military, according to testimony received in Executive Session. Better military and government preparedness is necessary to deter future coup attempts or reduce further the probability of a successful coup.

B.9. Role of the USAF Phantom Jets

The capability of the AFP to cope with the rebel assault was put to a test when rebel air assets from Sangley attacked Malacañang and government installations in Metro Manila. However, by the time the United States Air Force (USAF) jets flew over Metro Manila at 2:04 p.m. of 1 December, PAF planes flown by Maj Danilo Atienza, Capt Ariel Quijano, and Lt Antonio Avaricio had already destroyed the rebel air assets and the fuel dump at Sangley. The Commission's Interim Report No. 2 dated 12 May 1990 dealt exhaustively with the chronology of events with respect to the USAF jets.

The Commission concluded that the USAF jets did not destroy the rebel air assets nor were they instrumental in keeping the rebel planes on the ground to be destroyed by the PAF jets. That issue being settled, the Commission also wanted to know the military or political value of the so-called persuasion flights, both from hindsight and from the point of view of those making the military decisions at the time.

Gen de Villa contends that, since the tide of battle had started to turn before noon of 1 December with the arrival of more than sufficient reinforcements at Camp Aguinaldo and since the rebel air assets had already been destroyed, the flight of the Phantoms served no real military value for or against the government forces. This view appears to be supported by evidence that several units which intended to support the rebels were not deterred from still moving, even after wide publicity was given to the flight of the Phantoms, e.g. the 56 IB from Aurora, the column of Blando from Fort Magsaysay, the attack by rebel Marines on Camp Aguinaldo in the early morning of 3 December.

On the other hand, the 68 IB and 24 IB that secured Sangley may have decided to return to Bataan not only because the rebel air assets had already been destroyed but because the persuasion flights were made directly over them.

The Phantoms had a reverse effect on the 25 officers in Davao and the 40 in Cagayan de Oro City. They used the flights to express sympathy for the rebels and faulted the government for allowing foreign interference into a strictly "domestic" affair.

Ramos' view qualified de Villa's. He said that hindsight tells us that the persuasion flights did occur after the government had already gained the upperhand. However, at the time of the flight, the AFP command was not fully certain about the capability of the rebels to launch air

strikes from Mactan Air Base (MAB) or to bring reinforcements from Mindanao and Palawan to Manila. It was not until afterwards that the government knew about the refusal of all the pilots to go along with Comendador.

The political value of the flights to the government is questionable. The immediate effect to the public was probably one of relief at the thought that the US was firmly on the government side, particularly after the initial reports of rebel gains. On the other hand, the flights served to give the opposition, at least initially, a platform to put the government on the defensive, some young officers an occasion to express support for the rebels, and the US and its press a propaganda leverage for the bases negotiations. On hindsight, the government would have been better off not calling on the persuasion flights. But 20-20 vision was not available when the flights were first agreed upon at about 11:00 a.m. of 1 December, when a favorable outcome was not yet clearly in sight and a judgment call had to be made. That judgment, which paid immediate tribute to the US and a belated, but eventually fitting, credit to the PAF pilots, may have been the most rational under the circumstances. But its net after-effect is a political setback for the government. It brings home the lesson that there is no substitute for self-reliance and the removal of all vestiges of overdependence on a foreign patron.

B.10. Outnumbered But Not Outfought

Although an officer testified that Commo Domingo Calajate's turn to serve as Senior Command Duty Officer at Camp Aguinaldo on 30 November could not have been anticipated,⁴⁷ the coincidence remains rather suspicious. Infiltration from inside Camp Aguinaldo by LOGCOM officers, one of whom was the Duty Officer for the day, worked in the rebels' favor. The LOGCOM compound occupying two thirds of the camp made it easier for Calajate to position his men and to house a Marine company from the MBLT 1 as well as a Marine guard company to escort supplies for Subic Naval Base from LOGCOM in the evening of 30 November without inviting suspicion.

Inside Camp Aguinaldo, the government side was clearly at a disadvantage during the first several hours of the coup attempt. BGen Rodolfo Biazon, CG National Capital Region Defense Command (NCRDC), said "there were not many government troops in Aguinaldo" during this time.⁴⁸ The troops normally available to him as a maneuver battalion were the ones that bolted out of their cantonment area at Fort Bonifacio and occupied VAB.

Fort Bonifacio was quickly overrun by Scout Rangers who had filtered earlier into the camp from various points in Northern, Central, and Southern Luzon. They took over strategic targets in the camp as the MBLT 4 quickly took over VAB. With the same ease, rebels led by ex-Lt Col Oscar Legaspi, ex-Navy Capt Felix Turingan, and ex-LCdr Jaime Lucas occupied Sangley, took over the PAF air assets there, neutralized the officers, and operated the aircraft against government targets. Their task was made easier by conspiring with officers already inside Sangley like Navy Capt Pizarro of the Philippine Fleet and Navy Capt Jesus Durian, the Naval Base Commander. Durian denied being a rebel. Even PTV-4 was easily taken over by the rebels, again because defenders were greatly outnumbered.

The failure of the rebels to launch a massive and sustained attack against the government forces particularly at Camp Aguinaldo during the early hours of the coup enabled reinforcements from the latter side to get themselves organized and to reach the various camps in time to repel the main rebel attacks. Failure to gain success within the day sealed the fate of the rebels.⁴⁹ This was facilitated by the loyalty of officers who refused to use strategic assets on behalf of the rebels. The pilots at VAB as well as those at MAB, who refused to fly any aircraft for BGen Comendador, crippled the rebels' capability to bring reinforcement troops from Mindanao and to attack government targets. Hence, Comendador had the aircraft but could not fly them. Consequently, the troops from Mindanao brought to MAB apparently for transshipment to Manila to reinforce rebels could not be flown out of Mactan.

Perhaps the rebels' failure to mount a serious attack against government troops and installations and the reluctance of government troops to fire at the rebels could have been a function of their strong bonds of friendship and camaraderie. Soldiers detest fighting against fellow soldiers because the organization's unity, so essential to remaining an effective fighting force, would be breached. This could lead to the destruction of the army itself. Thus, as discussed in the Commission's Interim Report No. 2, the government pilots appeared unwilling to shoot at the rebel-controlled Tora-Toras (T-28) and Sikorskys, equipment that make them an effective fighting unit. Instead they fired warning shots at them, strafed the coasts along the Sangley runway, and only hit them when it became absolutely necessary.⁵⁰ This underlines the merit of the suggestion by MGen (Ret) Ramon Montano and BGen Loven Abadia that government troops should be commanded to fire immediately rather than talk to the other side to ensure their commitment.

B.11. The Sorry State of Military Equipment

Another reason for the pilots' hesitance to destroy the rebel aircraft is the inadequacy of equipment available to the AFP. This is the reason given by one of the F-5 pilots from Basa Air Base on why they exercised maximum tolerance when they first engaged the rebel T-28s. The country's long security relationship with the US has not only led to the neglect of its external defense capability but has also hindered it from modernizing its armed forces. The sorry state of its equipment was driven home to the Commission when it found out that intelligence messages could not be readily transmitted, resulting in the escape of rebel forces or in disadvantages to government forces.

There was a marked difference between the arms allegedly used by the coup leaders, their vehicles, and communications equipment, and those available to government forces. Although the rank and file used government-issued firearms and other supplies, the coup leaders had Uzis, Galils, and Ultimax guns, radio and telephone systems superior to those used by government troops. It will be recalled that Honasan remains accountable for arms, ammunition, and communications equipment issued to him as the commander of the MND elite battalion. After the August 1987 coup attempt, four carloads of M-16s, Galils, and Uzis were presumably returned to him by Commo Marcelo.⁵¹ Bibit's Customs connections could have given him access to sophisticated arms smuggled into the country. The Armburst anti-tank weapon issued to Noble through Sgt Asterio Dejarne came from a parked van at the South Harbor.

Pajeros, L-300 vans, and Land Cruisers appeared to be standard vehicles used by the coup plotters. In contrast, Col Clemente Mariano had to commandeer private trucks, including fish and fruit vendor's trucks, in order to ferry SOLCOM troops to Manila.⁵²

The lamentable state of military equipment has also been cited by military personnel, both rebel and government, as a source of grievance. Inadequate medical facilities and supplies in the field had led soldiers to describe these facilities as Mona Lisa hospitals where "they just lie there and they die there."⁵³ They also complain about politicians who use the military's scarce helicopters in their provincial sorties thereby competing with military purposes such as evacuating the wounded and transporting troops and critical supplies where and when they are most needed. This practice fans their dissatisfaction with politicians whom they think spend more time "politicking" than doing their job in Congress.

B.12. Will There Be Another Coup?

When asked that question, the military's usual answer is that the rebel groups may have the capability for mischief, de-stabilization, or terroristic activities but they do not have the organic forces, critical mass, or covert network in the military establishment to launch an attempt anywhere near the magnitude of the one of December 1989.

Part of the reason is that the rebels may have committed almost all or most of their resources last December, and need some time to remobilize. Despite the impression that they have a large armory which had its origin as far back as the Marcos regime, they still engage in arms' raids under risky conditions.

Secondly, the measures being taken by the government and the military after the December 1989 are better than those after earlier coup attempts. According to the military, the "cavalier" attitude toward coup participants is no longer practiced, to the extent that detainees are now protesting the "inhuman conditions" in military detention centers. A counter-intelligence unit has been organized directly under the CSAFP to address the problem of military mutinies. Loyalty to the Constitution is a major criterion for promotion and assignment to sensitive and command positions. And the benefits to soldiers continue to be improved despite the budgetary problems of the government, although the difficult economic situation will increasingly be felt by the military and their dependents.

Thirdly, the communication program of the government to mobilize public opinion against coups and any kind of violent change has improved considerably.

The Commission agrees with the military that the likelihood of a successful coup is remote. But, at this difficult economic period with more problems lurking around the corner, even the bombings that happen with disturbing regularity could push the country closer to a crisis, and the logical question is — do the rebels have the capability to make an attempt of sufficient magnitude and international impact, however ultimately unsuccessful, that would bring the country to crisis?

The Commission believes that if the measures recommended in this Report are adopted and the processes are sustained for solidarity and peace, first among the political parties, and next among all sectors, the rebel groups can be pre-empted from making such an attempt. At the moment, they appear to have lost some momentum in the war of nerves

with government forces. If the government continues to press the initiative and manages to capture more of the core group, including Honasan, the pre-emption can be permanent.

What about the possibility of a CPP-NPA tie-up with the RAM-HF or the YOU? As the December 1989 events demonstrated, even forces such as the RAM-HF and Loyalists, which may appear to be "oil and water", may have their own catalyzing element, at least for the short-run, in the overriding quest for power. That they will probably end up fighting among themselves over the "spoils", as indicated by attempts at one-upmanship last December, will not deter them from making tactical linkages. After all, they use a common language in representing themselves as real reformers, are able to rationalize the use of violence to attain their ends, and have very little chance of winning in the electoral process. Thus, the 1992 election is not a feasible alternative to them, only an opportunity to radicalize the people if the process is flawed. Should other opportunities present themselves earlier, such as a severe economic crisis, they could get together as a matter of expediency.

While the possibility exists, the strong anti-communist culture of the military, which the rebels adhere to and publicly espouse, is a strong deterrent against such an alliance. It would represent more of a contradiction than the RAM-HF-Loyalist coalition and could divide the rebel ranks. They must surely also realize that it would alienate whatever sympathy they may have among the disillusioned but law-abiding mainstream of society.

B.13. Conduct Expected of Public Officials

Sec 1, Article XI of the Constitution requires public officers to "be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and . . . act with patriotism and justice . . ." Moreover, elective and appointive officials take a solemn oath not only to "defend" but also to "preserve" the Constitution. Thus, they are duty bound as provided by Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code "to resist a rebellion by all means in their power."

As against these standards of conduct prescribed for all public officials, the Commission makes of record the evidence it received regarding the activities and behavior of several opposition politicians, some of whom are elective officials, during the coup attempt.

Since Vice President Salvador Laurel is the constitutional successor to the President, his actions during the period of the attempted coup

take on added importance. He was abroad when the coup occurred. During his stopover in Hongkong, he gave a telephone interview conducted by John Eidinow on 3 December 1989 for British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).⁵⁴ He refused at that time to condemn the coup which is all the more puzzling since the government forces were clearly in the ascendancy by then. Portions of the interview are quoted below for the reader's own consideration.

John Eidinow : "There has been upheaval too in the Philippines. But it has involved armed conflict, deaths, and injuries as President Aquino who has put off six attempted coups and since the people power propelled her into office in 1986. The attempted coup has been declared crushed according to the Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos with early mopping up operations going on. The situation remains confusing but President Aquino calls on the rebels thrice: surrender or die. A short while ago, I called Mrs Aquino's Vice-President but also an opposition leader, Salvador Laurel who's stranded in Hongkong to ask him for his attitude to the attempted coup and to the rebels.

VP Laurel : It's something that should not have happened. It's very painful to see Filipinos fighting and killing brother Filipinos. And I think the situation was exacerbated by the intervention of the United States in this affair.

John Eidinow : But I don't hear you condemning the rebels. [Emphasis supplied]

VP Laurel : Well I don't want to pre-judge them. I condemn the method. But I cannot condemn the cause because they have been quoted as fighting for good government. How can you be against good government? But I do not believe in the use of force and violence. I believe in constitutional and democratic processes. [Emphasis supplied]

John Eidinow : I'm surprised as far as the government's handling of the uprising is concerned. Do you think that Mrs Aquino's call to the rebels to surrender or die was the right course?

VP Laurel : I do not think that that was the right thing to say or do. You do not say that to people who are armed and ready to fight and die. I think, you know that's like waving a red flag at a bull. So I think she has not taken a more conciliatory position. I think we should have explored other avenues that could lead to an amicable settlement of the dispute.

John Eidinow : So although you condemn the course taken by the rebels, you still think that Mrs Aquino should have negotiated with them, but negotiate about what?

VP Laurel : Well, what are the gripes, what are the issues, what are the grievances that should be addressed. I see four immediate and major failures on the part of the Aquino government. The first is the failure to unite the nation, failure to adopt a policy of national reconciliation. Second is failure to enforce them. The President is the one principally tasked with the responsibility of enforcing and executing the laws, the laws primarily on graft and corruption have not been enforced. Third, is the failure to deliver basic services to the people. And this is a big disappointment especially because of the promises that have been made and not fulfilled. Finally, the fourth and the last, is the failure to provide direction and leadership. I think there should be a reasonable dialogue before we resort to the last recourse.

John Eidinow : And given the answers of the dialogue, do you think Mrs Aquino now should consider stepping down? [Emphasis supplied].

VP Laurel : Well, if that is the only way to avert a bloodshed or to avert a civil war. I think she should consider that as a cheap price to pay. I would be willing to step down with her if that is the only way we can avert bloodshed and civil war. [Emphasis supplied]

John Eidinow : But I mentioned you would also be willing to put your self forward if called to take her place? [Emphasis supplied]

VP Laurel : Well, that is the constitutional requirement. As Vice-President I am required under the Constitution to succeed in specific instances. [Emphasis supplied]

John Eidinow : Where do you think this leaves the Philippines now assuming that the rebellion is in fact crushed? Where do you think this leaves your country?

VP Laurel : I think it hurts the country very badly. The economy will surely be affected very adversely. And the investment climate will suffer. We try to get people to come to the Philippines to invest and it will take sometime before we can convince people to come to the Philippines again but I am confident that our people are a resilient people. We are used to adversity and I know we will bounce back especially under a good leadership, an effective and strong leadership.

John Eidinow : The Vice-President of the Philippines, Salvador Laurel, speaking from Hongkong. . .

The opposition Nacionalista Party (NP), as discussed in Chapter V, had a press conference at the Intercon which started at about 3:00 p.m. of 2 December and lasted for an hour. Intercon was not the original venue of this meeting. According to Blas Ople, Executive Vice President of the NP, at about 10:00 a.m. of 1 December, a member of the staff of Sen Juan Ponce Enrile, calling on behalf of the Senator, invited him to drop by the latter's residence at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, to informally discuss the future courses of action for the Party.⁵⁵ He arrived at the Enrile residence at about 1:30 p.m. Present on that occasion were Messrs Rene Espina, Bobby Brillantes, Geronimo Velasco, Ike Gutierrez (as representative of Vice-President Laurel), Dr & Mrs Rebecca Panlilio, and others he did not recognize. During their informal discussion, they saw the need to convene the Central Committee (CENCOM) of the Party because there were "members all over the country [who] were in the dark, and probably would appreciate some guidance from the Party on what was going on".

Enrile suggested his residence as the venue for the meeting but Ople pointed out that such a venue is not proper because the meeting "ought to be in a public place". Since the Hotel Intercontinental was "a place most familiar to the members of the Central Committee", Ople suggested it and requested Gutierrez to arrange for the Dasmariñas Room of the Intercon for the meeting on the following day, at 1:30 p.m. to be followed by a press conference at 3:00 p.m.⁵⁶

The decision to hold the press conference was made in the afternoon of 1 December. Purugganan, who was apparently the contact person to the RAM-HF command, moved elements of the FSRR to the Makati commercial district in the morning of 2 December after there was apparent agreement with government forces for the rebels to lay down their arms. By the time of the Nacionalista Party press conference, the rebels had full control of the vicinity of the Intercon.

Ople claimed he left the Enrile residence at 4:00 p.m. on 1 December "before the waiters [who were to subsequently execute affidavits that they saw Honasan in the house] could arrive in the residence of Senator Enrile".⁵⁷

When asked who were present during the CENCOM Meeting *cum* press conference, Ople testified before the Commission

If you want me to help identify to the best of my ability those who were there, I think, I remember that Sen Arturo Tolentino was there, Vic Rabaya, Frisco San Juan, Isidro Rodriguez, Dominador Aytona, Rene Espina, Mabungkay Reonto [Alonto], Atty Regalado Maambong and there is one not listed here who was also there, Speaker, former Speaker Jose P. Laurel, Jr. Those are the names that I recall, who were among those present. And yes, Sen Enrile was there."⁵⁸

The CENCOM Meeting was characterized by what Ople called "spirited exchanges among members of the Central Committee". And instead of what was originally intended (i.e., to provide guidance to party members who were in the dark and would have appreciated guidance from the party on what was going on), "primarily the meeting of the Central Committee dealt with a proposed position or statement concerning the emergency that was taking place at the time."⁵⁹ The proposed statement, which was admitted to have been drafted by Ople, was strongly critical of what the NP then considered "intervention of the United States through the Phantom Jets."⁶⁰

The Ople draft underwent several changes in the course of the "spirited exchange". The first involved a change in the object of the statement's condemnation. Ople narrated

You will note that in the third paragraph, in the fourth paragraph of page two. The statement says 'The Nacionalista Party does not countenance violence and stands by the Constitution of the Republic' In the original, it continued: 'it deplores the military rebellion and the government's incapacity to contain it more quickly, more effectively, . . . a situation reflecting directly on the adequacy, competence, and sustainability of the highest defense of military leadership' In the corrected version however, it comes out as: 'it deplores however the government's giving cause to the military rebellion and its

incapacity to contain it more quickly, more effectively' . . . etc. So that is an example on how the original draft underwent certain changes in the course of the open deliberation . . .⁶¹

Thus, while the original draft was explicitly against the attempted coup as it "deplore[d] the military rebellion," the revision made by the CENCOM withdrew said condemnation and instead deplored "the government's giving cause to the military rebellion." Both Ople and Maambong, NP Deputy Secretary General in charge of research, agreed that the revision "entirely changed the whole meaning" of the condemnation.⁶²

The only other change in the Ople draft consisted of an amendment of the first sentence of the second paragraph of page 1 of the statement. In its original form, the sentence read as follows

President Aquino, having lost the support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines requested for the US military rescue and President George Bush of the United States ordered that the necessary force be committed."

As given to the media, the phrase "shamelessly and without regard to national honor and dignity" was inserted on the second line between the words "Philippines" and "requested."

Unaltered during the discussions were allegations in the Ople draft that the US "fighter craft apparently unmarked to disguise its origin, shot rockets that killed innocent Filipino civilians"; that President Aquino "lost the support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines"; and that the "brazen act of intervention belies President Aquino's claims that her government is in full control of her military forces and that she enjoys broad popular support."

When asked about the inconsistency of the above-statements with his own testimony before the Commission deploring the politics of hate and vengeance and espousing reconciliation and unity, and when confronted with the inaccuracy of the statement's purported factual assertions, Ople asked the Commission to understand the NP statement in the light of "the atmosphere that prevailed at that time." He admitted that "if there is an opportunity to rewrite this statement, it would sound better and more balanced" and that it was actually "the very strong resentment of the American intervention . . . at the time that strongly colored the language."⁶⁴

The press statement of the Central Committee of the Nacionalista Party on 2 December with the corrections⁶⁵ is attached to this Report as an Appendix.

During the press conference, individual members of the CENCOM gave statements of their own, among them Enrile, Abdul Khayr Alonto, Espina and Aytona. When asked by the Commission, Ople categorically denied that he made a statement asking President Aquino to resign. Such a statement, said Ople, "would be inappropriate."⁶⁶

However, the Commission has a videotape⁶⁷ of portions of the press conference in which Ople said

There is a preponderant feeling which this statement has not captured in the ranks of the opposition that the constitutional legitimacy of President Aquino has been impaired by her own reckless renunciation of the sovereignty of the nation in order to, well, by seeking American support in order to prop herself up in power and this can constitute a very serious impairment of their own constitutional legitimacy. That is the reason there is a sentiment that she should consider stepping down and giving way to a government of national unity. But as I said, the text of this statement does not capture that sentiment and I'm saying this on my individual behalf rather than on behalf of the Central Committee of the Nacionalista Party. [Emphasis supplied]

The press conference ended by 4:00 p.m. Ople proceeded to the Peninsula Coffee Shop since he "wanted some privacy with my (his) coffee."

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile's personal comments during the press conference are equally revealing. He took pains to characterize the rebels as "antagonistic forces," "contending forces," or "challenging military elements," and when referring to the coup, he used such terms as "the situation," "this problem," or "military action against the Aquino government."

His assessment of the ongoing coup attempt indicated a bias in favor of the rebels as he recounted, "I was told over the radio" that Camp Aguinaldo was surrounded by "the group challenging the government. . . in a perimeter around Greenhills, . . . at the back of Camp Aguinaldo and . . . at the White Plains side of Aguinaldo." [Emphasis supplied] He, moreover, said that based on "what I hear over the radio and what I have read in the papers," [Emphasis supplied] the rebels controlled Legaspi Airport and they had reinforcement troops presumably coming from Negros Occidental and Iloilo, troops which were intercepted in Camarines Norte, and those coming from SOLCOM although in the case of the latter, it was not clear if

they are with the side of the government or on the side of the challenging military elements. They claim that they are here for a peacekeeping purpose to serve as a neutral element. If this is the situation, then this presents to you a spectacle of a government that has no command over the bulk of its own forces."⁶⁸

After collating testimonies and after-battle reports, the Commission found Enrile's information about rebel troop movements accurate. His assessment of the action of government forces must have been based on his own perception of the events of February 1986, which he appears to continue to think was a successful coup against Marcos, instead of the triumph of people power. He said

If they have 5,000 troops at their disposal at this point, then they should by now be able to mount a counter-attack and the longer this thing will last, I think it will become more difficult for the government to contain it. You see, from my own experience, one of the main errors of the former regime was to give us time in our favor. Had they taken the initiative at the outset of the conflict, that was on Saturday, 22nd of February, especially during the night of Saturday and on Sunday morning, then maybe the situation would have been different . . ."
[Emphasis supplied].

The above assessment indicates Enrile's optimism about the rebels' chances of succeeding in their attempt. Ople, on the other hand, testified to a contrary view. When asked what the evaluation of the Nacionalista Party was of the rebellion at the time of its CENCOM meeting, particularly on which side was winning, he said

... there are those like myself who thought that the issue of this confrontation had become clear, that the rebellion has been lost. Now, I'm sure there were others who wanted to stretch the boundaries of their optimism.⁶⁹ [Emphasis supplied]

Insofar as the portions of the videotape with the Commission shows, not only did Enrile blame the government for the coup attempt, but like Laurel, he failed to condemn the coup participants or call upon them to lay down their arms.

Laurel and Ople even suggested that President Aquino consider stepping down. Rather than close ranks to defend the Constitution and the duly constituted authority, as required of public officers, both Laurel and Enrile took turns heckling the beleaguered government and thus contributed to the instability of the situation. They sounded as if President Aquino, and not the rebels, was the lawbreaker.

B.14 The Role of Media in Crisis Situations

The December 1989 coup attempt served to highlight the issues of the role of media in a newly-restored democracy with weak political institutions in a Third World setting, and a well-developed media sector along the lines of First World countries. The result is a continuous dilemma within media itself and tension between government regulatory

agencies and media which are all heightened in times of crisis, such as an attempted coup.

The role of media is the dissemination of information.⁷¹ It is an indispensable institution in a free society based on the fundamental right of the people to relevant, adequate, and accurate information.⁷² When there is an ongoing coup, media play a difficult balancing act, more so for radio and television which have the capacity for live coverage. Media have to contend not only with physical danger, while grappling with the demands of their code of ethics on specific unfolding events, but also with regulatory officials with strong protective instincts for a government in real danger of being overthrown.⁷³

This dilemma was present in the "play-by-play" radio broadcast of DZRH during the critical hours of the coup when the outcome was in doubt, the attempt by rebel leaders to appear on television and radio to propagandize their cause, and the inclusion in news reports of the gore and violence of the fighting.

How is the dilemma to be resolved? During a coup attempt, as the media have the duty to inform the citizens, so has a government under siege the duty and the right to protect itself. Where the government leaves a vacuum, as it did in December, and the people need to be informed, media step into that vacuum. It is, therefore, part of the responsibility of government in reconciling the respective roles of government and media, to provide fast and accurate information during crisis, to use, if necessary, the government's own media resources to advance its interests, and, according to some communications practitioners and experts, even place embargoes on certain information or close down media establishments in situations of extreme danger.⁷⁴ On the other hand, it is the right of media to protest and question such moves at the earliest opportunity and thereby enable society, through judicial or administrative rulings, to build up the jurisprudence and traditions that it considers appropriate.⁷⁵

Ultimately, the most effective deterrent against inaccurate reporting that can amount to irresponsibility under extreme circumstances, is the self-discipline of a profession and its refusal to compromise itself with conflict of interest situations.

An obvious conflict of interest situation arises when a journalist also engages in public relations. Then, the public may become the victim of inaccurate or baseless information for which nobody really takes responsibility. During the December 1989 events, several press releases

of the rebels found their way into media through a person, Joan Orendain, who claimed that she was doing it as a journalist, but at the same admitted that she did not verify its authenticity before passing them on to her editor. She alleged that the releases were delivered to her apartment by unknown persons and she surmised that the rebels may have sought her out because she was a friend of a former RAM member (Robles) for which she was doing a personal favor because the person was being unjustly incriminated in the coup. In her testimony, Orendain constantly changed hats, between journalist and public relations, to explain her actions. The most charitable assessment for journalists of that genre is that they are confused about their responsibilities and their constituencies and should resolve their confusion for the sake of the entire profession.

The issue of accurate reporting has its own solutions. According to the members of media, accuracy can be developed through adequate training and preparation, a system of apprenticeship, the inculcation of a culture of thoroughness, and the realization that a media person is first and foremost a citizen with a social responsibility.⁷⁶ It is better to rely on the self-discipline of the profession and err on the side of accommodation than to engage in repression, since drastic measures do not necessarily lead to improved professionalism and ethical standards, but perhaps even to the opposite, as the martial law era demonstrated.⁷⁷

C. Recommendations

Pursuant to its mandate under Republic Act No. 6832, and recognizing that the ultimate responsibility for preventing coups rests with all the citizens, the Commission adopted Resolution No. 066 which sought from various organizations and/or sectors their suggestions towards this objective and the role they should play in attaining it.

A number of organizations and individuals submitted position papers to the Commission, the names of which are listed in Appendix L to this report. The Commission is grateful for the cooperation of those who responded and acknowledges the suggestions which have been incorporated in its report. However, the Commission takes full responsibility for its recommendations in compliance with the requirement of RA No. 6832.

The recommendations of the Commission are based on its analysis of the events, causes, environment, and lessons of the December 1989 coup attempt. As previously explained, however, the Commission also examined the previous coup attempts since they are all inextricably

linked, in order to fully understand the context and dynamics of the December 1989 events.

The recommendations are divided into three parts:

1. "damage control" and short-term prescriptions to address the immediate problem of another coup attempt;
2. an agenda for the remaining term of the Aquino administration; and
3. recommendations over the long-term.

The recommendations are further classified, where appropriate, by sector or area of responsibility. The principal theme of these recommendations is justice — firmly, fairly, and consistently administered — as a basic principle of governance. People can bear poverty, but they cannot bear injustice. In fact, the accumulation of injustices, personally experienced or generally perceived, was the principal factor in the people's alienation from the Marcos administration, and to the eventual loss of its legitimacy.

However, it should also be pointed out that if there is failure in the administration of justice in a society, government alone is not usually to blame. It is because there is a breakdown in the norms of conduct in the society itself. Thus, some recommendations are directed towards other sectors, e.g., the legal opposition, the business sector, educational institutions, and media.

In the final analysis, the guarantee against coups, as well as other aberrant behavior, is the creation of a just, humane, and progressive society, the elements of which are set out in the Constitution.

C.1. "Damage Control" and Short-Term Prescriptions to Address the Immediate Problem of Preventing Another Coup Attempt

Since a coup d'etat is primarily a military operation which does not depend on mass civilian support for its success, immediate prescriptions should be directed at immobilizing, isolating, and capturing military rebels, both known or covert, before they can plan, recruit, or launch a coup.

Addressing the immediate problem of another coup requires a set of prescriptions that fully recognizes the complex interaction of internal factors and external factors and the different degrees of participation and motive, and hence culpability.

The Commission reiterates its recommendations in Interim Reports No. 1 (system of military justice) and No. 3 (needed legislation), and further recommends:

a. Administering a justice and rehabilitation program to military participants as follows:

- i. Continuous trial for those already charged.
- ii. Speedy process for those under investigation as well as those recommended for prosecution, investigation, or reinvestigation by the Commission in Chapter VI, e.g., some members of the Cebu PC and Air Force commands, members of the Guardian Centre Foundation Inc involved in the Bibit operation at the North and South Harbors and at the Domestic Airport.
- iii. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all benefits, in valid instances allowing the attachment of their properties, and punishment to the full extent of the law for those found guilty as principals. Those with lesser offenses should be meted graduated punishment.
- iv. Strict enforcement of AW 68 for failure to report contacts, solicitations, and attempted recruitment to participate in coups.
- v. Immediate release of those against whom there is insufficient evidence for prosecution, without prejudice to a reopening of the cases, if warranted.
- vi. The restoration to the lineal roster of all those already cleared as well as those released for insufficient evidence.
- vii. An amnesty program for young officers (majors and below) who are not principals and who have exceptional service records, provided they sincerely renounce all coups, pledge not to have any kind of involvement in any recruitment or planning for any coup, and agree to resign from the armed

forces. This is without prejudice to their re-commissioning after two-three years without loss of seniority for those who express such intention at the time they apply for amnesty and engage in community and/or public service approved by the government during the "rehabilitation" period.

- viii. An early retirement program which is available to all but primarily directed at those lagging behind in the promotional ladder for reasons of non-performance, those who believe they are being discriminated upon for being identified with the Marcos-Ver or Enrile groups, and those implicated with or suspected to be sympathetic to the rebels but against whom evidence may not be sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The objective is not to invite the retirement of those officers the AFP wants to retain, but to give reasonable benefits to those who cannot meet the rigid requirements of a smaller officer corps and to provide an exit opportunity to those who believe that their careers have been impaired by their associations. It is the condition of such benefits that they not be found guilty subsequently of any crime against national security and public order. Otherwise, they are liable for the return of all the benefits plus interest.

In the Commission's view, the amnesty and retirement programs are necessary to allow officers, whose opportunities in the military may be limited, to leave without any stigma. It will also totally purge the AFP of officers vulnerable to using their position to recruit for or participate in a coup, without driving them to desperate behavior for lack of livelihood. The dilemma of the military is how to handle the loyal but dishonest or ineffective officer, or the honest and loyal but ineffective, or the effective and loyal but dishonest. While this is obviously a difficult decision, there is really only one answer if the military is to be restored to an honest, loyal, and effective force. Anyone who does not possess all three qualifications should be removed. But, they should be encouraged and helped to find a useful career in civilian life. By depriving coup-prone officers of an institutional base, the program would reduce considerably the risk of another coup. It would constitute the first stage in the strengthening of a post-insurgency military that is smaller, more professional, and fully modernized. The program would also offer a second chance to young officers genuinely interested in resuming their military careers but who need to be totally expunged of any coup "virus" and to have the cloud over them permanently removed. Finally, the program would answer the military rebels' accusation of selective justice by the government, with the case of former NPA Victor Corpus as well as the amnesty program for NPA insurgents being mentioned as examples.

However, the granting of amnesty should be only one component of a calibrated response and should be judiciously applied. The government should not allow itself to be stampeded into a generalized program to "start with a clean slate", since that argument was used as a ploy in past coup attempts to merely preempt prosecution of incorrigible rebels. It should be emphasized that an amnesty may cure the symptom but not the disease (i.e., injustice, poverty).

In conducting a "peace dialogue" with rightist rebels, the government should exercise utmost caution in choosing who to talk to. The government is advised not to start with the hardcore RAM-HF officers who have been involved in several coup attempts and are likely to exploit the process to advance their own agenda.

b. The strengthening of security measures on those under detention, especially where there may be sympathetic guards, i.e. Muntinlupa.

The escapes of Honasan and Bibit who successfully co-opted or outwitted their guards should not be forgotten by the government. Nothing hurts the government's image more or frustrates those who made the capture, than to see maximum security suspects escape with ease and impunity.

c. The intensification of efforts to capture key renegade soldiers with a special unit of trusted officers directly responsible to the CSAFP.

Honasan, Kapunan, Turingan, Batac, Bibit, Purugganan, and other central figures in the coup attempts should be specially targeted for capture. Despite the wide publicity given to the YOU and other military renegades as the potential source of new coups, the rebel cause would be set back considerably by the capture of the RAM-HF leaders. Furthermore, the public perception is that these renegades cannot be captured because they are protected by elements within the military itself. Their capture would be a clear signal that the military is unequivocally committed to enforce the law, as repeatedly stated by the Commander-in-Chief herself after each coup attempt. While several key rebels have been captured, the ability of the core group to elude capture after such tough talk tends to demoralize those who abide by the law and undermines the system of reward and punishment in the larger society itself.

d. A reinvestigation of the "God Save The Queen" plot and prosecution of all those implicated in it.

There appears to be sufficient basis for the military to conduct a formal investigation of the incident, and for the government to cause the prosecution of everyone found to have been involved. The original excuses for not conducting an investigation are not, nor were they ever, valid, i.e., no overt action, the risk of dividing the military, the independent character of the DND security force from the normal chain of command, the hope that those implicated can still be reformed, if not prosecuted. If there is to be a total approach to the problem of coups, it is important to close the book on the incident.

e. A review of the subsequent actuations of those involved in the Manila Hotel incident, both military and civilian, who pledged never to engage in similar adventurism again, if spared from prosecution.

Those who are implicated or suspected with respect to the December 1989 or any other coup attempts and are found to have violated their pledge should also be prosecuted for the Manila Hotel incident.

f. An intensive follow-up investigation by government police agencies and the Justice Department of civilians implicated in the December 1989 attempt.

If the renegade soldiers are to be cut off from their support systems, the message to actual or potential civilian supporters must be clearly spelled out — there is no margin for tolerance when the survival of democracy is at stake. The Commission believes, based on selective cases (i.e., identifying the vessel that ferried the rebel troops from Bataan to Sangley, identifying the civilian network of Fusilero, examining the connection of the coup plotters with personalities in the Mindanao Freedom Movement, fund-raising activities from business, the Hawaii connection of certain civilians) that the investigation of civilians tends to concentrate on national figures. Thus, it is likely that the lower profile civilian support network for the rebels is still intact. This could include persons on which the Commission's investigation has not been completed because, in its judgment, the incremental information that might be secured would not be justified by the cost. The investigation could be done by the DOJ in the course of its normal activities. This matter is covered by a formal resolution of the Commission to the DOJ.

g. Speedy action on appeals over decisions of AFP courts-martial.

This has already been mentioned in the Commission's Interim Report No.1. Related to this are the cases which are not being acted upon or are suffering undue delays. Actions on decisions on courts-martial which are subject to mandatory appellate review or which may eventually reach the President for confirmation should be speedily resolved.

h. The early passage of a comprehensive law on the establishment of the National Police.

Implementing the Constitutional provision would remove the anxiety and insecurity of those likely to be affected by the new law. Furthermore, the sooner such a law is enacted, the earlier could programs be implemented to separately strengthen the police and military organizations and resolve the confusion of overlapping jurisdictions.

i. The immediate implementation of a comprehensive program to provide timely rescue and medical assistance to troops wounded in combat.

The rebels have tried to claim credit for improving the benefits of soldiers. Unfortunately, the timing of such improvements (many have been instituted after coup attempts) have lent some credibility to these claims. The government is aware of the complaints about the inadequacy of medical and hospitalization benefits particularly of soldiers in combat. A comprehensive initiative of the government to help wounded soldiers would highlight its continuing concern, lift troop morale, and direct credit to where it belongs.

j. A review by the military of its decision to disband the Scout Ranger Regiment.

While the coup culture may have been implanted by Honasan and his group in some officers of the FSRR, it is not clear that it is permanently ingrained in the troops. It is also true that the military hierarchy may have unwittingly allowed it to happen and are, therefore, perceived to be arbitrary and unduly harsh. The FSRR may be one of the most effective units against the communist insurgency and should not end up being bitter and ineffective. Besides, attaching the Rangers to other units without first making sure they are rid of the coup "virus" would only facilitate the spread of the affliction. What makes the Rangers an elite unit, other than their training, is the spirit of oneness

and collective pride. It is a spirit that must be harnessed rather than dispersed. The solution should be the assignment of officers who command the respect of the soldiers and who are themselves absolutely committed to democracy.

k. An immediate audit of the value formation program of the military and, with the help of civilian experts, the formulation of an intensive program (essentially constructive indoctrination), and the training of field commanders to carry it out.

The Commission received conflicting testimony on the effectiveness of the present program and noted that the military is reluctant to extensively use civilian expertise presumably in the belief that civilians cannot fully understand the military mind. The result, as played up also by newspaper reports, is a traditional, repetitive, and unimaginative approach such as that used with and ridiculed by some of the Scout Rangers. Thus, the results of the program in specific units is quite uneven, depending on the individual skill of its commander.

l. The immediate removal or reassignment of officers of less than 100 percent loyalty from sensitive positions in the military hierarchy, i.e., intelligence, operations, logistics, and training functions.

Consistent with the policy of not taking any risks at this time, and of forging a military with unquestioning loyalty to the Constitution, those with any taint of the coup should first be tested in less sensitive positions (assuming they do not retire early) before being given choice assignments.

m. The immediate disbandment of GCFI and all other organizations not authorized by the military.

Such organizations encourage factionalism and give opportunities for those with hidden agendas to exploit and manipulate them.

n. The observance of a systematic selection process for the new Chief of Staff that generates the least controversy about the choice.

The possibility of deep selection should not be foreclosed. An important criteria should be an impeccable record and reputation for non-partisanship, since the 1992 elections will be a critical test for democratic and peaceful change.

o. Just as in the civilian government, a crackdown by the military on some "big fish" corrupt officers.

There are apparently officers known within the military establishment to be corrupt and are perceived to be protected for personal or political reasons. The value of example cannot be underestimated to restore the confidence of those alienated by reason of their own knowledge or experience of corruption in the military. In particular, those in "syndicates" engaged in illegal gambling should be dealt with uncompromisingly.

p. An immediate stop to unfair and/or humiliating treatment and criticism of military officers by Congress and other public officials, especially those before the Commission on Appointments.

Political "grandstanding" is especially grating to the troops in the field, who feel that they are risking their lives for the wrong people.

q. Speedy and firm disciplinary action and/or prosecution against members of the military involved in human rights violations as well as of civilian law enforcement personnel involved in victimizing military personnel.

There should be no "sacred cows" when it comes to dispensation of justice.

r. The purchase or charter by Congress of its own transportation facilities and a prohibition on their use of military equipment and aircraft.

Another common complaint of both rebel and government military officers is the use by members of Congress of military equipment, particularly aircraft, for their own purposes. On the one hand, such assets are perceived to be badly needed to support the troops in the field. On the other hand, the legitimate function of the legislature to appropriate funds, monitor the use of public money, and enact measures, would not be fully served if it did not have access to field observations and dialogues with such an important sector as the military. The Commission, therefore, suggests that Congress be allowed to purchase or charter a pool of transportation equipment, including airplanes, that can be utilized for official purposes, such as field inspections of military operations, provincial consultations, monitoring of the use of funds in emergency operations and calamities, and other similar purposes. In the long run, such

arrangements will prove to be the most economical, efficient, and practical way of dealing with the issue.

s. The expansion of the government's public information program which has considerably and commendably improved since December 1989, with more participation by local government officials.

One of the most common complaints of the rebel soldiers is the absence of local officials particularly in insurgency areas. The local officials are the frontliners in the delivery of government services. They should be required to be in the field and their activities duly recorded for dissemination through the government's public information program. Systematizing the flow of information between the executive and local government officials should also prove useful for other purposes, i.e., calamities, rebel troop movements.

t. The provision of sufficient resources and support to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military

The filling up of this position is consistent with the findings of the Commission. He must be given the resources to do his job since the appointment has raised expectations within the military that their grievances will be heard. In organizing the staff of the office, care should be taken not to appoint those with "scores to settle" and worn-out ideas. It is time for young blood with fresh ideas, if the problems of the military are to be resolved.

C.2. An Agenda for the Remaining Twenty-One Months of the Aquino Administration

The constitutional term of the present administration is 76 months. There are only 21 months left of that term to complete the successful transition of the country from a dictatorship to a full-fledged democracy. That task is not that of the President alone, or of the government, but of the entire society itself.

Despite the installation of the formal structures and the advances in democratic processes, the EDSA Revolt that installed Corazon C. Aquino as President did not result in the far-reaching revolution many people had hoped for. Most of these expectations were embodied in the new Constitution, but have largely remained unfulfilled. Therefore, stated simply, the job to be done in the next 21 months is to galvanize the people behind a national vision based on the agenda ratified by the people.

a. On the part of the Executive Department, a review of key policies and programs in the light of results, an acceptance of shortcomings where these exist, and a performance review of appointive officials.

Chapter III of this report describes how the "rainbow coalition" of 1986 quickly unraveled because there was no organic unity in the first place, only a common goal of removing a dictator. Yet, the disunity is not necessarily an affliction of the grassroots. All the social surveys indicate a discernible consensus of the people on major issues, some of them considered as controversial, i.e., agrarian reform, foreign debt, US military facilities, coup d'etat. Unfortunately, these are often obscured by the posturings of politicians and extremist groups, and the indecision of the Executive Department.

The first step, therefore, in putting the country back on track is to galvanize national unity.

As part of the process of self-reflection, the Executive Department must review existing policies and programs and establish clear directions for the next 21 months, particularly in the area of basic services. Government officials who have not performed or are responsible for failed programs have to be replaced. The economic situation and shortfalls in performance relative to targets cannot all be blamed on external factors and inherited problems. Furthermore, much can still be accomplished in 21 months. That is approximately the difference between the first term of a reelectable president under the 1935 Constitution and the six-year term of a non-reelectable president under the new Constitution. The expectation is a president will act as a statesman during that period rather than as a politician seeking another term. However, the appointment of new people would only make sense if the correct policies and programs are in place. Two major revamps occurred after coup attempts and were perceived to have been a reaction to the coups rather than a genuine effort to address issues of substance. Subsequent events tended to validate this perception. What is being asked of the Executive Department is to enforce the same principle of accountability being required of the military.

While there is understandably a reluctance by President Aquino to exercise power in a manner that might be compared with former President Marcos, a democracy in a crisis of transition calls for a firmer and more direct hand at the helm. People understand that a ship is never always on course. But the ship that arrives safely at its destination

is the one which constantly checks its bearings, corrects itself on time, and accelerates its speed when it is firmly on course.

The leader who transcends himself will be followed by his crew, even those who may believe that there is a shorter and safer route. It is the vision and the decisiveness that count.

b. On the part of the President, a categorical declaration of her position with respect to the issue of re-election.

In view of the unsettled constitutional issue of her right to seek re-election in 1992 and the continuing speculation on her intent to run despite her past pronouncements to the contrary, an unambiguous declaration on her part would be timely and would be perceived as an act of statesmanship rather than a politician's ploy.

c. On the part of the President, the immediate convening of the National Security Council and an initiative to invite all political parties to enter into a compact, to which peoples organizations and citizen groups would also subscribe, to defend and preserve our democracy, abjure the use of force and violence to effect change, commit to the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections in 1992, and arrive at solutions to our national problems through an honest and open debate of issues and programs;

and

on the part of the political opposition, a positive response to the call for a united front against unconstitutional means to change the government and for upholding democratic processes.

The ruling coalition and the opposition must agree on a constructive relationship to save and strengthen democracy. Both must learn the distinction between political debate on the basis of issues and the exigencies of political maneuvering to take or keep power. The climate of distrust, extra-constitutional tendencies, and the politics of personalities must somehow be changed. In the case of Vice President Laurel, the government must decide either to file charges or carry out an initiative to provide him with a role befitting an official elected by the people to the second highest position of government.

The President can take the initiative in creating a new climate of "unity in diversity" by immediately convening the National Security

Council. Then, she can issue a call for all political parties to sign a solemn compact before the people to uphold democracy, to resist with all the resources at their command any attempt to subvert or destroy it, and to participate fully in the elections in 1992.

The political opposition must be willing to respond positively to this initiative, following the example of their counterparts in such countries as Venezuela and Argentina where they actualized a vow to set aside their differences when democracy is threatened by military adventurism. One does not have to be in power to contribute to nation-building.

The Nacionalista Party led by Blas Ople and Senator Enrile missed a historic opportunity to put into practice what it preaches by way of reconciliation and commitment to democracy. Its press conference on 2 December 1989 turned out to be an opportunistic attempt to play up to the rebels and gain political points at a time of great peril for democracy. Vice President Laurel likewise fumbled his own opportunity for statesmanship while in Hongkong at the time. There is, however, no reason, given the shifting tide of politics, why the opposition cannot recover from the widespread disapproval of the people of its behavior during the December 1989 coup attempt, if it is perceived to be unequivocal about its commitment to democratic processes.

The solidarity of the political leadership is a giant step in addressing the issue of a military that is isolated from the society it is supposed to protect.

d. On the part of the Legislative Department and the President, the establishment of a special full-time commission to implement a post-insurgency program for the military that will modernize, professionalize, and bring it within the mainstream of national life.

Since the insurgency problem appears to be close to a solution, the government must design a post-insurgency program for the military, within the framework of the Constitution. The establishment of a commission of respected civilian and military experts appointed by the President, with full powers and a budget to carry out its task, would deliver a strong message to the military that the government cares about their future, recognizes the existence of deep-seated and complex problems, and is determined to solve them. The program itself should evoke a resolve in the military to perform better in the field and thus hasten the victory over both the communist and Muslim insurgencies. A vital component of the program is its thorough modernization and the

termination of its dependency on the US for its weaponry. Another component is a reformulation of the education system and training of officers. This would include a review of the program at the PMA and the establishment of other service academies. Although no direct correlation has been established between the PMA curriculum and the disposition of officers to engage in coups, testimonies of senior military officers call attention to the need to:

- i. Intensively inculcate civilian values among the military;
- ii. Cultivate a peer relationship between officers and civilians starting at the college level by examining the desirability of making the military academies the last two years of a college degree or of requiring the cadet to spend his junior year in a civilian university;
- iii. Institute measures to further democratize access to military academies and to discourage the emergence of an elitist military class that isolates the officers from the rest of society and negates the constitutional concept of a citizen army. Related to this is the problem of factionalism that is exacerbated by the dominance of PMA graduates in leadership and key positions in the military;
- iv. Upgrade the status of the teaching function in military academies to the level of combat command with financial incentives, performance credits, and promotional advantages, and invite more civilian instructors to handle non-military subjects,⁷⁸ and
- v. Temper the overly idealistic orientation at the PMA, and emphasize love of country as the most desirable value in an officer.⁷⁹

The Commission considered other options than the appointment of a new independent body in order to avoid any incremental burden on the budget. Among the alternatives considered were (a) a task force under the Department of Defense, (b) a special unit under the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, (c) a composite committee under the Office of the President to be supervised by the Executive Secretary, (d) the National Security Council, and (e) a special commission under the Office of the Vice-President.

A special commission under the DND, the NSC, or the Executive Secretary would have the handicap of having to use people who have other responsibilities and who might not be able to impart the sense of importance and urgency to the task at hand. In any case, the core of a new staff has to be appointed. With respect to the Office of the Vice President, the same staffing requirement would apply with the additional handicap that the office is an elective one and the task of the special commission is unlikely to be finished by mid-1992. The Deputy Ombudsman has a fixed tenure. However, his office would also need to recruit new staff. In the ultimate analysis, the same incremental cost for staffing would be incurred for all the alternatives, with the only difference being the additional cost of the commissioners who will oversee the program on a full-time basis, with respect to this Report's recommendations.

More importantly, a new task-oriented commission, possibly with a fixed term, would provide the necessary continuity, urgency, and sense of priority, that may well prove to be more economical than the cost in lives, money, and lost opportunities of military adventurism.

For having made this suggestion, members of the Fact-Finding Commission should not be considered for appointment to this commission.

e. On the part of the Legislative Department, the immediate enactment of laws to ensure the democratization of the electoral process and the validity and public acceptance of its results, with particular reference to the critical 1992 synchronized election.

The 1992 elections will be a critical test of democracy since the electoral process is often perceived as a way to legitimize the continued political domination of a few.

Both the Executive and the Legislative Departments should make urgent decisions regarding the synchronization in 1992 of elections as mandated by the Constitution. A lead time of two years is necessary for planning and for the procedures, equipment, selective computerization, and organization to be firmly in place on time. The legislation and budget for such preparations should already be enacted. Since elections is a process, procedures partake of the substance of the right to vote.

In addition, legislation to implement the constitutional mandate to democratize political power, as part of the social justice program, should be enacted before the elections in 1992 to pre-empt the rationalization of

rebel soldiers and the CPP/NPA for political intervention because of what they will describe as elitist and, therefore, meaningless results of elections.

Specifically, Congress should enact laws on the empowerment of independent people's organizations, the party-list system of representation, anti-dynasty, equal access to media time and space, subsidy program for poor but deserving candidates or their watchers, and procedures to enable the disabled and the illiterate to participate fully in the process.

f. The supremacy of civilian authority over the military should be established by the appointment, as soon as practicable, of civilians with the capability, integrity, and leadership to head the Department of National Defense (DND), the National Security Council (NSC), and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). The NICA should have its own intelligence capability that can complement as well as validate military intelligence information.

This recommendation does not detract from the outstanding and loyal service of Secretary Fidel Ramos in defending the government against attacks from both leftist and rightist extremists. The policy of appointing a civilian as head of DND should be adopted not only by this government but subsequent ones in compliance with the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional principle of the supremacy of civilian authority. Establishing the policy would integrate the military into the civilian government and induce a continuous supply of knowledgeable career civilians with the authority of expertise in military affairs. Eventually, military resentment about alleged "interference" of civilians would be muted.

The need for an independent and civilian-controlled intelligence network responsible directly to the President is highlighted by the fact that the Office of the President is totally dependent on the military for intelligence and in several instances appeared to be less than fully informed of developments. No matter how well-meaning the military intelligence community may be, the idea of sharing "top secret" information with a civilian does not appear to be accepted practice, even if that civilian happens to carry the title of Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C).

Secondly, J2 or the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (AFP) reports to the Chief of Staff who, in practice, does not really function as

"staff" to the C-in-C. The common perception within the military and, for that matter, among the public, is that the responsibility for military decisions ends at the desk of the CSAFP. This has less to do with the fact that the present C-in-C is a woman than the presumption that the man in uniform knows best on such matters, and the culture of enduring fraternal ties within the military.

g. The institutionalization of necessary improvements in the military in the areas of promotion and assignments, purchasing and auditing, educational benefits abroad, and compulsory attendance at military command schools.

The Commission's recommendations cannot be exhaustive. These improvements would be part of the terms of reference of the proposed special full-time commission to define the role of the military in the post-insurgency period. Examples, however, would be a review of the policy of merely rotating incompetent officers rather than weeding them out, instituting measures to decongest the "bunching" of middle level officers as a result of the accelerated expansion of the military in the mid-1970's on the one hand and the relative shortage of junior field officers on the other, the laxity in allowing Lt Cols to avoid going to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) where their fitness for promotion or separation from the service is determined.

With respect to purchasing and audit procedures, the military and the Commission on Audit (COA) must work out a practical solution to the problem of "conversion", i.e., spending the money for other than the budgeted purpose not necessarily because of graft and corruption but because of the needs in the field and the bureaucratic tape involved in complying with all the technicalities of disbursement. The Commission suggests that the military and the COA agree on a standard method by which the principle of transparency is practiced all the way down to the smallest unit by providing all the information about its budget to the soldiers. Although this is already being practiced in many units, much still needs to be done particularly in the matter of "conversion". The philosophy should be to challenge the military to perform better through a system of decentralization, transparency, and an appeal to the traditional military values of integrity and discipline, and relying on formal and informal sanctions for enforcement.

With respect to availments of educational benefits and rotational assignments abroad, special efforts must be made to eliminate the *tayo-tayo* system and to use the reward system to broaden the linkages of the

military and reduce its dependence on the US, and recognize performance and loyalty to the Constitution.

h. The President and the Commission on Appointments must work out a system by which recommendations for promotions can be categorized in practice to avoid the exploitation of the confirmation process for political purposes.

The appointments to the Chief of Staff position and the top positions in the major service commands have a political dimension which requires the exhaustive inquiry of the Commission on Appointments in the proper exercise of the principle of checks and balances. However, other appointments might merit a progressively different treatment based on institutional courtesy.

i. If justice is going to be a living principle of governance, the budgets of the Judiciary and the Department of Justice (DOJ) must be increased in order to upgrade the physical facilities, recording, investigative and prosecutive capability, and staffing of the system.

The budget of the Judiciary amounts to 1.08 % of the 1990 national budget. It is a grossly inadequate amount and should be increased in view of its critical role and the national scale of its responsibility as the conscience of the nation.

The Commission recommends the same approach with respect to the budget of the DOJ. The existence of honest judges and efficient courts would not result in a better administration of justice without a corresponding improvement in the investigative and prosecutorial capability of the DOJ. The courts can only decide on the evidence before it. If that evidence is inadequate and its presentation flawed and incompetent, the wheels of justice will not turn efficiently. The DOJ's budget for 1990 is only .5% (one-half of 1%) of the national budget. A significant increase in its budget should be considered to modernize facilities and equipment, provide funding for proper investigation and preparation of cases, and keep and attract the best people for the job.

i. The business sector, as the engine of growth of the economy, is the key sector, in addition to the government, in avoiding a severe economic crisis that could invite military adventurism. This is the time to stake its resources for democracy as the only political system under which it can survive and thrive, and thereby help others overcome their poverty.

The business sector is not a homogeneous group — a set of economic policies that favors one industry can hurt another — and engages in a broad range of partisan political activity. But its long-term interest is in strengthening democracy regardless of partisan politics or of any temporary advantage to business that authoritarianism may appear to offer. Authoritarianism in the Philippine experience eventually means arbitrary interference in private business, and lack of progress. This is the painful lesson we have learned, the same lesson which is being validated by the experience of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe today. Therefore, business should act as one — to help restore confidence in the economy by keeping and investing its resources in the country, to deny support to military rebels, to resist the temptation to subvert the electoral process to advance business interests, to pay correct taxes, and to keep honest rather than corrupt the bureaucracy. Beyond that, business must be willing to transcend itself by supporting rather than obstructing policies that dismantle the economic privileges of a few and diffuse the fruits of progress to the greatest number. In an economic slowdown, its social responsibility is to protect the jobs of its employees and to relieve them, as much as possible, from the burden of adjustment to adverse business conditions.

k. The non-governmental and peoples organizations are intermediating institutions which can help unify a factionalized society. By mobilizing communities and resources to improve the lives of the poor, they help the grassroots create a stake in democracy.

The task of such organizations in deterring coups is to strengthen the bond of nationhood and propagate by deeds the values of *pagkakaisa* at *pagmamalasakit*, self-reliance, and participation in fair and clean electoral exercises.⁸⁰ The role of peoples organizations is spelled out in the Constitution, and should be exercised by the people themselves without waiting for the formality of legislation. On the other hand, while the NGOs have a role to play in people empowerment, they should take care not to become the bureaucracy of the private sector by accumulating power rather than facilitating its transfer to the basic sectors. In a truly participatory democracy, these sectors must speak with their own voice in the formation of national consensus.

l. The church occupies a unique position in Philippine society, acting as an arbiter on moral issues even in the realm of politics, i.e., the condemnation of the election fraud by the Marcos administration in February 1986, although inhibited by

the constitutional mandate of separation of church and state, the boundaries of which may shift from time to time.

The biblical passages condemning rebellion, the exhortation against contributing to it, the moral duty to uphold duly-constituted authority, provide the church with a strong moral suasion to deter rebels and to unite people behind democracy. Its influence should also be brought to bear on solving the problems of gambling, graft and corruption, and structural poverty. In the more immediate future, the role of the church is to catalyze the peace process and to progressively expand it, regardless of the obstacles placed in its path. The success of the peace process would heal the festering wounds of the nation and also pave the way to a meaningful electoral process and democratic change in 1992.

m. The resolution of the dilemma faced by media in crisis reporting lies more in the media itself rather than government regulations.

While government should take whatever measures it considers appropriate to defend itself, such measures, when perceived to impair press freedom, should be immediately questioned, until a body of jurisprudence and tradition is accumulated. Because the preferred option is self-regulation and self-discipline, media should proceed with their initiatives in formalizing their own ethical standards, strictly enforce them, and inform the public of such efforts. It is also incumbent on media to define the boundaries of their profession not only during crisis but also in conflict of interest situations. Media should accept the responsibility to discipline erring members, to provide training and guidance to its apprentices, and to establish linkages with responsible counterparts abroad to broaden their experience and perspective.

C.3 Recommendations Over the Long-Term

A crisis does not develop overnight. It passes through symptomatic, acute, and chronic stages with progressive indicators on the severity of the situation. The task of leadership is to read the signals early enough so that the acute and chronic stages are bypassed and the problems resolved even before the crisis is reached.⁸¹

A coup d'etat does not happen overnight. Neither does a revolution or popular uprising of the citizenry itself. The responsibility of the political leadership is to build a national consensus on what must be done to address the underlying problems indicated by the symptoms. Since many of the problems of the country are structural in character, there are

no quick solutions, although one can resort to "damage control" and short-term alleviation to buy time. The longer-term solutions, however, must start today.

C.3.a. Love of Country as the Highest Value.

On the premise that the soldier is first a citizen before he becomes a military man and officers do not enter military school until after high school, it follows that our system of education has not been successful in transmitting the proper values to our students. The extent of the overhaul of the educational system is a matter for legislation, but the greater responsibility is in the entire education sector, public and private, for it does appear that it must do a better job at value formation, with love of country as the highest value. This will take time and will need to be reinforced by the family and the church. In addition, something must be done about public school teachers. How can they impart correct values when they themselves are demoralized, badly trained, and lack dedication and discipline? The Executive and the Legislative Departments have a joint responsibility to formulate a long-term and properly funded program to improve the educational system.

C.3.b. Social Justice

The full implementation of the social justice provisions of the Constitution. Until the gross inequalities of wealth and power are corrected, the ferment for change and the vulnerability of the men-at-arms to political intervention will continue. For the great majority of the military belong to the underprivileged class as well.

C.3.c. Citizen Army

The full implementation of the citizen army concept and the designated role of a small, modernized, and professional military in a democratic society. The de-linking of the military from the US on weaponry, its assumption of the external defense responsibility, and the immediate phaseout of the US facilities in Philippine bases and removal of all the vestiges of its colonialism would constitute the basic military-related steps toward becoming a truly sovereign and independent nation.

C.3.d. Decentralization

The decentralization of the national government as a precondition for the efficient delivery of government services. The devolution of power

to local communities would bring the government closer to the people and reduce the isolation of rural communities whose poverty tends to politicize officers in the field.

C.3.e. The Constitution

After an appropriate period, to give the present Constitution an opportunity to be tested, formal consultations should be conducted at the grassroots on the desirability of constitutional amendments and of the specific proposals advanced by the different sectors. A rush to amend the Constitution, including the basic structure of government, to suit contemporary problems is not always the answer. The people must be prepared to make amendments if it is clear that the fundamental law has proven to be irrelevant or inapplicable to the times. But the best way to test the relevance of the Constitution is not by speculative theories but the implementation of its key provisions, particularly on the diffusion of wealth and political power (social justice), and on economic progress with equity.

D. Choosing Democracy

If a coup d'etat starts in the minds of men, then it is the collective will of a unified people that can prevent and overcome it.

The people must choose democracy.

To flourish, democracy must become the living mortar that binds us. To work, it must come from a people that have willed their own liberation from poverty, dependency, and disunity. For it has truly been said that "democracy is based upon the conviction that there are extraordinary possibilities in ordinary people."⁸²

When there are forces that would destroy democracy, only the strength that comes from such a people can protect and uphold it. And the irreducible minimum to peaceful and orderly change, both societal and political, is for all the contenders in the political arena to agree to use the ballot and forego the bullet — for the path of peace is the path to progress, social justice, and nationhood.

THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION


Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6832

Makati, Metro Manila

3 October 1990


HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chairman


RICARDO J. ROMULO
Commissioner


DELFIN L. LAZARO
Commissioner


CAROLINA G. HERNANDEZ
Commissioner


CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD
Commissioner

ENDNOTES

- (1) Sworn Testimonies before the Fact-Finding Commission (FFC) of Lt Col Arsenio Tecson, 1 March 1990; Lt Col Ericson Aurelio, 10 March 1990; Lt Col Oscar Legaspi, 12 March 1990; and BGen Edgardo Abenina, 5 March 1990. Tecson, Aurelio and Abenina recounted their experiences in the field where they saw the lack of basic services even in areas near Manila. For Legaspi, the government's non-delivery of basic services, in spite of the tax raise, is one of the causes not only of the December 1989 coup attempt, but also that of August 1987.
- (2) See the Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of Lt Jose Rene Jarque, 22 March 1990; Lt Rolando Cal, 21 March 1990; Lt Augusto Marquez, Jr, 28 March 1990; Maj Rolando Irizari, 29 March 1990; Capt Gregory Ramos, 27 March 1990; Capt Proceso Maligalig, 12 March 1990; BGen Edgardo Abenina, *op. cit.*; and BGen Jose Comendador, 5 February 1990. According to these officers, graft and corruption is one of the alleged major causes of the coup. It exists not only in the civilian government but also in the military establishment as well. According to Lt Cal, even officers with fine records joined the coup because of discontent over widespread graft and corruption. For Maj Irizari, it is the number one problem in the country. In the military, according to Cmdr Maligalig, corruption exists in the form of the over-pricing of military uniforms and supplies, "conversion deals", and usurious loans. "Conversion deals" are those which involve the creation of artificial allocations in the budget for the purpose of circumventing the rules and regulations of the Commission on Audit. Corruption also exists in the administration of benefits. Lt Cal testifies that junior officers do not complain even if they have knowledge of the corrupt practices because when they confront senior officers about them, they are just brushed aside.
- (3) Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of Tecson, *op. cit.*; Col Rafael Galvez, 27 February 1990; and Irizari, *op. cit.* Tecson suggests that Congress should act more and talk less.
- (4) Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of Tecson, *op. cit.*; Marquez, *op. cit.*; and Comendador, 27 December 1989. Tecson distinguishes between the law and its implementation. Oftentimes, there is a proposal but it never gets to be implemented. As a result, poverty, especially in the countryside, is appalling, he said. Marquez

comments that poverty and the sufferings of the people are the battlecries of the coup plotters. For Comendador, poverty is one of the causes not only of coups but of the communist insurgency as well.

- (5) Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of Cal, *op. cit.*; Capt Ramos, *op. cit.*; Capt Danilo Pizarro, 7 March 1990; Legaspi, *op. cit.*; Maligalig, 17 April 1990; Lt Col Levy Zamora, 20 March 1990; and Col Renato Motus, 1 March 1990. The tayo-tayo system was brought about by factionalism in the military. Maligalig says that any superior officer appointed to a key position almost always brings in his team. Although this is natural, what is perceived as wrong is that preferential treatment results out of this practice, especially in housing, promotions, and schooling. The military leadership was also considered as unresponsive particularly when it comes to financial and logistical support for soldiers in the field. Legaspi laments the fact that while the military leadership procures expensive jets, soldiers in the field remain barefoot. Cal says that the men in the field are given supplies and equipment of inferior quality. They also complain that the pay and allowances that soldiers get are not commensurate with the responsibility given to them.
- (6) Legaspi Testimony, *op. cit.* For Legaspi, the government's reconciliation policy is selective. He views it as pro-Left.
- (7) Ibid. He said that justice is unequally dispensed. In terms of investigating human rights violations, the AFP is the only target. He also said that while the CPP/NPA are charged with simple rebellion, rightists and some members of the AFP are charged with rebellion complexed with murder.
- (8) Abenina and Tecson Testimonies, *op. cit.*
- (9) Cal and Tecson Testimonies, *op. cit.* They cite their experiences during counter-insurgency campaigns. After clearing the area of NPA influence, they try to provide livelihood for the people. But in their experience, there has been no corresponding support from the government especially in terms of the provision of basic services.
- (10) Sworn Testimony of Lt Jose Rene Jarque before the FFC, 22 March 1990; See also Abenina, Tecson, and Cal Testimonies, *op. cit.*

- (11) Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of BGen Rodolfo Biazon, 20 December 1989; BGen Tereso Isleta, 29 January 1990; Col Hector Tarrazona, 12 March 1990; BGen Alexander Aguirre, 15 January 1990; MGen Rodolfo Canieso, 24 February 1990; Cmdr Bernardo Patino, 15 June 1990; BGen Artemio Tadiar, 15 June 1990; and Lt Col Salvador Limsiaco, 13 February 1990.
- (12) See Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of BGen Aguirre, op. cit.; BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr, 29 March 1990; and Lt Gen Antonio Sotelo, 19 June 1990. BGen Aguirre believes that the coup plotters have vested personal interests. He cited the examples of Honasan and the RAM-HF core officers, who once enjoyed power under MND but lost it under the present dispensation.
- (13) Isleta and Biazon Testimonies, op. cit. BGen Isleta implied the existence of factions among the officer corps belonging to the PMA alumni, integrees and reservists. BGen Biazon considers the RAM, the loyalists, and the Young Officers Union (YOU) as the factions in the military.
- (14) Aguirre Testimony, op. cit.
- (15) Ibid.
- (16) Sworn Testimony of Rear Admiral Tagumpay Jardiniano (Ret) before the FFC, 27 June 1990.
- (17) See the financial improvements currently enjoyed by the military in Vittorio Hernandez, "Low Pay No Reason to Go Up in Arms, Businessworld, 27 July 1990, pp. 25-26.
- (18) Sworn Testimony of BGen Jose M. Crisol (Ret) before the FFC, 24 August 1990.
- (19) Abenina, Maligalig, 12 March 1990, Legaspi and Aurelio Testimonies, op. cit., Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of ex-LCdr Jaime Lucas and Lt Col Crucero Sua, 14 June 1990.
- (20) Dennis Arroyo, "Self-Rated Poverty and Poverty Threshold", Social Weather Stations Bulletin, 89-3 (February 1989).
- (21) Social Weather Stations, Survey of Public Opinion on the December 1, 1989 Coup Attempt.

- (22) Sworn Testimony of Gov Luis Villafuerte of Camarines Sur before the FFC, 24 April 1990.
- (23) Sworn Testimony of AM Luis Manalo given before the FFC 16 March 1990.
- (24) Sworn Testimony of Customs Commissioner Salvador Mison before the FFC, 22 February 1990.
- (25) Sworn Testimony of Col Voltaire Gazmin before the FFC, 17 February 1990.
- (26) Sworn Testimony of Gov Melvin Vargas of Cagayan Valley before the FFC, 17 April 1990.
- (27) Sworn Testimony of Romeo Rivera before the FFC, 24 April 1990.
- (28) Sworn Testimony of Commo Virgilio Marcelo before the FFC, 4 May 1990.
- (29) Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of Capt Adriano Morales, 10 August 1990; Capt Loreto Vergeire, 22 August 1990; and Roberto Huang, 7 August 1990.
- (30) Sworn Testimony of Col Virgilio G. Poblete before the FFC, 13 June 1990.
- (31) Biazon Testimony, op. cit.
- (32) Sworn Testimony of BGen Eduardo Cabanlig before the FFC, 20 December 1989.
- (33) Ibid.
- (34) Sworn Testimony of Lt Emil Ong before the FFC, 22 March 1990.
- (35) Gregory Ramos Testimony, op. cit.
- (36) Mison Testimony, op. cit.
- (37) Sworn Testimony of 2Lt Siegfried Mison before the FFC, 16 March 1990.
- (38) Sworn Testimony of Director Meliton Goyena, Bureau of

Corrections, before the FFC, 25 June 1990.

- (39) Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of of Atty Galilul Salialam, 21 May 1990 and P/Capt Job Gavino, 31 May 1990.
- (40) Sworn Testimony of Assistant City Prosecutor Elmer Sagsago, Baguio City before the FFC, 5 May 1990.
- (41) Sworn Testimony of C1C Elpidio Lazaga before the FFC, 5 January 1990.
- (42) Sworn Testimony of Pfc Victor Samonte before the FFC, 2 January 1990.
- (43) Sworn Testimony of Commo Antonio Empedrad before the FFC, 26 March 1990.
- (44) Sworn Testimony of LCdr Damian Carlos before the FFC 27 March 1990.
- (45) Testimony received in Executive Session.
- (46) Sworn Testimonies before the FFC of Navy Capt Rex Robles, 7 March 1990; and Lt Col Teodorico Viduya, 23 March 1990.
- (47) Maligalig Testimony, 17 April 1990, op. cit.
- (48) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rodolfo Biazon before the FFC, 21 December 1990.
- (49) Gregor Ferguson in his book COUP D'ETAT: A Practical Manual (Dorset: Arms and Armour Press Limited, 1987), pp. 88-89, describes a coup d'etat as having three phases: Assault, Continuation, and Consolidation. The most critical stage of the operation within two to six hours will spell doom for the attempt.
- (50) Sworn Testimony of Lt Antonio Avaricio before the FFC, 19 March 1990.
- (51) Marcelo Testimony, op. cit.
- (52) Sworn Testimony of Col Clemente Mariano before the FFC, 22 December 1989.

- (53) Sworn Testimony of BGen Rogelio Villanueva before the FFC, 26 February 1990.
- (54) Transcription of the taped telephone interview of Vice President Salvador Laurel by John Eidinow on 3 December 1989 and broadcast over BBC World Service, Exh-"KKKKKK-2"-Commission.
- (55) Sworn Testimony of Blas Ople, Member, 1986 Constitutional Commission, before the FFC, 7 May 1990.
- (56) Ibid.
- (57) Ibid.
- (58) Ibid.
- (59) Ibid.
- (60) Ibid.
- (61) Ibid.
- (62) Sworn Testimony of Atty Regalado Maambong before the FFC, 30 April 1990.
- (63) Copy of the Statement of the Nacionalista Party (NP) allegedly drafted by NP Vice President Blas Ople at the meeting of the Party officials on 2 December 1989 at the Intercontinental Manila, Exh. "C-Maambong", hereinafter referred to as NP Statement.
- (64) Ople Testimony, op. cit.
- (65) NP Statement, op. cit.
- (66) Ople Testimony, op. cit.
- (67) Video Recording of the Press Conference of the Nacionalista Party on 2 December 1989 at Hotel Intercontinental Manila dubbed by Cable News Network, Exh. "YYYYYY"-Commission.
- (68) Transcription of the CNN video recording of the Press Conference of the Nacionalista Party held on 2 December 1989. Exh. "YYYYYY-2"-Commission.

- (69) Ibid.
- (70) Ople Testimony, op. cit.
- (71) Sworn Testimony of Melinda Quintos de Jesus before the FFC, 9 July 1990.
- (72) Perfecto Fernandez, "Safeguarding the Public Right in Broadcast Media," Philippine Journalism Review (April 1990), p. 7.
- (73) See Testimony Monzon Palma before the FFC, 9 July 1990.
- (74) Sworn Testimony of Dr. Florangel R. Braid, before the FFC, 11 July 1990; Monzon Palma, op. cit.
- (75) Quintos de Jesus Testimony, op. cit.
- (76) Monzon Palma Testimony, op. cit.
- (77) Sworn Testimony of Georgina Encanto, Dean, University of the Philippines College of Mass Communications, before the FFC, 11 July 1990.
- (78) Sworn Testimony of BGen Arturo Enrile, Superintendent, Philippine Military Academy before the FFC, 5 March 1990.
- (79) Jardiniano Testimony, op. cit.
- (80) Ricardo J. Romulo, "Let Us Make This Land Safe for Democracy." Speech delivered at the graduation exercises of the De La Salle University, 2 June 1990. Published in Business World, 11 June 1990, pp. 4 and 5.
- (81) Kilusan ng mga Nagmamahal ng Bayan, "The Coup Crisis and the Future," Kilusan Paper No. 5, December 1989.
- (82) Quoted from Harry Emerson Fosdick.

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APPENDIX A

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION

(consisting of 21 pages)

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION

A. The Presidential Commission Under Administrative Order No. 146

On 6 December 1989, or on the sixth day of the failed December coup, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 146 creating a Presidential Commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 rebellion and the involvement therein of military and civilian officials and private persons.

The Presidential Commission was granted the powers of an investigating body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation, and issue compulsory processes to produce documents, books, records, and such other matters, in the performance of its functions. It could not, however, hold a witness in contempt without first applying for it before the appropriate court. It was authorized to engage the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel, and to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine Constabulary (PC), the Integrated National Police (INP), and any other law enforcing agency to assist it in the performance of its functions.

To compose the Presidential Commission were Hilario G. Davide, Jr, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and incumbent Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), as chairman; Carolina G. Hernandez, Professor and Director of the Center for Integrative and Development Studies (CIDS) of the University of the Philippines (UP); Ricardo J. Romulo, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, a practicing lawyer and a business executive; Delfin L. Lazaro, a member of the Board of Regents of the UP, Chairman and President of Benguet Corporation (Benguet Corp) and a 1985 TOYM awardee; and Msgr Leonardo Legaspi, Archbishop of the Diocese of Nueva Caceres and President of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, as members. The first four took their oath of office on 7 December 1989. Msgr Legaspi declined the appointment. In his place, President Aquino appointed Christian S. Monsod, also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, National Co-Chairman of the Bishops-

Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, a 1975 TOYM awardee, and a business executive, who took his oath of office on 28 December 1989.

Administratively, the Presidential Commission was under the Office of the President. The latter was to provide the necessary funds for the Presidential Commission and the Executive Secretary was authorized to detail any personnel from any government office to assist the new body.

The Presidential Commission set up its office in a 130-square meter area on the 11th floor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Building in Makati, Metro Manila. This office space was temporarily vacated by some members of the DBP Board of Directors as a gesture of support for the Commission.

Since time was of the essence, the Presidential Commission immediately began to function despite its lack of personnel and meager resources. It was able to equip itself with a vehicle, office equipment, and some pieces of furniture through the cooperation and support of the COMELEC, UP, DBP and Benguet Corp. Most of the equipment and furniture were furnished by Benguet Corp. For office supplies and miscellaneous expenses, the Office of the President established a revolving fund under the control and supervision of its own personnel who were detailed to the Presidential Commission.

With a skeletal staff composed of 22 professionals from varied disciplines drawn mainly from other government agencies and assigned temporarily to the Presidential Commission, it spent the next 22 days of its short existence formulating strategies, deputizing various offices or instrumentalities of the government to assist it in the performance of its functions (such as the AFP, NBI, PC and INP), identifying sources of information, and drawing up a work program in pursuit of its investigation. It established linkages with government and private agencies or institutions which were potential sources of information or data vital to its investigation, and promulgated a resolution urging citizens with personal knowledge of facts or in possession of evidence relating to the coup attempt to testify before the Commission or to provide it with the evidence and requesting the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) to give the resolution widest dissemination.

Following the promulgation of its Interim Rules of Procedures on 13 December 1989, the Presidential Commission started to receive testimonial evidence in open and closed-door sessions, and issued *subpoenas duces tecum* for the production of records, papers or documents.

Before the Presidential Commission was transformed into an independent Fact-Finding Commission, it had promulgated 22 resolutions, heard 40 witnesses in open and closed-door sessions, and obtained several records, papers or documents from other agencies or instrumentalities of the government. Its last session to receive testimonial evidence was held on 5 January 1990.

Based on the report of its Finance Officer, at the time of its dissolution the Office of the President had disbursed ₱30,000 for the supplies and miscellaneous expenses of the Presidential Commission.

B. The Fact-Finding Commission under Republic Act No. 6832

From the start, the Presidential Commission created under Administrative Order No. 146 faced several constraints and issues. Its powers were insufficient to enable it to satisfactorily perform its tasks. The validity of its creation was raised by some witnesses it called. To resolve these issues, the President referred a bill to Congress investing the Commission with additional powers. This bill became House Bill No. 27761. In the Senate, however, the Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws introduced Senate Bill No. 1391, which created an independent and non-partisan Commission to make a thorough investigation of all facts and circumstances surrounding the failed coup d'etat of December 1989 and to recommend measures to prevent the occurrence of similar attempts at violent seizure of power.

Congress was not able to approve these bills before its 1989 Christmas recess. In view of their urgency, President Aquino called Congress to a special session.

In its Special Session of 3 January 1990, Congress approved Republic Act No. 6832 (RA No. 6832) entitled An Act Creating A Commission To Conduct A Thorough Fact-Finding Investigation Of The Failed Coup D'Etat Of December 1989, Recommend Measures To Prevent The Occurrence Of Similar Attempts At A Violent Seizure Of Power, And For Other Purposes. This Act is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1391 and House Bill No. 27761. It was approved and signed by the President on 5 January 1990, and it took effect on 12 January 1990 following its publication in two national newspapers of general circulation.

The new Commission has since been known as the **FACT-FINDING COMMISSION**. President Aquino appointed to the new Commission the Chairman and the Members of the Presidential Commission who then took their oath of office on 12 January 1990.

B.1. Objectives and Powers

Republic Act No. 6832 directs the Fact-Finding Commission to investigate all the facts and circumstances of the failed coup d'etat of December 1989, and recommend measures to prevent the occurrence of similar attempts at a violent seizure of power. To attain these objectives, it is empowered to (a) conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of said coup and the involvement therein of military personnel and civilian personalities, including public officials and employees, evaluate all the facts and circumstances of the same and submit its findings and recommendations to the President, the Congress and other appropriate authorities not later than one year from the effectivity of the Act, (b) receive, review and evaluate the evidence adduced, and to this end, summon witnesses, and administer oaths, take testimony or receive evidence relevant to the investigation, and to issue *subpoenas ad testificandum* or *subpoenas duces tecum*, (c) turn over to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities all evidence involving any person when in the course of its investigation it finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that he appears to be liable for a criminal offense in connection with said coup, and (d) ask the Monetary Board to disclose information on and/or to grant authority to examine any bank deposits, trust or investment funds, or banking transactions in the name of and/or utilized by a person, natural or juridical, under investigation by the Commission, in any bank or banking institution in the Philippines, when the Commission has reasonable ground to believe that such deposits, trust or investment funds, or banking transactions have been used in support or furtherance of the objectives of said coup, and exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the objectives of the Act.

B.2. Authority

In order that it could effectively perform its powers and accomplish its objectives, the Act grants the Commission the authority to:

1. Promulgate its rules and regulations.
2. Call upon any government investigative and prosecutorial agency to make available their offices, personnel and facilities.
3. Engage the services of such persons as may be required, fix their duties and compensation, organize the Commission's structure and staffing pattern and authorize the payment of honoraria and/or allowances for deputized officers and officials. Persons so

appointed, designated or deputized shall be exempt from Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

4. Hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose appropriate penalties. The Commission's judgment on direct contempt shall be final and not appealable.
5. Grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testimony in any investigation conducted by it when, upon evaluation, such information or testimony is necessary and vital to the investigation.

Only the Supreme Court could issue any restraining order or preliminary injunction on any matter involving the official acts of the Commission and of the Monetary Board.

The budget for the operations of the Commission was P10 million, to be released automatically from the Contingent Fund.

Furthermore, on 17 January 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 153 directing the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, to extend assistance, support and cooperation to the Commission created under RA No. 6832. In accordance with this Order, the DBP assigned four cars for use by the Commission.

B.3. The Organization of the Commission and its Budget

Section 14 of RA No. 6832 stipulates that the records, facilities, equipment, property, rights and such other things incidental to the creation of the Presidential Commission, including its employees, are to be absorbed by the new Commission to the extent that it is administratively feasible. To this effect, the Fact-Finding Commission immediately promulgated, on 12 January 1990, Resolution No. 001 adopting the appropriate, relevant and pertinent Resolutions of the Presidential Commission.

The first priority of the Commission was its immediate organization and its compensation plan. On 12 January 1990, it promulgated Resolution No. 002 which provides for its organizational structure, staffing pattern and compensation plan.

Under its organizational structure, the Commission is made up of the Commission Proper, headed by the Chairman, supported by five

divisions with distinct functions. These divisions are the Office of the Commission Counsel, Office of Research, Evaluation and Publication, Administrative Services Division, Special Operations Division, and the Office of External Relations.

Under the Office of the Commission Counsel are the Clerk of the Commission, the Deputy Commission Counsels and the Special Counsels.

In addition to their functions of deliberating and deciding, *en banc*, on Commission policies and administrative matters, hearing testimonies of witnesses, and submitting reports, the Commissioners act as Commissioners-in-charge of the separate divisions to oversee their activities.

On 18 January 1990, the Commission submitted to the Office of the President and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) its financial plan for the release of its appropriation. After 11 days, the Commission received the first release of its budget in the amount of P1,949,498 corresponding to 19 percent of its P10 million appropriation. Subsequent releases that sum up to P7.615 million as of 31 August were made every month according to the policy of the government.

The mobilization of personnel who would occupy various positions in the organizational structure started on 12 January and by 31 May, 90 percent of the required number of personnel had been hired. Also, within 14 days after initial release of the budget, 22 percent of the required equipment and furniture had been procured.

The problem of office space was solved when the DBP Board of Directors, as a further gesture of support and cooperation, acceded to the Commission's request for a bigger space that could accommodate all the Commission personnel to be hired according to its staffing pattern. The DBP gave up an additional area of 170 square meters, bringing the total area occupied by the Commission to 300 square meters without any rental charges. Furthermore, the DBP allowed the use of its Suite No. 4 on the 12th floor as the Commission's hearing room at a discounted rental rate.

B.4. The Rules of Procedure of the Commission

To expedite the performance of its task and to provide rules for the transaction of its business and the smooth conduct of its investigations, the Commission promulgated on 15 January 1990 the Rules of Procedure of the Fact-Finding Commission (Resolution No. 004) which became

effective on 19 January 1990 following its publication in The Philippine Star and The Manila Standard on 17 January 1990.

B.4.a. The Fact-Finding Investigation Process: Work Flow

The fact-finding activities of the Commission were actually begun by its predecessor, the Presidential Commission, six days after it was organized under Administrative Order No. 146. All the evidence obtained by the latter was turned over to the former. The Fact-Finding Commission substantially pursued the data and evidence-gathering plan of the Presidential Commission, under which it initially interviewed parties believed to have knowledge of or information on facts, persons or events pertaining to or connected with the December 1989 coup and pursued leads that may provide evidence on the coup. It also began evaluating coup-related information that was submitted by concerned citizens, as well as intelligence reports and information obtained from the intelligence agencies of the AFP. News reports covering the coup were also analyzed. It also gathered other resource materials such as studies, published articles, and books relating to coups.

When the Fact-Finding Commission took over, it already had a list of probable witnesses whose testimonies it wanted to take and of documents, papers and records it wanted to obtain.

Following Section 1 of Rule 7 of its Rules of Procedure, it obtained facts or evidence through oral testimonies, sworn statements or affidavits of parties whom it considered to have knowledge of any fact or to have possession of any evidence which may be pertinent, material or relevant for purposes of attaining the objectives of the Commission.

Subpoenas ad testificandum were issued to witnesses for their appearances on specific dates.

Oral testimonies of witnesses were received by the Commission *en banc* which, as a general rule, had to be in open session. Before testifying, witnesses were placed under oath and informed of their rights. The Commission Counsel, his Deputy or any of the Special Counsels conducted the examination of the witnesses. Members of the Commission, however, could ask questions for clarification or to elicit more facts. Closed-door sessions were allowed in the instances provided by RA No. 6832 and the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. In some cases, only sworn statements or affidavits were taken from subpoenaed witnesses by the Commission Counsel, the Deputy Commission Counsels or any of the Special Counsels of the Commission, which were thereafter

marked as Exhibits. In other instances, witnesses were subpoenaed for the confirmation or re-swearing of sworn statements or affidavits earlier given by them, which were likewise marked as Exhibits.

Subpoenas duces tecum were issued for the production of documents, books, records and other papers which, upon their production, were marked Exhibits.

Although the taking of depositions is one of the modes of obtaining evidence under the Rules of the Commission, no deposition was scheduled. The Commission relied principally on the other modes.

Documents produced or identified during the reception of the testimony of a witness were also marked as Exhibits.

The Commission also directed its Research, Evaluation and Publication Office to conduct research on coups using as its sources books, published articles, theses, position papers, surveys and other materials, many of which were similarly marked as Exhibits. Its research findings or recommendations were then submitted to the Commission.

The Commission likewise decided to contract the services of respected and reputable social, political and economic scientists to undertake special studies on subjects relevant to coups, especially the December 1989 failed coup. Their reports were later marked as Exhibits. Pursuant to its Resolution No. 066, it requested national civic, religious, political, professional, business, labor, media, communicators, youth, women, veterans and other organizations to submit to the Commission their respective position papers and/or memoranda, embodying a statement of their role in preventing coups d'etat or similar attempts at violent seizure of power and indicating the measures they recommend to prevent such attempts. Only a few, however, submitted their papers, which were then marked as Exhibits.

All in all, the Commission, in a total of 145 session days, heard in open or closed-door sessions the testimonies of 332 witnesses. It also took the sworn statements or affidavits, or obtained the re-swearing of sworn statements earlier executed, of a total of 223 other witnesses subpoenaed for the purpose. Moreover, the Commission marked in evidence more or less 4,100 documents: records, video tapes, reports, papers and other documents obtained from or produced by the witness in the course of his testimony or subsequently submitted by him; sworn statements, affidavits, records or papers produced and submitted

pursuant to *subpoenas duces tecum*; and reports from special studies as well as position papers of various organizations.

To formulate its reports, the Commission consolidated and analyzed the oral testimonies; documentary evidence, sworn statements and affidavits obtained from witnesses; its own research findings and recommendations; and the special studies done for it by scholars. It did this with the assistance of its Research, Evaluation and Publication Office.

Before its Final Report, the Commission, pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 14 of its Rules of Procedure, submitted to the President and Congress three Interim Reports, namely:

1. Interim Report No. 1 entitled Observations And Recommendations On Military Justice As Related To Coups, dated 16 May 1990;
2. Interim Report No. 2 entitled The Role Of The Philippine Air Force In The Destruction Of The Rebel Air Assets In Sangle Point, dated 16 May 1990; and
3. Interim Report No. 3 entitled The Urgency Of Legislation Implementing Military-Related Provisions Of The 1987 Constitution, dated 28 August 1990.

Pursuant to Section 1 (c) of RA No. 6832, which provides as follows:

Turn over to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities all evidence involving any person when, in the course of investigation, the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that he appears to be liable for any criminal offense in connection with said coup d'etat.

the Commission had so far turned over the evidence to the proper authorities and recommended the prosecution of the following parties:

1. Some military officers in Region VII through Resolution No. 059 sent to the Chief of Staff.
2. Some military officers in Region XI through Resolution No. 060 sent to the Chief of Staff.
3. The prison guards at the Bureau of Corrections in Munting-lupa, Rizal, through Resolution No. 089 sent to the Secretary of Justice.

In Chapter VI of the Final Report, to which this Brief History is appended, the Commission mentions the other military and civilian

personalities whom it recommends for prosecution, investigation or reinvestigation in connection with the failed December 1989 coup attempt.

An illustration of the workflow of the fact-finding process of the Commission is provided at the end of this section.

B.4.b Protection of Rights of Witnesses/Court Injunctions

The Commission adequately protected the rights of witnesses who appeared before it. Rule 9 of the Rules touched on the right to remain silent, the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Before a witness testified, the Commission took pains to inform him of his rights. Many of the military personnel who are under detention for alleged involvement in the failed December coup took full advantage of these rights. Aware of the peculiar cases of those already actively prosecuted by the military, the Commission adopted the following measures in its *en banc* meeting of 31 January 1990:

1. Where a witness is already being actively prosecuted, to initially desist from calling him. Instead, the Commission shall subpoena the evidence already presented against him and determine its sufficiency for the Commission's purpose. It should consider calling the witness to appear before it only when it shall find that the evidence is insufficient for its purposes.
2. When a witness had been charged or may be charged, he should be warned before he is made to testify before the Commission as follows:

Under Section 7, RA No. 6832, you may be compelled by this Commission to give testimony or produce evidence even if it may tend to incriminate you or subject you to penalty or forfeiture; but in such a case, the law prohibits the use of said evidence against you in any proceeding, except perjury in so testifying.

However, in order to take advantage of the immunity granted you in Section 7, you must invoke your right against self-incrimination before making a response for each and every question the reply to which you believe may incriminate you. Should you fail to invoke your right in that manner, the testimony you shall give or the evidence you shall produce will not be covered by the immunity granted by Section 7. Is that clear? Do you have any question?

3. When the evidence is already in the hands of the prosecutors or where there is a doubt that it is, the witness should not be compelled to answer a question from the Commission.

There were civilian personalities, among whom were Enrique Cojuangco and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr, who invoked their right to remain silent several times.

Only in one instance was the Commission's ruling on the rights of witnesses judicially questioned. This was in the case of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile who was subpoenaed by the Commission to appear and testify before it. On the scheduled date for his testimony, 17 May 1990, Senator Enrile appeared but refused to testify; through counsel, he moved for the quashing of the subpoena. The motion having been denied on that date, and the written motion to reconsider the denial having been also denied on 30 May 1990, Senator Enrile filed on 15 June 1990 with the Supreme Court a petition for *certiorari* and prohibition with preliminary injunction/restraining order asking the Court to set aside the foregoing order of the Commission on the grounds that the Commission:

1. Acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in coercing him to take the witness stand against his will and in violation of the Constitutional proscription against compelling a person to be a witness against himself.
2. Interpretation of its mandate and powers under RA No. 6832 is not only at variance with the manifest legislative intent but also exposes to attack on the ground of Constitutional infirmity.
3. The various criminal cases against Senator Enrile, for his alleged involvement in the December 1989 coup attempt, are already *subjudice* and the Commission's attempt to compel Senator Enrile to take the witness stand against his will encroaches upon the exclusive prerogative of the judiciary in violation of the principle of separation of power.

Although it had not given due course to the Enrile petition, the Supreme Court, in its *en banc* resolution of 19 June 1990, required the Commission to comment therein within ten days and issued a restraining order, effective immediately, ordering the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing the subpoena issued to petitioner and from holding the scheduled reception of his testimony on 22 June.

On 29 June 1990, the Commission filed its comment. Thereafter, Senator Enrile filed a reply. According to its Resolution of 24 July 1990, the Supreme Court gave due course to the petition. However, as of the time of the writing of this report, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue presented.

B.4.c. Immunity to Witnesses

There was no occasion for the Commission to grant immunity, as allowed in Section 7 of RA No. 6832, or transactional immunity under Section 8 of said Act as amplified in Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, to any witness. Under said Rule, the Commission may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information and testifies in any investigation conducted by it where, upon its evaluation, such information or testimony is necessary and vital to the investigation and it can be granted only if:

1. The information or testimony he gives or offers is necessary and vital to the investigation conducted by the Commission.
2. There is absolute necessity for such information or testimony.
3. There is, at the time the testimony is to be taken, no direct evidence available for the purpose except such information or testimony.
4. The information or testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points.
5. The witness does not appear to be the most guilty.
6. The witness has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

The immunity thereby granted shall continue to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the appropriate court when required to do so by the latter. Should he refuse to repeat his testimony or should he materially change such testimony, the immunity granted him shall automatically cease.

B.4.d. Contempt

Although several witnesses were formally ordered to explain why they should not be held in contempt of the Commission for failure to appear on the dates set for the reception of their testimonies, the Commission, nevertheless, considered these incidents closed and terminated when the witnesses filed their written explanation or subsequently appeared and testified.

B.4.e. Inquiry into Bank Deposits

This subject is dealt with in the Final Report.

C. Resolutions Promulgated

Up to 30 September 1990, the Commission promulgated 123 resolutions on various matters.

D. Turnover of Its Records, Assets and Properties to DOJ

Although Section 4 of RA No. 6832 was given one year from its effectivity to attain the objectives thereof and to turn over to the Department of Justice (DOJ) all its records, assets and properties within two months thereafter, in view of the early completion of its work, the Commission decided to immediately make the turnover.

Realizing the need to preserve confidentiality of certain classes of documents, the Commission promulgated on 24 July 1990 Resolution No. 095 providing for the guidelines on the use, safekeeping and declassification of stenographic notes and tape recordings of testimonies taken in executive sessions and of the transcripts thereof. On 28 August 1990, it passed Resolution No. 102 on the preservation and/or the safeguarding of the confidentiality of copies of classified data, reports, documents or papers furnished the Commission pursuant to the security clearance granted the latter by the President.

Resolution No. 095 provides, among others, that

B. Stenographic notes of testimonies of witnesses taken/given in executive sessions and/or closed-door hearings, the tape recordings thereof and the transcriptions of such notes and tape recordings are deemed and classified as confidential and no access thereto shall be allowed to the public or to any third party until they are declassified in the manner as hereinafter set forth.

1. Before they are turned over to the Department of Justice, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6832, said documents should be under the custody of the Chairman of the Commission; after the transcriptions of the stenographic notes and/or the tape recordings, they shall be deposited, together with said transcription, in the safety deposit boxes rented by the Commission from a reputable bank.

(a) Transcriptions thereof shall be done under strict supervision of Atty. Mario Renato Navas, Executive Assistant of Commissioner Ricardo J. Romulo, or any other responsible personnel of the Commission as may be designated by the Chairman, who shall immediately turn over to the Chairman the stenographic notes and/or the tape recordings transcribed and the transcriptions.

(b) The stenographers who took down the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses, the recording machine operator who attended to the tape recording of the testimonies and the persons assigned to transcribe the tape recording shall in no case allow any party to see such stenographic notes and the tape recordings and their respective transcription, to listen to such tape recordings or to copy or to obtain copies of such transcripts and tape recordings or their transcriptions; neither shall they release any thereof to any party for any purpose whatsoever.

C. The above stenographic notes, tape recordings and the transcriptions of both the notes and the tape recordings shall be declassified only in the following manner:

1. Declassification by the Commission:

(a) If the executive session/closed-door hearing was held upon request of a witness on the ground of personal safety, upon prior consultation with the witness: provided, however, that if, upon review of the testimony, the Commission finds that the personal safety of the witness is not in fact involved, then such documents may forthwith be declassified.

(b) If the executive session/closed-door hearing was held on the ground of national security or public safety, the documents may be declassified if the Commission finds that neither national security nor public safety is involved in the testimony of the witness or that such testimony does not concern with or relate to either or both.

2. Declassification by Other Appropriate Authorities:

After the turn-over to the Department of Justice and upon the Commission's having become *functus officio* pursuant to Section 4 of R. A. No. 6832, the aforesaid documents may be declassified as follows:


a) if the executive session was held upon request of a witness on the ground of personal safety, upon prior consent of the witness or by order of a competent court;

b) if the executive session was held on the ground of national security or public safety, upon approval or order of the President in his/her capacity as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

On the other hand, Resolution No. 102 provides, among others, that

1. All classified documents submitted or furnished to the Commission pursuant to or by virtue of the security clearance granted by President Corazon C. Aquino in her aforesaid Memorandum of 27 December 1989, as amended by the Memorandum of 7 February 1990, transmitted under red or blue covers shall be treated and accorded the secrecy or confidentiality they deserve according to law and established policies of the offices which declared them as "classified";

4. The foregoing boxes shall be transmitted to the Department of Justice in the manner as may be agreed upon by it and the Commission in a Memorandum of Agreement which shall be signed by the Secretary of Justice and the Chairman of the Commission.



**LIST OF PERSONNEL WHO SERVED
IN THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION
(AND THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION PRIOR TO 12
JANUARY 1990) As of 2 October 1990**

Name	Classification	Position	Inclusive Dates of Service
I. COMMISSION PROPER			
1. Hilario G. Davide, Jr.	Regular	Chairman	12/07/89 - present
2. Ricardo J. Romulo	Regular	Commissioner	12/07/89 - present
3. Carolina G. Hernandez	Regular	Commissioner	12/07/89 - present
4. Delfin L. Lazaro	Regular	Commissioner	12/07/89 - present
5. Christian S. Monsod	Regular	Commissioner	12/28/89 - present
II. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN			
1. Gina Villapane	Detailed (COMELEC)	Executive Assistant	12/14/89 - 01/11/90
2. Joseph Bryan			
Hilary P. Davide	Regular	Executive Assistant	03/01/90 - present
3. Deborah Montesclaros	Detailed (COMELEC)	Private Secretary	12/14/89 - 01/11/90
4. Nancy V. Manlangit	Regular	Private Secretary	01/22/90 - present
5. Numeriano Sales	Detailed (COMELEC)	Chauffer	12/14/89 - present
III. OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER ROMULO			
1. Reynaldo G. Geronimo	Regular	Executive Assistant	02/15/90 - 04/30/90
	Regular	Deputy Commission Counsel	05/01/90 - present
2. Mario Renato A. Navas	Regular	Private Secretary	02/05/90 - 06/15/90
	Regular	Executive Assistant	06/16/90 - present
3. Josefa R. Roa	Regular	Private Secretary	06/18/90 - present
IV. OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER HERNANDEZ			
1. Shirley Teresita			
M. Monsalud	Regular	Executive Assistant	02/13/90 - present
2. Epifania M. Domingo	Regular	Private Secretary	02/01/90 - present
3. Bernardo Dominguez	Detailed (UPCIDS)	Chauffer	12/07/89 - present
V. OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER LAZARO (Volunteers from Benguet Corp)			
1. Juliet R. Roa	Volunteer	Executive Assistant	12/15/89 - 01/31/90
	Regular	Executive Assistant Collecting/Disbursing Officer	02/01/90 - present

Name	Classification	Position	Inclusive Dates of Service
2. Julio C. Elamparo	Volunteer	Legal Assistant	12/15/89 - 03/15/90
3. Senen R. Castillo	Volunteer	Secretary	01/10/90 - 01/31/90
	Regular	Private Secretary	02/01/90 - present
4. Reynaldo Ornum	Volunteer	Commission	
		Secretary	12/15/89 - 04/15/90
5. Erlinda Endona	Volunteer	Secretary	12/15/89 - 07/31/90
6. Danilo Ramos	Volunteer	Security Guard	12/21/89 - present
7. Rodolfo Rayandayan	Volunteer	Process Server	12/15/89 - present
8. Herminigildo Cabitac	Volunteer	Chauffer	03/13/90 - present
VI. OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER MONSOD			
1. Virgilio P. Gerolaga	Regular	Executive Assistant	01/22/90 - present
2. Irene N. Tijam	Regular	Private Secretary	02/05/90 - present
VII. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSION COUNSEL			
1. Jesus Guerrero	Detailed	Commission Counsel/Consultant (City Prosecutor's Office, Manila)	12/11/90 - 02/28/90
2. Julio Cezar Sangco	Regular	Commission Counsel	12/19/89 - 04/12/90
	Regular	Commission Evaluator	04/13/90 - 05/01/90
3. Ruben Fruto	Detailed (DBP)	Deputy Commission Counsel	12/14/89 - 01/11/90
4. Charles S. Anastacio	Regular	Deputy Commission Counsel	12/14/89 - 04/12/90
	Regular	Sr. Deputy Commission Counsel	04/13/90 - 05/14/90
	Regular	Commission Counsel	10/5/90 - present
5. Henry P. Tuason	Regular	Deputy Commission Counsel	01/05/90 - 04/15/90
6. Leonardo Gonzales, Jr.	Detailed (NBI)	Deputy Commission Counsel	01/03/90 - 04/30/90
7. Virgilio Jara	Detailed	Deputy Commission Counsel	02/14/90 - 05/15/90
		(Pres'l Committee on the Phil. Nuclear Power Plant)	
8. Alejandro Bijasa	Detailed	Special Counsel (City Prosecutor's Office, Manila)	01/03/90 - present
9. Antonio Carbonnel	Detailed	Special Counsel (City Prosecutor's Office, Quezon City)	01/23/90 - 04/30/90
10. Salvador Gubaton	Detailed	Special Counsel (City Prosecutor's Office, Manila)	01/03/90 - present
11. Christopher Lock	Detailed	Special Counsel	01/03/90 - 04/30/90
	Detailed	Deputy Commission Counsel	05/01/90 - present
		(City Prosecutor's Office, Manila)	
12. Elizabeth Reyes	Detailed	Special Counsel (City Prosecutor's Office, Quezon City)	01/23/90 - 04/30/90
13. Amor Sunodan	Detailed	Special Counsel (City Prosecutor's Office, Quezon City)	01/23/90 - 04/30/90

Name	Classification	Position	Inclusive Dates of Service
14. Albino V. Arriero	Regular	Clerk of the Commission	01/25/90 - 03/31/90
15. James D. Lansang	Regular	Deputy Clerk of Commission	04/04/90 - 04/30/90
16. Jesus S. Delfin	Regular	Deputy Clerk of Commission	02/19/90 - 04/01/90
	Regular	Clerk of the Commission	04/02/90 - present
17. Zenaida Soriano	Regular	Secretary	01/22/90 - present
18. Charina V. Aquino	Regular	Stenographer	03/15/90 - present
19. Ophelia Cabales	Detailed	Stenographer	01/23/90 - 06/30/90
		(City Prosecutor's Office, Quezon City)	
20. Leticia Delvo	Detailed	Stenographer	01/23/90 - 07/31/90
		(City Prosecutor's Office, Quezon City)	
21. Agripina Gonzales	Regular	Stenographer	02/12/90 - 09/30/90
22. Nonalyn Lopez	Detailed	Stenographer	03/01/90 - present
23. Ernesto Naval	Detailed	Stenographer	01/05/90 - 07/31/90
		(Special Prosecutor's Office, Tanodbayan)	
24. Caridad Pinote	Detailed	Stenographer	01/05/90 - present
		(Special Prosecutor's Office, Tanodbayan)	
25. Marilyn B. Profeta	Regular	Stenographer	02/07/90 - present
26. Ma. Victoria Serrano	Regular	Stenographer	03/15/90 - present
27. Solita T. Tagaca	Regular	Stenographer	03/26/90 - present
28. Belinda Baquero	Detailed	Clerk	04/04/90 - present
		(Commission on Audit)	
29. Danilo Ravago	Regular	Process Server	02/08/90 - present
30. Rodolfo Albarillo	Detailed	Process Server	02/01/90 - 04/30/90
31. Rolando Banquil	Regular	Clerk IV	02/23/90 - present
32. Judith Velasco	Regular	Clerk IV	01/23/90 - 07/31/90
33. Lt. Col. Manolo Gorospe	Detailed	Liaison Officer	02/14/90 - present
34. Dante O. Garin	Volunteer	Legal Counsel	Part-time
		(Office of the Public Attorney)	
35. Jason Amante	Volunteer	Legal Counsel	Part-time
		(Office of the Public Attorney)	
36. Domingo Dillague	Detailed	Intelligence Agent	01/26/90 - 04/30/90
		(NBI)	
37. Reynaldo Laigo	Detailed	Intelligence Agent	01/26/90 - 04/30/90
		(NBI)	
38. Alfredo Lazarte	Detailed	Intelligence Agent	01/26/90 - 04/30/90
		(NBI)	
39. Emeterio Rendon	Detailed	Chauffer	02/01/90 - 04/30/90
		(NBI)	
VIII. RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND PUBLICATION			
1. Marriz Manuel B. Agbon	Regular	Researcher	01/22/90 - 02/28/90
	Regular	Director	03/01/90 - present
2. Asuncion L. Benitez	Regular	Research Assistant	03/01/90 - 04/01/90
	Regular	Researcher	04/02/90 - present
3. Emma C. Matammu	Regular	Researcher	03/01/90 - 04/02/90
	Regular	Research Assistant	04/02/90 - present
4. Ma. Teresa C. Mauhay	Regular	Research Assistant	02/15/90 - present
7. Elena R. Revatoris	Regular	Records Officer	03/05/90 - present

Name	Classification	Position	Inclusive Dates of Service
8. Leo A. Agustin, Jr.	Contractual	Research Aide	04/02/90 - present
9. Alexander L. Lacson	Contractual	Research Aide	04/02/90 - present
10. Napoleon Camesa	Regular	Chauffer	06/13/90 - 07/31/90
11. Victorio G. Riva	Regular	Chauffer	08/20/90 - present
12. Aniano Desierto	Detailed	Liaison Officer	02/01/90 - present
		(JAGO-AFP)	
13. Capt. Alphinor Serrano	Detailed	Liaison Assistant	03/22/90 - present
		(JAGO-AFP)	
14. Lt. Edwin Acupan	Detailed	Liaison Assistant	03/22/90 - present
		(JAGO-AFP)	
IX. EXTERNAL RELATIONS			
1. Elena V. Romero	Detailed	Director (DAP)	01/12/90 - present
2. Ma. Rita M. Buenviaje	Regular	PRO III	02/06/90 - present
3. Ma. Carmen O. Villablanca	Regular	PRO III	02/06/90 - present
4. Anna Margarethe H. Ong	Regular	PRO I	02/03/90 - 05/31/90
5. Rolando R. Reyrata	Regular	Chauffer	02/01/90 - present
6. Arnaldo L. Mateo	Regular	Messenger	03/15/90 - 04/30/90
X. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES			
1. Teodoro A. Velasco	Detailed	Admin. Director	12/16/89 - 01/31/90
	(OPS)		
	Regular	Admin. Director	02/01/90 - present
2. Miguel Varquez, Jr.	Detailed	Administrative Officer	12/14/89 - present
		Auditor	02/01/90 - present
3. Amado Estrada, Jr.	Detailed	(Commission on Audit)	
4. Juan S. Sy Egco, Jr.	Regular	Budget Officer	01/22/90 - present
5. Atanacio L. Custodio	Regular	Supply Officer	02/05/90 - present
6. Cristito G. Abella	Regular	Clerk IV	01/23/90 - 05/29/90
7. Melody B. Casamina	Regular	Clerk IV	02/16/90 - present
8. Rowena C. Jaymalin	Regular	Clerk IV	06/18/90 - present
9. Cecilia E. Ricana	Regular	Clerk IV	02/01/90 - 08/15/90
10. Azila K. Ortiz	Regular	Secretary	02/01/90 - 05/31/90
11. Joaquina C. Panerio	Regular	Secretary	08/15/90 - present
12. Severino F. Magsadia	Regular	Repro.Mach. Oper.	02/08/90 - present
13. Rodolfo G. Dictado	Regular	Messenger	02/01/90 - present
14. Marites F. Festin	Regular	Messenger	03/16/90 - present
15. Wilson Y. Macarubbo	Regular	Chauffer	03/15/90 - present
16. Raymund A. Mapalad	Regular	Chauffer	02/01/90 - 03/06/90
17. Hernan Belarga	Detailed	Actg. Personnel Officer	01/12/90 - present
	(PSG)		
18. Cesar Sabino	Detailed	Actg. Asst. Records Officer	01/12/90 - present
	(PSG)		
19. Victoriano Asenci	Detailed	Security Officer	03/06/90 - 08/15/90
		(INP Makati Station)	
20. Hermie Funcion	Detailed	Security Officer	02/13/90 - 08/15/90
		(INP Makati Station)	
21. Victoriano Gumarin	Detailed	Security Officer	02/13/90 - 08/15/90
		(INP Makati Station)	

Republic of the Philippines
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metro Manila

Second Special Session

Held in Metro Manila on Wednesday, the third
day of January, nineteen hundred and ninety.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6832

AN ACT CREATING A COMMISSION TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH
FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILED COUP D' ETAT
OF DECEMBER 1989, RECOMMEND MEASURES TO PREVENT
THE OCCURRENCE OF SIMILAR ATTEMPTS AT A VIOLENT
SEIZURE OF POWER, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Creation, Objectives and Powers - There is hereby
created an independent Commission which shall investigate all the facts
and circumstances of the failed coup d' etat of December 1989, and
recommend measures to prevent similar attempts at a violent seizure of
power.

To attain these objectives, the Commission shall:

(a) Conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of the said coup d'
etat and the involvement therein of military personnel and civilian
personalities including public officials and employees, evaluate all the
facts and circumstances of the same, and submit its findings and
recommendations to the President, the Congress, and other appropriate
authorities not later than one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act;

(b) Receive, review and evaluate the evidence adduced and to this
end, summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or receive
evidence relevant to the investigation, and to issue subpoena ad
testificandum or subpoena duces tecum to produce documents, books,
records and other papers;

(c) Turn over to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities all evidence

APPENDIX E

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6832
CREATING THE FACT-FINDING
COMMISSION

(consisting of 5 pages)

involving any person when in the course of its investigation, the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that he appears to be liable for any criminal offense in connection with said coup d'etat;

(d) Ask the Monetary Board to disclose information on and/or to grant authority to examine any bank deposits, trust or investment funds, or banking transactions in the name of and/or utilized by a person, natural or juridical, under investigation by the Commission, in any bank or banking institution in the Philippines, when the Commission has reasonable ground to believe that said deposits, trust or investment funds, or banking transactions have been used in support or furtherance of the objectives of the said coup d'etat; and

(e) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the objectives of this Act.

SEC. 2. Bar Against Court Injunction; Exception, Supreme Court. - No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any restraining order or preliminary injunction on any matter involving the official acts of the Commission pursuant to this Act and of the Monetary Board under paragraph (d) of Section 1 hereof.

SEC. 3. Composition, Qualifications and Salary. - The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who shall be appointed by the President. The Chairman and members shall be citizens of the Philippines, at least thirty-five (35) years of age, and have an established reputation for integrity, honesty, probity and professional competence. They shall receive the same salary as the Chairman and members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions.

SEC. 4. Tenure and Turn Over of Records. - The Commission is hereby given one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act to attain the objectives set forth herein. Two (2) months after the lapse of said period, the Commission shall be functus officio, and shall turn over all its records, assets and properties to the Department of Justice.

SEC. 5. Orderly Conduct of Proceedings. - The Commission shall adopt rules and procedures for the orderly conduct of its investigation, proceedings and hearing, including the presentation of evidence. The rules of evidence under the Revised Rules of Court shall have suppletory application.

SEC. 6. Conduct of Hearings. - Proceedings and hearings of the

Commission, sitting en banc, shall be open to the public. The Commission may, motu proprio or upon request of the person testifying, hold an executive or closed-door hearing where matters of national security or public safety are involved or the personal safety of the witness warrants the holding of such executive or closed-door hearing. The Commission shall prescribe the rules to govern such executive or closed-door hearings.

Any person called to testify before the Commission shall have the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings.

SEC. 7. Right Against Self-Incrimination; Protection of Witness. - No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing documents, books, records, correspondence, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Commission on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture. After having invoked his right against self-incrimination, his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in any proceeding, except for perjury committed in so testifying.

The Commission shall protect any person called to testify by providing the necessary and reasonable security arrangements with the assistance and cooperation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other appropriate government agencies.

SEC. 8. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution. - The Commission is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by it where, upon its evaluation, such information or testimony is necessary and vital to the investigation. The immunity thereby granted shall continue to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the appropriate court when required to do so by the latter. Should he refuse to repeat such testimony, the immunity granted him shall cease.

SEC. 9. Direct or Indirect Contempt. - The Commission may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose appropriate penalties therefor.

A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the Commission as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect towards its officials, offensive personalities towards others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Commission and punished

with a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P 5,000.00) or imprisonment not exceeding thirty (30) days or both. The judgment of the Commission on direct contempt shall be final and not appealable.

Indirect contempt shall be dealt with by the Commission in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

SEC. 10. Personnel of the Commission. - The Chairman shall have the power to engage the services of such persons or personnel including a Commission Counsel, Deputy Commission Counsel(s) or such other officials as may be required for the effective performance of its functions and responsibilities, to fix their duties and compensation, to organize the structure and staffing pattern of the Commission; and to authorize the payment of honoraria and/or allowances for deputized officers and officials subject to the pertinent accounting and auditing rules and procedures. The persons appointed, designated, deputized or contracted by the Commission shall not be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

SEC. 11. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations; Publication of Rules and Reports. - The Commission shall have the power to promulgate its rules and regulations, enter into contracts, and perform any and all other acts necessary or incidental to the attainment of the objectives of this Act.

Commission rules and regulations shall be published in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect two (2) days after its publication. The final report to the President and to Congress shall be published.

SEC. 12. Role of Other Government Agencies. - The Commission may call upon any government investigative and prosecutorial agency, including the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police, to make available their offices, personnel and facilities to attain the objectives of this Act.

SEC. 13. Appropriations. - The sum of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) is hereby provided to the Commission, chargeable against the Contingent Fund. The said amount shall automatically be released to the Commission for disbursement by it in accordance with the auditing rules and regulations.

SEC. 14. Transfer of Records and Facilities to the Commission. The records, facilities, equipment, property, rights and such other things

incidental to the creation of the Presidential Commission under Administrative Order No. 146, Series of 1989, are hereby transferred to the Commission created by this Act: Provided, That, employees of the said Presidential Commission, particularly the rank and file, shall be absorbed by the Commission to the extent that it is administratively feasible.

SEC. 15. Applicable Law in Case of Conflict. - The provisions of this Act shall prevail over other laws, acts, executive orders, administrative orders, issuances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, or the Revised Rules of Court as regards the subject matter of this Act.

SEC. 16. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.

SEC. 17. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect two (2) days following its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved.

(SGD.) RAMON V. MITRA
Speaker of the House of
Representatives

(SGD.) JOVITO R. SALONGA
President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1391 and House Bill No. 27761 was finally passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives on January 3, 1990.

(SGD.) QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.
Secretary of the House of
Representatives

(SGD.) EDWIN P. ACOBA
Secretary of the Senate

Approved: January 5, 1990

(SGD.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines

ABOUT THE BOOK . . .

On 6 December 1989, or on the sixth day of the failed December coup, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 146 creating a Presidential Commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 rebellion and the involvement therein of military and civilian officials and private persons.

To compose the Presidential Commission were Hilario G. Davide, Jr., as chairman; Carolina G. Hernandez, Ricardo J. Romulo, Delfin L. Lazaro, and Msgr Leonardo Legaspi, as members. The first four took their oath of office on 7 December 1989. Msgr. Legaspi declined the appointment. In his place, President Aquino appointed Christian S. Monsod, who took his oath of office on 28 December 1989.

From the start, the Presidential Commission faced several constraints and issues. Its power were insufficient to enable it to satisfactorily perform its tasks. To resolve these issues, the President referred a bill to Congress investing the Commission with additional powers:

In its Special Session of 3 January 1990, Congress approved Republic Act No. 6832 entitled An Act Creating A Commission To Conduct A Thorough Fact-Finding Investigation Of The Failed Coup D'etat Of December 1989, Recommend Measures To Prevent The Occurence Of Similar Attempts At A Violent Seizure Of Power, And For Other Purposes.

The new Commission has since been known as the FACT-FINDING COMMISSION. President Aquino appointed to the new Commission the Chairman and the Members of the Presidential Commission who then took their oath of office on 12 January 1990.

This is the final report of that Commission.

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